Not Being Sure of Myself

Abstract. It's intuitive to think that an intentional action requires that the agent *knows* that she's doing so. In light of some apparent counterexamples, Setiya suggests that this intuitive insight is better captured in terms of credence: performing an intentional action requires the agent to have a higher credence that she's doing so than she would have otherwise. I argue that there is no such thing as an agent's credence for what she's doing. After distinguishing this thesis from an idea some defend under the slogan "deliberation crowds out prediction", I explore the thesis's broader epistemological implications for the belief-credence relation. (10815 words)

Keywords: agential-knowledge; betting hypothesis; credence; intentional action

1 The Controversial Cognition Condition

When Raymond is squeezing a lemon intentionally, he knows he is doing so. According to Anscombe (2000), an event isn't an intentional action if the agent doesn't know that she's performing the action. Small (2012) labels this the Cognition Condition.[1] Call the first-person knowledge that's constitutive of intentional actions agential knowledge.[2]

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[1] The *present continuous* tense is essential. The Cognition Condition isn't about what we have done, what we were doing, or what we will be doing in the distant future. It's a condition about self-knowledge regarding what we are doing. I add the phrase "in the distant future" because what I'm about to do in the immediate future is relevant to whether I am φ-ing — as a continuous process. If this is literally the very last moment I φ, I have φ-ed and have done φ-ing. Hence, whereas the Cognition Condition isn't about an agent's distant future, it's at least partly about the agent's immediate future. This will play a role in my subsequent argument.

[2] Many philosophers follow Anscombe in calling this kind of first-person knowledge "practical knowledge". I choose the term "agential knowledge" instead because "practical knowledge" is too often associated with know-how and skill instead of an agent's knowledge about the fact *that* she's performing certain intentional action.

Not everyone accepts the Cognition Condition. Davidson (1980/1971: 50) argues:

> But a man may even be doing something intentionally and not know that he is; so of course he can be doing it without knowing that he is. (A man may be making ten carbon copies as he writes, and this may be intentional; yet he may not know that he is; all he knows is that he is trying.)

The person intends to be making 10 carbon copies but is seriously unsure that he's writing hard enough to go through all 10 layers of paper. One might argue that due to such uncertainty, he doesn't really believe that he's producing 10 carbon copies, in spite of the fact that that's the intentional action he's performing. After all, he's definitely doing something. What else could he be doing?

Setiya (2011/2008: 41) presents a similar case against the Cognition Condition. According to Setiya, if a person is only slowly regaining control over their hand after suffering from paralysis, they might have the intention of holding a fist behind their back yet being extremely uncertain — hence arguably doesn't count as having the belief — that they are doing so. Yet, they are definitely doing *something* intentionally. It appears that the only intentional action they could be performing here is holding a fist behind their back.

The Cognition Condition appears to capture something right. So, we have two options. Option one: explain away these cases. Option two: modify the Cognition Condition to make it immune to those cases while still capture its intuitive appeal.

Setiya chooses the latter. He replaces the Cognition Condition with a condition about partial belief:[3]

> If A is doing ϕ intentionally, A believes that he is doing it or is **more confident** of this than he would otherwise be, or else he is doing ϕ by doing other things for which that condition holds. (42; my emphasis)

This idea of partial beliefs, or degrees of belief, or degrees of confidence is commonly referred to as credence. Call this new condition the Credence Condition. According to the Credence Condition, an intentional action ϕ requires the disjunction of three things:

> **[disjunct 1]** the agent believes that she's ϕ-ing, or
> **[disjunct 2]** the agent has higher credence that she's ϕ-ing than otherwise, or
> **[disjunct 3]** the agent is ψ-ing in order to ϕ and either [disjunct 1] or [disjunct 2] applies to her ψ-ing (instead of her ϕ-ing).

The first disjunct is the Cognition Condition's implication. What lets the Credence Condition accommodate the counterexamples is [disjunct 2]. Although the person in Davidson's case isn't certain that he's producing ten carbon copies, he must be more confident about the fact that he's doing so while he performs the action. [Disjunct 3] is not relevant for our purpose.

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[3] Setiya uses "confidence" and "partial belief" interchangeably.

Crucial to the way I presented the issue at hand is the assumption that knowledge is a kind of belief. This is why, so the challenge goes, an agent's uncertainty, by implying the lack of the relevant belief, implies the lack of the relevant knowledge. Some Anscombians may find this assumption questionable.

Admitting the general appeal of the Cognition Condition, some Anscombians argue that the condition is best interpreted as a condition about a special kind of knowledge they call "knowledge-in-intention". This kind of knowledge isn't a belief (e.g., a warranted true belief) but an intention, or an intention-like mental state. For example, Campbell (2018) appeals to this idea of knowledge-in-intention to shed light on another well-known Anscombian thesis about agency: agential knowledge isn't observation-based. She explains the thesis with the fact that intentions, unlike beliefs, aren't to be justified by evidence, let alone observational evidence. Along similar lines, other Anscombians propose that agential knowledge is neither a kind of belief nor a kind of intention, but a kind of command.[4]

This essay focuses on examining the philosophical issue surrounding the Cognition Condition as a thesis about belief-based knowledge. I won't wade into the debate whether the Credence Condition is to be interpreted as a condition about belief-based knowledge or as a condition about non-belief-based knowledge. For the purpose of this essay, this issue is irrelevant. Even if we accept that there is non-belief-based knowledge, even if intentional actions are always accompanied by the agent's intention-based knowledge about their intentional actions, it's nonetheless independently plausible that the agents *at least typically* also have beliefs about what they are doing intentionally, i.e., setting Davidson's and Setiya's untypical cases aside (I'll address

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[4] E.g., Haddock 2011.

these cases later). It's also reasonable to say that an agent's beliefs about what they are doing intentionally are typically epistemically warranted. There is typically nothing epistemically amiss with such first-person beliefs. In other words, introducing new kinds of knowledge into the conversation doesn't make the belief-based agential knowledge go away, whose nature still requires proper analysis. This essay focuses on belief-based agential knowledge.[5] Hence, the discussion about whether the Cognition

