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A-Intensions and Communication

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Abstract

In his ‘Why We Need A-Intensions’, Frank Jackson argues that ”representational content [is] how things are represented to be by a sentence in the communicative role it possesses in virtue of what it means,’ a type of content Jackson takes to be broadly descriptive. I think Jackson overstates his case. Even if we agree that such representational properties play a crucial reference-fixing role, it is much harder to argue the case for a crucial communicative role. I articulate my doubts about Jackson's views on this point by contrasting them with the views of John Stuart Mill, usually regarded as an early believer in something like a direct reference account of content for names, but someone who, on my reading, teaches us a salutary lesson about the importance of separating the question of how reference is determined from the question of how we succeed in communicating.

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Kroon, F. A-Intensions and Communication. Philosophical Studies 118, 279–298 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHIL.0000019549.42753.04

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHIL.0000019549.42753.04

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