Social Freedom: The Responsibility View

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Cambridge University Press, May 30, 1996 - Philosophy - 221 pages
When is it correct to say that a person's freedom is restricted? Can poverty constrain freedom? Can you constrain your own freedom, for instance through weakness of the will or self-deception, and are you not truly free unless you act on a rational choice? Kristjan Kristjansson offers a critical analysis of the main components of a theory of negative liberty: the nature of obstacles and constraints, the weight of obstacles, and the relation of freedom to power and autonomy. Through this discussion, which examines much of the contemporary work on political freedom, he develops his own theory of negative liberty, the so-called 'responsibility view', which meets many of the goals of advocates of positive liberty while retaining its distinctive 'negative' nature. He also argues for, and implements, a method of naturalistic revision as a way of solving conceptual disputes in social philosophy.

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About the author (1996)

Kristján Kristjánsson received his PhD from the University of St Andrews, Scotland. He has taught at the University of Akureyri, Iceland, the University of Iceland and the University of Birmingham, UK, where he is currently Professor of Character Education and Virtue Ethics. He has been a Visiting Fellow at Cornell University, the University of Konstanz, St Edmund's College, Cambridge, and the Institute of Education, University of London. He has written six books in English and three in Icelandic. His latest book is Virtues and Vices in Positive Psychology (Cambridge University Press, 2013). He has published numerous articles on topics in education, moral philosophy, and emotion theory in international journals. He is a member of the International Society for Study of the Emotions, and is on the editorial board of the Journal of Moral Education.

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