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The making of US monetary policy: Central bank transparency and the neoliberal dilemma

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Abstract

This article explores the implications of the Federal Reserve’s shift to transparency for recent debates about neoliberalism and neoliberal policymaking. I argue that the evolution of US monetary policy represents a specific instance of what I term the “neoliberal dilemma.” In the context of generally deteriorating economic conditions, policymakers are anxious to escape responsibility for economic outcomes, and yet markets require regulation to function in capitalist economies (Polanyi 2001). How policymakers negotiate these contradictory imperatives involves a continual process of institutional innovation in which functions are transferred to markets, but under the close control of the state. Thus, under transparency, Federal Reserve officials discovered innovations in the policy process that enabled “markets to do the Fed’s work for it.” These innovations enlisted market mechanisms, but did not represent a retreat from the state’s active role in managing the economy.

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Notes

  1. The FOMC is the policymaking arm of the Federal Reserve System. It consists of the seven Governors of the Federal Reserve Board who are permanent members, four rotating Presidents of the twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks, and the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, who is considered a permanent member.

  2. Greenspan testimony, House Banking Committee, October 25, 1989.

  3. As I discuss in the following analysis, the Federal Reserve did come under significant Congressional pressure to be more open in its operating procedures in the early 1990s. However, a close study of the Federal Reserve transcripts reveals that this pressure was not what precipitated the immediate disclosure of the Federal Reserve’s interest rate target. Moreover, in pursuing transparency the Federal Reserve has exceeded Congressional demands – and continues to advance along this path long after the issue has fallen off the Congressional agenda.

  4. Significantly, an earlier era of globalization and liberal economic management in the late nineteenth century was associated with a disenfranchised working class; as such, citizens were not able to hold governments accountable for economic policy failings (Eichengreen 1996). In contrast, as Pauly notes, the current conjecture is “beginning to look historically unprecedented” (1995: 372).

  5. Conversely, neoliberal policymakers continue to attempt to claim credit for positive economic outcomes, as under every economic policy regime. However, opportunities for policymakers to do so are relatively rare under neoliberalism as compared with more prosperous periods.

  6. For a recent, and important, exception to this statement, see Levy (2006).

  7. For exceptions to this statement, see Blyth (2002), Foucade-Gourinchas and Babb (2002), Hay (2001), Kjær and Pedersen (2001), and Schmidt (2002). However, these studies all pursue the problem of how or why neoliberal policies were adopted in different national contexts; they do not directly examine the nature of the reregulation of markets under neoliberalism – the problem considered here. It should be noted that both Dobbin (2004) and Snyder (2001) also discuss ideology in their accounts. However, Dobbin’s search for the roots of laissez faire in the nineteenth century leads him to treat ideology as an outcome of the institutional structures he describes; laissez faire is simply “read off” institutional practices. For Snyder, ideology is treated as a variable (defined in terms of the “populist” or “conservative” philosophy of political leaders) and invoked to explain patterns of reregulation where other factors – such as coalitions of social actors – cannot. In neither case, then, is neoliberal ideology considered in interaction with institutional practices, as it is in this article.

  8. Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb (2002) motivate their study of divergent paths to neoliberalism with a similar observation.

  9. The term “ideology” is subject to multiple usages in the social science literature, warranting some clarification here. In the following analysis, I do not use the term to refer to the beliefs or worldviews of neoliberal policymakers (such as their adherence to a particular political philosophy), as is common in discussions of neoliberalism. Rather, following the more Polanyian interpretation of Somers and Block (2005), I use the expression “neoliberalism as ideology” to refer to the ideational embeddedness of the economy in the notion of the self-regulating market. More concretely, I refer to the attempts of neoliberal policymakers to present state activities in the naturalistic guise of the market.

  10. Neoliberalism is often associated with the increased prominence of monetary policy as a domain of economic policy (Campbell and Pedersen 2001; Carruthers et al. 2001; Peck and Tickell 2002). The growing influence of monetarist doctrines has been of special interest in this regard (Blyth 2002; Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002; Hall 1992; Prasad 2006), and studies of central banking and financial markets more generally have provided critical case studies in developing knowledge of neoliberalism (e.g., Helleiner 1994; Maxfield 1997; McNamara 1999; Pauly 1998).

  11. The following discussion draws on Clouse (1994), Edwards (1997), Feinman (1993), Goodfriend and Whepley (1987), and Meulendyke (1998).

