

Information and
Existence

**Three Essays
and Appendices**

by Dan Kurth

(version: draft, 24.08.2013)

To the memory of my beloved mother

Den hebräischen Text aus Sefer_Yetzirah_Kaplan.pdf, (Seite 1 von 25 (1:1))
kopieren, und zwar 1) die ganze erste Zeile (Text, d.h. nach dem ersten
Doppelpunkt), dann ‘ ... ’ 2) dann ab inkl. dem vierten Wort der vorletzten Zeile
bis zum Schluß

Hier auf hebräisch: Sefer ha-Yetzirah

*With 32 mystical paths of Wisdom
engraved Yah*

...

Whose name is Holy -

...

*And He created His universe
with three books (Sepharim),
with text (Sepher)
with number (Sephar)
and with communication (Sippur).*

Sefer ha-Yetzirah*

Den hebräischen Text aus Sefer_Yetzirah_Kaplan.pdf, (z.B. Seite 2 oder 3,4 etc.
von 25 (1:2, 1:3 etc.) kopieren. Achtung: es handelt sich um die ersten 3 Worte der
Abschnitte

Hier auf hebräisch: Sefer ha-Yetzirah

* Sefer Yetzirah – The Book of Creation, (ed. Aryeh Kaplan), York Beach ME, Boston MA,
1997, p 5

Ten Sefirot of Nonexistence ...

Sefer ha-Yetzilah

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Preface

I've written the essays presented in this book in the years 2011 to xxxx. But I followed the main ideas, which led to the central statements in these essays, already since the late eighties of the last century. And since I've made the experience, that some philosophers somehow seem to be forced to think, what they think, and even more so, how they think, with a degree of freedom much smaller than they think, I probably could trace the earliest indications of such thinking back much further. Some steps in the development, which led to these essays, can be examined in the appendices.

Authors are no good commentators of their writings, and philosophers certainly are not the best interpreters of their works, but obviously many of them feel compelled to pretend it would be otherwise. A preface may be a good place to let one get away with such pretension.

Thus, looking for some labels, one could say, that in particular in the third essay concerning information monism, we will find an attempt of meinongifying Spinoza and also a bit vice versa. The main topic of this essay is clarifying the notion of substance in the context of information monism. This will also have the integration of some results of – in particular – the first essay into a comprehensive conceptual scheme as a consequence.

The second essay on 'Names and Objects' could go as an experiment of kryptonizing, pardon: kripenizing, Super Quine. Seen from another angle this could also go as clarifying the notion of essence in the theory of objects or, from again a further angle, as a radical ingression from the side of the theory of objects into conventional semantics.

The first essay, however, is ... de profundis, – what for once should be read as 'up from gunk'.

There I will try to overcome some seemingly unsurmountable difficulties in a literally 'fundamental' philosophy of everything. To attain that end some less philosophical considerations have also to be employed.

One of the mentioned unsurmountable difficulties, usually not dicussed in the repective physical theories, is, what I've called 'the paradox of reductionism' (see also appendix NN, TowTu), i.e. the paradox, that the reductionist program necessarily seems doomed to fail in its zenith, since it impossibly can ultimately terminate.

But then termination is that, what the reductionist program finally is all about. To accomplish its object some objectological measures had to be taken.

That mentioned ultimate failure of the reductionist program then also necessitates the consequence, that a purely scientific foundational explanation of everything is not possible. At least an additional philosophical assumption concerning the relations of a primordial substance to its only two attributes is indispensable. This then translates into the considerations of the third essay concerning 'information monism'.

In case some more labels are requested a condensed declaration might help: In the three essays presented in this book I will try to outline a strictly monist, nominalist, and – perhaps surprisingly – essentialist approach to such traditional philosophical questions as the theory of objects (including all of ontology as a minor part) and the theory of universals, yet I will sometimes do so with not so traditional means. Some collateral damage also will be caused in parts of the philosophy of language.

In all three essays some perhaps will find glimpses of a parousia of the ecstatic spirit of David Lewis. Although I don't share his materialist and his modal realist convictions, and disagree in most details of the answers he gave, I then, with the greatest sympathy, agree, on what the very questions are.

The essays and papers of this book have also been inspired by thoughts and ideas of Giordano Bruno, Baruch Spinoza, Alexius Meinong, Stanislaw Lesniewski, John Archibald Wheeler, Hugh Everett III, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Saul Kripke, and – of course – many others too.

My thanks go to Vera, for her patience with and loyalty to a far to often absent partner, and for much more.

Thanks also go to Anke, who bravely walks a fine line, Ayhan, who always will fight his way(s) through, Linda for being the most amiable Aztec priestess ever, and to Crissy, Alexander, Werner, Roland, and even Reinhard, and to all the other girls and guys in my favourite γυμνασιον, with whom I had much fun in the time, when I wrote the essays presented in this book.

