

# Śālikanātha's Criticism of Dharmakīrti's *svasaṃvedana* Theory

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**Abstract** The aim of this paper is to clarify how Śālikanātha's epistemology can be distinguished from that of Dharmakīrti, especially in terms of their respective views on cognitive form (*ākāra*). It has been pointed out that Śālikanātha's *tripuṭī* theory and *svayaṃprakāśa* theory are very close to Dharmakīrti's epistemology. However, it remains questionable if Śālikanātha, who belongs to the Prābhākara branch of the Mīmāṃsā and is therefore a *nirākāravādin*, can subscribe to notions that Dharmakīrti developed on the basis of *sākāravāda*. The present paper concludes that Śālikanātha agrees with Dharmakīrti in assuming that a single cognition consists of three parts; unlike Dharmakīrti, however, Śālikanātha puts emphasis on the difference between these parts, especially between the cognition and its form, on the ground that the cognitive form belongs to the external thing, and not to the cognition (*nirākāravāda*). In Dharmakīrti's epistemology, the cognitive form belongs to cognition (*sākāravāda*); in the ultimate level, there remains no difference between the three parts.

**Keywords** Dharmakīrti · Śālikanātha · *ākāra* · *svasaṃvedana* · *tripuṭī* · *svayaṃprakāśa*

## Introductory Remarks

Dharmakīrti and his followers maintain that a cognition possesses a cognitive form (*ākāra*)<sup>1</sup> as a part of itself; this position is referred to as *sākāravāda*. In the history

<sup>1</sup> In this paper I use the term “cognitive form (*ākāra*)” to refer to a form that is ‘being manifested in cognition’ or ‘relating to cognition,’ but neither ‘belonging to cognition’ nor ‘essential to cognition’ (that would be the case with *sākāravāda*), since this form is thought of as belonging to external objects in the Mīmāṃsaka view.

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of Indian philosophy, it has been in conflict with the opposite position which argues that the cognitive form is not possessed by cognition, but by external objects (*nirākāravāda*). Śālikanātha, who belongs to the *Prābhākara* branch of the *Mīmāṃsā*, subscribed to *nirākāravāda* and criticized Dharmakīrti's theory of self-cognition (*svasaṃvedana*) from the standpoint of *nirākāravāda* on its basis. However, as has also been pointed out by B. K. Matilal, in the *Pramāṇapārāyaṇa* section (especially in the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*) of his *Prakaraṇapañcikā* (PrP),<sup>2</sup> Śālikanātha puts forward a theory of self-illumination that *prima facie* appears to be very close to Dharmakīrti's theory of self-cognition: cognition shines forth by itself (*svayaṃprakāśa*). As has been shown by Kuroda,<sup>3</sup> the passage in Dharmakīrti's works that brings out this aspect of his epistemology most clearly is PVin 1.38:

*nānyo 'nubhāvyo buddhyāsti tasyā nānubhavo 'paraḥ |*  
*grāhyagrāhakavaidhuryāt svayaṃ saiva prakāśate ||*

There is no other (object) which is to be directly experienced by cognition, and there is no other direct experience of it (i.e., cognition). Since (cognition) lacks cognizer and cognized, nothing but this (i.e., cognition) illuminates itself on its own.<sup>4</sup>

Matilal distinguishes two theories of perception,  $T_1$  and  $T_2$ , and argues that both the Buddhist and Śālikanātha (or the *Prābhākara*) accept  $T_1$ :

$T_1$ : If an awareness,  $c_1$ , arises, it apprehends not only the thing,  $a$ , or the proposition  $p$ , but also  $c_1$  itself by the same token.

$T_2$ : If  $c_1$  arises, it apprehends only the thing,  $a$ , or the proposition,  $p$ , and we need another event,  $c_2$  to apprehend  $c_1$  . . .<sup>5</sup>

As Matilal further points out, *Prābhākaras* refer to  $T_1$  as 'self-revelation theory of awareness' (*sva-prakāśavāda*), while the Buddhists call their corresponding concept the 'self-awareness' of awareness (*sva-saṃvedana*).

In fact, when articulating  $T_1$ , Śālikanātha, a later exponent of the *Prābhākara* school, says that each awareness-event apprehends or 'reveals' the trio, the object or the fact, the awareness itself and the cognizing self; all three are 'perceived' in each

<sup>2</sup> As has already been suggested in Yoshimizu (1997, 34, n.13), it remains doubtful if all extant sections of PrP were written by Śālikanātha himself as constituting an independent work, although a number of cross-references to names of extant (and even non-extant) sections are found throughout in PrP. This is important to bear in mind when we attempt to determine the consistency of Śālikanātha's ideas throughout the individual sections, or possible stages in the development of his thought.

A general and comprehensive survey of the *Prābhākara* school's epistemology was first given in Jha (1911); a clear-cut summary is to be found in Hiriyanna (1972, 49–59). A part of the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* has recently been translated into English in Bandyopadhyay (2003). Pandurangi (2004) also gives an exposition of the whole text of PrP. For Kumāri's criticism of the Buddhist's *svasaṃvedana* theory, cf. Taber (2005, esp. 78ff).

<sup>3</sup> Kuroda (1982, 39–40).

<sup>4</sup> This is a **Ci'e**-passage of PV 3.327. For the sigla that are used in this article to characterize the relationship between passages, cf. PVin 1 (introduction, xxxv–xxxvi).

