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Fall and Rise of Aristotelian Metaphysics in the Philosophy of Science

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Abstract

The paper examines the fortunes of Aristotelian metaphysics in science and the philosophy of science. It considers the Enlightenment claim that such a metaphysics is fundamentally unscientific, and that its abandonment was essential to the scientific revolution. The history of the scientific revolution and the metaphysical debates involved in it is examined, and it is argued that the eclipse of Aristotelian views was neither complete, nor merited. The evolution of Humeian and positivist accounts of science is described, and it is shown how the severe problems with these accounts, together with a revival of Aristotelian concepts in philosophy, have led to the rebirth of broadly Aristotelian accounts of the metaphysics underlying science.

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Notes

  1. For defences of forms of this thesis see Zilsel (2003), Rossi (1970), Smith (2004).

  2. See Ovitt (1987), Whitney (1990), White (1978). White’s contested thesis is that Christian theology is responsible for the development of technology in Europe, a development he sees as a disaster on ecological grounds.

  3. See Duhem (1954, 1969, 1985, 1987, 1996). Duhem also wrote a number of articles for the 1912 Catholic Encyclopedia, which has helpfully been placed online at http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/index.html; they are ‘Albert of Saxony’, ‘History of Physics’, ‘Jean de Sax’, ‘Jordanus de Nemore’, ‘Nicole Oresme’, ‘Piere de Maricourt’, and ‘Thierry of Freburg’.

  4. See Burtt (1954), Koyré (1957), Lindberg (1990).

  5. For a survey see Sorabji (2005).

  6. This was because Euclidean geometry contradicted some of Epicurus’s metaphysical principles. Epicurus’s follower Polyaemus roundly asserted that ‘all of geometry is false’; see Cambiano (1999), p. 587.

  7. For discussion of the evolution of the concept and mathematics of probability, see Byrne (1968), Hacking (1975), Daston (1988), Hald (1990).

  8. Geach remarks that ‘As regards natural kinds in the animate world, Locke’s scepticism was largely based on a credulous acceptance of old wives’ tales: about rational parrots, and about “monsters” or “changelings” produced by the intercourse of bulls with mares, cats with rats, and “drills” with women’. Geach (1961), p. 88.

  9. See Koyré (1965), pp. 149–163, esp. pp. 149, 152, 149; Cohen (1987); Westfall (1986), p. 233.

  10. See Henry (1994) for discussion of alternative interpretations of Newton’s view of gravity.

  11. His view on gravity is now presented as ‘Intelligent Falling’, a satirical parody of the ‘Intelligent Design’ position of anti-Darwinists; see http://www.theonion.com/content/node/39512

  12. See Jammer (1999), pp. 40–41.

  13. See Garber (1982) on Leibniz’s early views.

  14. See Iltis (1973) for discussion of Leibniz and his followers.

  15. See Harman 1998, pp. 195–196.

  16. See Ellis 2001, pp. 263–268.

  17. See Ehring (1986) and (1997), and Dowe (2000).

  18. Suarez, for example, simply meant by ‘physical cause’ a cause that has a real influence on the production of an effect, as opposed to one that was termed a cause but did not actually produce an effect (as for example a factor that is described as a cause on the basis of its not preventing something it can and should prevent); see Suarez (1994), p. 16–17.

  19. See Aquinas (1975), ch. 69, pp. 226–235.

  20. For the new Hume, see Strawson (1989), Wright (1983); for the debate between interpretations, see Read and Richman (2000).

  21. For the move away from Kant, see Coffa (1991), Friedman (1999), and Frederick Suppe (1977), pp. 6–14.

  22. On this see Carnap (1936–1937).

  23. An important popularising description of the positivist programme is given in Ayer (1936). For a standard account of the Received View, its evolution, and objections to it, see Suppe (1977).

  24. See Stalker (1994) for discussion of Goodman’s new riddle.

  25. For the DNM see Hempel (1965).

  26. Discussed in Woodward (2003a, b).

  27. See Suppe (1977), pp. 80–86.

  28. See Feyerabend (1975) and (1987).

  29. See Lewis (1932), Marcus (1946, 1947).

  30. See Kripke (1980).

  31. See Putnam (1975).

  32. For criticism of the causal theory of reference as a basis for essentialism, see Salmon (1982) and Shapere (1984), ch. 18.

  33. See Thompson (1988) on the necessity of dispositional terms for physics.

  34. See the paper by Carnap, and criticisms of his approach, in Tuomela (1978).

  35. On the problems raised for conditional analyses of dispositions by the problems of masking and finkish dispositions, see Martin (1994), Lewis (1997), Mumford (1998) ch. 3, Bird (1998), Choi (2006); for survey and bibliography concerning dispositions generally, see Fara (2006).

  36. For these difficulties see Armstrong (1983), Tooley (1977, 1987).

  37. For this objection to laws of nature see Mumford (2004).

  38. The main examples of this approach are Popper (1935), Kuhn (1962), Lakatos (1970) and (1978), Laudan (1977).

  39. It should be mentioned that Popper introduced the Aristotelian notion of causal powers early on, in an attempt to give an account of notions of probability involved in quantum mechanics; see Popper (1957) and (1959), and Molnar (2003), pp. 105–107.

  40. See Harré and Madden (1975), Bird (2005a, b, 2006), Ellis (2001), Molnar (2003), Heil (2003), Cartwright (1983, 1989, 1999).

  41. He elaborates on this idea in Shoemaker (1984).

  42. Thus, Aquinas, in explicating Aristotle’s remarks in Physics book VIII 255b17, says that ‘to ask why a heavy thing is moved downwards is nothing other than to ask why it is heavy.’ Aquinas (1963), p. 511. This of course assumes Aristotle’s account of gravity; a Newtonian or Einsteinian account of gravity would rephrase the description of being heavy.

  43. See Ducasse (1969), p. 16.

  44. See Michotte (1946/1963), Anscombe (1981), pp. 136–137; Leslie and Keeble (1987), Fales (1990), p. 15; Sperber et al. (1995).

  45. For such defences see Molnar (2003), ch. 3; Martin and Pfeifer (1986), Place (1999a, b).

  46. See e.g. Ellis (2001), pp. 162–165.

  47. As remarked on by Woodward (2003), pp. 3–4.

  48. See van Fraassen (1980, 1989, 2002).

  49. See Dretske (1977), Tooley (1977, 1987), Armstrong (1983).

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  1. Department of Theology, Catholic Institute of Sydney, Strathfield, NSW, 2140, Australia

    John Lamont

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Lamont, J. Fall and Rise of Aristotelian Metaphysics in the Philosophy of Science. Sci & Educ 18, 861–884 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11191-007-9118-2

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