

MODERNISM, POSTMODERNISM AND POLITICS*

by Iddo Landau

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Over the last two decades a central issue in philosophy has been the controversy between modernism and postmodernism.¹ A major motivation on both sides has been moral. Besides the wish to articulate better theories of knowledge and theories of reality, there has also been the ambition to improve the moral and political state of the world. Thus, many modernists and postmodernists have also adduced moral and political considerations in attacking the views of the other side and defending their own. Each side has claimed that its ontology and epistemology could have a beneficial influence on society, while that of the other side might affect, or may already have affected, society for the worse.² Thus, for example, Joanna Hodge claims that "the concept of the subject, produced in Descartes' enquiries, has served both to exclude women from philosophy and to obscure how that exclusion has been effected."³ In Karl Jaspers' view "Heidegger's mode of thinking, which seems to me to be fundamentally un-free, dictatorial and uncommunicative, would have a very damaging effect on students at the present time".⁴ In Derrida's opinion it is the metaphysical tradition which is responsible for Heidegger's deep involvement with the Nazis.⁵ David Hiley asks whether we can "retain the Enlightenment commitment to autonomy, the possibility of reasoned criticism of society ... without retaining the Enlightenment separation of power and knowledge, its view of the universality and autonomy of reason, or the foundational project of philosophy."⁶ And John D. Caputo asserts that foundationalism and philosophical schemes should be distrusted since they harbor "an exclusionary gesture, a repressive act" whereas Derrida's deconstruction is "a praxis of liberation." Moreover, "the emancipation of the signifier... is generalized into an emancipatory project which seeks liberation from all oppressive ... and exclusionary discourses. It means to issue in free writing, free

speech, free literature, and free science, freedom in the academy and freedom outside."⁷

Of course, this is not the first time that philosophers have taken account of moral and political considerations in weighing ontological and epistemological theories.⁸ Husserl believed that phenomenology may lead to an ethical renewal.⁹ Popper thought that science instills hatred of violence and that it "will discipline its students ethically ... science never fails to make its students more tolerant."¹⁰ And determinism has frequently been accused of leading to apathy and an avoidance of moral responsibility. But the predominance of political considerations in the modernist-postmodernist controversy is unusual. In some cases these considerations appear to be not only a major, but even the main motivation in the debate.

In this paper I show that in spite of the wide (and growing) use of such arguments, their employment is problematic.¹¹ To illustrate the difficulty, I examine the validity of arguments from ontologies and epistemologies to their political consequences, and give examples of how the application of such arguments yields highly indeterminate moral conclusions.

It may be claimed that even if we knew that an ontology or epistemology would lead to devastating moral results we should still advocate it if, by pure ontological or epistemological standards, we judged it to be strong. Since reasons for accepting or rejecting epistemologies and ontologies should come only from within the fields themselves, the putative political implications of ontologies and epistemologies should be ignored as irrelevant. I shall not deal with this question here, but show that even if it is granted that ontologies and epistemologies should be accepted or rejected according to their political consequences, to do so in practice is very problematic.

It may also be claimed that arguments concerning the political and moral implications of modernism and postmodernism are not philosophical but sociological, and hence should be discussed as such. Again, I shall not take sides on the issue here. In section 1 I shall show the difficulties in arguments from ontologies and epistemologies to their political consequences from the philosophical point of view, and in section 2 from the sociological.

Descartes distinguishes between emotion and reason and establishes a hierarchy between them. He prefers the latter and calls on us to rely on it alone. However, women have traditionally been identified with the former. Thus, argues Genevieve Lloyd, Descartes' epistemology can be seen as influencing the subjugation of and the discrimination against women.¹²

Derrida and Jaspers discuss the connection between Heidegger's philosophy and his Nazism. Derrida links the Nazism to the essentialism that remained in Heidegger's thought, and Jaspers to what he takes to be its dictatorial and uncommunicative formulation.¹³

Lloyd's, Derrida's and Jasper's arguments are, of course, more sophisticated than that. But even in their more intricate versions, they remain based on analogies. Lloyd points out a characteristic of Cartesian epistemology (the distinction between emotion and reason and the preference given to the latter) and shows that it is analogous to some social phenomenon (the traditional association of women with emotion and men with reason and the predilection for the latter). Derrida refers to a characteristic of Heidegger's ontology—a degree of essentialism—and since it is somewhat analogous to Nazi race theory, takes the former to encourage the latter. Jaspers takes Heidegger's philosophy to be dictatorial, un-free and uncommunicative, and finds an analogy between it and undesirable moral-political characteristics.