  12. Interview, July 8, 2002.

  13. Conventionally, the way economists relate the short-term rate that the Federal Reserve controls to the long-term interest rates that matter for the economy is through the “expectations theory of the term structure” (Blinder 1998). Suppose a firm is undertaking a project that is expected to return the initial investment over a period of one year. The firm can finance the investment by issuing a one-year bond, at whatever the going rate, or by taking out and renewing a loan with a one-day maturity 365 times in a row. This potential for arbitrage between short- and long-term rates requires that they move together, such that through setting a short-term rate, monetary policy should be able to control longer-term rates. The problem with this theory is that while it is infallible theoretically, its empirical performance leaves something to be desired. In short, economists do not have a good understanding of the mechanism through which monetary policy affects long-term interest rates. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that monetary policy is reasonably effective in moderating economic fluctuations, whatever the precise mechanism.

  14. More accurately, all depository institutions – including commercial banks, savings banks, thrift institutions, and credit unions – are subject to reserve requirements (Feinman 1993). For ease of exposition, I refer here and in what follows only to banks, but this should be understood as shorthand for all depository institutions.

  15. It should be noted, however, that open market operations are not the only factor shaping the market for bank reserves. Other developments, such as seasonal fluctuations in the demand for currency and the financing needs of the US Treasury, change the pressure on reserves (Meulendyke 1998). In this sense, the rate “set” by the Federal Reserve through open market operations should be understood as a target; the actual rate varies around this target depending on other factors. The degree to which these other factors are offset through open market operations – and consequently how much the federal funds rate is allowed to fluctuate around its target – is the key operational decision made by the Trading Desk on a day-to-day basis.

  16. The Federal Reserve changes reserve requirements only infrequently to set broad parameters for monetary policy, relying on open market operations on a day-to-day basis to achieve policy objectives.

  17. In addition, banks are wary of excessive reliance on the discount window because overuse may invite increased supervision by bank regulators.

  18. As discussed below, this association weakened in the 1980s, with important consequences for policymakers (Meulendyke 1998).

  19. Banks do not earn any interest on reserves and so have an incentive to loan any amount held in excess of reserve requirements plus any additional amount needed for clearing purposes.

  20. See also Abolafia’s (2004, 2005) use of the related notions of “sensemaking” and “framing” to analyze policymaking at the Federal Reserve.

  21. This is ironic, since Hall (1993) elaborated the concept in theorizing the transition to monetarism under Thatcher. Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb (2002) represent an important exception to this observation.

  22. There is a venerable academic literature in support of this position, stemming from Kydland and Prescott’s (1977) argument that central bankers deliberately create inflation in order to “trick” economic agents – who mistake rising prices for increased demand – into producing more output. While the notion that central bankers purposely engineer inflation strains credibility in the contemporary context (Blinder 1998), the underlying idea that policy moves must be unanticipated to be effective has been an influential one in the central banking literature. See Cukierman and Melzer (1986) for an important statement of this more general view.

  23. See the discussion below of the “Volcker Shock” for support of this proposition.

  24. Interview, July 15, 2002.

  25. FOMC transcripts, February 2-3, 1981, 31.

  26. Interview, July 24, 2002.

  27. FOMC transcripts, October 6, 1979, 4-28.

  28. FOMC transcripts, October 6, 1979, 8.

  29. In the following narrative, all references to “Governor” refer to the governors of the Federal Reserve Board. Similarly, with the exception of references to President Carter and President Reagan, “President” refers to one of the presidents of the regional Federal Reserve Banks.

  30. FOMC transcripts, October 6, 1979, 19.

  31. FOMC transcripts, February 2-3, 1981, 1.

  32. FOMC transcripts, September 18, 1979, 13; see also FOMC transcript, October 4, 1979-Memorandum.

  33. President Carter’s credit control program added a strange twist to the implementation of monetary targeting in 1980. Carter wanted to signal the shared sacrifice that fighting inflation would entail and asked the Federal Reserve to impose restrictions on consumer credit. Volcker opposed the controls and purposely designed them to be weak – large ticket items, such as auto financing and installment credit, were exempted. Nevertheless, Carter’s plea to the American people resonated deeply; borrowing came abruptly to a halt, producing a sharp – if short – recession.

