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An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 September 2022

Kwok Chung Him ,
Shane Ryan Open the ORCID record for Shane Ryan [Opens in a new window]  and
Chienkuo Mi
Kwok Chung Him
Affiliation:
Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Shane Ryan
Affiliation:
Singapore Management University, Singapore
Chienkuo Mi*
Affiliation:
Soochow University, Taipei, Taiwan
*
*Corresponding author. Email: cmi@scu.edu.tw
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Abstract

This paper explores the prospects for a Pritchardean epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge. We begin by providing an overview of Duncan Pritchard's epistemological disjunctivist account of perceptual knowledge, as well as the theoretical advantages of such an account. Drawing on that account, we present and motivate our own Pritchardean epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge. After distinguishing different sorts of memory and the different roles that memory can play in knowledge acquisition, we set out our account and argue that the case for epistemological disjunctivism enjoys parity with the case for epistemological disjunctivism of perceptual knowledge. We also consider objections to our account. The first is from Joe Milburn and Andrew Moon, who argue against a general epistemological disjunctivism of memory on the basis of differences in memory types. The second objection arises from a Radford-like case whereby one's true belief is from memory even though one lacks rational support that is reflectively accessible to one.

Keywords

Epistemological disjunctivismmemory knowledgedeclarative memoryperceptual knowledge
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 20 , Issue 3 , September 2023 , pp. 584 - 597
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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