Special thanks go to Vitalij, who steadily motivated me to do something to maintain my health, and helped a lot in that respect.

Frankfurt am Main, in Month of 20xx

Introduction

In the three essays, which make up the primary content of this book, I've tried – from different angles – to give some arguments for a new and radical version of neutral monism, which I've called 'information monism'.

The first essay is about the emergence of existence, which, in my view, necessitates first and foremost to consider the givenness of nonexistence, in particular the ways of being there of nonexistent objects, which once had been proposed by Alexius Meinong in his 'Theory of Objects'. Starting from these considerations the line of arguments then – quite distantly – follows some mathematical (in particular topos theoretical and mereotopological), logical (in particular mereological) and – rather speculative – ideas in physics (in particular related to 'pregeometry' as once proposed by John A. Wheeler).

In the course of these arguments it then turns out, that existence doesn't properly emerge, but that it becomes eventually effected or actualized at a particular level of mathematical structural stability or complexity attained in a 'sequence' of emergent nonexistent objects. I.e. although existence 'emerges'¹ at such a level of minimal structural stability, existence still isn't at all originated by the nonexistent objects (and their structures) at that level, but existence is an attribute immediate to substance.

Space and time then would become secondary modes, utterly relational in the sense of Leibniz², and supervenient on the primary effected existent objects

The second essay is about a theory of universals appropriate for that objectological³ position of information monism, and also some linguistic consequences of that.

¹ In the sense, that it becomes manifest.

² "Et hoc ... modo spatium fit ordo coexistentium phaenomenorum, ut tempus successivorum;" (Letter from Leibniz to des Bosses of June 16.1712, in: G.W.Leibniz, Die Philosophischen Schriften (ed. G.J.Gerhardt), Bd.II, p 450)

("In this way ... space becomes the order of the coexisting things as time becomes the order of the successively existing things;").

Since information monism doesn't allow for an ontological privilege of allegedly existing objects over nonexistent ones, some deep rooted referential claims as well as linguistic Platonistic overload will be questioned.

Language or logico-linguistic forms are not the matrix of ontology. "Language is a social art"⁴, a means of social interaction. In particular language in itself doesn't make a distinction between existing and nonexistent objects. Language doesn't ontologize. That is something *we* have to do and to endure (the consequences). But by the act of naming we create all the objects, some of which may turn out to exist even without us creating them. And by using names we claim the identity of the named, as an essence preceding existence. The nonexistent as well as the existent objects designated by their names then should have a purely intelligible way of their essential nature being there (or being given). I'll try to show, what that could mean.

I also try to show, that as a consequence of the 'Überwindung des Vorurteils zugunsten des Wirklichen'⁵, the entire scope of ontology becomes just a minor part of objectology, i.e. the theory of objects.⁶ 'Overcoming of the prejudice in favour of the actual' taken literally and seriously then – as any overcoming of any prejudice – yields at least a liberation. Yet due to the graveness of the fundamental prejudice of ontology, which here becomes questioned, objectology (or the theory of objects) necessitates nothing less than a liberation of metaphysics – or rather: a libertarian metaphysics⁷.

³ 'Objectological' here means 'in the way of the theory of objects', i.e. 'objectological' is meant to be the respective adjective or adverbial form of 'theory of objects' and – by this – would become an English equivalent of 'gegenstandstheoretisch'.

⁴ Willard van Orman Quine, *Word and Object*, Cambridge MA, 1960, p ix. This famous quote is the first sentence of the preface to 'Word and Object', at least that far I'm in consent.

⁵ Alexius Meinong, *Über Gegenstandstheorie*, in: Alexius Meinong, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol II, *Abhandlungen zur Erkenntnistheorie und Gegenstandstheorie*, Graz – Austria 1971, pp 481-530, p 485.

Meinong's famous phrase goes in English as: 'The overcoming of the prejudice in favour of the actual'.

⁶ Thus using the notion of 'objectology' instead of 'the theory of objects' has the immediate merit of clarifying its relation with the subject of 'ontology' – albeit at first in a rather general way. I.e. objectology fully comprehends the subjects of ontology as well as *mêontology*. The distinction of ontology and *mêontology* however is not identical with the distinction of existent and nonexistent objects, since traditional ontologies deal with a lot of nonexistent objects. Yet the unions of ontology and a reasonable *mêontology*, i.e. a *mêontology*, which doesn't claim to substantiate 'nothing(ness)', on the one hand and of existent objects and nonexistent objects on the other are – at least ultimately – perfectly coextensive.

⁷ Here the notion of 'metaphysics' is not confined to the topics and concepts of Aristotelian *Metaphysics*, and is – by its very Meinongian reason – in particular distinct from any ontology; (cf. the preceding footnote).

In the three essays of this book I will always treat nonexistent objects with an utmost nominalist rigour, in particular including mereological and mereotopological means. This may sometimes even lead to the impression of a naturalistic approach to nonexistent objects, which of course it isn't and it couldn't be.