  34. FOMC transcripts, April 22, 1980, 10-22.

  35. FOMC transcripts, September 16, 1980, 24.

  36. FOMC transcripts, October 21, 1980, 16.

  37. FOMC transcripts, February 2-3, 1981, 3. Throughout the transcripts, there are numerous references to the “political cover” provided by money supply targeting. See, for example, FOMC transcripts, June 30-July 1, 1982, 56; FOMC transcripts, December 20-21, 1982, 35; FOMC transcripts, February 8-9, 1983, 21-32; FOMC transcripts, March 28-29, 1983, 42-43; FOMC transcripts, December 16-17, 1985,. 9; FOMC transcripts, December 15-16, 1989, 20.

  38. Indeed, the fact that there was already a constituency for the policy in Congress had been part of Volcker’s gambit in adopting money supply targeting. See FOMC transcripts, October 6, 1979, 8.

  39. For a sociological analysis of the difficulty of defining money in the context of financial innovation in the early 1980s, see Baker (1987).

  40. The most serious of these was the Mexican debt default in August 1982, but the resolve of the Committee was also tested by the failure of a series of domestic financial institutions, including Drysdale Securities in May 1982 and the Penn Square Bank in July 1982. See transcripts from that year of FOMC meetings and conference calls held on May 18, May 20, June 30-July 1, and August 24.

  41. Interview, July 15, 2002.

  42. FOMC transcripts, June 30-July 1, 1982, 44-58; August 24, 1982, 44-45.

  43. FOMC transcripts, June 30-July 1, 1982, 89.

  44. FOMC transcripts, July 12-13, 1982, 55.

  45. Wallich (1984: 22).

  46. FOMC transcripts, February 8-9, 1983, 89.

  47. FOMC transcripts, March 26-27, 1984, 70-1.

  48. M2 is defined as M1 plus time deposits and money market mutual funds; M3 consists of M2 plus large denomination financial instruments, such as “jumbo” certificates of deposit.

  49. The band around the federal funds rate target was usually four-percentage-points wide. The results of such consultations, when they occurred, was typically to refrain from any adjustment in policy, particularly if the federal funds rate overshot the high end of the band. This was largely because the Committee was eager to demonstrate to the market that it was not targeting interest rates (FOMC transcripts, May 6, 1981-Conference Call), but the asymmetry was noted bitterly by liberal Committee members such as Governor Nancy Teeters (FOMC transcripts November 17, 1981, 24).

  50. FOMC transcripts, June 30-July 1, 1982, 56.

  51. FOMC transcripts, March 28-29, 1983, 42.

  52. FOMC transcripts, March 28-49, 1983, 42-3; August 22-23, 1983, 22-4; March 26, 1985, 33; May 19, 1987, 44; July 7, 1987, 6-14.

  53. FOMC transcripts, March 31, 1987, 42.

  54. FOMC transcripts, November 22, 1988, Appendix-Kohn Statement.

  55. FOMC transcripts, March 28, 1988, Appendix-Kohn Statement.

  56. FOMC transcripts, July 7, 1987, 14.

  57. FOMC transcripts, March 28, 1988, 12.

  58. FOMC transcripts, December 13-14, 1988, 9.

  59. FOMC transcripts, August 21, 1984, 33.

  60. FOMC transcripts, August 21, 1984, 25.

  61. FOMC transcripts, December 13-14, 1988, 9.

  62. FOMC transcripts, November 3, 1987, Appendix-Kohn Statement.

  63. FOMC transcripts, December 15-16, 1987, 2-16.

  64. Meyer (1997: 3).

  65. FOMC transcripts, August 16, 1988, 36.

  66. FOMC transcripts, March 29, 1988, Appendix-Kohn Statement.

  67. FOMC transcripts, July 7, 1987, 6.

  68. FOMC transcripts, December 13-14, 1988, Appendix-Kohn Statement.

  69. FOMC transcripts, March 29, 1988, Appendix-Kohn Statement.

  70. FOMC transcripts, March 29, 1988, 30.

  71. FOMC transcripts, November 14, 1989, Appendix-Sternlight Statement.

  72. FOMC transcripts, December 15-16, 1987, Appendix-Kohn Statement.

  73. FOMC transcripts, December 18-19, 1989, 91.

  74. More broadly, the rational expectations “revolution” in macro-economics provides the intellectual context for discussions of credibility. The central tenet of rational expectations theory is that economic actors factor expectations about future policy actions into their behavior today. See Lucas (1972), Muth (1961), and Sargent and Wallace (1975) for seminal contributions to this literature.

