1. SOLIDARITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE. AN INTRODUCTION Arto Laitinen & Anne Birgitta Pessi T he word ‘solidarity’ derives from Latin: in the Roman Law obligatio in solidum involved the group liability of joint debtors. This is the sense of the French word solidarité in the Encyclopedia of 1765, and in Napoleon’s Code Civil 1804. Around the 1840s the term was adopted in German and English, and was politicized for example by the international labor movement, and was adopted to social sciences. Of the classics of sociology, especially Émile Durkheim (1947 [1893]) adopted the word as part of his basic terminology. Gradually the word came to be used in a broader meaning of emotionally and normatively motivated readiness for mutual support, as in the slogan “one for all and all for one.”1 Later the word was used for an official celebration day in the Soviet Union, for the famous trade union of Poland, and for various movements in support of developing countries. Interestingly, from European languages the word has been translated back to Latin, and forms part of the official social ethics of the Catholic Church. Many are of the opinion that the concept is so ideologically loaded, so flexible, and has such a controversial history that it should be left for ceremonial speeches (Luhmann 1984). On the other hand many defend the idea that sufficiently accurate uses of the concept of solidarity exist, and that “parasitic,” loose 4 ARTO LAITINEN & ANNE BIRGITTA PESSI and misleading uses can be separated from them (see e.g. Scholz 2008). As a concept, solidarity is both descriptive and normative. Solidarity in its different descriptive senses refers today to a kind of connection to other people, to other members of a group, large or small. One may also describe various microphenomena such as actions, motivations and attitudes as more or less solidary. “Solidarity” may be used to describe and explain the normal order and normative social integration in societies or communities, as opposed to chaos and conflict, and as opposed to order based on coercion or maximization of self-interest. But it also may be used to refer to more or less revolutionary critical social movements criticizing the normal order and the prevailing injustices. Solidarity may reign in small communities, combative political movements or in entire societies, even the whole humanity according to some. As a normative concept the concept of solidarity has been used in broader and narrower senses. For instance, the American social philosopher Richard Rorty (1989) seems to have thought that solidarity covers all prosocial thought and action. However, as solidarity is often based on we-thinking, it can be separated from not only anti-social egocentrism, but also from one-sided “thou-centrism” such as altruism, sympathy, caring, or Christian charity. While these concentrate on the wellbeing of the other or you, the target of concern in solidarity can be us together. Solidarity can be separated from these approaches in that solidarity requires a presumption of reciprocity and perhaps shared group-membership and behavior according to the norms of a given group. In this respect, solidarity is related to the principles of friendship or national “brotherhood” or sisterhood. Solidarity can also arguably be separated from justice and general duties. For example, the German social philosopher Jürgen Habermas (1989) considers solidarity and justice to be two sides of the same coin. According to him, solidarity is always internal to some concrete community, while universal morality and justice require one to detach oneself from the internal bonds of concrete communities. This way solidarity is always partial or agent-relative “we-thinking” while justice represents an impartial, agent-neutral perspective. SOLIDARITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE. AN INTRODUCTION 5 The Micro-level Phenomena: Behavior and Motives In sociology and social psychology, solidarity has been conceived either as a macro-level phenomenon of group cohesion, integration or order or as a micro-level behavior, emotions, and attitudes explaining such cohesion. Not all macro-level cohesion or unity deserves to be called a form of solidarity: if the social order is sustained by coercion or appeals to everyone’s self-interest, it is less a case of social solidarity than if the order is sustained by a commitment to shared norms and valued social bonds. While irreducible to self-interest, the degree to which the social norms and institutions are seen to benefit oneself (and one’s kin), and the degree to which one’s own fate depends on that of the whole group may nonetheless partly explain the strength of the commitment to the norms and institutions. The term was introduced to sociology by August Comte, but the classic treatment is Émile Durkheim’s (1947 [1893]) distinction between the ‘mechanic’ solidarity of traditional communities and the ‘organic’ solidarity of modern societies. Mechanic solidarity is based on the similarity of the members and the dominance of collective consciousness over individuality. Organic solidarity is based on the interdependence of different individuals and on the social division of labour. The Durkheimian distinction made it possible both to acknowledge that traditional social ties are eroding (while not fully disappearing) thanks to industrialization, urbanization, individualization, or democratization, and to see a different basis for social life emerging, consistent with these processes, leaving room for individual differences. The distinctive features of solidarity have been listed in many ways, here is the social philosopher Larry May’s (1996, 44) list. He has proposed that solidarity consists of five elements: 1) conscious identification with the group, 2) bonds of sentiment, 3) common interests in the group’s well-being, 4) shared values and beliefs, and 5) readiness to show moral support. According to May, identification with a group and the thought that the group’s well-being is part of each member’s well-being is central and constitutive of solidarity. This way solidarity is, to a great extent, built on similarity, uniform- 6 ARTO LAITINEN & ANNE BIRGITTA PESSI ity with members; shared values and beliefs can be based on, for instance, common history or living in the same area. Readiness to show support to the others when faced with adversity is also essential: solidarity is not mere passive feeling but also includes practical dispositions to act. As a microlevel phenomenon, solidarity has been conceptualized as prosocial behavior across different situations: helping and supporting in situations of need, doing one’s share in situations of cooperation, fairness in situations of distributing goods, avoiding breach in situations of trust, and moral repair when violations have taken place. According to Siegwart Lindenberg, who is one of the contributors to this volume, solidarity manifests itself especially in five particular types of situations where (as behavior and as norms) there could be a temptation to act without solidarity (cf. however the article in this collection, which adds a sixth type, related to mutual understanding). According to Lindenberg solidarity in fact means just that in these situations the individual (henceforth referred to as “Ego”) follows norms to