Yet I will treat nonexistent objects not differently from existent objects, except for the only difference, that matters here, namely that the former are nonexistent and the latter existent. From this follow two – for the subsequent arguments – basic propositions

- 1) All objects are or have been either existent or nonexistent at the same time.

or equivalently

- 2) There is no object existent and nonexistent at the same time

and as further annotations

- 3) A formerly or actual existing object cannot have attributes presupposing, requiring or implying its nonexistence (e.g. its merely fictional existence)

or equivalently

- 3a) A formerly or actual existing object cannot truthfully be predicated by any attribute, that presupposes, requires or implies its nonexistence (e.g. its merely fictional existence)

and

- 3') A nonexistent object cannot have attributes presupposing, requiring or implying its former or actual existence

or equivalently

- 3'a) A nonexistent object cannot truthfully be predicated by any attribute, that presupposes, requires or implies its former or actual existence

Now there are some objects, which are at certain times actually existent and at other times no more, for the reason that they de cease or dissolve or vanish in any way.

These once actually existing objects, like for example Julius Caesar, Leonardo da Vinci et. al., won't ever become proper nonexistent objects, because they are still connected to all actually existing objects by potential spatio-temporal trajectories (or possible world lines), but they become 'not actually existing objects' or 'formerly existing objects' instead.

Being a 'not actually existing object' may not lead to semantic difficulties in the case of proper individuals designated by names.

Yet in the case of objects denoted by quasi-singular terms it seems to have led to (false or inadequate) denotations. One of the reasons for that could be the chimaeric nature of certain (quasi-)singular terms, namely these which are singular only by just being temporal or spatial particularisations of general terms. Another reason may be a violation of (3a). Sometimes both reasons may have played a role together.

Hier Russell 'on denoting' zitieren, Problem exponieren

4) The present King of France is bald.

A careful analysis of 4) shows, that 4) consists of a complex denotation

4p1) 'The present King of France'

and a predication

4p2) 'is bald'

related to that complex denotation. Both of these parts of 4), 4p1) and 4p2), are far more intricate than it seems at the first look.

4p1) 'The present King of France' is only the supposed denotation it is, as long as all its linguistic elements, i.e. words, come up properly together, since there have been many Kings of France and there could be more as well, but there only can be one 'present King of France' at one particular time. And here it also becomes obvious, that 'present' isn't an elementary determination within a complex denotation but rather a cover of a covert inexplicated part of that denotation, – and with respect to the question of nonexistent or existent objects, including existent and nonexistent Kings of France, a most significant part at top of that.

‘Present’ here is an inexplicit version of ‘actually existent’, since that is that, what ‘present’ means. Then 4p1) in the appropriate explicit version goes as

4p1*) ‘The actually existing King of France’.

But unfortunately ‘present’ isn’t the only linguistic element in

4p1) ‘The present King of France’,

which is severely inexplicit. The other is the only one left, namely ‘King of France’. Already for the reason, that today, btw. not other than in the year 1905, there doesn’t resp. didn’t exist an actual King of France, we shouldn’t take the occurrence of that titulus⁸ lightly. And since we made some effort to explicate ‘present’ as a covert version for ‘actually existing’ and then also took notice, that suspiciously there was no ‘actually existing King of France’ in 1905, when on the other hand there was so much denotative action directed to some ‘King of France’ then, it seems imperative for avoiding any further covert ambiguities to rigorously distinguish between two different sorts of Kings of France: formerly and actually existing Kings of France and not formerly and not actually existing Kings of France. The latter mentioned ‘not formerly and not actually existing Kings of France’ then just are nonexistent or fictional Kings of France. There are of course many of these fictional Kings of France. As an example may serve the Louis XIV of Alexandre Dumas’ ‘The Man in the Iron Mask’⁹ or of his ‘The Vicomte De Bragelonne’¹⁰. The Louis XIV of these novels is of course a purely fictional, i.e. nonexistent object, notwithstanding that this fictional King of France seemingly bears the same name and title as the formerly existing historical Louis XIV. The fictional Louis XIV also shares a lot of seemingly similar features with the historical one, but mercifully none of them was bald.

There are however not only the very many nonexistent Kings of France, which are just fictional versions of formerly or actually existing Kings of France¹¹, but even

⁸ The latin ‘titulus’ translates – somewhat indeterminate – as ‘heading’, ‘label’, ‘title’, ‘placard’, ‘pretext’, and as ‘distinction’, ‘honour’, ‘inscription’, and ‘reputation’.

⁹ Cf. Alexandre Dumas, *The Man in the Iron Mask* (Oxford World's Classics) Oxford University Press, USA, 2009

¹⁰ Cf. Alexandre Dumas, *The Vicomte de Bragelonne* (Oxford World's Classics) Oxford University Press, USA, 2009. In earlier editions of ‘Vicomte De Bragelonne, or Ten Years Later’ ‘The Man in the Iron Mask’ was just a part of it.