  75. FOMC transcripts, December 18-19, 1989, Appendix-Stockman, Silfman, and Hooper Statement; FOMC transcripts, July 2-3, 1990, Appendix-Prell Statement.

  76. FOMC transcripts, September 7, 1990-Conference Call; FOMC transcripts, October 30, 1991-Conference Call; FOMC transcripts, June 30-July 1, 1992, 42; FOMC transcripts, November 16, 1993, 69; FOMC transcripts, December 21, 1993, 20, 32-33.

  77. FOMC transcripts, December 21, 1993, 37.

  78. FOMC transcripts, December 18-19, 1989, 43.

  79. FOMC transcripts, November 17, 1992, Appendix-Kohn Statement.

  80. FOMC transcripts, October 15, 1993-Conference Call.

  81. In an earlier era, taping of the meetings – then used to prepare what were called “Memoranda of Discussion,” elaborate summaries of what transpired in meetings closer in purpose to verbatim transcripts than to what are now released as minutes – had been public knowledge, but the practice of retaining these tapes was apparently discontinued by Chairman Arthur Burns when the Freedom of Information Act was passed in the mid-1970s. During this period, the Chairman and top staff were aware of the tapes, even if Committee members were not. Stephen Axilrod, Secretary of the FOMC for many years, noted: “We did not stop keeping the tapes of the meetings. We had the tapes all the way back. I asked every incoming Chairman after I became Secretary – I asked Paul [Volcker], and I asked [G. William] Miller – ‘You want to destroy the tapes?’ ‘I’m not going to destroy these tapes.’ ” (Interview, July 15, 2002).

  82. FOMC transcripts, October 5, 1993-Conference Call; October 15, 1993-Conference Call; October 22, 1993-Conference Call.

  83. FOMC transcripts, December 14, 1992-Conference Call.

  84. FOMC transcripts, July 6-7, 1993, 78.

  85. FOMC transcripts, November 16, 1993, 1-63.

  86. FOMC transcripts, July 6-7, 1993, 83.

  87. FOMC transcripts, November 17, 1992, 54-60.

  88. FOMC transcripts, December 21, 1993, 26.

  89. FOMC transcripts, August 17, 1993, 34.

  90. FOMC transcripts, July 6-7, 1993, 78.

  91. The full Directive, with the statement of the policy “bias,” was not released.

  92. FOMC transcripts, February 3-4, 1994, 30.

  93. FOMC transcripts, February 2-3, 1993, 69.

  94. FOMC transcripts, November 17, 1992, 58.

  95. FOMC transcripts, February 3-4, 1994, 33.

  96. The text of the statement read: “Chairman Greenspan announced today that the Federal Open Market Committee decided to increase slightly the degree of pressure on reserve positions. The action is expected to be consistent with a small increase in money market rates. The decision was taken to move toward a less accommodative stance in monetary policy in order to sustain and enhance the economic expansion. Chairman Greenspan decided to announce the action immediately so as to avoid any misunderstanding of the Committee’s purposes given the fact that this is the first firming of reserve conditions by the Committee since early 1989.” FOMC transcripts, February 3-4, 1994, 59.

  97. FOMC transcripts, February 28, 1994-Conference Call.

  98. FOMC transcripts, March 22, 1994, Appendix-Kohn Statement.

  99. FOMC transcripts, August 20, 1991, Appendix-Lindsey Statement; italics added.

  100. Volcker (2002: 10).

  101. FOMC transcripts, July 1-2, 1997, 78-81.

  102. FOMC transcripts, June 29-30, 1999, 92.

  103. FOMC transcripts, February 4, 1994, 32.

  104. The notion of an “automatic stabilizer” is typically used to refer to the process by which tax revenues fall during a recession and rise during an expansion, stimulating and contracting economic activity respectively, without requiring legislation or in fact any action on the part of policymakers.

  105. FOMC transcripts, March 22, 1994, 43-44.

  106. Between 1983 and the present, the Federal Reserve has made policy adjustments between meetings on 98 occasions. Of these intermeeting moves, 96 occurred before the change in disclosure policy in 1994. Subsequent to its change in disclosure practices, the Federal Reserve has made intermeeting policy adjustments only on two occasions (Thornton and Wheelock 2000: 8).