But arguments based on analogy are lax. Thus, they can be used to prove a great number of desirable and undesirable political consequences for any ontological or epistemological theory. Since any given element may be analogous to many other elements, a particular ontological or epistemological characteristic may have a number of political analogies, some positive, others negative. For example, the modernist emphasis on universally binding procedures is analogous to a state in which political and judicial procedures are publicly known and binding (frequently viewed as positive), as well as to the tendency to relate to other people according to set rules, thus tending to alienation (frequently seen as negative).

This is all the more so when, even if not much is changed in the analogy itself, the political implications differ only in their radicality. But differences in radicality can modify the moral evaluation of the implications. For example, the postmodernist avoidance of striving for an objective truth can be seen as analogous to pluralism (frequently valued positively),

or to the more radical anarchy (frequently valued negatively). Yet the analogy holds in both cases. Similarly, the modernist search for one intersubjective truth can be seen as analogous to solidarity (frequently valued positively), or to the more radical dogmatism (frequently valued negatively).

Further, since ontologies and epistemologies are complex and contain many factors, many different analogical conclusions can be derived from them, some supporting favored approaches, others opposed ones.

Finally, it is hard to evaluate the degree of resemblance between an element of the theory and its putative political consequence. Hence it is also difficult to distinguish between reasonable analogies and far-fetched ones.

Arguments from analogy can thus be used to prove a plethora of both desirable and undesirable political consequences for any ontological or epistemological theory. In what follows I exemplify how they can be employed to do so for modernism and postmodernism, represented here by Cartesianism and Heideggerianism. Both theories can be taken to entail, if arguments from analogy are used, individualism as well as anti-individualism, tolerance and intolerance, feminism and non-feminism, etc.

Individualism: The Cartesian aspiration towards one universal truth, and the use of procedures obligatory on everyone, encourages anti-individualism. Nevertheless, the Heideggerian tendency to holism, its stress on the role of the community in our understanding, and the qualified acceptance of prejudice (which is a social phenomenon) also encourage anti-individualism. On the other hand, the Heideggerian acceptance of certain degrees of relativism, its denial of the existence of any one unique, stable truth, and its preference for the model of aesthetic understanding, foster differences among people, thus enhancing individualism. But Cartesian atomism, and its disposition to analyze and make distinctions between phenomena, also enhance individualism.

Anti-racism, tolerance, pluralism, anti-dogmatism, non-authoritarianism: By striving toward universal truths and accepting universal procedures for attaining them, Cartesianism inspires anti-racism. Through its critical attitude and rejection of prejudice it promotes antiauthoritarianism, as well as liberates people from political and racial preconceptions. The distinction between the rational and the emotional encourages people to disagree without hating one another, thus supporting tolerance. But Heideggerianism too stimulates anti-racism, tolerance, pluralism, anti-dogmatism, and non-authoritarianism by adhering to a degree of relativism, claiming that our

views will continue to change, preferring aesthetic understanding as the model of knowing, and rejecting ideals of necessity and certainty. On the other hand, the Cartesian search, according to fixed procedures, for an unchanging and objective truth, enables us to force opponents to admit they are wrong. This fosters a dogmatic, intolerant, even dictatorial approach. Cartesian foundationalism, which reduces differences to some basic common elements or governing laws, also fosters dogmatic, intolerant, and dictatorial approaches. Nevertheless, the Heideggerian emphasis on community promotes antipathy and intolerance toward other communities. The acceptance of prejudice encourages permissiveness toward racism. Downplaying universally binding procedures leaves no way of resolving disagreements, thus opening the door to arbitrary fiat or violence.