<sup>5</sup> Matilal (1986, 142–143). Matilal also points out that the view of earlier *Prābhākaras* seems to have been quite different, maintaining that "the awareness,  $c_1$ , apprehends or reveals (to the self) the object only, neither itself nor the cognizing self . . ." For this question cf. further below n. 27. An informative survey of the distinction between old and new *Prābhākaras* is given in Kuroda (1989).

cognitive act or awareness-event. He accordingly divides a single cognition into three parts (*tripuṭī*), i.e., cognizer (*pramātr*), object of cognition (*prameya*) and the resulting cognition (*pramiti/saṃvittis/saṃvid*).<sup>6</sup> This division, too, reminds us of Dharmakīrti who famously argues that cognition consists of the cognized object (*grāhya*), the cognizer (*grāhaka*), and cognition (*saṃvitti*) as a result.<sup>7</sup>

But can Śālikanātha, who is a *nirākāravādin*, really subscribe to notions that Dharmakīrti developed on the basis of *sākāravāda*?<sup>8</sup> This paper will, it is hoped, clarify how Śālikanātha's epistemology can be distinguished from that of Dharmakīrti, especially in terms of their respective views on cognitive form (*ākāra*). I am going to first outline Śālikanātha's attitude to Dharmakīrti's theory of self-cognition and then highlight some crucial points in Śālikanātha's criticism of it. Finally, Śālikanātha's theories of *svayaṃprakāśa* and *tripuṭī* will be examined in greater detail, so that we can distinguish them more clearly from seemingly similar concepts in Dharmakīrti's epistemology.

### Śālikanātha's Attitude to Dharmakīrti's *svasaṃvedana* Theory

In the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* of the *Pramāṇapārāyaṇa* section, Śālikanātha presents Dharmakīrti's definition of self-cognition before expounding his own *tripuṭī* theory. Śālikanātha here presupposes self-cognition as a perceptual awareness that all cognitions have of themselves.<sup>9</sup> But the only Buddhist reasoning for self-cognition that

<sup>6</sup> It has been pointed out (cf. Shastri 1967; Chatterjee 1979; Kuroda 1982) that *jñāna* should be differentiated from *saṃvid* in Śālikanātha's terminology: *jñāna* is to be seen as 'the process beginning with the connection of *ātman* with *manas* and resulting in cognition,' the existence of which is inferred merely by *saṃvid*, which in turn means, in contrast to *jñāna*, '(the resulting) cognition.' Cf. RV 80,20–23: *katham idānīm jñānasiddhiḥ? ucyate – phalabhūtāyāḥ saṃvidāḥ kāryarūpatvāt, kāryasya ca kāraṇam antareṇānupapattēh, nityakāryodayāpattiyā cātmanāḥ sthīrasya kāraṇatve niraste, kādācitkaṃ jñānam anumīyate* | '(Question:) Then, how can (the existence of) cognition be established? (Answer:) Cognition, being a result, is of the nature of an effect, and no effect can be produced without a cause. Therefore, (the existence of) transitory cognition is inferred, as it is rejected that the permanent self is the cause (of cognition as an effect), for otherwise the effect (i.e. cognition) would be perpetually produced.' When I refer to *saṃvid* as "cognition" in this paper, this should therefore be understood as the result of the cognitive process.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. PV 3.353 (quoted below in n. 32). As is well-known, the three parts of cognition in Śālikanātha's *tripuṭī* theory are illustrated through sentences like "I know this (*idam ahaṃ gr̥hṇāmi*)." While *saṃvid* (or *pramiti*) as one part of cognition is said to be represented in the expression '(I) know,' the term *saṃvid* is also used for the entire cognition which consists of these three parts. Cf. Kuroda (1982, 40). As we shall see below, this ambiguity is rooted in the following epistemological situation: *saṃvid* shines forth by itself and illuminates *meya* and *mātr*, which are both distinct from *saṃvid*. At the same time, however, both *meya* and *mātr* are considered as 'part of' *saṃvid* or as 'connected to' *saṃvid*.

<sup>8</sup> This question has been indirectly raised by Kuroda (1982, 90–91). Kuroda thinks that Śālikanātha's epistemology is close to that of Dharmakīrti, and that Śālikanātha does not pay much attention to the role of external objects in his epistemology, in spite of his *nirākāravāda*. Kuroda further implies that this tendency leads Śālikanātha's epistemology to a kind of self-contradiction.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. PrP(E<sub>B</sub>) 138,5–6: *sarvajñānānām svasaṃvedanaṃ vikalpavirahāt pratyakṣam*. "The self-cognition with regard to all cognitions is (a kind of) perception, since (it) lacks conceptualization." As suggested by the editor of PrP(E<sub>B</sub>), Subrahmanya (cf. PrP(E<sub>B</sub>) 138, n. 1), some passages from Dharmottara's *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (NBT) are reported in the *Nyāyasiddhi* (NS), a commentary on PrP (e.g. NS 138,17–19, a Re-passage of NBT 64,3–4). In connection with the concept of cognitive form, we may also notice the Cie of PV in 1 2,7–8 in PrP(E<sub>B</sub>) 139,9–10.

he refers to is an argument about the nature of pleasure, etc. (*sukhādi*): pleasure, etc., are identical with cognition because they arise from the same complex of causes (*hetusāmagrī*) that also causes cognition.<sup>10</sup> More importantly, in the same context Śālikanātha also concisely presents a Buddhist argument for *sākāravāda*, as well as the *sahopalambhaniyama*-inference which appeals to the necessary joint cognition of cognition and its form. The former argument, according to Śālikanātha, maintains that only *sākāravāda* can explain the manifestation of a cognitive form, even in the case of a dream, where external objects are evidently not present in our consciousness; if we would not accept *sākāravāda*, the cognitive form would be excluded from cognition and therefore could not be illuminated.<sup>11</sup> The *sahopalambhaniyama*-inference seems to be presented in the form it was articulated by Dharmottara, who uses it to prove the non-difference (*abheda*) of cognition and its form.<sup>12</sup>