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[5] On multiple occasions, it has been pointed out to me that Anscombe was interested in the kind of first-person knowledge that is *practical* (i.e., what I call agential, see footnote 2) instead of *theoretical*. It's said that belief-based knowledge is theoretical knowledge. So, my discussion about belief-based agential knowledge fails to engage with what Anscombe was interested in when she presented the Cognition Condition. There is a quick answer and a more involved answer to this concern. The quick answer: this essay is inspired by certain claims Anscombe made, but it isn't meant to be a piece of Anscombe exegesis. What Anscombe herself cared about isn't crucial to the current essay (not that this is uninteresting). The more involved answer is that Anscombe's writing is hard to decipher. To me, it remains an open question what Anscombe is trying to get at when she draws the distinction between the engaged practical knowledge and the detached theoretical knowledge. In the literature, there are attempts to flesh out the distinction that doesn't require practical knowledge to be non-belief based (e.g., Moran 2001). Methodologically, we should resist the temptation to conflate a phenomenon and our preferred theoretical account of said phenomenon, especially when there isn't widespread consensus that our theoretical account is right. I suspect this is one of those cases where philosophers can be tempted to replace the phenomenon of the engaged nature of agential/practical knowledge, which is a common ground among Anscombians, with their preferred theoretical treatment of said phenomenon (e.g., the treatment that this engaged nature is analyzed as the fact that agential knowledge isn't a belief). Of course, I'm not against the possibility that this theoretical treatment turns out to be correct. But this is far from being settled. In short, whether the issue this essay tries to tackle aligns perfectly with what Anscombe was interested in isn't particularly important for my purpose. But I also don't *know* that it isn't what she had in mind.

Condition can also be interpreted to be about non-belief-based agential knowledge and whether we have good reason to posit a non-belief-based form of knowledge are issues beyond the task at hand. They are irrelevant to the puzzle for belief-based agential knowledge, i.e., the puzzle that stems from Davidson's and Setiya's cases we saw earlier.

I'll argue that Setiya's disjunctive principle fails. More importantly, the reason it fails rests on something of broader significance about the connection between agency, credence, and belief. Here's the plan. **Section 2:** I'll demonstrate a standard heuristic for measuring people's credence. **Section 3-5:** I'll show how this heuristic yields no meaningful results when it's applied to agential knowledge. It will be argued that this is a good reason to believe that an agent has no credence for what they are doing intentionally. Call this "act-credence".[6] This thesis is closely related to, yet importantly different from an idea some philosophers defend under the slogan "deliberation crowds out prediction". The Credence Condition fails as a result. **Section 6:** I'll strengthen my case and clarify my view by addressing several objections. **Section 7:** The broader significance of such credence gaps is considered.

2 Determining Credence

Our credence contributes to the formation of our preferences. In principle, a person's credence for p can be reverse engineered to a certain extent from their preferences. This is achievable by considering their preferences in an idealized betting situation regarding

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[6] Some authors use the term "act-credence" to denote an agent's credence for what they are *about to* do intentionally; but I shall reserve the term for the credence for statements about actions in the present continuous tense: an agent's credence for what they *are doing*.

p, where the truth of p matters to them in a particular way. This essay assumes that a person's betting preferences in the relevantly idealized scenarios is a proper heuristic to give us *some* information about the person's credence.[7]

Suppose we want to determine Bill's credence for the state-of-affair that it'll rain tomorrow. What we can do is to conceive of a betting scenario, in which q is the betting quotient and \$S is the stake of the bet. If Bill decides to play, he pays us \$qS to get \$S in return if the state-of-affair occurs (i.e., it'll indeed rain). Ideally for Bill, $q = 0$, which means he gets the chance to win money at no cost at all. But Bill would be willing to play for some but not all positive values q as long as it is neither a logical impossibility, nor a tautology that it will rain tomorrow. The maximum value for q that Bill is willing to accept reflects how certain Bill is that it will rain.[8]

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[7] The betting interpretation of credence was first developed in Ramsey 1926, also independently in de Finette 1989/1931. Some *analyze/define* credence in terms of hypothetical betting behaviors (a.k.a. the strong betting interpretation). Others make the weaker assumption that credence *can be measured* in terms of hypothetical betting behaviors (see Jeffreys 1939). This essay makes the even weaker assumption that people's preference is a suitable heuristic for measuring credence at least *to some extent*. Some challenges to the betting interpretation can be found in Christensen 2001, Eriksson & Hajek 2007, Meacham & Weisberg 2011, and Eriksson & Rabinowicz 2013. Although this paper assumes the relevance of betting preferences in measuring credences, make this assumption in the weakest form that does not subject to the challenge of these objections (or so I would argue). For this reason, I won't directly engage with many of these objections. For an illuminating defense of the betting interpretation against many of the objections, see Elliot 2019. It's noteworthy that neither the betting interpretation nor my argument in this essay assumes that hypothetical betting preferences are the only measure of credences.

[8] This is, of course, an oversimplification. Knowing whether one is betting for or against something distorts how one reveals one's evaluation of that thing. This is made evident by the fact that, at any given moment, the buying and asking price of a stock never coincide. The value of q is a better measure of Bill's

There are further well-known complications regarding such hypothetical betting situations. These complications are often presented as objections to measuring a person's credence with their preferences. People's real life betting behaviors are subject to many influences, which we need to filter out by various idealizations. For example, it's argued that the betting scenario doesn't measure credence because people might be risk-aversive so that their preferences don't reflect their credences (for this, and more similar concerns, see Plantinga 1993: 118-119).[9] This can be handled by adjusting the thought experiment we use. We can stipulate that the stake is not too big that it would scare the person involved and not too small that they don't care enough to bet

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credence if he doesn't know whether he is betting for or against the relevant proposition. For this reason, it is better to set up the betting scenario so that the stake S may be positive or negative. (S cannot be 0 because there is no bet without a stake.) If $S > 0$, there is a maximum q, beyond which Bill will not be willing to play (i.e., there is a maximum amount Bill is willing to pay upfront to play). By contrast, if $S <$ 0, there is a minimum q, below which Bill will not be willing to play (i.e., there is a minimum amount Bill must be paid upfront for him to be willing to play). By letting S be either positive or negative, the biases associated with betting for and against a state-of-affair should cancel out each other so that, *ideally*, the maximum q when $S > 0$ and the minimum q when $S < 0$ would converge on a value that can represent Bill's credence for the state-of-affair that it will rain tomorrow. (see Gillies 2000: 55).

[9] A similar concern is presented by Eriksson and Hajek's (2007) Zen monk case. Suppose a monk has reached nirvana so that they have no preferences to anything despite their credences about what happens in the world. The monk's preferences would therefore tell us absolutely nothing about their credences. What Eriksson and Hajek overlooked, however, is that Buddhists end up having no preferences to anything *exactly* by entertaining arguments for a nihilistic metaphysics that requires them to *suspend judgments* about all things, i.e., they don't have credence about anything. Of course, Eriksson and Hajek can talk about a fictional Buddhist school of thought Zen*. But then the case would have limited force as a counterexample.

thoughtfully. We also need to stipulate that, during the bet, the agent is a rational utility maximizer that cares only about the reward in the bet, and so on and so forth.