take others (henceforth referred to as “Alter”) into consideration in his or her actions, although pursuit for short-term pleasure or perhaps also personal long-term benefit would suggest to act differently in that particular situation. Cooperation refers to situations where common good is produced. Both Ego and Alter belong to a group where common good is produced. Ego acts in a solidary manner if she participates in the production of common good even if it is arduous and even if there is an opportunity for freeriding. Fairness refers to situations of sharing. The Ego responsible for distributing burdens and benefits acts in accordance with solidarity if she strives to give everyone a fair amount of both benefits and burdens instead of attempting to maximize her own benefits and minimize her own burdens. What justice demands in detail is dependent on the accepted norms of the group. Altruism refers to needs and helping situations. Ego acts in a solidary manner if she helps the Alter in distress. What is regarded as needs and what is considered the minimum amount of help needed for the behavior to be solidary, again depends on the shared interpretations within a group. These may differ in different groups. Trustworthiness refers to situations of temptation where breaching implicit or explicit contracts would be tempting. Ego acts in a solidary manner if she avoids harming others even if it would mean increased costs for her. Considerateness refers to situations where things go awry, and promises or contracts cannot be fulfilled. Here the Ego acts in a solidary manner if SOLIDARITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE. AN INTRODUCTION 7 she apologizes, if possible warns about this beforehand and strives to compensate for her breaches. (Lindenberg, Fetchenhauer, Flache & Bruunk 2006, 9) In all these situations solidaristic behavior may require a sacrifice, a cost to oneself for the benefit of another individual or the whole group. Lindenberg has in his previous work sought to explain what makes people act in such a solidary manner, as opposed to hedonic or gain-seeking ways, in some situations, but not in others. In addition to the general formation of character or practical dispositions, situational cues have been shown to make a difference to behavior by affecting the salience of the solidarity frame as opposed to the frames of immediate gratification or long-term gain. Solidarity is thus precarious and needs to be supported by factors that increase the salience of the solidarity frame. Classical sociological theories stress the internalization of shared values and norms, but they sometimes fail to explain why socialized people would even want to act in a manner that is not solidary. On the other hand, theories of rational choice or classical economy, according to which an individual always acts according to her own interests, are unable to explain why individuals nevertheless sometimes behave in a sincerely solidary manner. Lindenberg’s model attempts to explain the possibility of both solidary and unsolidary behavior and highlight the situational and fragile nature of both. The situational fluctuation of solidary behavior, according to Lindenberg, results especially from our limited observational ability; we cannot observe all the dimensions of different situations. We have competing interpretative frameworks in every situation; situations are observed through frameworks shaped by different goals and relationships. For instance, when a friend asks me to borrow money, I perceive the situation to be in the category of “helping a friend in need” instead of primarily experiencing the loss of money as a cost. Helping a friend is salient, while economic thinking fades to the background. Thus I behave altruistically, but I do not fully forget my personal economy and benefits: if the same friend asks for a substantial amount of money for a third time in a row without having paid back his debts in between, I may well frame the situation otherwise. According to Lindenberg, the challenge in promoting solidarity is in supporting the solidarity framework as a salient interpretative frame- 8 ARTO LAITINEN & ANNE BIRGITTA PESSI work. In this sense, social pressure or formal rituals can also produce solidarity. These questions have been studied for decades also in interdisciplinary altruism research (see Pessi & Saari 2008). For methodological reasons, a focus on behaviour, excluding emotional or attitudinal elements, is often adopted in empirical research (e.g. by Hechter and Lindenberg). Most theorists (including Lindenberg) argue that behavior is not enough for solidarity (see e.g. Salmela’s contribution in this volume), as acting out of solidarity requires the presence of attitudes or emotions such as a sense of belonging, concern for the others’ well-being, commitment to shared norms, valuing the social bonds in question or identification with the group. As a distinct motivational pattern, solidarity combines elements of (extended) egoism, and (restricted) altruism. It can be seen as a form of “we-thinking” based on collective intentionality, whose nature has been studied in recent social philosophy (see e.g. Tuomela 2007, 2013, chapter 9). Action which is motivated by especially solidary motives can further be analyzed with more specific criteria. According to the German social philosopher Andreas Wildt (1999, 217-218), an action can be identified as one of solidarity when the actor 1) has, together with the recipient, feelings of sympathy and belonging together, 2) is partly motivated by altruism, 3) considers the act as a case of helping in a time of distress, 4) holds the distress as a moral problem, injustice, and a source of moral obligation, 5) holds him- or herself obligated to act to help, 6) does not believe the recipient has a legal or moral right to demand and receive from him or her in particular, 7) assumes that the recipient evaluates the distress in a similar way; 8) assumes that the recipient is motivated to alleviate his or her own distress and actively attempts to do so; and 9) assumes at least the possibility of analogous situations in which the recipient acts, has acted, or will act in analogous ways towards him or her. This definition by Wildt can arguably be broadened so as to include the other act- and situation-types apart from helping in need (e.g. the ones mentioned by Lindenberg: cooperation, fair sharing, trustworthiness and considerateness). SOLIDARITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE. AN INTRODUCTION 9 The Scope of Solidarity at the Macro Level: From Concrete Communities to Societies, from Political Movements to the Entire Humanity In both descriptive and evaluative usages, solidarity has been taken to be one important feature of, first, smaller communities, and second, entire societies (complementing for example social justice, democracy and autonomy as an evaluative notion). ‘Solidarity’ has made its way to the EU Constitution, and been promoted by such rival movements as Marxism, Social Democracy, French Solidarism, Liberalism, Roman Catholicism and neo-Fascism. The classical Liberal and Catholic approaches stress interpersonal responsibility and solidarity as a private or personal virtue, while Marxists and Social Democrats typically stress structural obstacles, institutional solutions and shared