¹¹ These are at least as many as there are fictional figures in novels, poems, movies, theater plays, etc., which in these fictional contexts go by the name of a formerly or actually existing ‘King of France’.

many more, i.e. as many as one can imagine having been or being a fictional King of France.

After all that distinguishing exercise it seems to be a proper precautionary measure to accordingly distinguish between two sets (or ensembles) namely the set of formerly and actually existing Kings of France $\{KF\}$ and the set of nonexistent, i.e. fictional Kings of France $\{KF\}$.

Before coming back to this distinction between $\{KF\}$ and $\{KF\}$ we at first will substitute 4p1) by 4p1*) in 4) and as a result get

4a) The actually existing King of France is bald.

If we want to bring 4a) closer to the inevitable formal notation, we should before prepare it in normal language. To prepare for the existential quantifier, we transform 4a) to

4b) There is an actually existing King of France and he is bald

but about the 'he' in 4b) something can obviously not well be predicated. Again that has to be substituted by what it really stands for, and thus fully explicated it becomes transformed to

4c) There is an actually existing King of France and the actually existing King of France is bald

that now is sufficiently prepared for being presented in an albeit unfinished formal version

4c'a) $\exists(x)(E!x \wedge x \in \{KF\}) \wedge (E!x \wedge x \in \{KF\})$ is bald.

with $E!$ being no operator, but the predicate 'is actually existing'; and $\{KF\}$ the set of formerly and actually existing Kings of France providing for the other denotative part 'the King of France'.

Less agreeable however is

4c'b) $\exists(x)(E!x \wedge x \in \{KF\}) \wedge (E!x \wedge x \in \{KF\})$ is bald.

with $E!$ being no operator, but the predicate ‘is actually existing’; and the set of nonexistent, i.e. fictional Kings of France $\{KF\}$. here being the other denotative part ‘the King of France’.

4c’b) contains – already in its denotative part – the obvious self-contradiction, that the actually existing King of France is also a fictional King of France at the same time. This is also in contradiction to 3) and 3a), which said

3a) A formerly or actual existing object cannot truthfully be predicated by any attribute, that presupposes, requires or implies its nonexistence (e.g. its merely fictional existence).

Later, when we will have fully explicated all covert implicated elements of

4) The present King of France is bald,

we will come back to 4c’b) (and that apparent self-contradiction in it) and assess, what it means for it with respect to being true, false or meaningless.

But before we will do so, we have to care about the baldness of this (or these) King(s), since already in 4c’a) it also became apparent, that not only the presence of this (or these) King(s) is somehow questionable, but so is his (or their) baldness. At least this rather unwelcome feature is ambiguous with respect to the existence or nonexistence of its – to add insult to injury – bearer.

In case that bearer is actually existent, let’s say it is ‘the actually existing King of France’, his baldness should be expressed as

$$4c’p2) (E!x \wedge x \in \{KF\}) \in \{BM\}$$

with $\{KF\}$ being the set of formerly and actually existing Kings of France and $\{BM\}$ being the ‘set of actually existing bald men’.

Then 4c’p2) says: ‘the actually existing King of France’ is a member of the ‘set of actually existing bald men’, which is an appropriate way of predicating the feature of (actual) baldness to that allegedly actually existing King of France. 4c’p2) will be a true proposition, iff an actually existing King of France exists and iff he is bald.

And the answer to the question, if indeed these both conditional facts are the case, is a completely extra-logical and extra-linguistic matter, which is in no way determined by 4c’p2) or the original 4).

However we know, that there is no actually existing King of France, and it had been stated, that predicating (actual) baldness to a not actually existing King would only lead to an either false or meaningless proposition, and – even worse – the negation of that proposition wouldn't do better.

But then only a fool would predicate actual baldness to a not actually existing King. And there is no reason and no need at all to do so, since in case the bearer of the baldness is not actually existent, let's say it is 'the not actually existing or fictional King of France', his then also not actually existing, but merely fictional baldness should be expressed as

$$4c''p2) (E!x \wedge x \in \{KF\}) \in \{BM\}$$

with $\{KF\}$ being the set of nonexistent, i.e. fictional Kings of France and $\{BM\}$ being the 'set of not actually existing bald men'.