It's useful to conceive of what we're doing here — tweaking the betting scenario by stipulations — as something similar in spirit to what Rawls did when he fine-tuned his veil of ignorance thought experiment to approach a reflective equilibrium, at which point the stipulations in the thought experiment are carefully calibrated to single out the features relevant to the conception of fairness/justice in our liberal political culture. Here, our goal is to use the idealized betting thought experiment as a heuristic to approach an equilibrium that more or less extract information about credence's contribution to a person's preferences. Like the *caribus paribus* laws in science, it's impossible to completely flesh out all the idealizations required for the thought experiment to uniquely determine a person's credence. Perhaps we can only conceive of a betting scenario *idealized enough* to narrow down q to a value-range instead of converging on a single value. But this isn't a significant problem. My assumption isn't that our credence can be defined or even fully measured in terms of our preferences. All measurement has a limit of precision; credence is no exception. This won't matter for my subsequent argument. This essay only needs the modest assumption that a person's betting preferences in a suitably idealized scenario is a proper heuristic for giving us some information about their credence.

3 Credence of Control

There is a complication when we are to determine a person's credence for p while the person believes that they are in control of whether p. Suppose we want to determine Bill's credence for the fact that his wallet won't be in his pocket 10 seconds from now.

We conceive of a betting scenario and ask Bill his preference regarding q. What is the maximum value for q Bill could rationally accept? It seems that the answer is 1 because he can simply take his wallet out of his pocket, thereby guaranteeing that the statement that his wallet won't be in his pocket 10 seconds from now is true.

There is something problematic in this attempt to measure Bill's credence. The issue isn't that the betting opportunity itself influences Bill's preference for q.[10] All measurement processes affect what's being measured. Instead, the problem is this. If the person, whose credence for p is what we are trying to measure, is allowed to believe that they can make p true/false, the value of q generated by the betting scenario would end up tracking the wrong thing, i.e., something other than the person's credence for p. In Bill's case, Bill would be willing to choose q = 1 regardless of both *whether* Bill had credence about the proposition that his wallet won't be in his pocket and, if he had credence about it, *what* the value of such credence was before he was placed in this hypothetical betting scenario. In other words, if Bill is allowed to believe that he can control the fact that his wallet won't be in his pocket, the value of q is generated *solely* based on how much control he believes he has over the fact (q = 1 indicates that he believes he has full control). Thus, the value or value-range for q doesn't track Bill's relevant credence even the slightest to give us *any* information about it.

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[10] To make things more explicit, in this wallet case, Bill's influence on p changes his mind about p due to the transparency of beliefs. Our beliefs and credences track the world; changing the world changes our beliefs and credences about what happens in the world. See, e.g., Evans 1982, Moran 2001, and Byrne 2018 on the transparency of belief. Due to Bill's ability to act on p, offering him the bet is part of the reason that he would set q = 1 in order to win the bet; this appears to be the kind of situation when "being placed in a betting situation can itself change one's degree of belief in the proposition in question." (Eriksson & Rabinowicz's 2013: 813)

For the thought experiment to track the relevant credence at all, the person must therefore be stipulated to *think* that their control over the relevant event is *somehow* suspended.[11] We are interested in Bill's preferences regarding the value of q, under the stipulation that he believes that he has no control over the fact that his wallet won't be in his pocket 10 seconds from now.

This stipulation certainly makes the thought experiment less realistic. But so is Rawls's veil of ignorance. The temptation to think that being unrealistic is a problem stems from an unhelpful way of understanding the purpose of this intellectual exercise. It's unhelpful to depict the betting thought experiment as an attempt to develop an empirical procedure for actually determining someone's credence, just like it would be unhelpful to regard Rawls's thought experiment as an attempt to develop an empirically respectable procedure for discovering justice.[12] Furthermore, the search for

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[11] There are many ways this can be introduced by idealization. One is suggested by Eriksson and Rabinowicz (2012: 827). But they dismiss it due to the unrealistic idealization, a concern I address below.

[12] This problem is created by the early proponents of the betting interpretation themselves, who were motivated by their operationalist or behaviorist leaning. Their goal was indeed to make the notion of credence empirically respectable. But this isn't the most helpful way to flesh out the significance of the betting interpretation. For one thing, operationalism and behaviorism have both proved untenable. If that were the goal of the thought experiment, Eriksson and Rabinowicz would be right to question the heavy idealizations needed (2012: 827-828). However, I reckon it's more helpful to conceive of the thought experiment as an intellectual exercise similar to Rawls's Original Position. This is important because many of the objections against the betting interpretation relies on specific pre-conceptions of the interpretation's purpose. For example, Meacham & Weisberg (2011) say: "on the basis of no evidence, [the heavily idealized thought experiment] makes precise empirical claims about agents of a kind we've never encountered. It seems ill-advised to try to rest the [empirical] foundations of decision theory on such a claim." (650) As I said, early proponents of the betting interpretation indeed have the goal of making

an equilibrium between our conception of justice and the proper setting of the Original Position isn't an attempt to reduce or define "justice" in terms of other concepts. Instead, the refinement of the veil of ignorance thought experiment seeks to enhance our understanding of justice by illuminating the ties between our notion of justice and many associated notions (e.g., compliance, bias, rights, welfare). The same can be said of our attempt to articulate a proper idealized betting scenario of credence measurement: it helps bring to light the ties between credence and many associated notions.

4 An Agent's Gambit

Let's apply this to our beliefs about what we're *doing* intentionally. Consider the event that I'm whistling intentionally. (Hereafter, I'll just talk about whistling, assuming that it is intentional.) The question is, if I had credence for the fact that I'm whistling, what my credence would be. This has long been known to be tricky.[13]

Using the same procedure, we conceive of a hypothetical betting situation. What value would my maximum reasonable betting quotient q be if the bet is on whether I'm whistling? Before answering this question, two caveats are in order.

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discussions about credence empirically justified/grounded; so, the critics aren't wrong. But the betting interpretation can be detached from these goals. We can consider the intellectual significance of the exercise in other ways. A theory doesn't have to be held hostage to its initial motivations. After all, it can't be an accident that we find it so naturally useful to appeal to betting as a textbook approach to introduce/understand the idea of credence (see Elliot 2019: 3738).

[13] For example, Ramsey noted, "It is possible to take one's future voluntary action as an intellectual problem: 'Shall I be able to keep it up?' But only by dissociating one's future self." (1929: 142) Though notice that Ramsey is considering actions that one is still deciding, while I'm interested in something different: the actions that the agent is already performing. This is a key difference that I'll address shortly.

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Caveat 1. Recall the discussion about Bill's credence for the fact that his wallet isn't in his pocket. Although Bill has control over the location of his wallet, his control isn't necessary for the event to occur. Perhaps someone else took it from his pocket. Things are different when it comes to intentional actions like whistling. The agent's control over an event is *necessary* for the event to count as an intentional action. Imagine someone knocking over a chair intentionally. If we removed the agent's control, the event would no longer count as the agent's intentional action of knocking over a chair — even if the chair is somehow knocked over.