responsibility, so that solidarity can equally be a virtue of institutions. A moderate view holds that institutional arrangements can promote and realize genuine group solidarity (e.g. via progressive taxation and social services), but if the institutional arrangements are obeyed for solely coercive or self-interested reasons, they fall short of genuine solidarity. In social policy research European welfare states have been seen as realizing institutionally relatively high degrees of social (or ‘civic’) solidarity and distributive social justice. A third type of solidarity has been at stake for example in the international workers’ movement, the Polish Solidarność and various new social movements. The word solidarity may indeed, to many, conjure up images of the Polish labor union, solidarity strikes, or perhaps united labor front against oppression. In such political solidarity activists and members of the movement join to oppose the injustice or oppression of some group, and possibly to seek support from outside (out-group solidarity). Political solidarity in this sense strengthens the internal cohesion and mutual support of a group fighting against observed flaws, in the spirit of all for one, and one for all (see Scholz 2008). The struggling group does not necessarily promote its own interests, but through its actions expresses solidarity to the group whose unjust treatment is the cause for the struggle. These groups are often partly overlapping. Solidarity can also be targeted at groups on the other side of the world such as in the case of Finnish solidarity barn sales for supporting Nicaraguans. : ARTO LAITINEN & ANNE BIRGITTA PESSI Fourthly, the term is sometimes used very broadly to refer to the basic ethical concern for others, as in the work of Richard Rorty (1989). In this context, it is often called moral or human solidarity. While solidarity is typically seen as a positive quality, various forms of solidarity have been criticized for their tendency to lead to the exclusion of outsiders, perhaps represented as enemies, or for the internal repression of individuality, autonomy or personal responsibility. The relationship of the concept of solidarity to global thinking is one of tension. In the history of the concept, the emphasis has been on limited groups with mutual agendas, challenges, interests or a common good to share, and perhaps also a common foe or adversary. Traditionally it is taken that solidarity is primarily internal to a group, whereas global humanitarianism is then classified as a matter of sympathy, altruism, charity or respect for human rights—something other than solidarity. On the other hand solidarity is intertwined with the thought that all individuals are neighbors. For instance, in the societal teachings of the Catholic Church it is clearly emphasized that genuine solidarity may hold between all people. Let us next look at these four contexts a bit more closely. Concrete Communities: Exclusivity and Solidarity Solidarity is closely connected to communality. Solidarity’s characteristics may materialize most accurately in rather small communities whose members share, among other things, common history, common language, feeling of cohesion, willingness to help each other, common beliefs, and systems of values and norms. The core feature is inclusion and exclusion: not everyone is a member. This attitude promotes and in part specifically creates feelings of cohesion and density of a group. Respectively, outsiders may have their own communities. Any agent may have some responsibilities towards anyone, but typically shares their life more intensively with the particular members of one’s own group.2 In good and bad, the most solid communities seem to be the ones which emphasize their difference to other communities. Such communities include, for example, many fanatical religious and political communities. The phenomenon has been explained through two varieties of the concept of social capital: bridging capital and bonding SOLIDARITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE. AN INTRODUCTION ; capital (Putnam 2001). With regard to a broader community such as the society at large, a healthy community has several links and connections to other communities; in other words they have plenty of bridging capital. A community like this promotes not only its own communality, but also that of the broader community. Conversely, highly cohesive and introverted fanatical communities, bigger or smaller, have lots of bonding social capital and they may in fact damage the broader community very severely. One central challenge is to reconcile communality with individual autonomy and freedom (see chapter 6 of this volume). Although it has been stated otherwise, late modern individualism and freedom of choice do not necessarily ruin solidarity. On the contrary, in the late modern era the bonds between individuals have increased; we are all parts of multiple solidarities. It is precisely this that challenges institutions to be more flowing and flexible than before: the boundaries of institutions cannot be set in stone nor can institutions exclude others when individuals move about and become members of several institutions (Ammermann 2007, Sewell 1992).3 Lindenberg (1998) has introduced the term “weak solidarity” for combined bridging and bonding (with weaker expected sacrifice in the five solidarity situations described above). In chapter 2 he also discusses conditions that make the reach of solidarity vary. Society-wide Solidarity Solidarity in entire societies manifests itself in different ways, depending on the perspective and discipline. One way to speak about solidarity is to call it the social glue, or the cement of the society. This refers to the types of social bonds that cannot be traced back to coercive power or self-interest. An essential question for societal solidarity is how various goods are distributed. In this discourse the most central topics are income distribution, social services, and taxation: for example, in the Nordic welfare states the high level of taxation and social services is justified through solidarity. So instead of societal income distribution being based on voluntary charity, the right of each individual to basic income and tolerable living conditions has been institutionalized. Some consider this societal bureaucratic solidarity cold quasi-solidarity (Bayertz 1999, 24- 32 ARTO LAITINEN & ANNE BIRGITTA PESSI 25), but it can also be thought that certain types of institutional solutions produce solidary thinking, for example maintaining the solidarity framework. Further, democratic decision-making requires some solidarity: it is more demanding to be an active citizen than a subject to an enlightened dictator, content with bread and circuses. Political Movements and “Fighting Solidarity” Solidarity is a central concept also in the analysis of political movements. The political philosopher Sally Scholz (2008, 233-236) distinguishes three varieties of solidarity: social solidarity refers to group cohesion and differs from civic solidarity (the relationship between the citizens and the political state) and political solidarity. According to Scholtz, political solidarity highlights the conscience and commitment of an individual. Political solidarity manifests itself as responses to unjust and oppressive situations. The