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On the Interplay of the Cognitive and the Social in Scientific Practices

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Hugh Lacey
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Abstract

I consider the following questions, central to recent disagreements between Longino and Kitcher: Is it constitutive of making judgments of the cognitive acceptability of theories that they are made under certain social relations that embody specific social values that have been cultivated among investigators (Longino)? Or is making them (sound ones) just a consequence of social interactions that occur under these relations (Kitcher)? While generally endorsing the latter view, I make a distinction, not made by the philosophers under discussion, between sound acceptance and endorsement of a theory, and argue that Longino's view applies to endorsement.

Type
Gender and Science
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 72 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2004 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers , December 2005 , pp. 977 - 988
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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