Caveat 2. It's useful to distinguish an intentional action from what an intentional action produces. The fact that Bill's wallet isn't in his pocket is an event that can be a *product* of his intentional actions; maybe Bill intentionally removed it. But the fact that Bill's wallet isn't there isn't an intentional action. Furthermore, although an intentional action aims to produce something, an intentional action doesn't need to succeed in producing it for the intentional action to happen. It can remain true that I am intentionally making an omelet, even if the intentional action fails to produce anything that counts as an omelet (see Thompson 2011: 209). This essay is interested in our knowledge about our intentional actions, not our knowledge about the products of our actions.

With all this out of the way, here's why it appears that the maximum value of q I can accept is 0 when the bet is about whether I'm whistling. The previous section teaches us this: by stipulation, I believe that I have no control over the occurrence of the relevant events I'm betting on. Since an event without my control cannot possibly be what I'm doing intentionally, setting $q > 0$ is to accept what I believe to be a sure lose.

Now one may argue that an event counts as my intentional action even if I have no control over it *now*, as long as I *had* control over it (by controlling what led up to it).

So, believing that I have no control over the relevant event now during the bet doesn't imply that q > 0 is a sure lose for me.

It's false that having control in the past is sufficient for intentional action. Note that *that I'm ϕ-ing intentionally* (in present continuous tense) is an on-going process. The fact that I'm ϕ-ing intentionally depends on what will continue to happen as much as what happens now. (See footnote 1.) That I intentionally continue to ϕ in the immediate future is essential to the fact that I am intentionally ϕ-ing. I cannot intentionally *continue* to ϕ if I have no control now over whether I'm intentionally ϕ-ing. Hence, if I have no control over my intentionally ϕ-ing now, I'm not intentionally ϕ-ing. Given our stipulation, a utility maximizing me would set 0 as the maximum value of q I can reasonably accept. Apparently, my credence for the fact that I'm whistling must be 0.[14]

Set aside the implausibility of this result. There is a deeper problem. The stipulation that I believe that I couldn't control the truth-value of "I'm whistling" during the bet *alone* is sufficient to make q = 0 regardless of whether, independent of the betting scenario, I have, and if so, how much credence I have about the fact that I'm whistling. The issue isn't the 0 *per se* but the fact that the 0 doesn't depend on my credence about my whistling at all. In fact, the maximum value of q doesn't have to be 0. Suppose I believe I have significant but not total control (e.g., 90% control) of my whistling so that there is a chance that I'm not whistling even if I mean to be doing so. As a result, the maximum value of q that I can reasonably accept is 0.9.[15] Instead of my

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[14] What's essential here is that it appears I must have *the lowest possible credence* for what I'm doing, not necessarily 0. For an attempt to represent credence without numbers, see Maudlin 2020.

[15] My argument relies on some claims about what a person can or cannot reasonably accept in the hypothetical betting scenario. These are fairly weak claims. Unlike how such betting scenarios are used in

credence for the event that I'm whistling, the value of q ends up tracking the wrong

thing: how much control I think I have over whether I'm whistling. The value of q

carries no information at all (not just limited information) regarding my act-credence.

5 Evidence for Credence Gap

There are only two logical options regarding the betting scenario. Either let me believe

that I control what I'm betting on or do not let me believe that. In either way, our

preferences carry not just imprecise or distorted, but zero information about the

existence of act-credence, let alone its value. (We cannot have the agents bet on the

intentional actions of clones of themselves instead. If we did, we would be measuring

the agents' third-person credences about intentional actions instead of the first-person

credences we want.) This provides a *prima facie* reason for concluding that there is no

such thing as act-credence. Call this conclusion the No Credence Thesis.

Why does the failure to extract information about act-credences constitute a *prima

facie* reason for thinking that act-credences don't exist? After all, we shouldn't conclude

that lava has no temperature because our thermometer broke when we stuck it in the

lava. As Joyce (2002) points out:

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various Dutch-Book arguments for possibilism, my argument doesn't assume that a rational person's

credence should be *absolutely* un-Dutch-Book-able. It requires only that a reasonable agent would accept

obvious sure wins and avoid obvious sure losses under properly idealized conditions. It also doesn't

need to assume that this exhausts all there is about rationality of credence (unlike a Dutch-Book

argument for possibilism, see Hajek 2009: XXX). Finally, since the thought experiment isn't invoked to

support possibilism, my argument doesn't assume that the reason why I must set the value of q in this or

that way is an *epistemic* reason.

It is quite true that the probabilities [an agent] assigns to acts during her deliberations cannot be elicited using wagers in the usual way, but this does not show that they are incoherent, only that they are difficult to measure. (86-87)

Rabinowicz (2002) makes a similar remark:

In those cases when bet offers themselves would influence our probabilities for the events on which the bets are made, probabilities no longer are translatable into betting dispositions. This does not mean, however, that probability estimates are impossible to make in cases like this. The correct conclusion is rather that the connection between probabilities and betting rates is not as tight as one might initially be tempted to think. (110)

Perhaps we just need a different measurement method for act-credences.[16] The weak betting interpretation doesn't assume that our betting-preferences constitute our *only* access to credences. Even if no actual measurement procedure assigns values that track act-credences appropriately, we have no reason to rule out a procedure that does can/will be developed. (It's instructive to emphasize that it isn't enough to develop an alternate procedure that assigns values to act-credences. The hypothetical betting thought experiment do that, too. Such values must track the alleged act-credences.)

Admittedly, we typically cannot conclude that something has no temperature because our thermometers cannot produce meaningful measure of it; the thermometer

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[16] Joyce (2002) develops an alternative, though Liu & Price (2019) show that a similar concern about act-credence applies to the alternative measurement framework.

may be broken. Yet, if a substance is such that *no matter how we idealize* a hypothetical thermometer (e.g., one that withstands any extreme heat), the thermometer still wouldn't produce *any* information about its temperature, then we have a *prima facie* reason to think that it doesn't have temperature. Even though preference-based measure isn't assumed to be the only possible measure for credence, given that our credence is a key ingredient in the composition of our preferences, these preferences, when placed in a properly idealized scenario to hold the contribution of all other ingredients fixed, *should* yield some information about the value of our credence, if such credence exists. If we can get no information at all about act-credences no matter how we idealize the betting scenario, i.e., no matter how we hold everything else fixed, we have a *prima facie* reason to resist postulating such mental states in our heads.