term is tightly connected to the history of the class struggle of the labor movement, to industrial strikes, and to political movements. Thus it can be called “fighting solidarity.” It was mentioned above that communal and societal solidarity require a certain type of exclusion. Fighting solidarity seems to further require antagonism, an enemy—perhaps an oppressor. The core of fighting solidarity is the idea of fighting together against injustices for example, by going on strike. Intra-group solidarity is essential in fighting solidarity, but another important characteristic is the moral support of outsiders. One expression for this is in the case of a strike, other groups or unions may go on strike to show support. However, the struggles are not always about injustice; sometimes fighting solidarity can be defending privileges already granted as well as pursuing new benefits. Solidarity of the Entire Humanity Solidarity of the entire humanity may be any kind of solidarity (societal, political, moral) extended to the whole humanity. It can be a matter of societal solidarity applied to a global society, or it may be a matter of political solidarity on a global scale, or then it may be a matter of moral, humanitarian universalistic solidarity. SOLIDARITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE. AN INTRODUCTION 33 So first, the entire humanity might one day form one comprehensive global state, one global society where national solidarity would cover all individuals. But it is not clear whether humanity at its present size could be a “concrete society” in the proper meaning of the term. What about connecting, secondly, all humanity and political solidarity; is it possible? Can the entire humankind unite into a political movement to battle epidemics, climate change or genocides, to name a few examples? For instance, ecological issues have garnered support from an ever-growing mass of individuals around the globe. The fact that the ecological movement still has its opponents (as well as those who treat the issue with indifference) does not as such diminish its global nature any more than the existence of crime in a society diminishes the “societal” nature of the laws or solidarity of that society. Thirdly, there is the moral perspective of altruism or equal respect. The altruistic perspective is a feeling of connection to other people; a feeling that the helper often finds difficult to articulate. Instead of dividing people into us and them, altruists see all individuals—all others—as members of the general humankind. When investigated, many individuals who have committed an altruistic deed that has been considered heroic have simply stated: “It was the only thing I could have done. They are people, just like me” (Monroe 1994; 1996). With this example we are close to the concept of humanitarian solidarity. This form of solidarity can be seen, following for example Sally Scholtz (2008, 233-236), as one variety of solidarity. Humanitarian solidarity is based on the notion of unity of all humanity.4 The Crisis of Social Solidarity within the Nation States? Solidarity is not primarily created through contracts. However, the predominant accepted practices and understandings according to which the central forms of togetherness are organized can perhaps be called an implicit solidarity contract. In other words, solidarity contracts encompass the different networks of “us” and “others” through which work, leisure time, and material, social, cultural and spiritual 34 ARTO LAITINEN & ANNE BIRGITTA PESSI needs of a community are organized. In the Western modern world, solidarity contracts have changed, according to the classics of sociology, from an all-encompassing forced communality, i.e. mechanical solidarity, towards an organic solidarity more permissive of individualism (Durkheim 1947 [1893]). At the beginning of the twentieth century solidarity was a fashionable concept. Alexandre Millerand, the French Minister of Finance who opened the Paris world fair of 1900, praised progress, enlightenment, science and solidarity: “Science reveals to us the material and ethical secrets that may be summarized in one word—solidarity” (Liedman 2002, 1). Technological and economic progress seemed to fracture traditional communality, but on the other hand it appeared to give birth to positive mutual dependence as well as to a new kind of solidarity based on an intensified division of labor that was more tolerant of individuality. The new solidarity manifested itself especially in relatively recently born territorial nation states. Contemporary conceptions of solidarity and practices of communality, togetherness, and joint responsibility are continuously being pondered, questioned, and altered. In advanced welfare states such as Finland there is currently an ongoing debate on, for example, decreasing tax rates and diminishing welfare services, presumed economic necessities, excessive corporate executive bonuses, justifications for strikes, moral alarmism concerning the treatment of beggars, factory shutdowns, the recession as part of an international financial crisis, and anti-immigration sentiments. In the European context the financial crisis has been used to justify austerity measures that some would call downright class warfare against the lower classes, and some would defend as the only available form of responsible long-term decision-making. Globally, events such as Occupy Wall Street, the Indignados and the Arab Spring have created calls for international political solidarity, as have the ongoing long-term movements against male chauvinism, racism, global poverty and injustice, tax havens, or the looming climate catastrophes. Hauke Brunkhorst, a German social theorist also contributing to this volume, has argued in his book Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Community that the nation state system succeeded in meeting three central historical challenges, that are currently re-emerging at the global level (Brunkhorst 2005). First, the nation SOLIDARITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE. AN INTRODUCTION 35 state system offered a way to avoid religious conflicts. In the Peace of Westphalia 1648, after wars over religion, religions had been defined to be each state’s own affairs, and inside states increasingly each individual’s personal affairs. Second, the nation state offered a way to avoid political revolutions and turmoil by implementing fundamental political rights. After the French Revolution the implementation of democracy and political rights has been a part of the autonomy of nation states; for instance, guaranteeing voting rights for women continued the implementation of the same idea. Third, states have controlled the dissatisfactions caused by socio-economic uncertainty and injustice. The role of the state as a regulator of the market economy and at the same time as a type of a protector of justice has proven to be central. Nation states have been able to adapt to the challenges of both capitalism and socialism (Brunkhorst 2005; 2007). As an addition to this, one can mention that the homogeneity of nations and the sharedness of cultures have presumably furthered cohesion on a societal level. The idea of “when in Rome, do as the Romans do” justified assimilative practices in, among other things, treatment of immigrants. Currently