Śālikanātha's succinct refutations of these arguments can be summarized as follows:<sup>13</sup> even if cognition is different from its object (i.e., cognitive form), it can connect itself to the object, so that we can cognize it.<sup>14</sup> The act of illumination is exclusively directed at (external) objects that are not of cognitive nature (*jaḍa*). For Śālikanātha, this is the reason why the *sahopalambhaniyama*-inference is not acceptable. He also denies that pleasure, etc. arise from the same complex of causes as cognition. The cause of cognition is the (external) object, and that of pleasure, etc. is cognition. As their causes are therefore different, pleasure is not the same as cognition.

Even though Śālikanātha criticizes Dharmakīrti's concept of self-cognition on the grounds of his own different position on the cognitive form, he expresses a kind of sympathy for it:

<sup>10</sup> Cf. PrP(E<sub>B</sub>) 138,6–139,1: *sukhādayāś ca (ca M<sub>M</sub>, M<sub>N</sub>, E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> : tu E<sub>B</sub>) vijñānābhinnahetukatayā na tasmād bhidyanta (bhidyanta M<sub>M</sub>, E<sub>B</sub>, E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> : bhidyanta M<sub>N</sub>) iti te 'pi svasaṃviditā eva*. "Further, pleasure etc. are not different from it (i.e., cognition), since their cause is not different from that of cognition. Therefore, they too are certainly cognized by themselves." Cf. Dharmakīrti's argument in PV 3.251 = PVin 1.22: *tadatadrūpiṇo bhāvās tadatadrūpahetuḥ | tat sukhādi kim ajñānaṃ vijñānābhinnahetujam* || "Existent things have this or that characteristic because they arise from causes that have this or that characteristic. Why, then, should pleasure, etc., which arise from causes that do not differ from the causes of cognition, not be cognition?"

<sup>11</sup> Cf. PrP(E<sub>B</sub>) 140,1–3.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. PrP(E<sub>B</sub>) 140,4–6. Śālikanātha regards the reason in this proof as *vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi*; this expression appears later in PrP(E<sub>B</sub>) 175,2–3; 181,4–182,1; 317,4f. Its source is probably Dharmottara's formulation mentioned in Iwata (1991, 128, n. 173). Cf. also the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* fragment in DAT 71,18–19.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. PrP(E<sub>B</sub>) 143,12–144,8.

<sup>14</sup> Here it should be added that Śālikanātha also refers to the *sākāravādin*'s argument of *pratikarmavyavasthā* which the latter uses to prove that cognition itself has the object's form (cf. PrP(E<sub>B</sub>) 174,1–7): in the case of *nirākāravāda*, there would be no difference between cognitions, since the content of cognition, i.e., cognitive form, belongs only to external objects. But if we adopt *sākāravāda*, the difference between cognitions is easy to explain, since each cognition has its own content. The argument can be traced back to PV 3.302: *tatrānubhavamātreṇa jñānasya sadṛśātmanaḥ | bhāvyaṃ tenātmanā yena pratikarma vibhajyate* || "For cognition, which is the same for them (i.e., for all objects) in terms of (being) mere experience, there should exist a nature which distinguishes (one cognition from the other) according to their object." Cf. also PVin 1 31,4–5 as **Ce'e** of this verse. This argument is, however, rejected by Śālikanātha, who insists that the difference between cognitions is based on that between the external objects with which they are connected.

Further, it is stated (by Dharmakīrti) that self-cognition with regard to all cognitions is (a kind of) perception. We do accept this.<sup>15</sup>

Śālikanātha's sympathy seems to be related to one facet of his *tripuṭī* theory, i.e., the notion that both cognizer and cognized are to be seen as parts of cognition; it might also be related to the fact that both Śālikanātha and Dharmakīrti accept three elements in a single cognition.<sup>16</sup>

The issue of cognitive form, which is involved in Dharmakīrti's theory of self-cognition, comes up for discussion again in the context of Śālikanātha's theories of *svayaṃprakāśa* and *tripuṭī*.<sup>17</sup> Immediately after presenting his own theories, Śālikanātha gives an account of the arguments of both Sautrāntika and Vijñānavādin, which he presents as objections.<sup>18</sup> These arguments will now be examined in greater detail.

### Śālikanātha's Criticism of *sākāravāda*

Śālikanātha's concept of cognitive form seems to be explicit in the following statement, where he rejects the objection that his theories of *svayaṃprakāśa* and *tripuṭī* would inevitably entail *sākāravāda*:

“Further, the following is said: cognition, which is admitted to be self-illuminating, should have a cognitive form such as ‘blue’ (as belonging to itself). That too is not reasonable, since it is impossible that a cognitive form, which manifests itself as different from cognition, should be based on the nature of cognition.”<sup>19</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Cf. PrP(E<sub>B</sub>) 144,5: *yac ca svasaṃvedanaṃ (svasaṃvedanaṃ M<sub>M</sub>, E<sub>B</sub>, E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> : svayaṃvedanaṃ M<sub>N</sub>) sarvavittināṃ (sarvavittināṃ M<sub>M</sub>, M<sub>N</sub>, E<sub>B</sub> : sarvasavittināṃ E<sub>P</sub> : sarvasya vittināṃ E<sub>C</sub>) pratyakṣam uktam. tad (tad M<sub>M</sub>, E<sub>B</sub>, E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> : tad apy M<sub>N</sub>) anumanyāma eva (eva M<sub>N</sub>, E<sub>B</sub> : n. e. M<sub>M</sub>, E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub>). For the reading *eva*, cf. also NS 144,22: *vittināṃ (vittināṃ em. : vrttināṃ NS) svasaṃvedanam aṅgikriyā eva*.*

