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Notes
I discuss this and other construals of “phenomenal intentionality” in Kriegel (2011), Ch.1.
For some key texts in this burgeoning research program, see Loar (1987, 2003), McGinn (1988), Searle (1990, 1992), Strawson (1994, 2008), Horst (1996), Siewert (1998), Horgan and Tienson (2002), Kriegel (2003, 2011), Georgalis (2006), and Bourget (2010). I attempt to summarize the main strands in the research program in Kriegel forthcoming.
If so, phenomenal intentionality’s distinctiveness is acute as can be and its basicness important as can be. Hence “limit case”!
The co-extension of mentality, intentionality, and consciousness guarantees not only that all intentional states are conscious, but also that all mental states are consciously intentional, including nonperceptual, purely intellectual states, such as thoughts, judgments, suppositions, etc. These would be forms of what Anglo-American philosophers call “cognitive phenomenology.”
Chisholm was so impressed by Brentano as a philosopher that he translated a number of his works into English.
The reason for this is unclear to me, but my sense is that if we treat Twardowski’s account as targeting specifically phenomenal intentionality—which we must, since he recognized no other—the account would come across as much more compelling.
Brentano’s best-known student overall would have to be Freud. The exact relationship between the two is unclear, but in a 1932 letter to Theodore Gomperz, Freud asserts unequivocally that he was a student of Brentano’s (see Merlan 1945).
It is in Freiburg that Husserl met who was his assistant from 1919 to 1923.
There are of course exceptions to this rule, such as in the work of Jean-Toussaint Desanti (1914–2002)—see Desanti (1963).
It is a legitimate question which work does the better job of giving a compact sense of the entire enterprise, Levinas’ thesis or Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations—whose first translation into French is actually by Levinas himself (together with Gabrielle Peiffer).
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Kriegel, U. Phenomenal intentionality past and present: introductory. Phenom Cogn Sci 12, 437–444 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-013-9308-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-013-9308-0