it seems that global economy, religion, media and environmental problems have made some of these achievements of the nation state system obsolete. Will they give birth to new ways of organizing social relations? On the one hand intolerance is increasing its lure and the decline in societal solidarity may support the birth of more local communalities, where the circles of solidarity may be quite tightly defined to cover only a small group. On the other hand, some of these concerns are genuinely global and may call for global solidarities. Despite progress in various areas of life, the twentieth century has been called humanity’s darkest century, especially due to the destructive wars, concentration camps, nuclear weapons and environmental degradation (Glover 1999). Wars and other exceptional circumstances may reinforce national solidarity, but particularly after the World Wars it is grotesque to think of wars as means to increase cohesion. The thought of technological and economic progress as a pure blessing has dissipated with environmental destruction and global poverty. The solidarity contract based on nation states seems to have rescinded: the challenges that the nation state system was able to 36 ARTO LAITINEN & ANNE BIRGITTA PESSI respond to have returned on a global level. In the twenty first century the roles of capitalist economy (and with it the global classes of ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’, see Brunkhorst in this volume) and—contrary to what is often thought—religion, have only strengthened on a global level. Further, the assimilatory approach to cultural differences has come under critical scrutiny with the debates on multiculturalism, although populist movements have created a kind of backlash on those issues. The ideals of global democracy and global solidarity appear more pressing than ever—as an analogous response to the socio-economic, political, religious and cultural challenges that the nation-states successfully provided in the latter half of the second millennium. Solidarity and Justice As an evaluative or normative notion, solidarity corresponds closely to the principle of fraternité, which in the slogan of the French Revolution complements equality and liberty. Contemporary theories of justice typically cover issues of basic liberties and social equality, so it is illuminating to approach the evaluative and normative nature of solidarity in comparison to the ideal of justice. Strong solidarity is by no means a perfect guarantee of justice. Strong solidarity within a group can easily be accompanied by insolidarity and injustice towards outsiders (cf. Lindenberg 1998). Further, arrangements considered just inside a group (such as those based on hereditary hierarchy) can be highly inconsistent with better principles of justice, which members of the group might accept after some reflection. However, solidarity arguably erodes, if members of the group do not experience or consider its basic structures to be sufficiently just: a solidary social order is not based only on pure coercion or calculated pursuit of self-interest, but also on moral acceptance independent of them. John Rawls states in the beginning of his Theory of Justice (1971) that justice is the most important virtue of the basic structure of societies, and that this is a widely accepted idea. According to Rawls, proponents of different conceptions of justice can agree that the concept of justice refers to a quality of the highest importance. As justice SOLIDARITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE. AN INTRODUCTION 37 is given primacy in terms of social qualities, solidarity is considered at most the second most important quality, for example as a practical precondition, for justice to be actualized. Solidarity is connected to justice in at least two different ways. First, the ideal of solidarity can affect the contents of the principles of justice. According to Rawls, societal justice requires, in addition to a maximal balance between freedom and opportunities, stringently limiting economic and social inequalities so that the arrangements are the best possible for the most disadvantaged (the difference principle). According to Rawls, the difference principle aspires for the ideal of brotherhood, with its focus on the position of the worst-off. According to Andreas Wildt (2007), the Rawlsian difference principle is roughly the principle of distribution that solidarity requires. Such a principle of solidarity requires not only solidarity from the rich towards the poor but also solidarity from the poor towards the rich. Arguably the requirement of equality of opportunities has not been materialized in the real world too well. In its absence, a demand for solidarity towards the better-off may sound audacious, but in principle the idea of solidarity from the worse-off to the better-off dignifies the worse-off as agents of solidarity and not mere recipients or beneficiaries, and that is of course how things ought to be. On the other hand, solidarity may be a factor pertaining to the functioning (rather than the content) of the principles of justice. To work in practice, the principles require people to follow them so that they would not be mere utopian ideals, but would become concrete social reality. Some commentators of Rawls, communitarians such as Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor, posit that it is precisely the Rawlsian difference principle that requires strong solidarity. The last chapter of the Theory of Justice treats this question in the same spirit, so Rawls himself is in broad agreement here. According to Jürgen Habermas (1989, 47) the requirements of justice can be formally justified without appealing to the well-being of others or common good, but the principle of solidarity combines the concern for the well-being of others and the entire group. For him, solidarity is based on the insight that all individuals are to take responsibility for each other because as members of the same society they all have a similar interest in keeping their own life contexts intact. Deontologically conceptualized justice requires solidarity as its flipside. 38 ARTO LAITINEN & ANNE BIRGITTA PESSI The requirements of justice and fairness are a natural part not only of the basic structure of society but also of smaller communities. As we saw, for instance, according to Lindenberg the just distribution of benefits and burdens is one of the requirements of solidarity. Justice is also connected to political, fighting solidarity. Many theories regard political solidarity as fighting specifically injustice. Additionally, the questions of global solidarity weave into the demands for justice— global justice is a central requirement of the ethics of world citizens. At the same time, as Lindenberg has pointed out justice, concerns are only one part of solidarity, so more is needed than global justice. An Overview of the Chapters The purpose of this book is to offer tools for conceiving the world from the perspective of solidarity. The book analyses both the concept and theories of solidarity, and the empirical practices in which they are manifested. It is often thought that while unselfish actions must be explained through socialization to norms, selfish action is something “natural” as a result of evolution. Recent research