<sup>16</sup> Of course, from this it does not follow that Śālikanātha himself accepts *sākāravāda*; rather, the cognized is, in a more or less loose way, connected to cognition or counted as its ‘part’ in his epistemological scheme.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. PrP(E<sub>B</sub>) 167,3–173,7.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. PrP(E<sub>B</sub>) 173,8ff. Both names are mentioned by Śālikanātha himself (e.g., the Sautrāntika in PrP(E<sub>B</sub>) 177,4; the Vijñānavādin in PrP(E<sub>B</sub>) 178,4). Having traced the manner in which the Vijñānavādin rejects the Sautrāntika's theory of an external world, Śālikanātha criticizes both of them as based on *sākāravāda*. Significantly enough, he also uses the name *sākāravijñānavādin* in PrP(E<sub>B</sub>) 179,13. In this article I simply follow Śālikanātha in the usage of these names.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. PrP(E<sub>B</sub>) 183,6–8: *yac cedam uktam – svayaṃprakāśāyāḥ saṃvido 'bhyupagatāyā nilādyākāro (nilādyākāro M<sub>M</sub>, E<sub>B</sub>, E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> : nilādika ākāro M<sub>N</sub>) 'stv iti ('stv iti M<sub>M</sub>, M<sub>N</sub>, E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> : 'stīti E<sub>B</sub>). tad apy ayuktam. saṃvidbhinnatayāvabhāsamānasyākārasya (saṃvid . . . ākārasya em. : saṃvidbhinnatayā ca bhāsamānasyākārasya M<sub>N</sub> : saṃvidabhinnatayāvabhāsamānasyākārasya E<sub>B</sub> : saṃvidbhinnasyārthasya bhāsamānasyākārasya E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> : saṃvidbhinnasyā ca(!) bhāsamānasyākārasya M<sub>M</sub>) saṃvidrūpāśraya-ñānupapateḥ (saṃvid. . . anupapateḥ M<sub>M</sub>, E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> : saṃvidrūpatvāśrayaṇnupapateḥ M<sub>N</sub> : saṃvidrūpatvānupapateḥ E<sub>B</sub>). In this paragraph, Śālikanātha seems to rephrase the Sautrāntika's counterargument against his *svayaṃprakāśa* theory in PrP(E<sub>B</sub>) 173,9–11. If we read *saṃvidbhinnasyārthasya* . . . with E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> (and perhaps M<sub>M</sub>), it remains uncertain whether *artha* refers to a cognitive form or an external object. The former is possible because Śālikanātha identifies *ākāra* with *artha* in another place; cf. n. 24.*

Even though Śālikanātha in his *tripuṭī* theory considers the cognitive form to be a part of the single cognition, he unlike Dharmakīrti lays stress on the distinction between the cognition and its form. For this reason, as indicated above, Śālikanātha insists that the necessary joint perception of cognition and its object (*sahopalambhaniyama*) is possible even when both are essentially different, whereas his Buddhist opponent thinks it establishes that the two are non-different.<sup>20</sup> This point will be made clearer in the following two arguments.

### The Cognitive Form in Dreams is Derived from External Objects

The first argument centers on the status of the cognitive form in dreams. As is well-known, dream-cognition is frequently used by the Vijñānavādin in order to detach the cognitive form, which they believe is inherent in cognition, from external objects. Śālikanātha's rejoinder is as follows:

“Further, the following was said: in a dream, only the form of a cognition appears (and not that of an external object). That too is unreasonable, since in that case, too, cognition has the manifestation of external (things). Moreover, it (i.e., a cognition in a dream) certainly does have external (things) as its object because (it has external) things that have been directly experienced before as its object, in that mental imprints that were placed in (the mind) by previous direct experience are awakened.”<sup>21</sup>

According to Śālikanātha, even the cognitive form appearing in a dream originates from an external object that was directly experienced before. Śālikanātha here seems to be trying to keep up the position of *nirākāravāda* even in the case of dreams, in order to consistently present the cognitive form as belonging to external objects.

<sup>20</sup> In this context, the well-known half-verse PVi 1.54ab is quoted in both RV and PrP, cf. RV 79,6; PrP(E<sub>B</sub>) 175,4: *sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ* | “There is no difference between ‘blue’ and its cognition because of the necessary joint cognition (of both).” It is interesting to note that this verse is coupled with PV 3.388ab in RV 79,6–7: *bhedaś ca bhrāntivijñānair dṛśyetendāv ivādvaye* | “However, a difference (between cognition and its object) would be seen by those whose cognition is erroneous, just like in the case of the non-dual moon (which people with erroneous cognition see as two moons).” A coupling of PVi 1 and PV verses is also found in NS 140,15, which should have been borrowed from RV 79,6–7. Cf. also the Ci of PV 3.388ab in PrP(E<sub>B</sub>) 175,8 and 183,2.

