religions
Article
A Dilemma for Theistic Non-Naturalism
St.John Lambert
Department of Theology, Ethics, and Philosophy, Felsted School, Dunmow CM6 3LL, UK;
lambertphilosophy1@gmail.com
Abstract: Non-naturalism is the view that there are sui generis, non-natural moral properties. This
paper poses a dilemma for theists who accept this view. Either God explains why non-moral
properties make sui generis, non-natural moral properties obtain, or God does not explain this. If
the former, then God is unacceptably involved in the explanation of his own moral goodness. If
the latter, then God’s sovereignty, stature, and importance are undermined, and an unacceptable
queerness is introduced into the world. This paper concludes that theists have good reasons to reject
non-naturalism on account of the unacceptable consequences of accepting either horn.
Keywords: non-naturalism; theism; making-relation; moral properties; divine goodness; sovereignty;
queerness
1. Introduction
Citation: Lambert, St.John. 2023. A
Dilemma for Theistic
Non-Naturalism. Religions 14: 1115.
https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14091115
Academic Editors: Martin Jakobsen
and David Peter Lawrence
Received: 25 July 2023
While non-naturalism has received much attention in the metaethical literature,
it has received relatively little attention in the philosophy of religion literature. This
is surprising, given that most theists are moral realists (of one stripe or another) and
non-naturalism is one of the main realist theories on offer, receiving powerful defences
from Shafer-Landau (2003), Enoch (2011), Cuneo (2007), Huemer (2005), FitzPatrick (2008),
and Wielenberg (2014).
In this paper, I draw some connections between these two literatures by arguing that
theists who accept non-naturalism face a challenging dilemma. Either (i) God explains why
non-moral properties make sui generis, non-natural moral properties obtain, or (ii) God
does not explain why non-moral properties make sui generis, non-natural moral properties
obtain. In Section 3, I argue that the first horn of the dilemma is unacceptable because it
implies that God is unacceptably involved in the explanation of his own moral goodness.
In Section 4, I argue that the second horn of the dilemma is unacceptable because it
undermines God’s sovereignty, stature, and importance, and it introduces an unacceptable
queerness into the world. I conclude that theists have good reasons to reject non-naturalism
on account of the unacceptable consequences of accepting either horn.1
I will start by clarifying what theism and non-naturalism are.
Revised: 22 August 2023
Accepted: 26 August 2023
2. Theism and Non-Naturalism
Published: 29 August 2023
Theism is the view that God exists. For the purpose of this paper, I will accept a
traditional, monotheistic conception of God, according to which God is an omnipotent,
omniscient, perfectly good being, who is worthy of worship and the sovereign creator and
sustainer of all things distinct from himself. This is the type of theism that I have in mind
throughout this paper.
Non-naturalism, by contrast, is a metaphysical view about the nature and existence of
moral properties, where moral properties are properties such as moral rightness, wrongness, goodness, and badness. This view holds that moral properties exist and that moral
properties are sui generis and non-natural. I will clarify what I mean by ‘sui generis’ and
‘non-natural’.
Copyright:
© 2023 by the author.
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
This article is an open access article
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Religions 2023, 14, 1115. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14091115
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To say that moral properties are sui generis is to say that moral properties are not
identical to or constituted by non-moral properties. In other words, it is to say that moral
properties are irreducible. They are their own distinct kind of property that is not identical
to or constituted by any kind of non-moral property. If moral properties are sui generis, then
moral properties are wholly distinct from non-moral properties. Take the moral property of
goodness, for example. While the moral property of goodness might obtain in virtue of the
non-moral property of being pleasurable, the moral property of goodness is not identical
to or constituted by the non-moral property of being pleasurable (or any other non-moral
property that might make goodness obtain), according to non-naturalism. They are wholly
distinct properties. As Moore (1903, p. 9) says, “good is good, and that is the end of the
matter.” The same is true for other moral properties such as moral rightness, wrongness,
and badness. They are sui generis and thus wholly distinct from non-moral properties, on
non-naturalism.2
To say that moral properties are non-natural, by contrast, is to say that moral properties cannot even in principle be known through empirical investigation. Unlike natural
properties—such as biological, physical, chemical, and psychological properties—nonnatural properties are completely outside the remit of scientific investigation. They cannot
be known in the same empirical way that natural properties can be known. Non-naturalism
is often supplemented with an epistemological account of how we come to know nonnatural moral properties, usually involving intuition, but we need not discuss such accounts here.