gives reasons to doubt this: evolution has also made us naturally capable of moral and solidary stances and cooperation, while the very same capacities and abilities also enable selfish behavior in the long term. Which of these prevail is then a matter of norms prescribing solidary behavior. But it has also been shown by the social psychologist Dale Miller (1999) that there exists a norm of selfishness in the background of selfish action, and we even want to cloak our altruistic actions in an egoistically prudential cloak. The opening chapter by Siegwart Lindenberg takes an evolutionary approach to study the norms of solidarity. He studies their content and scope as well as the nature of our conformity with them. He builds on one of the important discoveries of the last decades, namely the so-called “social brain” (Dunbar) enabling non-selfish behavior. Seemingly, our most advanced brain power (our relatively large frontal lobes) has evolved in order to allow human beings to derive individual adaptive advantages from living in groups and especially from living in fairly large social groups. The relevant practices include pair bonding and cooperative child raising. Collective SOLIDARITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE. AN INTRODUCTION 39 goods produced by larger groups are the basis for individual adaptive advantages from living in such groups, and our brain has evolved to allow us living in fairly large groups in the sense that we (a) derive adaptive advantages from living in groups and (b) are able to maintain the production of collective goods in the group. In this chapter, Lindenberg discusses these developments in two stages: first, as the development of norms in general, and solidarity norms in particular, and second, the development of additional solidarity norms as responses to problems created by the development of the abilities and processes that allow living in larger groups in the first place. These abilities include first, the ability to put oneself in the other’s shoes, second, the development of language, and third, “the combined cognitive and motivational processes that allow goals to become the most prominent mechanism for steering behavior and cognitive and affective mentalizing.” Lindenberg shows how “the combination of these three psychological developments allowed the evolution of a unique basis for solidarity: (a) the working of norms in general and solidarity norms in particular; and (b) the fact that norms in general and solidarity norms in particular have a flexible reach, applying sometimes to small, sometimes to more inclusive groups.” On this basis, Lindenberg argues there are three basic solidarity norms (sharing, helping, cooperation) and three additional ones (trustworthiness, considerateness, efforts at understanding and being understood). Of these, the norm concerning mutual understanding is added to the previous five situations of solidarity, presented above in this introduction (chapter 2). Importantly, he argues that, to remain important for behavior, solidarity norms need to be constantly supported by institutional and social arrangements. Mikko Salmela’s chapter responds to Siegwart Lindenberg’s earlier work. He starts from the observation that researchers widely agree that feelings of togetherness and other collective emotions are central to group solidarity. Sceptics about the role of emotions in group solidarity include Lindenberg, who has argued that purely affective conceptions of solidarity are weak in explaining the dynamics and precariousness of solidarity. Instead, as we have seen, Lindenberg defines solidarity as prosocial norm-oriented behavior in situations that involve contributing to the common good, fair distribution of costs and benefits, helping others in need, refraining from hurting others 3: ARTO LAITINEN & ANNE BIRGITTA PESSI at a cost to oneself, and mitigating unintended or unavoidable harms to others. Salmela suggest that emotions, both individual and collective, also have several significant functions in Lindenberg’s theory. They stabilize the normative solidarity frame; they serve as relational signals of being in this frame; and they motivate solidary behavior. To show this, Salmela replaces the Durkheimian conception of collective emotion as collective effervescence with a philosophical notion of collectively intentional shared emotions. Collective emotions are then the “glue” of solidarity, as Randall Collins has remarked (albeit for partially different reasons), and as such, necessary for solidary groups (chapter 3). Kristen Renwick Monroe examines how the concept of solidarity can help us understand the different responses to the suffering of others. She focuses on the importance of psychological perceptions as they affect our solidarity, and on how our perceived relationship to others determines our treatment of them. She stresses the importance of what she calls “the ethical perspective,” a sense of connection with the person in need that then leads to a felt imperative to act to alleviate the person’s suffering, and the role of psychological trigger mechanisms that cause the ethical perspective to click into play. She presents the empirical data that lead her to this theory and presents the theory itself in some detail, suggesting how identity perceptions work through an innate ethical framework to influence our treatment of others. She first reviews some empirical data that suggest moral choices are spontaneous, not the result of conscious deliberation, religious or otherwise. She then suggests a model of moral choice designed to explain these spontaneous responses. She concludes with a discussion of the psychology behind this pre-conscious, spontaneous choice (chapter 4). Simon Derpmann focuses on moral solidarity, establishing first with reference to David Wiggins’s work that moral solidarity is a worthy topic for moral theory, and then arguing that the viewpoint of universal moral solidarity does not capture everything there is to solidarity. There are communal or partial aspects to solidarity which need to be taken into account. A theory of moral solidarity needs to accommodate a specific type of partiality that finds expression in references like ‘my’, ‘our’ and ‘like me’ that reveal a distinct form of communal relatedness (chapter 5). SOLIDARITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE. AN INTRODUCTION 3; Arto Laitinen examines how solidarity can be understood as a form of mutual recognition; or possibly, as a social phenomenon, which combines different forms of mutual recognition. The emphasis is on the connection between ‘thin’ universal mutual respect, and the thicker relations between people, more sensitive to their particular needs, contributions and attachments, which social solidarity involves. Three claims will be argued for: first, thin mutual respect already constitutes a relationship of unity between persons, which can be seen when (more or less encompassing and demanding) moral duties are seen not as monadic but dyadic or communal; second, thick social solidarity as an ongoing practice of mutual aid and support contains three kinds of recognition that go beyond thin respect and thus provide a thicker unity; third, the three contexts of solidarity as distinguished in contemporary debates, namely moral solidarity, political solidarity, and