Feminism: Women have traditionally been identified with the body. But in Cartesianism the body is not part of the researching subject; it is part of the researched object. This obstructs viewing women as subjects and enhances seeing them as objects of research and gaze, passive entities merely to be looked at. Even as an object of research the body does not have an important place in Cartesianism, which is more interested in mathematics and abstract ideas. This even further marginalizes women in culture and society. The Cartesian separation of reason from emotion, and the preference given to the former, strengthens the view that women, traditionally identified with the latter, are inferior to men. Cartesianism concentrates on theory, not on praxis. But women have traditionally been associated with praxis. Cartesianism distinguishes between the internal and the external, a distinction related to that between the private and the public. This enhances the confinement of women to the privacy of their homes, and the association of men with the public sphere.

Nevertheless, Cartesianism is anti-traditional and summons us to disregard accepted views and prejudices. Feminism, too, breaks with tradition and revolts against accepted views and prejudices. Cartesianism is critical and skeptical, as feminism is. The distinction between private and public enhances women's right to decide whether to have or not to have abortions without taking into account prevailing views or other people's decisions.

As before, Heideggerianism can be seen as having similar negative and positive influences on feminism in conversely parallel ways.

Alienation: By perceiving people atomistically Cartesianism promotes alienation. The distinction between the rational and the emotional can lead people to relate to others and to themselves on only

one of these planes (generally the rational one), or on both but without integrating them, which in turn fosters alienation. Distinguishing subject from object also influences people to relate to others, and even to themselves, in an alienated way. The critical-skeptical tendencies in Cartesianism promote an alienated attitude toward life and the world in general. Alienation is also fostered by the Cartesian tendency to take what we perceive and know to be only a representation of the world, and not the world itself. However, Heideggerianism too fosters alienation by advocating incessant transformation, which creates the sensation of a rapidly changing world lacking any stable element. It does so also by perceiving the world in aesthetic categories, thus promoting the feeling that it is merely a work of art, rather than a real thing. The emphasis on tradition and community leads people to feel that they have only little in common with those of other communities, thus promoting alienation from them.

Other political-moral consequences—and their opposites—could be similarly argued to follow from Cartesianism and Heideggerianism, as well as from other theories.¹⁴

But it may be claimed that even if the majority of the arguments above are based on analogies, some are not. In some cases characteristics of ontological or epistemological theories can be understood as necessary conditions for the political consequence of these theories. For example, the critical spirit of Cartesianism can be understood as a necessary condition for the feminist critical approach.

It is not completely clear that the Cartesian critical attitude is indeed a necessary condition for the feminist critical approach, i.e., that without Cartesianism feminism could not have arisen. However, even if this were granted, it would not mean that feminism could be inferred to be a political consequence of Cartesianism. "If p is a necessary condition of q, then q cannot be true unless p is true."¹⁵ It does not mean that if p exists, so must the q. Hence, even if Cartesianism were a necessary condition for feminism, it could not be deduced that Cartesianism would have feminism as a political consequence. Arguments based on necessary conditions, then, are not helpful for claiming that certain political consequences will follow from certain ontologies and epistemologies.

But it may be claimed that in some arguments the ontological or epistemological characteristics can even be understood as sufficient conditions for political consequence. For example, the argument from Heideggerian relativism to pluralism and anti-dogmatism seems to be more than an argument from analogy or from a necessary condition. Relativism seems to be

a sufficient condition for pluralism, in the sense that if one is a relativist, one must also be a pluralist. Similarly, the Derridaen deconstruction of hierarchical dichotomies can be taken to be a sufficient condition for nondiscrimination. One cannot accept the deconstruction of hierarchical dichotomies if one discriminates.

I shall not go into the question whether this kind of argument is indeed based on sufficient condition. This way or that, it is more rigorous than any of the others discussed above, and relying on it is clearly better than relying on them. However, arguments belonging to this rigorous type are few. If we wish to depend on them alone, we shall have very little to rely on. Moreover, some of the problems that affect the argument from analogy also affect the argument of sufficient condition. Here, too, a radicalization or a small change in a political feature can alter our positive evaluation of it into a negative one. For example, relativism can be taken to entail both pluralism and anarchy. Likewise, the deconstruction of hierarchies can be taken to entail both non-discrimination and non-distinction between the moral and the immoral. Furthermore, ontological and epistemological characteristics rarely appear in actual theories in their pure form. Heidegger, for example, is not a complete relativist. Similarly Derrida does not think that deconstruction can completely obliterate the hierarchical, logocentric tradition. Thus, we cannot deduce complete pluralism or nondiscrimination from Heidegger's and Derrida's theories, but only pluralism and non-discrimination to a certain extent, and we should keep in mind that these theories also contain ontological and epistemological elements contradicting those we are arguing from.