<sup>21</sup> PrP(E<sub>B</sub>) 184,3–5: *yac cōktam – svapne jñānasyaivākāro (jñānasyaivākāro M<sub>M</sub>, E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> : jñānasyākāro M<sub>N</sub>, E<sub>B</sub>) ’vabhāsata iti. tad apy ayuktam (ayuktam M<sub>N</sub>, E<sub>B</sub>, E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> : uktam M<sub>M</sub>). tatrāpi (tatrāpi E<sub>B</sub> : tatrāpi hi E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> : tathāpi M<sub>N</sub> : taśapi hir(!) M<sub>M</sub> ; NS’s pratika follows E<sub>B</sub>) bahiravabhāsītīvāt (bahiravabhāsītīvāt M<sub>N</sub>, E<sub>B</sub> : bahiravabhāsātīvāt E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> : avabhāsātīvāt M<sub>M</sub>) saṃvidāḥ. na (na M<sub>M</sub>, E<sub>B</sub>, E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> : nanu M<sub>N</sub>) ca sā bahirviśayā na bhavati (na bhavati M<sub>N</sub>, E<sub>B</sub> : na sambhavati E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> : sambhavati M<sub>M</sub>). tasyāḥ (tasyāḥ E<sub>B</sub> : n. e. M<sub>M</sub>, M<sub>N</sub>, E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub>) pūrvānubhavāhitasaṃskārod bodhavaśēna (-saṃskāra-E<sub>B</sub> : -bhāvanā- M<sub>M</sub>, M<sub>N</sub>, E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> ; NS’s pratika reads -saṃskāra-) pūrvānubhūtavastuviśayatīvāt. Against the majority of witnesses, -saṃskāra- seems to be preferable to -bhāvanā-, since the term *saṃskārod-bodha* is repeatedly used in the same paragraph.*

## The Non-Existence of the Cognitive Form on the Ultimate Level

Another argument that Śālikanātha offers in defense of *nirākāravāda* concerns itself with an argument by Dharmakīrti which became considered as establishing the theory that cognition is variegated, yet non-dual (*citrādvaitavāda*):

“Moreover, since variegated cognitive forms in the cognition of a multicoloured painting are incompatible with (the idea that cognition has) the nature of a single illumination, only the non-existence (of these forms) is admitted.”<sup>22</sup>

After this statement, Śālikanātha quotes PV 3.208 and 209 for the purpose of rejecting the existence of a cognitive form.

“If objects which have variegated manifestations cannot be one, how of all things should a cognition which has variegated manifestations be one?’ (PV 3.208) After raising (this doubting question, Dharmakīrti) says as follows: ‘What the wise teaches is attained by the force of real entities. The more objects are taken into consideration, the more they fall asunder.’ (PV 3.209) (In other words,) the more cognitive forms are taken into consideration, the more they are divided asunder as incoherent, (i.e.,) become empty; it means that (they) become non-existent.”<sup>23</sup>

While PV 3.208 puts forward an anonymous objection against *citrādvaitavāda*, Dharmakīrti's response to this in 209 is understood by Śālikanātha as indicating his position from the perspective of ultimate truth, where even the existence of cognitive forms is to be abandoned. The point to be observed here is that Śālikanātha interprets Dharmakīrti's statement in PV 3.209 as subscribing to the position of *nirākāravijñānavāda*, taking it to the advantage of his own *nirākāravāda*.<sup>24</sup> The cognitive form is then regarded as ultimately non-existent on the basis of Dharmakīrti's own statement; thus it is removed from cognition.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. PrP(E<sub>B</sub>) 185,1–2: *kiṃ ca citrapaṭajñāne (citrapaṭajñāne E<sub>B</sub>, E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> : citrajñāne M<sub>N</sub>) nānabhū-tānām ākārāṇām (kiṃ ... ākārāṇām M<sub>N</sub>, E<sub>B</sub>, E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> : n. e. M<sub>M</sub>) ekaparakāśātmakatvavirodhād (ekaparakāśātmakatvavirodhād E<sub>B</sub>, E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> : ekaparakāśātmakatvaṇ virodhād M<sub>N</sub> : aprakāśātmakatvavirodhād M<sub>M</sub>) asadbhūtatvam evābhyupagatam.*

<sup>23</sup> PrP(E<sub>B</sub>) 185,3–10: *citrāvabhāseṣv (citrāvabhāseṣv M<sub>M</sub>, E<sub>B</sub>, E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> : citrāvabhāsiṣv M<sub>N</sub>) artheṣu yady ekatvaṃ na yujyate | sāiva tāvat katham buddhir ekā citrāvabhāsinī || (PV 3.208) iti codayitvoktam. idam vastubalāyātaṃ yad vadanti vipaścitaḥ | yathā (yathā M<sub>M</sub>, E<sub>B</sub>, E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> : tathā M<sub>N</sub>) yathārthāś cintyante vivicyante (vivicyante M<sub>M</sub>, E<sub>B</sub>, E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> : gīyante te M<sub>N</sub>; the testimony of witnesses for PV seems to be still inconclusive, although Tosaki follows *viśīryante*; cf. Tosaki 1979, 310, n. 40) tathā tathā || (PV 3.209) iti (iti M<sub>N</sub>, E<sub>B</sub> : n. e. M<sub>M</sub>, E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub>). yathā yathākārā vicāryante tathā tathāghaṭamānā vivicyante (aḡhaṭamānā vivicyante M<sub>M</sub>, E<sub>B</sub>, E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> : aṭamānā vidhīyante M<sub>N</sub>) – śūnyā bhavanti – asadbhūta bhavantīty (asadbhūta bhavantīty M<sub>M</sub>, M<sub>N</sub>, E<sub>B</sub> : asadbhavantīty E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub>) arthaḥ. For the last part, cf. also PVP ad PV 3.209d (P 225a8–225b1 = D 193a4): ... *rnam par bral žin stoñ par 'gyur te | ran bžin 'ga' žig la yañ rnam par mi gnas so žes bya ba'i tha tshig go* | “... (they) are divided asunder, (i.e.,) become empty; it means that (they) are never settled in any kind of nature.”*

<sup>24</sup> Note that Śālikanātha replaces *artha* in PV 3.209c with *ākāra*. In another place, he refers to the object as *vedya*. Cf. n. 26.