And of course there are such sets of 'nonexistent, i.e. fictional Kings of France'¹² as well as 'not actually existing, i.e. fictional bald men'.¹³

The predicate 'is bald' is not at all as unequivocal as it seemed in the original

4) The present King of France is bald,

since, if 'is bald' is properly analyzed, it becomes obvious, that it equally relates to two different interpretations. 'x is bald' predicates the feature of baldness, usually to persons and mostly to men. But with respect to our topic we should make a distinction between two different sets (or ensembles) of men, namely actually or formerly existing men and nonexistent, for example fictional men. And the baldness of an actually or formerly existing man then is the actual or former baldness of this man, i.e. that man is or was a member of the sets (or ensembles) of actually or formerly existing bald men. In contrast to that the baldness of a fictional man is the fictional baldness of a fictional man, i.e. that fictional man is a member of the set (or ensemble) of fictional (and therefore not existing) bald men. Sometimes occurrences of actually or formerly existing bald (or bald-shaved) men, i.e. members of the sets (or ensembles) of actually or formerly existing bald (or

¹² That assertion has been graphically justified in the preceding, cf. the discussion following the first occurrence of 4p1*) concerning the Louis XIV of Alexandre Dumas' 'The Man in the Iron Mask'.

¹³ That assertion will be graphically justified in the immediate following.

bald-shaved) men and fictionally bald fictional men, i.e. members of the set (or ensemble) of fictional bald men can even be seen or respectively imagined in an utmost close proximity, so – in a nontechnical sense – to speak: in superposition. Good examples for that are the late actors Yul Brynner and Telly Savalas on the one hand and the retired gunslinger Chris Adams, (who together with six other magnificent gunmen gained some merit in defending the rights of the inhabitants of a Mexican village) and Detective Lieutenant Theo Kojak on the other.

An even more intricate superposition of actually or formerly bald-shavedness, fictional baldness (or fictional bald-shavedness), and a related second actually or formerly baldness (or bald-shavedness) can be encountered in the musical film ‘The King and I’ of 1956, where the actually or formerly existing bald-shaved actor Yul Brynner plays the fictionally bald (or fictionally bald-shaved) fictional character ‘King Mongkut of Siam’¹⁴, which however relates directly to the formerly existing bald (or bald-shaved) King Rama IV (18 October 1804 – 1 October 1868) of Siam (Thailand), known in Western countries as King Mongkut of Siam. Alas, one has no easy game with bald Kings; they may be Kings of Siam or – Kings of France.

After having finally explicated all linguistic elements within the original

4) The present King of France is bald

carefully and after having found various possible admissible versions of any of these elements, we eventually can look how many now explicable versions of 4) had been jointly concealed in that covert original 4). And we will analyze them and their various negations with respect to the question of how many sense they make relating to the problem of predication on actually existing and actually not existing objects.

By substitution of the formerly inexplicated linguistic elements of 4) by the explicit ones we at first get

$$4d) \exists(x) (E!x \wedge x \in \{KF\}) \wedge (E!x \wedge x \in \{KF\}) \in \{BM\}$$

with $E!$ being no operator, but the predicate ‘is actually existing’;
and $\{KF\}$ the set of formerly and actually existing Kings of France

¹⁴ The ‘King Mongkut of Siam’ of the musical film ‘The King and I’ of 1956 is an adaptation of the semi-fictional figure ‘King Mongkut of Siam’ of the 1944 novel ‘Anna and the King of Siam’ by Margaret Landon.

providing for the other denotative part ‘the King of France’, and $\{BM\}$ being the ‘set of actually existing bald men’.

4d) says, that there is an actually existing King of France and the actually existing King of France is actually bald. 4d) is obviously true, iff there is an actually existing King of France and iff he is actually bald. If however there is – as we know – no actually existing King of France, then 4d) is false. And so it becomes already merely for the first part of its propositional content within the quantification $(E!x \wedge x \in \{KF\})$, which is fairly soothing, since the respective second part $(E!x \wedge x \in \{KF\}) \in \{BM\}$ looks definitely less welcome. That second part says, that the actually existing King of France is actually bald, but even if we know, that an actually existing King of France doesn’t actually exists, then that second part still says, that this existentially self-contradictory King of France is actually bald. That is a most severe ontological or objectological confusion, yet it is not a proper semantic inconsistency, since at first that confusion is entirely due to our external knowledge of the world and not the internal composition of 4d) and secondly – if no actual King of France exists – 4d) becomes false to the facts (and not meaningless) already and sufficiently for the first part of its propositional content within the quantification $(E!x \wedge x \in \{KF\})$, and that dubiously placed baldness doesn’t matter for that at all.

But then it has been said, that the negation of 4d) would lead to real semantic inconsistencies. Yet it will turnout, that a more interesting question would have been, which negation would lead to what version of a semantic inconsistency, if any. A negation of the entire sentence 4d) would yield

$$4d\text{-ne}) \neg (\exists(x) (E!x \wedge x \in \{KF\}) \wedge (E!x \wedge x \in \{KF\}) \in \{BM\})$$

4d-ne) then says, that it is not the case (or not true) ‘that there is an actually existing King of France and the actually existing King of France is actually bald.’ 4d-ne) is obviously false, iff there is an actually existing King of France and iff he is actually bald. The matter here however becomes less pleasant, if it is not the case, that an actually existent King of France actually exists. 4d-ne) then becomes true already for the first part of its propositional content within the quantification, i.e. for $(E!x \wedge x \in \{KF\})$, since if it is not the case, that an actually existent King of France actually exists, then the entire ‘ $\exists(x) (E!x \wedge x \in \{KF\}) \wedge (E!x \wedge x \in \{KF\}) \in \{BM\}$ ’ becomes false, and its entire negation 4d-ne) becomes true.