Even in the infrequent cases in which argument by sufficient condition can be used, then, it too is not as dependable as one may hope. Like the other types of argument, it can be used to prove too wide a variety of both desirable and undesirable political consequences, and thus cannot be relied on for rejecting or accepting ontologies and epistemologies.

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But it may be claimed that it is wrong to interpret arguments concerning the political influence of ontologies and epistemologies as philosophical. They are sociological. It is possible, for example, that as a sociological fact Descartes' reliance on the mind enhances discrimination against women even if the latter does not follow from the former. Hence, we should not be concerned with the logical rigor of such arguments, but examine them with sociological tools.

However, using sociological tools to prove that epistemologies and ontologies have certain political implications and not others is also difficult. To do so, one may try to show that some ontological or epistemological characteristics have already had certain political results. For example, if Cartesianism is to be rejected because it is expected to aggravate discrimination against women, it would be helpful to cite instances in which this influence was exerted. To do so one would have to show coincidence between adherence to Cartesianism and a change in the levels of discrimination against women. A good historical study would also have to examine whether these changes might not be explained by other factors (e.g. religious, economic).

But even if it were sufficiently shown that a certain ontology or epistemology did have one political influence rather than another in the past, it could still not be immediately assumed that it would continue to do so in the future. It could be supposed that an ontology or an epistemology would have political implications similar to those it had in the past only if the societies it influences in the future are similar to those it did in the past. A change in the social context in which an ontology or epistemology operates may affect the political influence it exerts. For example, Pierre Bourdieu claims that "it is easy enough to detect his [Heidegger's] viscerally antagonistic reactions to ... the shifting nature of the emancipated mind and the rootlessness of the errant intellectual, associated through this key word with the figure of the Wandering Jew."¹⁶ Bourdieu thinks that one can see the relation between the concepts 'errant intellectual' and 'wandering Jew' once one becomes acquainted with the stereotypes prevalent in Heidegger's Germany. If this is granted, we may suppose that Heidegger's condemnation of the 'errant intellectual' could in some ways have fortified antisemitic tendencies in Germany of his time. But this does not mean that Heidegger's philosophy will have the same effect on, e.g., North American university students in the 1990's. Similarly, modernism may be claimed to combat attitudes tainted with corruption through its demand for universally known and binding procedures, while postmodernism, which does not endorse a clear, objective methodology, may be accused of obstructing the fight against corruption. But it is reasonable to suppose that postmodernism may have a different effect on communities with no tradition of public civil service than it would on communities with a publicly examined and relatively "clean" civil service. Thus, we may accept postmodernism because of its putative political influence on some societies and reject it because of its

influence on others. This may also be true of different groups within the same society: nurses may react differently to an epistemological or ontological theory than might artists, and artists than truckers.

One may also try to deduce the likelihood of a certain ontology's or epistemology's future influence from the fact that a limited number of famous individuals who created or advocated it also adhered to certain political views. For example, some modernists point out that Heidegger and Paul de Man supported National Socialism and that Sartre (if it is granted that he was a postmodernist) was for part of his life a Stalinist. Postmodernists, too, can point to disturbing facts about several modernist philosophers. Frege, Hume and Locke were racists.¹⁷ Locke also supported the slave trade, as did Berkeley.¹⁸

However, it is not clear that these facts are at all relevant to the issue discussed here. The question is not whether Heidegger or Locke were racists, but whether it is likely that exposing ourselves, our students, and our culture to their philosophy will increase the prevalence of racism in our society. Empirical testimony to such an outcome cannot be based on knowledge of the political tendencies of a few geniuses or of their readers and supporters, who in any case are only a small fraction of the entire popula-

tion.¹⁹

It should also be remembered that ontological or epistemological theories can exert an influence through misinterpretation. Nietzsche's teachings about the *Übermensch* and the will-to-power may have influenced the favorable reception of Nazi propaganda in Germany. Still, most modern Nietzsche scholars agree that if they had such an influence, it was due to a wrong understanding. Likewise, to the extent that the Christian doctrine of Grace and the ideas of rationalism did not serve as mere pretexts for religious persecution and Napoleon's imperialism respectively, but actually influenced them, they did so while being wrongly understood.