## Cognitive Form in Śālikanātha's Epistemology

As mentioned above, in his criticism of *sākāravāda* Śālikanātha emphasizes the difference between cognition and cognitive form, since the latter belongs to external objects. Let us now examine further Śālikanātha's own theories of *svayamprakāśa* and *tripuṭī* in terms of how they deal with cognitive form.

The *svayamprakāśa* Theory: Cognitive Form as Belonging to External Objects

The *Mīmāṃsaka*'s most definite statement on *nirākāravāda* is found in the *Śābarabhāṣya*'s (ŚBh) refutation of the Buddhist *sākāravāda*:

“According to us, it is not cognition but the external object which has the cognitive form, since it (i.e., the external object) is cognized before the eyes as connected to an external place.”<sup>25</sup>

In his commentary, the *Bṛhatī*, Prabhākara explains this statement as follows:

“Indeed, cognition is to be cognized as cognition, but not as the object of cognition. (Question:) What is this eminently logical way of speaking: ‘... to be cognized ... not to be cognized ...?’ (Answer:) This is (the meaning of) this eminently logical way of speaking: of this (cognition), being the object of action (*karmabhāva*) is not cognized. And the object of action is to be denoted with the word ‘to be cognized’ (*saṃvedya*), not cognition (is to be denoted with this word).”<sup>26</sup>

The beginning of the passage means that cognition is cognized as such, that is, as cognition, but not as the object that is to be cognized. As its wording appears to be a little bit confusing, Prabhākara further introduces the concept of being the object of action (*karmabhāva*), in order to stress that cognition itself is not cognized as an object of cognition. In this regard, it should not be overlooked that Śālikanātha,

<sup>25</sup> Cf. ŚBh 28,17–18: *nirākārā tu no buddhiḥ, ākāravān bāhyo 'rthaḥ, sa hi bahirdeśasambaddhaḥ pratyakṣam upalabhyate.*

<sup>26</sup> Cf. B 82,8–10: *saṃvittayā hi saṃvit saṃvedyā na saṃvedyatayā. keyaṃ vācocyati, saṃvedyā na saṃvedyeti. iyaṃ iyaṃ vācocyati, nāsyāḥ karmabhāvo vidyā itī. karma ca saṃvedyābhidheyam, na saṃvit.* The underlined part is paraphrased by Śālikanātha when he emphasizes the difference between (*saṃ*) *vitti* and *vedya* (here *vedya* is equated with *ākāra*). Cf. PrP(E<sub>B</sub>) 143, 2–4: *na cāyam ākāro vitter eva (eva M<sub>N</sub>, E<sub>B</sub>, E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> : ava M<sub>M</sub>), vedyatayā vitteḥ pṛthag avabhāsanāt (avabhāsanāt M<sub>M</sub>, E<sub>B</sub>, E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> : anavabhāsanāt M<sub>N</sub>), vittir hi (vittir hi M<sub>N</sub>, E<sub>B</sub>, E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> : vittir vvi M<sub>M</sub>) vittitayā (vittitayā M<sub>M</sub>, E<sub>B</sub>, E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> : vitayā M<sub>N</sub>) vedyas cāyam ākāro (cāyam ākāro M<sub>N</sub> : cākāro M<sub>M</sub>, E<sub>B</sub>, E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub>) vedyatayāvabhāṭī (vedyatayāvabhāṭī E<sub>B</sub> : vedyatayāvabhāṭī M<sub>M</sub>, E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> : vedyatayaiva bhāṭī M<sub>N</sub>) ato (ato M<sub>M</sub>, E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> : n. e. M<sub>N</sub>, E<sub>B</sub>) na tayos tādātmyam (tādātmyam M<sub>M</sub>, M<sub>N</sub>, E<sub>C</sub>, E<sub>P</sub> : tadātmakatā E<sub>B</sub>) upapadyate. “Further, this cognitive form does not belong to cognition at all, since (it) manifests itself as distinct from cognition, as the cognized (object). That is to say, cognition manifests itself as cognition, and the object of cognition, i.e., this cognitive form, (manifests itself) as the object of cognition. Thus, the identity of both is not suitable.”*



refers to the term *svayaṃprakāśa* when he comments on the concept of *karmabhāva*<sup>27</sup>:

“... For cognition is self-illuminating. Further, it is not an object of action, since its illumination is not dependent on anything else, yet it does not follow that (cognition) has no illumination. Further, it is said to exist as (self-) illuminating, yet (its) being an object of action is not intended.”<sup>28</sup>

What is meant by *svayaṃprakāśa* in the above passage is that cognition shines forth by itself, not having the nature of the object of cognition. Viewed in this light, this term should be differentiated from Dharmakīrti's notion of self-cognition, in which case cognition knows itself on the premise that there is no difference between the object of cognition, cognizer and cognition.<sup>29</sup>