Of course, the thermometer case is a bit more complicated. Scientifically, it's typical to define temperature as the average kinetic energy of the particles in a system. *If* a physical substance must have a value of kinetic energy — including zero, then perhaps we have a theoretical reason to think that a specific substance must have a temperature even if somehow no idealized thermometer yield information about its temperature. In this case, a scientific law serves as a theoretical reason to defeat a *prima facie* reason to think that the substance has no temperature. By contrast, in the case of act-credence, there is no similar scientific reason to defeat the *prima facie* evidence against act-credence.

Here is an analogy that may illustrate why this *prima facie* evidence is immune to specifically concerns about alternate methods of measurement. Imagine a group of ideal observers looking at a table. For each of them, we have independent reason to think that if there were apples on the table, they would see them, being ideal observers. The fact that some of these observers see no apple on the table constitutes a *prima facie* reason to

think that there is no apple on the table even if the rest of the group see apples. One might protest, per Feldman (2006), that in the case of disagreement among epistemic peers (in this case, the ideal observers), one should remain agnostic. Whereas I'm not unsympathetic to the view, ontology is arguably unique: we have Ockham's Razor consideration. We should deny the existence of things that we don't have all-things-considered reason to postulate. Either we have enough reason to postulate apples on the table, or we don't. There is no room for agnosticism. Thus, if some ideal observers see no apple, we have *prima facie* reason to not just withheld judgment but to assert that there is no apple.[17] We can think of each idealized measurement procedure as an expert of detecting the quantity being measured.

The No Credence Thesis sounds similar to a thesis defended by some on similar basis, e.g., see Liu & Price 2019, under the slogan "Deliberation Crowds Out Prediction" (DCOP) due to Levi (1997). DCOP states that an agent cannot process theoretical predictions about how likely p is going to happen while deliberating whether to make p happen.[18] Using Moran's (2001) work on the transparency of beliefs in their defense and explanation of DCOP, Liu & Price (2018) argue that, if whether p is up to an agent S's practical deliberation, two things happen: (1) S's theoretical reasoning for predicting whether p is rendered unnecessary (45-6),[19] and (2) S, who's deliberating on the matter,

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[17] [Add acknowledgement]

[18] See also Spohn (1977). Rabinowicz (2002) traces the view all the way back to Kant.

[19] Liu & Price (2018) go back and forth between theoretical consideration being rendered *unnecessary* and it being rendered *inaccessible* to the agent. They occasionally gesture at the latter by stating that their transparency-based argument can do more than the former:

> *Theoretically-grounded* knowledge of one's own mind is **inaccessible** to a deliberating agent,

is in the midst of a belief *updating process* via practical deliberation which puts her *in between credal states*, hence having no credence for p (138, 142).

DCOP is different from the No Credence Thesis in important ways. The latter is about an agent's knowledge of what she's *doing intentionally*, not knowledge of what she *is to do* as in the action she *is deliberating whether* to perform. In all the cases I've been working with, the agents have deliberated and are performing the actions. Arguments

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according to [Moran's thesis about the transparency of beliefs], because deliberation crowds it out. (2018: 146; italics in the original, my emphasis)

[Moran's thesis about the transparency of beliefs] offers us **something stronger** — as Moran puts it, a *categorical* reason for thinking that the first question [about deliberation/decision] **excludes** the second [about prediction]." (148; italics in the original, my emphasis).

But despite their stating otherwise, I don't see how their argument can establish anything stronger than the claim that an agent *doesn't need to* engage in theoretical prediction for matter that is up to their practical deliberation. Immediately following the second quote, they say:

By Moran's lights what is really odd about the second question is that in the context provided by the first, it amounts simply to *repeating* the first question" (148; italics in the original).

If question b merely repeats question a, question b is unnecessary. Someone who asks question b after asking question a is perhaps annoying. But this doesn't make whatever is relevant to answering question b *inaccessible* to either the one issuing the question or the one at the receiving end of the question. (The concern applies to Moran, too.) So, I have my reservation about Liu & Price's argument and account for DCOP (see also footnote 28). But since the tension between deliberation and prediction is distinct from the phenomenon I'm interested in here (or so I argue below), I'll leave further discussion on this topic for another occasion.

for the fact that (and explanations for how) *S's deliberation on whether to φ* makes *S's*
theoretical reasoning/prediction about whether her φ-ing will likely to happen inaccessible to S
neither (1) give us a reason to think *that* S has no credences for *what she's doing* nor (2)
explain *why* this is the case *if* this is indeed the case. An account for DCOP isn't
automatically an account for the No Credence Thesis (see also footnote 28 for why the
No Credence Thesis cannot be a result of credence updating, unlike DCOP).

In any case, the Credence Condition fails. For the Credence Condition to do what
it's supposed to do, it must say that, in the cases where [disjunct 2] is meant to
contribute, an agent has higher credence for what she's doing than otherwise. But we
have no act-credences.[20]

6 Objections: Credence Gap & Measurement Gap

It's normal to have gaps in our credences. This shouldn't be controversial if we think of
credences as psychological states instead of a just-so story to *model* human behaviors.
(My argument doesn't deny that as long as a person's preferences meet certain
constraints, it's possible to model this person's behaviors *as if* the person has act-
credences.) There are a lot of issues that we have never considered to have degrees of

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[20] There are various things one might say about the truth-value of the Credence Condition in virtue of the
No Credence Thesis. One might think that applying the concept of credence to things beyond its scope of
application renders [disjunct 2] either meaningless (neither true nor false) or necessarily false. For those
who choose the meaningless-route, one might say that the condition as a whole is meaningless because a
disjunction is meaningless as long as one of the disjuncts is meaningless. Alternatively, one might allow a
disjunction to be true if one of the disjuncts is true even if there are other disjuncts that are meaningless.
What's important for our purpose is that no matter how you slice it, a crucial part of the Credence
Condition just won't do the job it was introduced for.

certainty about. Credence gaps like this are *fillable*. By contrast, the credence gaps regarding what we're doing intentionally are *unfillable*. The No Credence Thesis is a surprising conclusion that is sure to trigger skepticism.[21] In this section, I'll smooth off the rough edges of my argument by addressing a few potential objections.

Every measurement procedure interferes with what's being measured. So, every measurement process, no matter how idealized, inevitably distorts the measurement results. One might object that my argument falsely assumes that if act-credences exist, it must be possible to idealize the preference-based measurement so that we can measure credences without distortion.

