Will there be a neuroscientific theory of consciousness?

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Abstract

Neuroscientists and philosophers nowadays claim that the problem of phenomenal consciousness is a scientific problem. Increasing knowledge of the neural correlates of consciousness is expected to yield an explanation of consciousness in neuroscientific terms. On the other hand, it is sometimes argued that even complete knowledge of brain function will leave unanswered the question of why cerebral processes are accompanied by consciousness at all. Proponents of this view assume an unbridgeable `explanatory gap' between the brain and the whole realm of phenomenal consciousness. Here, it is argued that this `explanatory gap' problem can not adequately be met by current neuroscientific approaches to consciousness, while purely philosophical approaches remain controversial because they inevitably reach a level of contradictory intuitions that do not seem to be resolvable by further argument. However, the problem may be resolved once one accepts that the features of consciousness itself might change with our judgments and descriptions of consciousness inspired by neuroscience. Such a `change of consciousness' becomes realistic when consciousness is construed as a description-dependent, `non-intrinsic' property[1]. Hence, it is argued that neuroscientists are right not to try to refute the explanatory gap argument, but that they should continue research on the neural correlates of consciousness, thus preparing new descriptions of phenomenal consciousness.

Section snippets

Two kinds of consciousness

In a recent paper, Ned Block[6]has stressed a well-known but important distinction7, 8between what he calls phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness (see Table 1). A state is phenomenally conscious (`p-conscious') if it has `experiential properties', that is, if there is something `it is like' to be in that state for the subject of consciousness. A state is access-conscious (`a-conscious'), on the other hand, if it has relevance for reasoning and control of action, owing to its

The persistence of the explanatory gap

The explanatory gap argument concerning p-consciousness leads to the claim that a description of the physical (or physiological) correlates of a p-conscious state like, say, a perception of red does not explain why that p-conscious state has this specific quality and not an other (e.g. that of perceiving green) or no phenomenal quality at all. The physical, or neurophysiological, story for a perception of red can only state the correlation or coincidence of a physical state with a p-conscious

Consciousness and its descriptions

What could it mean for p-consciousness to be `description-dependent'? According to Rorty[1], description-dependency is relationality—in contrast to intrinsicality—of a certain property (e.g. the property of being conscious). Rorty applies an epistemological definition of `intrinsicality': a property of an object is epistemologically intrinsic if we know the object to have the property independently of our knowledge of how to describe that object. A property is epistemologically relational, on

Why neuroscientists should not mind the `explanatory gap'

If the property of being p-conscious can be conceived as a relational, description-dependent property, then p-conscious states appear as rather ephemeral phenomena that might change their character with a modification of cultural, historical and scientific conditions. Once we have realized that, we might just lose interest in the scientific explanation of these phenomena and find that we have been dazzled by the seemingly impressive and enigmatic `subjective character' of p-conscious states. As

Outstanding questions

  • Is the validity of the explanatory gap intuition decidable on scientific or philosophical grounds?

  • Has cognitive neuroscience already begun to change the concept of consciousness?

  • Can phenomenal consciousness be construed as a description-dependent property?

  • Is there convincing evidence of a modification of phenomenal aspects of consciousness by access consciousness?

  • Can culture create or merely influence phenomenal consciousness?

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