Abstract
We characterize two lexicographic-type preference extension rules from a set X to the set Ψ of all orders on this set. Elements of X are interpreted as basic economic policy decisions, whereas elements of Ψ are conceived as political programs among which a collectivity has to choose through majority voting. The main axiom is called tournament-consistency, and states that whenever majority pairwise comparisons based on initial preferences on X define an order on X, then this order is also chosen by a majority among all other orders in Ψ. Tournament-consistency thus allows to predict the outcome of majority voting upon orders from the knowledge of majority preferences on their components.
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Laffond, G., Lainé, J. Majority voting on orders. Theory and Decision 49, 249–287 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026425015999
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026425015999