Abstract
Recent work on the relation between narrative and selfhood has emphasized embodiment as an indispensable foundation for selfhood. This has occasioned an interesting debate on the relation between embodiment and narrative. In this paper, I attempt to mediate the range of conflicting intuitions within the debate by proposing a scalar approach to narrative and an accompanying concept of a split-self (Waldenfels 2000). Drawing on theoretical developments from contemporary narratology, I argue that we need to move away from a binary understanding of narrative as something an entity (the self) strictly is or is not; rather, we need to see narrative as an attribute admitting of degrees. I suggest that the relation between narrative and embodiment should be seen along these lines, proposing three levels of the narrativity of embodied experiencing: 1) the unnarratable, 2) the narratable and 3) the narrative. Finally, I discuss the implications this framework has for the general question of the narrative constitution of selfhood.
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Notes
Waldenfels takes up this ambitious project in his book Das leibliche Selbst (Waldenfels 2000).
A proponent of narrative such as Anthony Rudd (2012) straightforwardly concedes to this (p. 199)
For a contemporary overview, see Baroni and Revaz (2016)
Though a contested topic in narratology, I believe that this definition will be in line with most of the intentions and foci of philosophical theories of narrative selfhood.
Ryan (2007) gives a lucid account of what she calls a “fuzzy-set definition” to help pinpoint this gradual transition.
’Das Unerzählbare wohnt der Erzählung inne, indem es diese zugleich übersteigt und sprengt’.
This problem has particularly been discussed in relation to Martin Heidegger’s philosophy: e.g. (Bertram 2013; Carman 2003; Fisher 2010). Waldenfels (2000) goes beyond this focus on narrative closure in this discussion in emphasizing the vast pre-history of selfhood: i.e. the dimensions of my becoming that remain beyond any recollection.
Interestingly, Gallagher (2005) describes the case of Ian Waterman who loses the functioning of his body schemes and is able to partially compensate through substituting a virtual body scheme rooted in a body image. This could indicate some overlap between narrativity and body schemes. However, as Gallagher repeatedly emphasizes, this substitution is only partial and has clear limitations. Arguably, this is due to the fact that the two modes of embodiment are fundamentally different in kind.
The following case example is taken from my own therapeutic practice as a narrative therapist. I use it merely as a basis for illustrating a theoretical point.
This point echoes Strawson (2004) claim of a deep individual variable between “episodics” and “diachronics”.
An approach to psychotherapy that specifically works within a narrative framework can be found in Michael White (2007).
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Acknowledgments
This research was supported by the Danish Counsel of Independent Research (DFF)
My thanks to Federico Pianzola and Thomas Schwarz Wentzer for their helpful comments in the process of writing this paper
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Køster, A. Narrative and embodiment – a scalar approach. Phenom Cogn Sci 16, 893–908 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-016-9485-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-016-9485-8