Realism/antirealism and EpistemologyChristopher B. Kulp This landmark collection of essays by six renowned philosophers explores the implications of the contentious realism/antirealism debate for epistemology. The essays examine issues such as whether epistemology needs to be realist, the bearing of a realist conception of truth on epistemology, and realism and antirealism in terms of a pragmatist conception of epistemic justification. Richard Rorty's essay provides a critical commentary on the other five. |
Contents
Does the Real World Exist? | 15 |
Realism and the Tasks of Epistemology | 53 |
Why the Theory of Knowledge Has to Be Realistic | 95 |
Copyright | |
4 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
accept alethic realism Alston answer antirealism antirealist argue argument believe that cigarettes believing-that-p Cambridge causal cause cancer Chisholm claim cognitive coherence conception of truth consider Davidson degrees of belief determine distinction Donald Davidson entities epis epistemic conception epistemic justification epistemic reason epistemology Everest evidence example exists independently experiences explain external realism fact false Gilbert Harman Ginet Harman Hilary Putnam human hypothesis ideal epistemic ideally justifiable indeterminacy indeterminacy of translation internalist interpretation intuitive language logical material objects ment naïve realism nonepistemic reasons normal understanding numbers ontological perception philosophers practical reasons pragmatism pragmatists presupposes presupposition propositional attitudes Putnam question Quine rational realism and antirealism realist conception relation relevant Richard Rorty Rorty Searle sense sentences skepticism sort statement subjective probability suppose T-schema temic Temporal Dutch Book theory of knowledge things tion true truth conditions truth value truth-conducivity University Press utterances verificationists W. V. Quine