  107. FOMC transcripts, August 16, 1994, Appendix-Kohn Statement; FOMC transcripts, August 16, 1994, 32-34; FOMC transcripts, January 31-February 1, 1995, 6; FOMC transcripts, August 20, 1996, Appendix-Kohn Statement; FOMC transcripts, August 20, 1996, 40; FOMC transcripts, March 25, 1997, Appendix-Kohn Statement; FOMC transcripts, November 17, 1998, 93, 99.

  108. See Taylor (2001) for a clean economic model explaining this phenomenon. Essentially, the intuition is the following: If a bank expects that the Federal Reserve will lower its target for the federal funds rate tomorrow, it will delay purchases of federal funds today in anticipation of the lower rate. This has the effect of immediately reducing the demand for federal funds and depressing the rate (i.e., before the Trading Desk has actually conducted any open market operations) (Meulendyke 1998: 180).

  109. Although recent, this literature is voluminous. Representative works are: Blinder et al. (2001), Broaddus (2001), Freedman (2002), Friedman (2002), Guthrie and Wright (2000), Kohn and Sack (2003), Lange et al. (2001), Poole and Rasche (2000), Poole et al. (2002), Sellon (2002), and Woodford (2002).

  110. FOMC transcripts, January 30-31, 1996, Appendix-Kohn Statement.

  111. FOMC transcripts, July 5-6, 1995, Appendix-Simpson Statement; emphasis added.

  112. FOMC transcripts, July 5-6, 1995, 8; emphasis added.

  113. FOMC transcripts, July 5-6, 1995, 11.

  114. FOMC transcripts, May 21, 1996, 16.

  115. FOMC transcripts, May 21, 1996, 17.

  116. FOMC transcripts, November 12, 1997, 54; FOMC transcripts, December 16, 1997, 29-30.

  117. FOMC transcripts, November 12, 1997, 54.

  118. FOMC transcripts, November 12, 1997, 76; emphasis added.

  119. FOMC transcripts, December 13-14, 1988, 9.

  120. FOMC transcripts, August 16, 1988, Appendix-Kohn Statement; FOMC transcripts, August 16, 1988, 33-37; FOMC transcripts, February 7-8, 1989, Appendix-Kohn Statement; FOMC transcripts, December 13-14, 1988, 13.

  121. FOMC transcripts, November 16, 1999, 62-73; FOMC transcripts, December 21, 1999, 59-80.

  122. Friedman is referring specifically to inflation targeting, although his comment applies equally well to transparency in the sense that we have been discussing it in this article. Inflation targeting is the practice of establishing an explicit target for inflation (typically zero, one, or two percent). Transparency is often treated as synonymous with inflation targeting, but in the US context, transparency does not encompass an explicit target for inflation. The Federal Reserve’s failure to adopt inflation targeting reflects its unique legal mandate to pursue both price stability and full employment. Specific historical legacies of the “Volcker Shock” are likely relevant here, as well.

  123. Janet Yellen, former member of President Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers, discussed Rubin’s position at length (Interview, June 10, 2002).

  124. According to Douglas Cliggott, an analyst for J.P. Morgan Chase, this view was widely shared on Wall Street during the 1990s (Interview, July 11, 2002). Bert Ely, a well-known financial consultant, led nothing short of a public campaign in the news media to discredit the Federal Reserve, reproducing many of Rubin’s arguments in opinion pieces published in the Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, the Economist magazine, and similar periodicals. His writings on the subject are reproduced on his website (http://www.ely-co.com).

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Acknowledgments

I gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Giovanni Arrighi, Sarah Babb, Fred Block, Rogers Brubaker, Nitsan Chorev, Jane Collins, Michael Mann, Jamie Peck, William Roy, Margaret Somers, Mark Suchman, Erik Wright, and three anonymous reviewers for Theory and Society, all of whom commented on earlier versions of this paper. In addition, I wish to thank the following individuals who agreed to be interviewed for this research: Stephen Axilrod, Alan Blinder, Douglas Cliggott, Jane D’Arista, Benjamin Friedman, Donald Kohn, Alice Rivlin, Charles Schultze, and Janet Yellen. Finally, I benefited from the contributions of audiences at the University of California-Berkeley, UCLA, Cornell University, the University of Michigan, Northwestern University, and the 2005 Meeting of the American Sociological Association. This research was supported by the National Science Foundation (Grant #: SES-0117048).