social or group solidarity can each be illuminated as part of this picture starting from mutual respect and aiming at thicker mutual aid and support (chapter 6). Nicholas H. Smith in his chapter argues for the centrality of work for understanding solidarity. If solidarity is a feature of effective cooperative relationships, and if it is above all in work that the concrete meaning of cooperation becomes manifest to us, then work should not be a marginal or secondary consideration for theorists of solidarity, as it currently is, but a central consideration. Smith first discusses the relation between solidarity and work that emerges from some of the classical theories, from Durkheim, Hegel and Marx. He then shows how the contemporary debate around solidarity by Axel Honneth and others tends either to marginalize this relation or to make it difficult to keep in view, and how even the accounts that do take the relation between work and solidarity seriously, nevertheless ignore or choose to discount the possibility of a solidarity that is embedded in working activity itself on account of its cooperative nature. Smith elaborates the meaning of the claim that work has this feature by drawing on Christophe Dejours’s psychodynamic approach to work. Smith concludes by responding to some of the main objections to his approach (chapter 7). Hauke Brunkhorst’s analysis focuses on the notion of constitution. In his chapter “Solidarity in Times of Crisis: Constitutional Evolution and Europe” he first gives a brief outline of his theoret- 42 ARTO LAITINEN & ANNE BIRGITTA PESSI ical framework that is founded in evolutionary theory. He argues that constitutions are, like brains or eyes of organisms, evolutionary universals or evolutionary advances. Then he draws a distinction between revolutionary and gradual (or ‘evolutionary’) change within the social evolution. He then gives various examples of sequences of revolutionary and evolutionary change in constitutional history in Germany, France and United States, and then turns to discuss the European Union. He argues that although the foundation of the European Union in 1951 was a very limited unification, it was nevertheless a kind of revolutionary founding act. In the last two sections he then reconstructs the evolutionary development of the European constitution and demonstrates that the evolution of European constitutional law poses structural problems of legitimization which now are going to become manifest in a serious and existential crisis of legitimization (chapter 8). Juho Saari and Anne Birgitta Pessi start from the observation that the institutional structures of the twenty-seven Member States of the European Union are currently caught in a process of rapid change, Europeanization and modernization of the European social model. They study the mechanisms affecting the modernisation of the European social model and people’s attitudes towards solidarity, in the sense of helping others, in the countries of the European Union. Their working hypothesis is that the institutional structure of each Member State will, to a significant degree, account for the differences observed in people’s solidarity (e.g., attitudes towards helping others). They find that a strong public welfare sector and an active civil society promote solidarity. This overall finding resonates with studies by other scholars—which also shed light on possible further explanations. First of all, it has been indicated that in countries of strong public welfare sector people trust each other more; equality promotes trust. Second, equality further shortens the social distance between citizens, and social interaction (for example in volunteering) is not considered risky. Third, a strong public welfare sector may maintain the norm of solidarity—which may then inspire individuals to help each other and particularly people in need. The welfare sector sets the ideal that no one should be left alone to suffer. Fourth, in countries with a strong public welfare system also NGOs and the overall third sector agents do well (e.g. they may be partially funded by the SOLIDARITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE. AN INTRODUCTION 43 welfare system). Time and resources offered by the public welfare system enable individuals to, for instance, volunteer. The findings support an approach—in line with Polanyi, among others—that would stress the role of the national institutional setting. As a social concern, helping others seems to be associated with general social development. It gets more prominence in the Member States which have also done well in other areas. The authors conclude by discussing two possible explanations for this (chapter 9). In the next chapter, Arto Laitinen and Anne Birgitta Pessi discuss further the conceptual relationship of solidarity to helping behaviour and motivations. They first investigate the notion of solidarity and ask whether the requirement to help is part and parcel of solidarity. They defend the view that some helping behavior is demanded by solidarity, whereas some helping behavior exceeds the demands of solidarity. They then examine with empirical data how solidarity, so defined, figures in the helping behavior, motivations, and experiences of togetherness of Finns. One striking finding is connected to European solidarity: the attitudes towards helping Europeans were less positive than attitudes towards helping “anyone in the world.” This was puzzling as it could be hypothesized that Europeans are not really perceived as being in need of help (so that European solidarity would be based on other behaviours and attitudes relevant for solidarity, for example cooperation rather than helping). Since the collection (in 2006) of the data used here, the debt crisis has changed the constellation considerably, and European solidarity has increasingly meant helping the banks and economies of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, or Spain, with opponents arguing that under the austerity measures, this is not really solidarity with the people of those countries but rather with the international banking and financing sector (chapter 10). Heikki Hiilamo studies the role of voluntary organizations and especially the role of the church in the development of Nordic welfare state model in Finland. The qualitative change that Protestantism brought about in the church-state relationship has been understood as a historically decisive prelude to secularization and the welfare state. The history of Finland gives a good lesson on how the political foundation for solidarity can be re-established in a highly divided country. In 1918, Finland experienced a severe civil war between the 44 ARTO LAITINEN & ANNE BIRGITTA PESSI ‘Reds’ and ‘Whites’, one of the bloodiest on the European continent. After World War II, Finland faced a challenge in resettling the evacuees from the areas that were occupied by the Soviet Union. More than one-tenth of the population had to be relocated. Key elements in the rebuilding process were expanding the social policies, implementing extensive land reforms, modernizing the educational system and using social insurance funds as investment capital. Social policy programs and the people’s insurance covered everyone equally and created a feeling of solidarity. Nordic universalism was an expression of human rights, a