Thus, not only on the philosophical-conceptual level, but also on the sociological one, employing these arguments to show that an ontology or an epistemology has only positive, or negative, political consequences will be based on partial discussions, considering selectively those implications that confirm preconceived views. Both on the philosophical and on the sociological level claims that certain modernist or postmodernist theories should be accepted or rejected because of their possible political consequences are problematic. They can be used to prove too much.

FOOTNOTES

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1. I here take modernism and postmodernism to be characterized by the following features: modernism typically strives for certainty, intersubjectivity and even objectivity (that is, attaining, or approaching, a stable, universal truth); is atomistic; sees mathematics, the natural sciences or judicial activity as the model for cognitive activity; is critical and skeptical; distinguishes between subject and object; between the normative and the factual; between the emotional and the rational; and between the internal and private spheres on the one hand and the external and public ones on the other. Modernists frequently try to demarcate areas where reliance on personal, aesthetic, moral or religious considerations is appropriate from those where rational methods are. They think that we cannot know reality itself but only a representation of it; tend to reject, or try to improve on, states of doubt and

prejudice; are foundationalists and operate with universally obligatory and fixed procedures. Postmodernism typically adheres to what modernism repudiates, and tries to overcome what modernism sees as recommendable. Thus, postmodernists strive to overcome states of necessary certainty, which they perceive as closed; seek the personal; are sensitive to different cultural points of view; see reality as dynamic; accept reliance on prejudice as unavoidable; accept holism and communitarianism; tend to decompose the distinctions between subject and object, the normative and the factual, the emotional and the rational, the internal and the external and the private and the public. Postmodernists oppose obligatory procedures; rely on feelings and on aesthetic considerations; and see aesthetic perception as a possible model for cognitive activity. They oppose foundationalism, and try to overcome what they see as the traditional modernist obsession to achieve an unchanging, objective truth.

2. The terms "ontology" and "epistemology" do not

fit all the philosophies discussed here. Derrida, for example, does not think that his teachings are an ontology, an epistemology, a method, or even a theory. For brevity's sake, however, I shall use these terms throughout this article to refer to the views of both modernists and postmodernists.