Dissatisfactions with the preference-centric measure of credence exist and are largely due to the fact that our preferences are shaped by more than just our credences. Examining a person's actual preferences alone won't narrow down their credence for any proposition in a meaningful way, let alone to a unique value. That's why we need to idealize the betting scenario to filter out other factors and isolate our credences' footprints in our preferences. Even then, there's no guarantee we can idealize away all "impurities" (see Christensen 2001 for a version of this concern). But once we, as I argued earlier, give up the requirement that the betting scenario must be realistic and, to be specific, allow ourselves to consider (1) counterfactual situations where the agent had *different desires* and (2) the counterfactual situations where the agent is *an expected utility maximizer*, the severity of the worry is significantly mitigated (see Elliot 2019:

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[21] Though not surprising to defenders of the view (or, strictly speaking, the slightly different DCOP), who typically seem to find the thesis intuitive, obvious even. For example, Spohn says, "[p]robably anyone will find it absurd to assume that someone has subjective probabilities for things which are under his control and which he can actualize as he pleases" (1977, 115).

section 6). More importantly, my argument is fully compatible with this kind of imperfection of the preference-centric measure of credence.

Notice that it's one thing to find ourselves incapable of separating cleanly and completely — via idealizations — our credences' contribution from some other factors' contribution to our preferences. It's another thing to find that no matter how we tweak our procedure to measure act-credences to hold everything else fixed, it keeps tracking something else entirely — not tracking the right thing albeit imprecisely. The crucial observation here is that, as I have argued, our preferences in the betting scenario are *completely* accounted for by factors other than the act-credences and there is nothing we can idealize away to change this. The situation isn't simply one where my preference is a *stubborn mix* of my credence for p plus some "unwanted" factors that we cannot fully filter out. Instead, it's a situation where my preference appears always to be the product of these "unwanted" factors alone, with no discernible traces of my credence for p at all.

Some might not be fully satisfied with my response thus far. There are cases in the sciences where a quantity cannot be determined because it cannot be done without altering the quantity. For example, we cannot determine the position and momentum of something simultaneously. When we have determined an electron's position, which requires us to shoot light-wave with a short wavelength at the electron, we are doomed to have significantly altered its momentum. There is no proper measure of the momentum of an electron with a known position. But we *don't* say such electron has *no momentum*. As an *analogy*, one may argue even if we cannot determine our credence for what we're doing intentionally, we shouldn't conclude that we have *no credence* for that.

Note that, in the electron case, although we don't say that the electron has no momentum, we standardly say that it has *no determinate momentum*. It isn't that the electron has a determinate momentum that's hidden from us. There is no such thing as

a determinate momentum of the electron in this situation. Similarly, an electron whose momentum has been determined simply don't have a determinate position, not that it has a determinate position that resists discovery. If we want to uphold the analogy, we should say that we have credence for what we're doing intentionally but not any particular *credence value*. In fact, it's worse in the credence case. In the electron case, we can determine the probability distribution of its position/momentum; we still have some kind of measurement value. Regarding credence for what we're doing, we don't even have that.

In contrast to the No Credence Thesis, let's call the thesis that we can have credence but not any *credence value* for what we're doing intentionally the No Credence Value Thesis. For undermining Setiya's Credence Condition, either one would do. If there is no value for one's credence for p, one doesn't have a credence for p that's "more" or "less" than otherwise.[22] That said, I prefer the No Credence Thesis due to its simplicity. I don't see a strong reason to complicate things by adding fundamental indeterminacy in the picture.[23]

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[22] The choice between No Credence Thesis and No Credence Value Thesis has nothing to do with the debate about whether credence can be or should ever be *imprecise*. To have imprecise credence is to have a vague range of one's credence for something, instead of having a singular value. Having an imprecise range of credence value still counts as having a measure of credence. The No Credence Value Thesis states that there is no measure at all of our credence for what we're doing, precise or not. So, the No Credence Thesis and the No Credence Value Thesis both rule out imprecise credence for our intentional actions and the choice between the two thesis is orthogonal to the debate regarding imprecise credences. (See Joyce 2010 and Schoenfield 2017 for the debate about imprecise credences.)

[23] Not that there is anything inherently wrong with fundamental indeterminacy (see Wilson 2012, 2013 and French & Krause 2003 for two kinds of fundamental indeterminacy).

Perhaps some insist that we have act-credences because of phenomenology. We *feel certain* about what we're doing intentionally. So, one might argue based on introspective evidence that we clearly have act-credence if credence just is certainty or confidence. At best, what my argument has shown is that, although we have credence for what we're doing, we don't have any (precise or imprecise) value/degree of credence for that (i.e., No Credence Value Thesis).

I'm skeptical that we have the kind of phenomenology this objection needs. I feel more or less certain about what I *have done*. And I feel more or less certain about what I *will be doing* in the distant future. But I'm not entirely positive, from the first-person perspective, I feel more or less certain about what I *am doing*. So, first of all, it's easy to confuse a feeling of certainty about what one *will do* or what one *has done* with a feeling of certainty about what one *is doing*. Secondly, we may feel more or less certain about whether our actions successfully produce what we mean to produce. But I have already cautioned that intentional actions and their products aren't the same. Finally, when it comes to future and present intentional actions, there is also a non-epistemic sense in which we may feel more or less certain about what we do — i.e., we may feel more or less *determined* about what we're doing or what we're going to do.[24] It isn't improbable for one to conflate the phenomenology of this non-epistemic certainty with the epistemic one, i.e., credence. Given that there are *at least* three ways in which we could easily mistake some other phenomenology to be a phenomenology of being more or less certain (epistemically) about what we're doing intentionally, we should not put much evidential weight on phenomenological reports regarding act-credences.

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[24] This echoes Anscombe's remark that the statement "I am going to φ" has two readings: (1) a prediction; (2) an expression of intent. (2001: 2)

Finally, one might object that the No Credence Thesis (and the No Credence Value Thesis) runs afoul of some theorems of probability calculus, assuming probabilism, i.e., that our credences conform to probability calculus. Suppose Bill is whistling intentionally. My thesis states that Bill doesn't have credence for the first-person statement "I am whistling intentionally". But one can take a step back and look at one's own actions from a third-person perspective, *suspending one's self-identification with the person who's performing those actions*. My thesis doesn't rule out Bill's credence for the third-person statement "Bill is whistling intentionally" in this way. Say, independently, he knows that he is Bill (with a degree of certainty). So, Bill has credence for (a) and (b) but not for (c):

(a) Bill is whistling intentionally.

(b) I'm Bill.

(c) I'm whistling intentionally.

But (a) and (b) jointly entail (c). Since (a) and (b) are independent events, Bill's credence for the conjunction (a) & (b) is the product of his credence for (a) and his credence for (b). Furthermore, if p entails q, one's credence for q would at least be identical to one's credence for p. One may then argue, Bill's credence for (c) must at least be identical to the product of his credence for (a) and his credence for (b). It seems that probability calculus requires that Bill must have credence for (c) as long as he has credence for (a) and (b). The No Credence Thesis is false.