According to non-naturalism, moral properties exist and are sui generis and nonnatural. For ease of exposition, I will now use ‘moral properties’ to mean ‘sui generis,
non-natural moral properties’.
Non-Naturalism: Moral Properties Exist and Are Sui Generis and Non-Natural
Importantly, for the purpose of this paper, non-naturalism does not merely hold that
moral properties exist. It also holds that non-moral properties make moral properties exist.
In other words, it holds that moral properties are dependent upon non-moral properties: that
moral properties obtain only in virtue of or because of non-moral properties. According
to non-naturalism, if an action is good, then it is good because it has certain non-moral
properties that make it good. For example, an action might be good because it is pleasurable
or because it is kind. The same is true for other moral properties. No action can just be good,
bad, right, or wrong. It must be good, bad, right, or wrong in virtue of having non-moral
properties that make it good, bad, right, or wrong. This means that moral properties cannot
float free, on non-naturalism, for they depend for their existence on non-moral properties.
Let us stipulatively call the asymmetric dependence relation that holds between moral
properties and non-moral properties the making relation. Non-naturalists can and have
offered different accounts of the making relation. For example, some non-naturalists might
say that it is the grounding relation (Rosen 2010; Schaffer 2009), while others might say that it
is a robust causal relation (Wielenberg 2014, pp. 16–20). For the purpose of this paper, we
need not commit non-naturalism to any particular account of the making relation. We need
only note that non-naturalism is committed to the making relation.
The Making Relation: Non-Moral Properties Make Sui Generis, Non-Natural Moral
Properties Obtain
This idea will be the focus of this paper because it raises a challenging dilemma for
theists who accept non-naturalism. The issue at the heart of this dilemma concerns whether
God explains the making relation. Either (i) God explains the making relation and so
explains why non-moral properties make sui generis, non-natural moral properties obtain,
or (ii) God does not explain the making relation and so does not explain why non-moral
properties make sui generis, non-natural moral properties obtain. Let us call this dilemma,
the making dilemma. In Section 3, I argue that the first horn of the making dilemma is
unacceptable because it implies that God is unacceptably involved in the explanation of his
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own moral goodness. In Section 4, I argue that the second horn of the making dilemma
is unacceptable because it undermines God’s sovereignty, stature, and importance, and it
introduces an unacceptable queerness into the world.
Four preliminary comments are necessary before we proceed. First, the making
dilemma is different from the Euthyphro dilemma, which poses the following question: ‘Is an
action right because God commands it, or does God command it because it is right?’. These
dilemmas are importantly different for two reasons. First, the making dilemma specifically
targets theists who accept non-naturalism, and so assumes, for the sake of argument, that
moral properties are sui generis and non-natural, and that non-moral properties make
them obtain. The Euthyphro dilemma, by contrast, does not do this. Second, the making
dilemma considers whether God explains the making relation, while the Euthyphro dilemma
considers whether God’s commands make actions right. This means that the dilemmas
consider fundamentally different questions. The Euthyphro dilemma considers the question
‘What makes actions right?’, while the making dilemma considers the question ‘Does God
explain the making relation between moral and non-moral properties?’. The making
dilemma is thus importantly different from the Euthyphro dilemma and should therefore
be kept distinct.3
Second, non-naturalism can be characterised in a number of different ways. For the
purpose of this paper, I characterise any view that accepts the existence of non-natural, sui
generis moral properties to be a version of non-naturalism. Importantly, this means that
views in which God explains the making relation between non-natural, sui generis moral
properties and non-moral properties count as versions of non-naturalism in this paper.
While this might not be the taxonomical norm for some philosophers, such views count as
versions of non-naturalism in this paper because they accept the existence of non-natural,
sui generis moral properties.