Turning to the object of cognition (*meya*) and cognizer (*mātr*), Śālikanātha maintains that neither of them has the nature of illumination. This is most explicitly stated in the following passage:

“Further, the objects of cognition, the essence of which is non-illumination, and the cognizer are to be dependent on illumination. Illumination is, however, not dependent on anything else, since its essence is illumination. Indeed, the objects of cognition, as well as the cognizer, are illuminated in (the cognition of) those who are awake, while both of them are not being illuminated in (the cognition of) those who are sound asleep.”<sup>30</sup>

<sup>27</sup> There is no consensus of opinion as regards whether Prabhākara already advocated the *svayaṃprakāśa* theory. According to Chatterjee (1979), it is not reasonable to say that Prabhākara already advocated the same epistemological scheme as Śālikanātha, since the meaning of the term *saṃvid* differs remarkably between them. In other words, Prabhākara's *saṃvid* has not yet obtained the function that Śālikanātha's *tripuṭī* theory presupposes. On the other hand, Kuroda assumes that Śālikanātha's theory of *svayaṃprakāśa* had already been prepared in Prabhākara's *Bṛhatī*, even though Prabhākara himself does not employ the term *svayaṃprakāśa*. Cf. Kuroda (1982, 39).

<sup>28</sup> Cf. RV 83,10–12: *svayaṃprakāśatvāt saṃvidah. na ca parādīhinaprakāśa iti na karmatā, na ca prakāśābhāvaḥ. prakāśamānaṃ caṣṭīty ucyate, na punaḥ karmataiva vivakṣitā.*

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Hiriyanna (1972, 52–53). According to Hiriyanna, Śālikanātha's *svayaṃprakāśa* should be understood as meaning ‘not requiring to be revealed,’ whereas the Buddhist theory of self-cognition means that ‘it is knowable by itself and not by another *jñāna*.’ Unlike the former, however, the latter involves ‘the absurdity of one and the same thing being simultaneously the knower as well as the known.’ Hiriyanna's distinction seems to be persuasive, even though Matilal regards both as belonging to the same type of cognition ( $T_1$ ), which is not in need of being cognized by another cognition (cf. above, n. 5). To put it another way, Śālikanātha's epistemology and that of Dharmakīrti differ from each other with regard to ‘the reason’ why they are both classified into  $T_1$  in Matilal's classification. It is true that the expression *svayaṃprakāśa* is also used by Dharmakīrti himself (cf. PVin 1.38 and PV 3.327 as mentioned above in n. 4), but its usage seems not to be the same as that of Śālikanātha. Cf. PVin 1 35,13–14 ad 1.38: *sā ca tādātmyāt svayaṃ prakāśate*. “Consequently, it (i.e., cognition) illuminates itself because of the identity between the object of cognition, cognizer and cognition.”

<sup>30</sup> PrP( $E_B$ ) 172,1–3: *kiṃ cāprakāśasvabhāvāni (kiṃ cāpra... M\_N, E\_B, E\_C, E\_P : kiṃ ca | pra... M\_M) meyāni mātā (meyāni mātā M\_M, E\_B, E\_C, E\_P : prameyāni pramātā M\_N) ca prakāśam apekṣantām. prakāśas tu prakāśātmakatvān nānyam (prakāśātmakatvān nānyam E\_B, E\_C, E\_P : tadātmakatvān nānyam M\_N : prakāśātmakatvānyam M\_M) apekṣate. jāgrato hi meyāni (meyāni M\_M, E\_B, E\_C, E\_P : mayāni M\_N) mātā ca prakāśante (prakāśante M\_N, E\_B, E\_C, E\_P : prakāśate M\_M). suṣuptasya tu na tad (tu na tad em. : tu na M\_N : ca na M\_M, E\_C, E\_P : tadā na tad E\_B) dvayam api prakāśate (api prakāśate M\_M, E\_B, E\_C, E\_P : api pi prathate M\_N).*

In this passage, Śālikanātha states that either the object of cognition or the cognizer cannot shine forth by themselves, since both are dependent on the illumination of cognition. Thus, from the perspective of the nature of illumination too, it is clear that Śālikanātha distinguishes cognition from its form, i.e., the object of cognition.<sup>31</sup> This is in stark contrast to Dharmakīrti, who insists on the non-difference between the object of cognition, the cognizer and cognition on the ultimate level.

The *tripuṭī* Theory: the Difference Between the Three Parts is Non-Illusory

How does Śālikanātha himself evaluate Dharmakīrti's theory of self-cognition? The following statement in the *Mīmāṃsābhāṣyapariśiṣṭa* (MBhP) is helpful in this regard:

“Further, even those who hold that cognition has the cognitive form as its own part do not despise the manifestation of three parts (of cognition). Even they say so: ‘Although cognition itself is undivided, those who hold perverse views regard it as if it had the difference between the object of cognition, cognizer and the result of cognition.’”<sup>32</sup>

Quoting PV 3.353 (or PVin 1.44), Śālikanātha claims that cognition can be regarded as consisting of three parts even in Dharmakīrti's *sākārajñānavāda*. Nevertheless, he was also clearly conscious of the fundamental difference between his own epistemology and that of Dharmakīrti:

“However, (they) maintain that the manifestation of the difference (between three parts of cognition) is illusory. Consequently, (the following) is said (by them): ‘The manifestation of the different (three parts of cognition) in the cognition which has the non-difference (between them) is, indeed, illusory.’”<sup>33</sup>

As discussed above, the difference between the three parts of cognition, especially between cognition and its form, is not illusory in Śālikanātha's epistemology, inasmuch as the cognitive form belongs to external objects.