Notice that this kind of concern isn't unique to my view about act-credence. It's a concern for almost any view that accept credence gaps. Take Hajek's (2003) discussion on conditional probability for instance. Hajek accepts that there are credence gaps. That

is, our credence function doesn't need to have a value for every possible statements. Consider the following statements:

(d) Snow is white or there is a black hole at the center of our galaxy.

(e) There is a black hole at the center of our galaxy.

Say Bill has never even heard of black holes before and has therefore never considered the statement (e) to have credence for it, the same for (d) as a result. But he understands probability well enough to be absolutely certain that (d) given (e), i.e., $Cr(d \mid e) = 1$, where $Cr(x)$ is Bill's credence function. So, $Cr(d \mid e)$ has a value but not $Cr(d)$ and $Cr(e)$. Notice that [C] is is a theorem:

[C] $Cr(d \mid e) = Cr(d \ \& \ e)/Cr(e)$

But [C] cannot be true if there is no value for $Cr(e)$. [C] would be true given any values for $Cr(e)$, but not when $Cr(e)$ simply has no value. So, the idea that Bill has a credence gap for $Cr(e)$ appears to go against probability calculus.

One might be tempted to answer this challenge by saying that when we say credences are governed by the theorems of probability calculus, we refer to ideal rational agents. If credence gaps only exist in non-ideal agents, then the fact that theorems like [C] isn't true of agents with credence gaps doesn't constitute an objection to the idea of credence gaps (or the No Credence Thesis that entails the existence of credence gaps). But it's false that credence gaps only exist in non-ideal agents, as long as we are talking about "ideal" and "non-ideal" in the relevant sense. Theorems of probability describe the credences of agents who are ideal in the way they process and

update credence. These ideal agents aren't supposed to be ideal or omniscient about empirical facts, e.g., the existence of Black Holes. The credence gaps in our example stem from an agent's unawareness of an empirical fact alone. Hence, even an ideal agent — ideal in the relevant sense — could have gaps in their credence function. An apparent tension remains between theses that entail the existence of credence gaps and probabilism about credence.

Instead of taking this to be a reason to deny the existence of credence gaps, Hajek argues that we should properly interpret the theorems about credences in light of the existence of credence gap. The theorems about credences shouldn't be taken as valid in the same way as the theorems of other logical systems. We should interpret theorems about credences like [C] as statements that describe the necessary correlations among credences/probabilities *if these credences exist*:

> "What [...] theorems of probability provide, are *constraints*: when all the terms that appear in the theorem are defined, they must conform to that theorem. If, on the other hand, some of the terms are undefined, then what we have is not a violation of the theorem, but rather a *non-instance* — something that simply does not fall under the theorem." (Hajek 2003: 314; italic in the original)

In other words, these theorems themselves shouldn't be interpreted to have existential imports about credences. After all, credences are concrete psychological states. There shouldn't be mathematical proofs for the existence of psychological states. If [C] is interpreted this way, Bill's credence gap doesn't constitute a counterexample to [C]. [C] simply doesn't apply in Bill's case.

Hajek is right. His strategy can be deployed to defend the No Credence Thesis against similar potential objections. We saw earlier that the theorems about credence require that Bill's credence for (c) must at least be identical to the product of his credence for (a) and his credence for (b). According to the objection, this requires Bill to have credence for (c), contrary to what the No Credence Thesis implies. But if Hajek is right about the proper interpretation of the theorems of probability calculus when it's applied to credences, those theorems only require that *if* Bill has credence for (a), credence for (b), and credence for (c), *then* these credence values should be such that his credence for (c) is at least the product of his credence for (a) or his credence for (b). The theorem alone makes no demand that Bill has credence for anything in the same way the laws about planetary motion alone don't entail the existence of any planets. The No Credence Thesis doesn't run afoul of theorems of probability calculus when they are appropriately interpreted.

7 Self-Knowledge, Credence, Belief, etc.

Let's consider the bigger picture. The No Credence Thesis has broader epistemological implications than implying that Setiya is wrong about something. Here's one of them. The relation between belief and credence is contested among epistemologists. The popular view is that they are intimately connected phenomena such that one is reductively analyzed in terms of the other. There are two major camps. First, there are the reductivists. Some of them hold a *belief-first view*. According to this view, credence is analyzed in terms of belief: credences are beliefs about chances. Other reductivists hold a *credence-first view*. According to this view, credence is the fundamental phenomenon and belief is reductively analyzed in terms of it. For example, one might say that to have

a belief is to have credence beyond a certain threshold (a.k.a., the Lockean Thesis). Second, there are non-reductive views. *Dualism* states that belief and credence are distinct and equally fundamental phenomena. We aren't supposed to reductively analyze one in terms of the other.[25] Finally, one may defend *eliminativism* that advocates for eliminating the notion of belief all together and replacing it with the notion of credence.

The No Credence Thesis rules out the credence-first view. When we act intentionally, *at least sometimes*, we know what we're doing (we *must* know what we're doing intentionally if the Cognition Condition is true). If knowledge implies belief, then, at least sometimes, an agent has a belief about what he's doing but has no corresponding credence. Hence, belief cannot be analyzed in terms of credence.[26]

Whereas the No Credence Thesis doesn't rule out eliminativism, the thesis gives us strong reason against it. When an agent performs an intentional action, the agent typically has a cognitive first-person representation of themselves performing said action. If the notion of belief is eliminated and act-credence isn't available, we are left with no theoretical resources at all to characterize this self-representation properly.

The No Credence Thesis rules out neither the belief-first view nor dualism. It should be obvious why it doesn't rule out dualism. It's worth pointing out that there is a good reason that it doesn't rule out the belief-first view. Similar to credences, beliefs about objective chances help shape the strength of our preferences. Given this fact, like

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[25] See Jackson 2019 for a survey of the epistemological significance of some of these options about the belief-credence relation.

[26] It's a popular view that having a belief that p entails having credence for p. For an example of others who argue that there can be belief without credence on other grounds, see Moon 2019.

what we saw about credences, with proper idealizations to hold other factors fixed, it must be possible to reverse engineer a person's belief about the chance of an event based on the person's preferences. The same type of argument I presented can be applied to demonstrate that we should think that there is no such thing as *de se* belief about the objective chance of our current intentional action, *even if* one rejects the belief-first view and thinks that credences and beliefs about chances are distinct.[27] For this reason, assuming that my argument for the No Credence Thesis works, we should have no qualm with the implication of combining the No Credence Thesis with the belief-first view, i.e., the implication that there is no *de se* beliefs about the objective chance of one's own current intentional actions. The No Credence Thesis and my argument for it remain neutral between the belief-first view and dualism.