Third, non-naturalism is often characterised as a robust or metaphysically heavy view
that embraces moral ontology (Cuneo 2007; Enoch 2011; Wielenberg 2014). I accept this
characterisation of the view. While there are relaxed or metaphysically light versions of
non-naturalism that eschew moral ontology (Dworkin 1996; Parfit 2011; Scanlon 2014), I do
not have these versions of the view in mind. This is because it is not clear to me that the
making dilemma can be raised against theists who accept non-naturalist views that deny
that moral properties and relations carry ontological commitments. For this reason, the
version of non-naturalism that I have in mind throughout this paper is the robust one that
embraces moral ontology and takes moral properties and relations to carry ontological
commitments.4
Fourth, non-naturalism is itself neutral on the realist/nominalist debate about universals. Non-naturalists can be realists about universals who think that, in addition to
moral property-tokens or instances, there also exist universals or moral property-types.
For example, non-naturalists can think that in addition to a particular action’s rightness
(a property-token), there also exists a universal, rightness, that all right actions instantiate.
However, non-naturalists can also be nominalists about universals who reject the existence
of universals and think that only particular moral property-tokens or instances exist. Nonnaturalism is itself neutral on this important metaphysical issue and is compatible with a
range of realist and nominalist views. As I understand it, non-naturalism is primarily a
view about moral property-tokens or instances. It holds that moral property-tokens are sui
generis and non-natural, and that non-moral property-tokens make moral property-tokens
exist. Whether there are also moral property-types or universals is an independent issue
that should be settled by general debates in metaphysics (see Wielenberg 2018, pp. 365–68;
2020, pp. 204–5). In this paper, all claims about properties should be interpreted as claims
about property-tokens or instances.
Now that we have clarified what theism and non-naturalism are, and we have stated
the making dilemma for theists who accept non-naturalism, we can move on to consider
the two horns of the making dilemma, starting with the first horn.
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3. The First Horn
According to the first horn of the dilemma, God explains the making relation and
so explains why non-moral properties make moral properties obtain. For example, God
explains why the non-moral property of being pleasurable makes the non-natural, sui
generis moral property of goodness obtain. This horn of the dilemma is unacceptable
because it implies that God is unacceptably involved in the explanation of his own moral
goodness. This becomes clear when we consider the ways in which God could explain why
non-moral properties make moral properties obtain.
On the one hand, God could directly explain why non-moral properties make moral
properties obtain by willing that non-moral properties make moral properties obtain. For
example, God could will that this instance of pleasure make the moral property of goodness
obtain, and that this other instance of pleasure make the moral property of goodness obtain,
and so on. Alternatively, God could will that certain classes of non-moral properties make
moral properties obtain. For example, God could will that all instances of pleasure make
the moral property of goodness obtain. On either version of this view, an act of divine
willing directly explains why non-moral properties make moral properties obtain.
On the other hand, God could indirectly explain why non-moral properties make
moral properties obtain by explaining various moral principles which themselves explain why
non-moral properties make moral properties obtain. For example, God could will the truth
of the principle of utility—that an action is right if and only if and because it maximises
happiness—and then this principle could itself explain why the non-moral property of
maximising happiness makes the moral property of rightness obtain. On this view, God
indirectly explains why non-moral properties make moral properties obtain by willing the
truth of moral principles which themselves explain why non-moral properties make moral
properties obtain.5
These two views describe the main ways in which God could explain the making
relation between moral and non-moral properties. Let us call these views explanationist
views.6 It is worth noting that explanationist views are distinct from voluntarist views which
hold that “moral [properties] depend directly and immediately on God’s will” (Murphy
2011, p. 100). This is because voluntarist views hold that moral properties depend directly
and immediately on God’s will, while explanationist views hold that only the making relation
depends on God’s will. We can see this by considering the following schema.
Moral Properties M Stand in Making Relation R to Non-Moral Properties N
On explanationist views, God’s will explains the making relation, R, between moral
and non-moral properties, but God’s will is not itself the non-moral property, N, that
makes moral properties, M, obtain. For example, God’s will explains why pleasure stands
in the making relation to goodness, but it is pleasure itself that makes goodness obtain.
According to explanationist views, God’s will explains the making relation without itself
being one of the non-moral properties that makes moral properties obtain. This means that
explanationist views are distinct from voluntarist views and should not be conflated.
