Skip to main content
Log in

Moore's Paradox and the Structure of Conscious Belief

  • Published:
Erkenntnis Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Propositions such as <It is raining, but I do not believe that it is raining> are paradoxical, in that even though they can be true, they cannot be truly asserted or believed. This is Moore's paradox. Sydney Shoemaker has recently argued that the paradox arises from a constitutive relation that holds between first- and second-order beliefs. This paper explores this approach to the paradox. Although Shoemaker's own account of the paradox is rejected, a different account along similar lines is endorsed. At the core of the endorsed account is the claim that conscious beliefs are always partly about themselves; it will be shown to follow from this that conscious beliefs in Moorean propositions are self-contradictory.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

REFERENCES

  • Aristotle: 1907, De Anima, (trans. R. D. Hicks), Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baldwin, T.: 1990, G. E. Moore, Routledge, London and New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brentano, F.: 1874, in O. Kraus (ed.), Psychology from Empirical Standpoint, ed. Of English edition L. L. McAlister (trans. A. C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell, and L. L. McAlister), London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brook, A.: 1994, Kant and the Mind,Cambridge UP, Cambridge and New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Byrne, D.: 1997, 'Some Like It HOT: Consciousness and Higher Order Thoughts', Philosophical Studies 86, 103–129.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carruthers, P.: 1989, 'Brute Experience', Journal of Philosophy 85, 258–269.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carruthers, P.: 1996, Language, Thought, and Consciousness, Cambridge UP, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Castañ eda, H.-N.: 1966 'He': A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness', Ratio 8, 130–157.

    Google Scholar 

  • Castañ eda, H.-N.: 1969, 'On the Phenomeno-Logic of the I', reprinted in Q. Cassam (ed.), Self-Knowledge, Oxford UP, Oxford 1994.

    Google Scholar 

  • Caston, V.: 2002, 'Aristotle on Consciousness', Mind 111, 751–815.

    Google Scholar 

  • de Almeida, C.: 2001, 'What Moore's Paradox is About', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62, 33–58.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. C.: 1969, Consciousness and Content, Routledge, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. C.: 1991, Consciousness Explained, MIT Press/Bradford Books, Cambridge MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dretske, F. I.: 1993, 'Conscious Experience', Mind 102, 263–283.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gillies, A. S.: 2001, 'A New Solution to Moore's Paradox', Philosophical Studies 105, 237–250.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goldman, A.: 1993, 'Consciousness, Folk Psychology, and Cognitive Science', Consciousness and Cognition 2, 364–383.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heal, J.: 1994, 'Moore's Paradox: A Wittgensteinian Approach', in Mind 103, 5–24.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hintikka, J.: 1962, Knowledge and Belief, Cornell UP, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hossack, K.: 2002, 'Self-Knowledge and Consciousness', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102, pp. 163–181.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kriegel, U.: 2003a, 'Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33, 103–132.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kriegel, U.: 2003b, 'Consciousness, Higher-Order Content, and the Individuation of Vehicles', in Synthese 134, pp. 477–504.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kriegel, U.: 'Naturalizing Subjective Character', forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

  • Larkin, W. S.: 1999, 'Shoemaker on Moore's Paradox and Self-Knowledge', Philosophical Studies 96, 239–252.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lycan, W. G.: 2001, 'A Simple Argument for a Higher-Order Representation Theory of Consciousness', Analysis 61, 3–4.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mellor, D. H.: 1978, 'Conscious Belief', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78, 87–101.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moore, G. E.: 1942, 'A Reply to My Critics', in P. A. Schlipp (ed.), The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, Tudor Publishing Company, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Perry, J.: 1979, 'The Problem of the Essential Indexical', Nous 13, 3–21.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. V. O.: 1960, Word and Object, Harvard UP, Cambridge MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosenthal, D. M.: 1986, 'Two Concept of Consciousness', Philosophical Studies 94, 329–359.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosenthal, D. M.: 1990, 'A Theory of Consciousness', ZiF Technical Report 40, Bielfield, Germany, reprinted in N. J. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, MIT/Bradford, Cambridge MAS: 1997.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosenthal, D. M.: 1995a, 'Moore's Paradox and Consciousness', Philosophical Perspectives, 9: 313–333.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosenthal, D. M.: 1995b, 'Self-Knowledge and Moore's Paradox', Philosophical Studies 77, 195–209.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosenthal, D. M.: 1990b, 'Why Are Verbally Expressed Thoughts Conscious?', Technical Report 32.

  • Shoemaker, S.: 1988, 'On Knowing One's Own Mind', Philosophical Perspectives 2, 183–209.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shoemaker, S.: 1995, 'Moore's Paradox and Self-Knowledge', Philosophical Studies 77, 211–228.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, D. W.: 1986, 'The Structure of (Self-)Consciousness', Topoi 5, 149–156.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, D. W.: 1989, The Circle of Acquaintance, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sturma, D.: 1995, 'Self-Consciousness and the Philosophy of Mind: A Kantian Reconsideration', in Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, vol. 1, Marquette UP, Milwaukee WI.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thomasson, A. L.: 2000, 'After Brentano: A One-Level Theory of Consciousness', European Journal of Philosophy 8, 190–209.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Williams, J. N.: 1979, 'Moore's Paradox-One or Two?', in Analysis 39, 141–142.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williams, J. N.: 1981, 'Inconsistency and Contradiction', Mind 90, 600–602.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williams, J. N. 1994, 'Moorean Absurdity and the Intentional 'Structure' of Assertion', Analysis 54, 160–166.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williams, J. N.: 1996, 'Moorean Absurdities and the Nature of Assertion', in Australian Journal of Philosophy 74, 135–149.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williams, J. N.: 1998, 'Wittgensteinian Accounts of Moorean Absurdity', Philosophical Studies 92, 283–306.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wittgenstein, L.: 1953, Philosophical Investigations (trans. G. E. M. Anscombe), McMillan, New York.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Kriegel, U. Moore's Paradox and the Structure of Conscious Belief. Erkenntnis 61, 99–121 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:ERKE.0000037548.06150.b6

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:ERKE.0000037548.06150.b6

Keywords

Navigation