Unfortunately the second part of its propositional content within the quantification, i.e. $(E!x \wedge x \in \{KF\}) \in \{BM\}$, then still says, that the actually existent King of France, which – as we know – doesn't actually exist, is actually bald, i.e. is a member of the set of actually existing bald men. And now, since 4d-ne) is a formally true sentence, that is obviously utter nonsense, i.e. it is the celebrated semantic inconsistency.

Yet the question is, how much that matters, since there are not only other negations of 4d) admissible than just 4d-ne), but there are also other substitutions of the formerly inexplicated linguistic elements of 4), respectively with even more possible negations attached, as we will see.

The negation of the aggregate sentence 4d) then goes as

$$4d-na) \exists(x) \neg \left((E!x \wedge x \in \{KF\}) \wedge (E!x \wedge x \in \{KF\}) \in \{BM\} \right)$$

4d-na) says, that there is a x , i.e. something, for which it is the case (or true), that it is not the case (or true), 'that it actually exists and that it is the actually existing King of France and that this actually existing x , which is the actually existing King of France is actually bald, i.e. a member of the set of the actually existing bald men.'

Anders als in 4d-ne) bleibt die Aussage dass es etwas gibt (Meinong's givenness) bestehen!!

Zunächst alle Versionen aufführen auch die mit globaler negation, die unzulässig, weil wider besseres Wissen falsch zuordnen

Achtung: fictional present Kings of France must be sited in a fictional presence.

Beispiel für co-/non-/existence the present, i.e. actually existing Queen of England and the fictional Queen of England of the 2006 film “The Queen” played by the actress Helen Mirren

But what about Balmoral Castle if a castle could act one should say, that the actually existing Balmoral Castle in the film ‘The Queen’ acts as the fictional Balmoral Castle, of that film, but since castles do not act, one better says ‘it stands for’. Actors which plays themselves.

Here also applies, what already has been said concerning other conditions: something or someone cannot be just a bit fictional wg. Sätze 2) und 3) und weil’s stimmt.

hier weiter alle Versionen,
neither Quantification nor
predication matters at all, but
only the fact(s) if there is an
actually existing KF or not and
if he is bald or not. I.e.
existence as well as
nonexistence are real predicates
and not something evoked or

erased by an (existential) quantifier.

Dann die 4 zulässigen versionen 2 x positiv 2x negiert aufführen und analysieren

Now, after having analyzed, i.e. explicated

4) The present King of France is bald

thoroughly, we will get two quite different admissible versions of its previously somewhat covert propositional contents, together with their respective negations.

Now are two possibilities left.

a) Either 4c) is an ordinary proposition, which ordinarily claims to be true, then this claim fails, since there is no actually existing King of France, and 4c) is false, and consequently 4a), 4b) and 4) are also false. A negation of 4c) then goes as

4d) It is not the case/true, that ‘there is an actually existing King of France and the actually existing King of France is bald’

$$\neg (\exists(x) (E!x \wedge x=KF) \wedge (E!x \wedge x=KF) \in \{BM\})$$

hier:

Die falsche Auflösung, nämlich die Negation der zweiten Hälfte von 4d) vorher anführen und verwerfen, auch die richtige Negation der ersten Satzhälfte, noch vorher

After that careful analysis of all the covert implicated presuppositions, which had been elementary for

4) The present King of France is bald

already in the first place, it has turned out, that 4) never was a good example for the argument, it then was famously used for, namely that the admittance of singular terms related to nonexistent objects (or persons) in predicative propositions would lead to semantic inconsistencies or worse.

Quite on the contrary 4) has been shown to be perfectly distinctive with respect to the possible existence or nonexistence of the object signified by the denotative term, if only that denotation as well as the related predication become adequately *analyzed*.

$$\exists(x) \neg (E!x \wedge x = KF) \wedge (E!x \wedge x = KF) \notin \{BM\}$$

das ist die richtige Auflösung, der gesamte Satz ist wahr ,ohne dass irgendetwas über die Kahlköpfigkeit des akt Königs ausgesagt wurde, sondern nur das ein nichtexistierender König nicht zur menge der akt. exist Kahlköpfe gehört.

Argumentation muß noch verbessert werden!!

obviously the negation of the first part of the quoted proposition 4c) 'there is an actually existing King of France' is true, since it rightly says, that there is no actually existing King of France.

Now let's look at the negation of the second part of the in 4d) quoted proposition 4c) 'the actually existing King of France is bald'.