In what follows, I argue that explanationist views are implausible because they imply
that God is unacceptably involved in the explanation of his own moral goodness. But
before I do that, there is another objection to explanationist views that is worth considering.
Graham Oppy (2006) argues that explanationist views are implausible because they
imply that morality is objectionably contingent. According to Oppy, if God explains why
non-moral properties make moral properties obtain, then God could make any non-moral
property make any moral property obtain. This is implausible because it seems that there
are some non-moral properties, such as those of Nazi death camps, that could never make
the moral property of goodness obtain. Oppy writes:
If it is up to an orthodoxly conceived monotheistic god to establish the relations
that obtain between moral properties or facts and non-moral properties or facts,
then it must be that there are other possible worlds in which the relations that
obtain between moral properties or facts and non-moral properties or facts differ
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from the relations that obtain in the actual world. In particular, then, it seems that,
if it is up to an orthodoxly conceived monotheistic god to establish the relations
that obtain between moral properties or facts and non-moral properties or facts,
then there are other possible worlds . . . in which there is a natural duplicate of
our universe in which the moral properties are different, for example, possible
worlds in which there are universes that share the natural history of our world,
but in which the Nazi death camps are not evil. I do not think that it is very
controversial to claim that there are no such possible universes. (Oppy 2006,
p. 354)
This objection is unpersuasive, however, because explanationists could argue that God
necessarily wills that non-moral properties make moral properties obtain, and so there is
no possibility of objectionable contingency. Moreover, explanationists could supplement
their response by arguing that God’s necessary character traits (such as his being perfectly
loving) impose various constraints on God’s will. They could then argue that God’s
necessary character traits make it impossible for God to will such things as that the nonmoral properties of Nazi death camps make the moral property of goodness obtain. To
respond to this, Oppy would need to show that a perfectly loving God could will such
things as that the non-moral properties of Nazi death camps make the moral property of
goodness obtain. Since this is no easy task, I suggest we look elsewhere for objections to
explanationist views.7
My preferred objection to explanationist views is that they imply that God is unacceptably involved in the explanation of his own moral goodness. This is clear because if God
explains why non-moral properties make moral properties obtain, then God must somehow
be involved in the explanation of his own moral goodness. In particular, God must make
himself morally good, either by willing that his non-moral properties make the moral
property of goodness obtain, or by willing the truth of moral principles which themselves
explain why God’s non-moral properties make the moral property of goodness obtain.
This is unacceptable for at least two reasons. First, it implies that prior to God’s
explaining why non-moral properties make moral properties obtain, God was not morally
good. This is because on explanationist views, God only becomes morally good after willing
that his non-moral properties make the moral property of goodness obtain, or willing the
truth of moral principles that do the same thing. Explanationist views thus make God’s
moral goodness dependent on an act of divine will. Most theists will find this unacceptable.
It is important to note that explanationists do not have to say that there was a time
when God was not good, for God could timelessly explain, or explain at every moment
of time, why his non-moral properties make the moral property of goodness obtain. But
explanationists do have to say that God was not morally good explanatorily or logically prior
to God’s explaining why non-moral properties make moral properties obtain, which is
unacceptable because it makes God’s moral goodness dependent on an act of divine will.
Second, if God’s moral goodness is dependent on an act of divine will, then this makes
God’s goodness less worthy of praise. This is because it is not praiseworthy for a being to
make itself morally good by willing that its non-moral properties make the moral property
of goodness obtain, or by willing the truth of moral principles that do the same thing. It
is akin to creating a test that one will pass with flying colours and then expecting (and
perhaps even requiring) others to praise you for having passed that test. This, I submit,
is not praiseworthy behaviour and it does not merit the moral praise that God’s moral
goodness is supposed to merit.