<sup>31</sup> So far as Śābarasvāmin is concerned, he might possibly imply that the external object which possesses its cognitive form is considered as that which is to be cognized. In the case of Śālikanātha, however, we may suppose that the object of cognition is, at least in its primary sense, the cognitive form. Cf. above, n. 24 and n. 26.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. MBhP 18,7–10: *api ca sākārajñānavādino 'pi tritayāvabhāsam naivāvajanate. te 'py evam āhuḥ - avibhāgo 'pi buddhyātmā viparyāsītadarśanaḥ | grāhyagrāhakaśaṅkittibhedavān iva lakṣyate ||* (PV 3.353 = PVin 1.44) For this passage, cf. also Kuroda (1982, 40). In spite of the fact that Śālikanātha often quotes Dharmakīrti's works, it seems to be unclear to what extent Śālikanātha as *nirākāravādin* had been influenced by Dharmakīrti as *sākāravādin* with regard to his epistemological scheme, i.e., his *tripuṭī* theory, since it is quite common for Indian thinkers to suppose these components in a single cognition.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. MBhP 18,11–12: *kin tu bhedapratibhāsam imam aupaplavikam icchanti. tathā cōktam - jñānasyābhedino bhinnapratibhāso (bhinnapratibhāso em. : nityaṃ pratibhāso MBhP; PV reads bheda-pratibhāso) hy upaplavah |* (PV 3.212cd) The basis of the above emendation is the same verse quoted in PrP 176, 3, which has *bhinnapratibhāso* as a variant of *bhedapratibhāso*.

## Concluding Remarks

With regard to the distinction between Śālikanātha's epistemology and that of Dharmakīrti, I would like to draw the following conclusions:

- (1) As is shown in his MBhP, Śālikanātha agrees with Dharmakīrti in assuming that a single cognition consists of three parts. Unlike Dharmakīrti, however, Śālikanātha puts emphasis on the difference between these parts, especially between the cognition and its form, on the ground that the cognitive form belongs to the external thing, and not to the cognition (*nirākāravāda*). In Dharmakīrti's epistemology, the cognitive form belongs to cognition (*sākāra vāda*) and in the ultimate level, there remains no difference between the three parts. Even if Dharmakīrti thinks that each entity (*vastu*) has the ability to produce its own cognition or to throw its own form into cognition (*ākārasa marpaṇa*), the cognitive form cannot belong to external objects; from the viewpoint of *sākāravāda*, it should be thrown into or handed over to cognition.
- (2) The first point is relevant to a delicate difference between "self-illumination" (*svayaṃprakāśa*) and self-cognition (*svasaṃvedana*), although Matilal considers both as part of the same type of theory of perception: according to the *svayaṃprakāśa* theory, cognition shines forth by itself, whereas the cognizer or the object of cognition (i.e., the cognitive form belonging to external objects) do not shine forth by themselves. This would be the reason why cognition is distinguished from the cognizer and the object of cognition in Śālikanātha's epistemology. On the other hand, Dharmakīrti asserts that cognition illuminates a cognitive form as a part of itself. This results from Dharmakīrti's epistemological position that there is no ultimate difference between cognizer, object of cognition and result of cognition.

Within the confines of his *tripuṭī* theory, Śālikanātha obviously accepts that the cognitive form belongs to external objects and is therefore distinct from cognition. As mentioned above in n. 8, it has been suggested by Kuroda that Śālikanātha's *tripuṭī* theory leads to a kind of self-contradiction in terms of the relationship between cognition and cognitive form, since his epistemology is very close to that of Dharmakīrti. On the basis of the above reflections, however, it seems that Śālikanātha is consistent at least in maintaining that the cognitive form belongs to external objects, even though he counts the cognitive form also as a part of cognition.

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### General Abbreviations

em.: emended  
n. e.: not existent

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- DAT: Jambuvijaya, Muni (Ed.). (2001). *Ācārya Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra's Dravyālinkāra. With Autocommentary*. Ahmedabad.
- NBT: Mālvaniyā, D. (Ed.). (1971). *Pañḍita Durveka Miśras Dharmottarapradīpa. [Being a sub-commentary of Dharmottaras Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrtis Nyāyabindu]*. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute.
- NS: *Nyāyasiddhi* of Jayapurī Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa. See PrP (E<sub>B</sub>).
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- PrP(M<sub>N</sub>): Manuscript of *Pramāṇapārāyikā* (sic; of the whole PrP). Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project (NGMPP): B0056/03, Devanāgarī, paper, complete, 164 folios.
- PV 3: *Pramāṇavārttika* of Dharmakīrti, chapter on perception (*pratyakṣa*). See Tosaki 1979 (vv. 1–319) and Tosaki 1985 (vv. 320–539).
- PVIn 1: Steinkellner, E. (Ed.). *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya. Chapters 1 and 2*. Beijing/Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House/Austrian Academy of Sciences Press 2007. For Corrigenda, cf. *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 51 (2007–2008) 207–208, as well as [http://ikga.oew.ac.at/Mat/steinkellner07\\_corrigena.pdf](http://ikga.oew.ac.at/Mat/steinkellner07_corrigena.pdf) (last accessed 14 January 2009).
- PVP: *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* of Devendrabuddhi. Tibetan translation: *Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi dka' 'grel*, translated by Subhūtiśrī(śānti) and (rMa) dGe ba'i blo gros. D 4217, Che 1b1-326b4; P 5717, Che 1-390a8.
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