Abstract
In this note we introduce the notion of K–player additive extension of a symmetric two-player game and prove a result relating the equilibria in mixed strategies in the two games. Then we apply the result to the Borda electoral competition game.
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Laffond, G., Laslier, JF. & Breton, M.L. K–Player Additive Extension of Two-Player games with an Application to the Borda Electoral Competition Game. Theory and Decision 48, 129–137 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005256424944
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005256424944