One might reply that God’s moral goodness does merit moral praise, because God
is good in virtue of his praiseworthy non-moral properties such as being loving, being
just, and being merciful. However, while I agree that God’s non-moral properties do
merit moral praise, it must be noted that God’s non-moral properties are only morally
good and praiseworthy, on explanationist views, because God wills them to be. Indeed,
on explanationist views, there was nothing morally good or praiseworthy about God’s
non-moral properties prior to his act of divine will. They only became morally good and
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praiseworthy after his act of divine will. This in turn makes God’s non-moral properties less
worthy of praise, for God’s non-moral properties are only morally good and praiseworthy
because God wills them to be, and there is nothing praiseworthy about this—willing that
one’s non-moral properties make the moral property of goodness and thus praiseworthiness
obtain, or willing the truth of moral principles that do the same thing. This in turn makes
God’s moral goodness less worthy of praise, which is unacceptable.8
For these reasons, I find the first horn of the making dilemma—that God explains the
making relation—unacceptable. Let us now consider the second horn of the dilemma.9
4. The Second Horn
According to the second horn of the dilemma, God does not explain the making
relation and so does not explain why non-moral properties make moral properties obtain.
Non-moral properties just make moral properties obtain, independently of God. For
example, the non-moral property of being pleasurable just makes the non-natural, sui
generis moral property of goodness obtain, independently of God. Let us call this view in
which God does not explain the making relation the brute view and consider four problems
for it.
First, if God does not explain why non-moral properties make moral properties obtain,
then God’s perfection of sovereignty, according to which everything distinct from God is
dependent on God, is undermined. This is because on the brute view, the making relation
is both distinct from and independent of God. This is clear because on the brute view, God
does not explain why non-moral properties make moral properties obtain. Non-moral
properties just make moral properties obtain, independently of God. While God does
explain why there is a world that has non-moral properties, he does not explain why nonmoral properties make moral properties obtain. This just happens, independently of God.
The brute view thus implies that there is something distinct from God that is independent
of him—the making relation. This undermines God’s sovereignty, which is unacceptable.10
Second, if God does not explain why non-moral properties make moral properties
obtain and God has moral obligations, then the brute view implies that God is subject to
the demands of an independent moral reality and must do what it requires, on pain of
immorality. This means that the brute view implies that there is something independent
of God that tells God what to do. This makes God subservient to an independent reality,
which in turn undermines his exalted stature. This, I submit, is unacceptable.
Third, if God does not explain why non-moral properties make moral properties
obtain and morality is of overriding normative importance, then the brute view implies that
the requirements of morality are more important than the requirements (or commands) of
God. This is because we should always do what morality requires, on this view, even if God
were (perhaps counterpossibly) to require otherwise. God might, of course, just require us
to do what morality requires, but that would not show that the requirements of God are as
important as the requirements of morality, for God would just be relaying the requirements
of an independently authoritative reality. Indeed, on this view, God would be relegated to
the status of a mere messenger who simply relays the requirements of an independently
authoritative reality. This view thus not only undermines the exalted stature of God, but
also undermines our allegiance to God, because it implies that there is an independent
reality whose requirements are more important than God’s. This, I submit, is unacceptable.
Fourth and finally, if God does not explain why non-moral properties make moral
properties obtain, then an unacceptable queerness is introduced into the world. This is
because on the brute view, reality is inexplicably agent-orientated. This is clear because on
the brute view, reality comes morally equipped for agents by coming pre-loaded with the
making relation. On the brute view, it is as if reality knew that agents would exist and came
equipped to bestow moral properties on their non-moral properties, making moral verdicts
on their conduct. This, I submit, is unacceptably queer. If reality is orientated towards or
set up for agents, then that cries out for explanation. However, on the brute view, God
cannot be invoked to explain this. Reality is just inexplicably orientated towards agents in
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virtue of being set up to make moral verdicts on agents by bestowing moral properties on
their non-moral properties. This, I submit, is unacceptably queer and counts against the
brute view.11
For these reasons, I find the second horn of the making dilemma—that God does not
explain the making relation—unacceptable.
5. Conclusions
In conclusion, I have argued that theists who accept non-naturalism face a dilemma.
Either (i) God explains the making relation or (ii) God does not explain the making relation.
I have argued that both horns of the dilemma have unacceptable consequences. On the
first horn, God is unacceptably involved in the explanation of his own moral goodness.
On the second horn, God’s sovereignty, stature, and importance are undermined, and an
unacceptable queerness is introduced into the world. While these considerations might
not show that non-naturalism is false, they do show that theists have good reason to reject
non-naturalism. This is a striking conclusion, given that most theists want to be moral
realists, and non-naturalism is one of the main realist theories on offer.12
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement: Not applicable.
Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.
Notes
1
To my knowledge, theists who accept non-naturalism include Cuneo (2007), Mawson (2002), Sampson (2023), Swinburne (2015),
and Yandell (2012). As far as I know, these theists have not discussed the dilemma raised in this paper, though I suspect they
would opt for the second horn.
2
Note that some non-naturalists deny that moral properties are sui generis in the sense of being neither identical to nor constituted
by non-moral properties. For example, Shafer-Landau (2003, pp. 66, 74–78) thinks that moral properties are sui generis, despite
being “exhaustively constituted” by non-moral properties. Since Shafer-Landau rejects my characterisation of what it is for moral
properties to be sui generis, his version of non-naturalism is not one that I have in mind in this paper because he does not accept
that moral properties are sui generis in the specified sense. For non-naturalists who accept my characterisation, see Enoch (2011,
pp. 101–2) and Wielenberg (2014, p. 14).
3
Note that most divine command theorists reject the claim that moral properties are sui generis because they accept reductive divine
command theory, the view according to which the moral property of being right is identical to or constituted by the non-moral
property of being commanded by God (Adams 1999; Baggett and Walls 2011; Evans 2013). Note also that reductive divine
command theory avoids the making dilemma because it rejects the claim that non-moral properties make sui generis moral
properties obtain.
4
Note that if I am mistaken and the making dilemma can be raised against theists who accept relaxed versions of non-naturalism,
then so much the better for my making dilemma. For discussion of the difference between relaxed and robust views in metaethics,
see Böddeling (2020).
5
One might object that moral principles are necessary, and so they cannot be explained, not even by God. There are three things to
note in response to this. First, I am not defending this view, I am merely describing it. Second, some have argued that necessary
moral principles can be explained by God (Craig 2008, p. 178; Murphy 2011, pp. 47–49). Third, others have argued that moral
principles are contingent (Rosen 2020).
6
For discussion of views that are in the vicinity of explanationist views, see Mackie (1982, pp. 114–18), Mulgan (2015, pp. 52–54),
Murphy (2011, pp. 110–11), and Quinn (1990).
7
For discussion and defence of this response in the different context of divine command theory, see Adams (1999, p. 280), Evans
(2013, p. 92), Flannagan (2022), Quinn (2000, pp. 69–71), and Wierenga (1989, p. 221). Note that I have not said that Oppy cannot
respond to this response. I have only said that it is no easy task.
8
Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point.
9
One might object that theistic non-naturalists can avoid the first horn of the making dilemma by restricting their view and
holding that God only explains the making relation for moral properties other than moral goodness. There are three things to note
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in response to this. First, it is ad hoc and introduces an ugly asymmetry into God’s explanation of morality, whereby God only
explains the making relation for some moral properties and not others. Second, the restricted view still faces the second horn
of the making dilemma because it holds that God does not explain the making relation for moral goodness. Third and finally,
note that theistic non-naturalists cannot motivate the restriction of their view by holding that moral goodness is identical to or
constituted by theological properties, because theistic non-naturalism holds that all moral properties (including moral goodness)
are sui generis. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point.
10
For discussion of God’s perfection of sovereignty, see Craig (2016, p. 41), Leftow (2012, pp. 19–22), Murphy (2011, pp. 6–12), and
Quinn (1990, pp. 293–97).
11
Note that I am not claiming that morality is queer on the brute view because it is committed to the existence of categorical reasons
(Joyce 2001) or irreducible normativity (Olson 2014). Rather, I am claiming that morality is queer on the brute view because it
makes reality inexplicably agent-orientated. (Mackie (1982, pp. 114–18) broadly discusses this problem for theists and proposes
that theists endorse explanationist views instead.) One might object that reality is already orientated towards agents on theism
because an agent is built into the foundation of reality. But this is not right. To be agent-orientated, reality must be in some
way set up for agents. But the mere fact that God exists at the foundational level does not show that reality is set up for agents.
Moreover, if reality were in some way set up for God, then that would, I submit, also be unacceptably queer, for it would seem to
imply that there is something independent of God that set reality up for him. Thanks to an anonymous referee for bringing this
objection to my attention.
12
I would like to thank Christophe de Ray and several anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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