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  1. Department of Sociology, University of Michigan, 4146 LSA Building, 500 S. State Street, Ann Arbor, MI, 48109-1382, USA

    Greta R. Krippner

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Appendices

Appendix A

Four monetary policy regimes, 1979–1999

Period

Technical Procedure

Implementation of Policy

Reason Abandoned

1979–1982

Nonborrowed Reserves Targeting (Monetarism)

The money supply is held constant; interest rates fluctuate in order to achieve the desired degree of ease or restraint in the economy. In theory, the two levers are equivalent because it is possible to affect the price of credit by controlling it directly (setting interest rates) or indirectly (controlling the money supply).

In practice, as a result of financial innovation, the relationship of the money supply to interest rates became erratic in the early 1980s producing unacceptable levels of volatility in the US economy.

1982–1987

Borrowed Reserves Targeting

Interest rates are stabilized; the money supply is allowed to fluctuate in order to achieve the desired degree of restraint or ease. But rather than targeting the federal funds rate directly, a proxy for the federal funds rate (borrowing at the discount window) is targeted. The resulting fluctuation in interest rates produces a “market-like” effect.

Allowing fluctuation in the federal funds rate disguises policymakers’ role in setting interest rates, but it also confuses the market. A number of episodes during which policy intentions were misinterpreted by the market convinced policymakers that disguising their role in setting interest rates was not viable.

1987–1994

Experimentation

Interest rates are stabilized; the money supply is allowed to fluctuate. In setting interest rates, policymakers vacillate between borrowed reserves targeting and directly targeting a specific level of the federal funds rate.

Growing size and sensitivity of financial markets makes borrowed reserves targeting increasingly untenable.

1994–1999

Federal Funds Rate Targeting (Transparency)

Interest rates are stabilized; the money supply is allowed to fluctuate. The federal funds rate is directly targeted within a narrow range. Interest rate objectives are announced, with the result the Federal Reserve actually conducts fewer operations in the market.

“Redundancy” of the Federal Reserve?

Appendix B

Interview subjects

The following is a list of individuals (and their positions) interviewed for the research presented in this paper. All interview subjects agreed to be identified by name.

1) Stephen Axilrod, Staff Director for Monetary and Financial Policy, Federal Reserve Board (1976–1986); Staff Director of Federal Open Market Committee (1978–1986); Secretary of Federal Open Market Committee (1979–1986). Interviewed in Lyme, Connecticut on July 15, 2002.

2) Alan Blinder, Professor of Economics at Princeton University (1971 – present); Vice-Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board (1994–1996); Member of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers (1993–1994). Interviewed in Princeton, NJ on July 8, 2002.

3) Douglas Cliggott, Hedge Fund Manager, Brummer and Partners (2001 – present); Equities Strategist for J.P. Morgan Chase (1995–2001). Interviewed in New York City on July 11, 2002.

4) Jane D’Arista, Director of Programs at the Financial Markets Center (1999 – present); Associate Director, Graduate Program in International Banking and Finance, Boston University School of Law (1986–1999); Finance Economist for the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance (1983–1986); Analyst for Congressional Budget Office (1978–1983); Economist for the House Banking Committee (1966–1983). Interviewed in Hadlyme, Connecticut on July 15 and 16, 2002.

5) Benjamin Friedman, Professor of Economics, Harvard University (1972 – present). Interviewed in Cambridge, MA, July 12, 2002.

6) Donald Kohn, Governor of the Federal Reserve Board (2002 – present); formerly Adviser to the Board for the Monetary Policy (1986–2002). Interviewed in Washington, D.C. on July 18, 2002.

7) Alice Rivlin, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution (1999 – present); Vice-Chair of the Federal Reserve Board (1996–1999). Interviewed in Washington, D.C., July 19, 2002.

8) Charles Schultze, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution (1981 – present); Chairman of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers (1977–1981). Interviewed in Washington, D.C., July 24, 2002.

9) Janet Yellen, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (2004 – present); Professor of Business Administration at the University of California-Berkeley (1980 – present); Chair of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers (1997–1999); Governor of the Federal Reserve Board (1994–1997). Interviewed in Berkeley, California, on June 10, 2002.

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Krippner, G.R. The making of US monetary policy: Central bank transparency and the neoliberal dilemma. Theor Soc 36, 477–513 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-007-9043-z

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