Abstract
The budget-voting paradox states that, when social alternatives are proper subsets of a finite set of decisions, choosing decision-wise according to the majority rule may select an alternative that is covered in the majority tournament among alternatives. Individual preferences are defined on single decisions, and are extended to preferences over the alternative set by means of a preference extension rule. We prove the existence of the paradox for any rank-based, monotone, and independent extension rule.
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Laffond, G., Lainé, J. The Budget-Voting Paradox. Theory Decis 64, 447–478 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9047-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9047-1