First of all the second part of 4c) turns out to be identical with

4a) The actually existing King of France is bald

This of course already shows, that a negation of the second part of 4c), will always lead – first by reverse substitution to 4b) and then to 4c) and finally – again to the negation of the entire sentence

4c) There is an actually existing King of France and the actually existing King of France is bald,

since explicating 4a) will always lead again to 4c) – possibly by infinite iteration¹⁵. Consequently the negation of the second part of 4c) 'the actually existing King of France is bald' is also false and entirely for the same reason as the first part, namely that there is no actually existing King of France.

I.e. already the original Russellian example

4) The present King of France is bald

doesn't – against all appearances – contain a statement, that would matter for the truth of 4), about the baldness (or non baldness) of a nonexistent object, namely the present, i.e. actually nonexistent, King of France. There is simply no actual baldness predicated about an actually not existing King of France, since that would be neither true nor false but utter nonsense.

And therefore the formerly puzzling question, if one of the propositions, namely either, that this nonexistent 'actually existing King of France' is bald or, that he is not bald, could become true or false or in any way referential in the course of such

¹⁵ And neither commuting the first and the second half of 4c) nor even commuting the sequence of implicit and explicit predication in the original 4), e.g. to $\exists(x).x \in \{BM\} \wedge (x = pKF)$, (with BM = the set of 'actually existing and actually not existing bald men', and pKF = the 'present King of France') is admissible, since being the 'present King of France' is no predication of the set of 'bald men', but a denotation of x . Being a member of a) the set of 'actually or formerly existing bald men' (like for example Telly Savalas) or being a member of b) the entirely different set of 'not existing bald men' (like for example Detective Lieutenant Theo Kojak) is an admissible predication of a possible secondary attribute of – in the case of a) – any actually or formerly existing or – in the case of b) – not existing man, respectively including existing and not existing Kings of France.

a play with negations, doesn't – together with a lot of semantical deliberations – arise anymore.

The other of the two remaining possibilities after having reached 4c) is

b) here 4c) isn't meant to be a proposition, which claims to be true. The proponent is rather well informed enough, to know, that there is no actually existing King of France, but he is also unscrupulous enough to tell a story, in which a fictional 'actually existing King of France' plays a role, and not enough, that dubious proponent also ridicules this nonexistent 'actually existing King of France' and makes him bald.

Here the expression 'actually existing King of France' isn't part of an ordinary proposition, which makes a statement about the actual existence of an actually existing King of France, but it is rather like a name of a fictional character in a fictional story. And that fictional character then has the (fictional) feature of being (fictionally) bald. In the context of such a story 3c) could very well be 'true', yet truth is in such complicated intensional contexts even more of a puzzle than anyway.

From a) as well as b) follows the same:

one cannot predicate or ascribe actual (existing) baldness to a nonexistent person.

Or in general:

one cannot predicate (actually) existent properties of nonexistent objects.

In a) one could see, that the proposition 4d) always turns out to be false already before the predication of actual existing baldness ever comes into question. It also had been shown that 4d) is merely the negation of an explicated and an equivalent version of 4).

In b) it has been shown, that a nonexistent fictional (feature of) baldness can obviously be predicated about a nonexistent fictional person.

This at least adds evidence to a central proposition of the essays of this book, namely that language and logic do not matter with respect to the existence or nonexistence of objects, language and logic do not even add or take away anything concerning the question, if objects exist or not exist.

The questions, if objects exist or not exist, will rather be decided by (theory based) justified knowledge, experience, rational considerations, common sense, and other ways of informed praxis.

Gegen Russell 'on denoting'

Sir Walter Scott is the author of 'Waverley'

Sir Walter Scott is the 'Author of 'Waverley'' (s. Wikipedia)

William Shakespeare is the author of 'The Comedy of Errors'

Marcel Proust is the author of 'À la recherche du l'auteur vrai'

B. Traven is the author of ''

The case of Shakespeare is the the real case: we can never know beyond any possible doubt if any author is the true author of a novel or a poem or even a philosophical essay or any artist is the genuine creator of a certain piece of art, as the very many revisions of creatorship in the sciences and the business of arts is witness of.

After that little distraction let's proceed with some more introductory remarks about the essays in this book. The third essay is mainly about the peculiar (conceptual) relationship between substance, which, I will claim, is itself an ineffable nonexistent object (or rather a gunky¹⁶ bunch of them), and its merely two primordial attributes, namely nonexistence and existence.

Against abstract objects: the idea of preexisting abstract objects is utterly incompatible with informationmonism and its claim, that all objects, i.e. nonexistent and existent objects are equally emergent from a primordial stratum of gunky nonexistent objects, which is the one and only substance. I.e. all objects are manifestations or instantiations of this substance. Existent objects however are – independently – also structurally emergent of another kind of nonexistent objects, which, in the broadest sense, could be called pregeometric objects. Yet their quality of being existent (objects), i.e. the manifestation of the primordial attribute of existence, is instantaneously emergent of the ineffable substance¹⁷. Existence is

¹⁶ 'Gunky' here is used as an – admittedly somewhat fishy* sounding – terminus technicus, cf. David Lewis, *Parts of Classes*, Oxford, Cambridge MA, 1991, p 20.