fellowship of interests and responsibilities on a national level. In the Nordic model the same programs cover all the categories of the population, which in turn is seen to be a solid guarantee for large popular support for the welfare state. Ideally, since everybody contributes to and everybody benefits from the system, there is no wedge between the well-off payers and the worse-off beneficiaries. The welfare state is an all-encompassing form of solidarity. Development of the universal welfare state in Finland began truly in the 1960s. The state assumed all-encompassing responsibility in health care and social welfare; consequently the role of the Church and other voluntary organizations was marginal. A deep economic recession hit the Nordic countries in the early 1990s. This led to an abrupt end of the golden years of the Nordic welfare state. The following decades witnessed permanent austerity, which was aggravated by the economic collapse of 2008 and the European debt crisis. These austerity measures can be seen as a step back from universality, and in these conditions the role of the church and NGOs in poverty alleviation has become relevant in filling the gaps in the welfare state provisions (chapter 11). Bente Blanche Nicolaysen in her chapter “Volunteering, the Humanitarian Gift to ‘Distant Suffering,’ and Solidarity” first reports a case study that covers a Norwegian voluntary association’s spending of funds (raised at the fund-raising bazaar) for humanitarian causes outside Norway over time (1950-2000) to discuss the possibilities and limits of trans-national solidarities. The focus is on the nature of the relationships over time that a local voluntary association and the volunteers within it develop when the recipient of funds is the “unnamed and universal stranger” (Titmuss). What form can volunteering take when those called upon to act are thousands of miles SOLIDARITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE. AN INTRODUCTION 45 away from the person(s) suffering? The chapter first outlines the case study, and then presents the theoretical framework. It argues that one should abandon solidarity as a generic term, and instead speak of solidarity in an at once narrow and a trans-national sense (following Gould 2007). Then, the changing nature of social ties (and of solidarity) when the association (and its members) extend their commitment from local to national and international projects is examined, in two steps: first, by taking a historical look at the local association’s engagement at the local and national levels; and second, by outlining the association’s gradual use of fundraising for engagement in “distant suffering.” Finally, the potential for an extension of the moral horizon horizon of the volunteers the volunteers involved is discussed (chapter 12). Notes 1 See Laitinen 2013, and on Laitinen & Pessi 2011. 2 These types of concrete communities in which there exists great solidarity include, for example, families, clans, village communities, work communities, religious groups, and groups that are formed around different interests and activities. The family is an especially tight-knit community whose membership late modern individuals, too, share. Its solidarity is not straightforward either; for example, intra-family cross-generational solidarity is described through a model where family solidarity is divided into six parts (Bengtson & Roberts 1991, 857). Associational solidarity describes the density of different types of cross-generational interaction and mutual activity. Affectual solidarity is used to evaluate, for instance, the amount and depth of affection, warmth, intimacy, trust and respect, as well as their reciprocity between family members. Consensual solidarity is the sharing of values, attitudes and beliefs between family members. Functional solidarity covers more concrete forms of helping and resource exchange in a family. Normative solidarity, on the other hand, describes the degree of commitment to intra-family roles and duties, while structural solidarity describes the general possibilities for cross-generational relations based on residence, number of family members and their health (Silverstein et al. 1995, 466-473). 46 ARTO LAITINEN & ANNE BIRGITTA PESSI 3 One has to keep in mind that the additional duties and commitments brought about by the new communal solidarity relationship may be suppressive and over-demanding. Consequently, one cannot make the general statement that the more there is solidarity, the better: various groups and ad-hoc committees exist for functional purposes only and it would be counter-productive to require too much internal solidarity from them. 4 Solidarity of humanity may concern moral, humanitarian solidarity where community memberships are ignored. In such a case other individuals are moral persons towards whom each individual has both negative and positive duties. Negative duties are often prohibitions from doing harmful things and they are often possible to fulfill by not doing anything: that way there is no mischief involved. Positive duties in turn are suggestions or demands to help others and actively contribute to their well-being—mere inaction would indicate breaching these suggestions. According to Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) well-known idea, all persons form a Kingdom of Ends: each individual has rights and duties. All individuals are one another’s neighbors in a deeply binding and touching manner. This may sound utopian, but as mentioned earlier, it is precisely in everyday helping where attitude is an essential and explaining factor for action. Several theoreticians—for example the already mentioned Kant and Rawls—regard universal duties towards other individuals and their well-being as integral requirements for human rights. The challenge of humane solidarity is to include other individuals as part of ‘us’ even if they were originally outsiders. The term of discussion is ‘incremental solidarity’ (Kolenda 1989) where, much like in Durkheim’s definition of organic solidarity, humane solidarity is considered an aim to aspire. It is not easy for solidarity of humanity, or even incremental solidarity, to materialize. Most individuals rather identify with race, class, religion or gender than humanity (May 1996). Additionally individualism—although it needs not be seen as a mutually exclusive opposite to a sense of community—can create additional barriers for the materialization of humane solidarity. SOLIDARITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE. AN INTRODUCTION 47 Literature Ammerman, Nancy (2007). Everyday Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Anderson, Benedict (1983). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso Baldwin, Peter (1990). The Politics of Social Solidarity. Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bayertz, Kurt (1999). Four Uses of ‘Solidarity’, in Solidarity, ed. Kurt Bayertz. Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture, Vol. 5. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer, 3-28. Bayertz, Kurt, ed. (1999). Solidarity. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Bengtson, Vern L. & Robert E. L. Roberts (1991). Intergenerational Solidarity in Aging Families: An Example of Formal Theory Construction. 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