3. Joanna Hodge, "Subject, Body and the Exclusion of Women from Philosophy," in Morwenna Griffiths and Margaret Whitford, eds., *Feminist Perspectives in Philosophy* (London: Macmillan, 1988), 152. Some other recent discussions of the implications of postmodernism on feminism are Somer Brodribb, *Nothing Mat(t)ers: A Feminist Critique of Postmodernism* (Melbourne: Spinifex, 1992). Kate Soper, "Feminism, Humanism and Postmodernism," *Radical Philosophy* 55 (1990): 11-17. Susan Hekman, "Reconstituting the Subject: Feminism, Modernism, and Postmodernism," *Hypatia* 6 (1991): 44-63. Diana T. Meyers, "Personal Autonomy or the Deconstructed Subject? A Reply to Hekman," *Hypatia* 7 (1992): 124-132. Seyla Benhabib, "Feminism and Postmodernism: An Uneasy Alliance," *Praxis International* 11 (1991): 137-149. Judith Butler, "Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of 'Postmodernism'," *Praxis International* 11 (1991): 150-165. Nancy Fraser, "False Antitheses: A Response to Seyla Benhabib and Judith Butler," *Praxis International* 11 (1991): 166-177. Henry S. Kariel, "The Feminist Subject Spinning in the Postmodern Project," *Political Theory* 18 (1990): 255-272. Anne Norton, "Response to Henry S. Kariel," *Political Theory* 18 (1990): 273-279. Ruth Berman, "From Aristotle's Dualism to Materialist Dialectics: Feminist Transformations of Science and Society," in Alison M. Jaggar and Susan R. Bordo, *Gender/Body/Knowledge: Feminist Reconstructions of Being and Knowing* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989), 224-255. Susan R. Bordo, *The Flight to Objectivity: Essays on Cartesianism and Culture* (New York: SUNY Press, 1987). Chris Weedon, *Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).
4. Quoted in Hugo Ott, *Martin Heidegger: A Political Life*, trans. Allan Blunden (New York: Basic Books, 1993), 339.
5. Jacques Derrida, "Heidegger, 1, enfer des philosophes," an interview with Didier Eribon, *Le Nouvel Observateur*, Nov. 612, 1987, 172-73. For some recent discussions on the relation between Heidegger's philosophy and Nazism see William V. Spanos, *Heidegger and Criticism: Retrieving the Cultural Politics of Deconstruction* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993). Richard Wolin, ed., *The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993). Pierre Bourdieu, *The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger*, tr. Peter Collier (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991). Jean Francois Lyotard, *Heidegger and "The Jews"*, trans. Andreas Michel and Mark S. Roberts (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990). Victor Farias, *Heidegger and Nazism* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989).
6. David R. Hiley, *Philosophy in Question: Essays on a Pyrrhonian Theme* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 7.
7. John D. Caputo, *Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987), 263, 193. Some other discussions on the moral-political implications of modernist and postmodernist theories are Christopher Norris, "The 'End of Ideology' Revisited: The Gulf War, Postmodernism and Realpolitik," *Philosophy and Political Criticism* 17 (1991): 1-40. William Barrett, *Death of the Soul: from Descartes to the Computer* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1986), xvi, 173. Henry Pachter, "Heidegger and Hitler: The Incompatibility of Geist and Politics," *Boston University Journal* 24 (1976): 47-55. Franz Böhm, *Anti-Cartesianismus: Deutsche Philosophie im Widerstand* (Leipzig: Meiner, 1938).
8. See also John Churchill, "Coercion and the Authority of Reason," *Metaphilosophy* 15 (1984): 172-85.
9. Edmund Husserl, "Erneuerung: Ihr Problem and ihre Methode," *Kaizo* 1922, 84-92, cited in Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction*, 2nd ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), vol. I, 85. See also Charles W. Harvey, "Husserl's Phenomenology as Critique of Epistemic Ideology," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 30 (1990): 33-42.
10. Karl R. Popper, "Toleration and Intellectual Responsibility," in *On Toleration*, ed. Susan Mendus and David Edwards (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 30.
11. Some authors are not clear on whether their discussions are indeed meant to warn against ontologies and epistemologies, or just to discuss the political influence that these ontologies and epistemologies had in the past, and the moral behavior of their authors. Tone and context generally point to the former alternative, and it is frequently unclear what the rationale of the discussion would be otherwise. But my argument is

- relevant only to those cases in which the discussion of the political dimensions of ontologies and epistemologies is indeed meant to warn against or recommend them.
12. Genevieve Lloyd, "The Man of Reason," *Metaphilosophy* 10 (1979): 18-37, esp. 22-24.
 13. See notes 4 and 5 above.
 14. This claim is in contrast to Derrida's view that although metaphysical humanism can be related both to Anti-Nazism and to Nazism (as well as to "all the Nazisms"), his own deconstructive teachings cannot ("Heidegger, lienfer des philosophes," an interview with Didier Eribon, *Le Nouvel Observateur*, Nov. 6-12, 1987, 172-73).
 15. *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*, ed. Simon Blackburn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 73.
 16. Pierre Bourdieu, *The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger*, tr. Peter Collier (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 49-50.
 17. Michael Dummett, *Frege: Philosophy of Language*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), Preface to the First Edition, p. xii. David Hume, "Of National Characters," in *Essays: Moral, Political and Literary*, eds. T. H. Green and T. H. Grose (London: Longmans, 1875), I, 252. Peter Laslett's Introduction and notes to John Locke, *Two Treatise of Government: A Critical Edition with Introduction and Apparatus Criticus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), pp. 52, 302-3.
 18. Locke, *Ibid.* George Berkeley, Sermon 9 (1732), in *Works*, eds. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (London: T. Nelson, 1944), VII, 122.
 19. Cf. Jacques Derrida, "Like the Sound of the Sea deep within a Shell: Paul de Man's War," *Critical Inquiry* 14 (1988): 646-47.