Abstract
Open-mindedness is generally regarded as an intellectual virtue because its exercise reliably leads to truth. However, some theorists have argued that open-mindedness’s truth-conduciveness is highly contingent, pointing out that it is either not truth-conducive at all under certain scenarios or no better than dogmatism or credulity in others. Given such shaky ties to truth, it would appear that the status of open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue is in jeopardy. In this paper, I propose to defend open-mindedness against these challenges. In particular, I show that the challenges are ill-founded because they misconstrue the nature of open-mindedness and fail to consider the requisite conditions of its application. With a proper understanding of open-mindedness and of its requirements, it is clear that recourse to it is indeed truth-conducive.
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Notes
Not all virtue epistemologists subscribe to this reliabilist view, nor to the idea that the value of an intellectual virtue is construed instrumentally. For instance, some virtue responsibilists maintain that a character trait is an intellectual virtue not necessarily (or at all) because its exercise reliably leads to truth (though this may still be an important feature) but because it is a manifestation of an excellence of character. Moreover, they hold that an intellectual virtue can be intrinsically valuable in that it constitutes an excellence of character. For the purposes of this essay, which is to query whether open-mindedness is truth-conducive, I will assume the reliabilist view that a trait is an intellectual virtue to the extent that it reliably leads to some epistemic good or goal (in this case, truth). Thanks to an anonymous referee for directing my attention to this point.
My present contention is merely a response to the perceived failure of open-mindedness to be truth-conducive and its threatened status as an intellectual virtue. It does not preclude the possibility that there are independent reasons for developing these alternative options.
Given this focus, this paper will not therefore address James Montmarquet’s argument (1993), which shows via a different route that open-mindedness does not reliably lead us to true beliefs. Incidentally, I find Linda Zagzebki’s responses to Montmarquet quite convincing (1993, Sect. 4.1.3).
A caveat is in order. The scope of this paper will be limited to the question of whether the exercise of open-mindedness reliably leads to truth, and whether it can be established as an intellectual virtue on this score. The discussion to follow will therefore assume that if open-mindedness can be shown to be truth-conducive, then it is an intellectual virtue. Given this focus, I will for the most part bypass the separate and complex issue of whether an appeal to truth-conduciveness is adequate to explain the status of open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue. For example, Carter and Gordon’s objection against the motivationalist approach can arguably be modified to show that it is not (2014). Nevertheless, at the end of the paper, I will briefly outline how some of the arguments offered in this paper can shed light on this issue.
It is worth noting that Baehr, who is a virtue responsibilist, does not regard truth-conduciveness to be necessary or sufficient for open-mindedness to be intellectually virtuous. Even so, my view is that his account of the characteristic psychology associated with open-mindedness serves as a useful resource for helping establish its truth-conduciveness.
Despite the fact that these intellectual virtues and capacities “enter into the specific motivational conditions of open-mindedness” (p. 207), Baehr is careful to point out that open-mindedness is not reducible to them; the notion of cognitive transcendence, as he explains, isolates a function that is unique to open-mindedness
For additional resources, see William Hare’s pioneering work on open-mindedness in the philosophy of education (e.g., 1979; 1985; 2003). Much of it can be used in support of the present contention that the exercise of open-mindedness demands serious consideration. This view is also stressed in Kwong (forthcoming).
It is worth noting that this point can also be used to address the potential objection that the uncritically credulous actually acquires more truths than the open-minded. The way to do so is to concede that this may initially be the case. However, for reasons just discussed, true beliefs held by the credulous will dwindle in quantity over time whereas those held by the open-minded will remain in place.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for directing my attention to Carter and Gordon’s case of Victor.
Here, I assume that whether a person is genuinely open-minded depends not only on what she actually does in inquiry, but what she is disposed to do.
For example, one of the first questions with which Victor will have to grapple is whether it is in fact true that acquiring as many truths as possible is a way of being maximally intellectually virtuous.
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Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Luke Kwong for his help and advice in writing this paper. I would also like to thank two anonymous referees for Synthese for their insightful comments and suggestions.
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Kwong, J.M.C. Is Open-Mindedness Conducive to Truth?. Synthese 194, 1613–1626 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-1008-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-1008-6