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Knowledge and credit

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Abstract

A widely accepted view in recent work in epistemology is that knowledge is a cognitive achievement that is properly creditable to those subjects who possess it. More precisely, according to the Credit View of Knowledge, if S knows that p, then S deserves credit for truly believing that p. In spite of its intuitive appeal and explanatory power, I have elsewhere argued that the Credit View is false. Various responses have been offered to my argument and I here consider each of these objections in turn. I show that none succeeds in undermining my argument and, thus, my original conclusion stands—the Credit View of Knowledge is false.

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Notes

  1. See also Sosa (1991, 2003), Zagzebski (1996, 1999, 2003), Riggs (2002), Greco (2003), and Neta and Rohrbaugh (2004).

  2. See Lackey (2007).

  3. It should be noted that I include several kinds of counterexamples to the Credit View of Knowledge in my (2007), some of which do not involve testimonial knowledge.

  4. See Lackey (2003).

  5. See Lackey (2003, 2008).

  6. It is only what Sosa calls animal knowledge that is acquired in extended Gettier cases; he still denies that subjects in such cases acquire what he calls reflective knowledge.

  7. See, for instance, Nozick (1981), Sosa (2000, 1999, 2002), Williamson (2000), and Pritchard (2005).

  8. For an early discussion of this thesis, see Goldman (1976).

  9. See Pritchard (forthcoming).

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Acknowledgement

I am grateful to Marian David, Sandy Goldberg, members of the Northwestern Metaphysics and Epistemology Reading Group, audience members at the 2007 Midwest Epistemology Workshop at Northwestern University, and, especially, Baron Reed, for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

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  1. Northwestern University, 1880 Campus Drive, Evanston, IL, 60208, USA

    Jennifer Lackey

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  1. Jennifer Lackey
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Lackey, J. Knowledge and credit. Philos Stud 142, 27–42 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9304-3

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