*'Fishy' is not a terminus technicus.

¹⁷ Calling substance 'ineffable' is not meant to denote it as being of a mystic nature or being mysteriously. Following the arguments in these essays one will find out, that it is a thoroughly

inseparably linked, i.e. coextensive, with actuality. Therefore it makes no sense at all to claim any other kind of existence than actual existence. That excludes the possibility of preexistent abstract objects¹⁸, most of which traditionally had been called Platonic objects.

Information monism is a neutral monism very much in the form as it had been originated by Baruch Spinoza, even if it differs in most of the relevant concepts and in nearly all details. The most fundamental difference however is not due to modern terminology and concepts of science, but concerns a quite traditional point, that could have already been raised in a 17th century discourse. This difference relates to Spinoza's theory of attributes, since it becomes apparent, that by the distinction of his two main attributes, namely extension and thought¹⁹, Spinoza has still been stuck in the cartesian paradigm of the dualism between *res extensa* and *res cogitans*. Despite effectively laying the fundamentals of a neutral monism by introducing his concept of one substance prior to all its attributes and all possible predications, that cartesian infected distinction of extension and thought is inadequate and detrimental. Thought (or *cogitatio* or *mens* or *intellectus*) isn't of the same rank as extension at all. Rather thought et.al. requires extension as an indispensable precondition for it becoming actual.²⁰

sober statement, and simply the proper characterisation of substance. I.e. already for nonexistence and existence being the only two attributes of substance and furthermore for all predicables indirectly being predicates of substance, which then also leads to infinitely many contradictory assertions being true with respect to substance, substance cannot be denoted by any combination of any amount of predicates imaginable. Yet the utmost immediate emergent mode of substance is predicable, and I will make a proposal for as what.

¹⁸ For a concise introduction into the matter of abstract objects, with some discussion of their difference to Meinongian (nonexistent) objects, cf. Edward N.Zalta, *Abstract Objects*, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster 1983

¹⁹ Cf. Spinoza, *Ethica - Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata – Ethik - mit geometrischer Methode begründet, Pars Secunda – Zweiter Theil, Propositio I, Propositio II*, in: Spinoza, *Opera – Werke*, vol.ii, pp 90 – 557, pp 162 – 165; Darmstadt 1967

²⁰ *Demonstratio brevis. Evidenter. (Short proof. By evidence.)*.

Demonstratio longa. Quia existentia data est et nonexistentia attributum substantiae, existentia autem non potest emergere ab nonexistencia, consequitur existentiam attributum substantiae. (Long proof. Since existence is given and since nonexistence is an attribute of substance, and for the further reason, that existence cannot emerge from nonexistence, it follows, that existence is an attribute of substance.).

Scholium. Exsistentia ratiocinati ratio est existentiam attributum substantiae. Quod quasi sit adaequatum cum indicis functione observatoris in status relativi interpretatione quantum-mechanicae. (Annotation. The existence of the reasoning person is the reason for the fact, that existence is an attribute of substance. That somehow corresponds to the index-function of the observer in the relative state interpretation of QM.)

Yet there is an intelligible attribute of substance, which together with a more manifest version of the not quite so intelligible extension, makes the other of the only two attributes of substance: nonexistence (the other then being: existence).

Being intelligible then has nothing to do with thought or cogitatio, mens or intellectus it rather means: not being actual, i.e. being something, that cannot be encountered by interaction. Therefore the concept of nonexistence or nonexistent objects, which plays that major role in the essays in this book, has no epistemic connotations whatsoever, i.e. it has no particular spiritual, mental, cognitive or noetic characteristics or meaning. Nonexistence here is a purely objectological concept, and not an epistemological concept at all. And not at least for this reason the theory of objects or objectology should not be mistaken for something alike or a different version of phenomenology. In his theory of objects Meinong radically departed from the background of Brentano's philosophy, and he departed for a very different end than that of Husserl.

The reason for this is, that in Meinong's 'Theory of Objects' the central concept (of Brentano's philosophical endeavours) for the determination of an object, i.e. intentionality, becomes ultimately obsolete.²¹ The objects, nonexistent as well as existent ones, just stand in and for themselves, and merely shadows of intentionality remain as an inefficacious residual in (the acts of) naming them.

²¹ Cf., for that topic, Arkadiusz Chrudzimski, *Gegenstandstheorie und Theorie der Intentionalität bei Alexius Meinong*, Dordrecht 2007. Chrudzimski analyzes various differing views in the development of Meinong's positions related to this topic, and doesn't come to such a radical conclusion.