Although the No Credence Thesis doesn't single out one view out of the four, what we get is still a significant result that substantially restricts our options regarding the nature of credence by suggesting that beliefs play a unique role in our self-awareness that isn't easily displaced by credence.[28] This throws further light on the nature of agential knowledge in several ways. I'll briefly discuss two.

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[27] I'm grateful to [redacted for blind review] for encouraging me to think harder about my argument's application to beliefs instead of credences.

[28] This is another a critical difference between the No Credence Thesis and Liu & Price's (2018; 2019) theory about DCOP (see section 3). First of all, Liu and Price's argument won't work unless they *assume* that credences just are beliefs about likelihood (a.k.a., the belief-first view). The crux of their (and Moran's) reasoning is that practical deliberation inhibits theoretical reasoning about prediction. If credences weren't assumed to be beliefs about likelihood, having credences wouldn't obviously be tied to making predictions, which are basically forming beliefs about the likelihood of future events. Hence, the fact that deliberation blocks prediction alone, even if true, would neither prove nor explain the absence of

Setiya's Credence Condition is presented as an improvement to the Cognition Condition. It saves the latter's insight about an agent's epistemic access to themselves from a group of counterexamples. Now that we reject the Credence Condition, what's left for us to say about that original insight? The No Credence Thesis has more to say on the subject. Whereas the Credence Condition addresses the counterexamples to the Cognition Condition by weakening intentional action's requirement, the No Credence Thesis gives us resources to explain away those counterexamples and defend the Cognition Condition in its original form.

Let me illustrate with Davidson's case. The person intends to produce 10 carbon copies. He felt uncertain. In other words, his credence for *something* is very low. Originally, we are supposed to think that his credence is low for the fact *that he is performing the intentional action of producing 10 carbon copies*. Now we have an independent reason for thinking that this cannot be true: he has no act-credence for that at all. So, we should interpret the case so that this person's low credence is for something else. Here's a natural candidate: the fact *that his intentional action succeeds in producing 10 carbon copies*. (Recall that the fact that a person is performing an intentional

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act-credences. Hence, whereas the No Credence Thesis *favors* — not assumes — the belief-first view or dualism, Liu & Price's theory about DCOP doesn't and *assumes* the belief-first view instead. Secondly, if they are right that DCOP is true because agents are in between credal states while they are deliberating and making up their minds, the agents wouldn't only lack credences but also *beliefs* about what they are to do when they are making up their minds. Whereas I find this idea intuitive regarding an act we are deliberating whether to do, this isn't plausible in most — if not all — of the cases about actions we are already performing. This is why separating the No Credence Thesis about what an agent is doing and DCOP about what an agent is deliberating to do is important. Though the two theses can be argued for in a similar way, they aim to capture rather different phenomena.

action and the fact that a person succeeds in producing what the intentional action is meant to produce are distinct events.) Notice that this isn't *ad hoc*. Davidson's case isn't interpreted this way for the sake of preserving the Cognition Condition; instead, the argument for the No Credence Thesis independently motivates this interpretation. Once Davidson's case is interpreted this way, we cannot deduce that this person doesn't have a belief about what he's doing based on his *low credence* for his intentional action. And since the No Credence Thesis rules out the credence-first view about credence, we also cannot deduce that this person doesn't have the belief about what he's doing based on the fact that he *doesn't have credence* for what he's doing at all. Both dualism and the belief-first view allow a person to believe something while having low or no credence for it whatsoever. Thus, we cannot argue that, despite performing an intentional action, this person doesn't have *knowledge* about his intentional action *on the basis that he doesn't have the belief*. Davidson's case is no longer a counterexample to the Cognition Condition. The same applies to Setiya's case.

The No Credence Thesis sheds light on the nature of agential knowledge in yet another significant way. Following Anscombe, many philosophers are of the opinion that agential knowledge is uniquely non-observational: I know what I'm doing not because I'm observing myself. The follow-up question is about the source of our agential knowledge's epistemic warrant if it isn't observation. There are two major camps in the literature. On the one hand, there are those who defend the idea that agential knowledge is non-observational because it's based on introspective evidence about one's inner state. Let's call this the evidential approach since the epistemic warrant of agential knowledge remains evidence-based according to this approach.[29] On

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[29] For example, see Paul 2005.

the other hand, without going into too much detail, there are those who favor the idea that agential knowledge is non-observational because its epistemic warrant isn't based on evidence at all. Hence, it isn't based on *observational* evidence. Let's call this the non-evidential approach to agential knowledge.[30]

The No Credence Thesis doesn't rule out the evidential approach. But it puts the approach in an unfavorable position. Evidential support is often understood in terms of a boost of credence. If we have neither credences nor beliefs about the chances about our current intentional actions, then we cannot meaningfully talk about an evidential boost regarding what we're doing intentionally. Whatever epistemic warrant our agential knowledge has better stems from something other than evidence. By contrast, the No Credence Thesis meshes well with theories of agential knowledge that appeal to epistemic warrant that isn't based on evidence. The lack of act-credence provides a possible explanation for the felt immediacy and the apparent indubitability associated with our first-person agential knowledge, despite its fallibility.[31]

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[30] There are many variations of this approach. For example, see Velleman 1989, Setiya 2008, Moran 2001, Lam 2021. Philosophers who explore the idea of non-belief-based agential knowledge are also typically motivated by the idea that agential knowledge isn't based on evidence. But we are only focusing on belief-based agential knowledge here.

[31] I have only scratched the surface of the significance of the No Credence Thesis (or the No Credence Value Thesis). First of all, the No Credence Thesis has interesting implications for the norms of self-knowledge, substantiating Buchark's (2014) thesis that beliefs and credences are governed by different norms (because the norm for attributing blame that applies to what we believe cannot be plausibly translated into a norm about credence, or so she argues). Furthermore, the thesis is in tension with a popular view about the nature of belief that says beliefs are tools for reducing our cognitive load, which would be a huge burden if we reason with credences alone (see Ross & Schroeder 2012, Staffel 2018). Since there is no such thing as having credence for what I'm doing, it's at least not immediately clear that

8 Conclusion

I've defended the No Credence Thesis. And it's demonstrated how it's different from Deliberation Crowds Out Prediction (DCOP) in philosophically important ways. I argue that the No Credence Thesis undermines Setiya's Credence Condition and, unlike DCOP, supports either dualism or the belief-first view about the belief-credence relation and that, by doing so, the No Credence Thesis reveals something unique about an agent's self-awareness's apparent immediacy and indubitability.[32]

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my belief about what I'm doing spares me any cognitive load that I would have suffered otherwise. (Of course, one could say that belief's function is so and so without implying that whenever a belief exists, it does so and so. That's why I only say there is tension, not a conflict.) Exploring these thorny issues is for another occasion.

[32] [Add acknowledgement]

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