

threshold standards for a claim's being warranted to any degree. But the legal concept seems stronger, requiring the claim to be warranted, not just to *some* degree, however small, but to such a degree that it wouldn't be "unreasonable" to infer it from the evidence. And I'm less hopeful than Walker that the crossword analogy will help with the very difficult problem of specifying such a threshold; less sure, for that matter, whether we really *want* a definite cutoff point, rather than one that varies with context.

The crossword analogy, though a very useful tool, isn't a Universal Adjustable Epistemological Wrench; it isn't even the only analogy in my toolbox. In thinking about social aspects of science, I have switched up and back between my metaphor of several people working on the same crossword, and Popper's of science as a medieval cathedral, built over centuries by generations of workers; in thinking about the relation of the natural and the social sciences, I have switched up and back between thinking in terms of relatively isolatable parts of crosswords, and in terms of a road map superimposed on a contour map of the same territory. But come to think of it, that's another virtue of metaphors and analogies as intellectual tools: not only do they work even where they don't work (e.g., by prompting you to ask *why* there is apparently no epistemological analogue of the number of letters in a crossword entry), but also you can switch from one to another depending on which is more helpful to the task at hand.

NOTES

1. See inter alia 1993.b, ch. 4 and p. 136f; 1994.a2; 1995.a2; 2003.b, chs. 3, 4, and 10.
2. E. O. Wilson, *Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge* (New York: Knopf, 1998).
3. 2003.b, ch. 12, on predictions of The End of Science, has some bearing on this.
4. *General Electric Co. v. Joiner*, 522 U.S. 136, 118 S.Ct. 512 (1997).

6

PEIRCEPTION

Haack's Critical Common-sensism about Perception

ROBERT LANE

I am a *realist* about perception, in that I believe that the objects of perception are nonmental, external things and events that exist apart from our perception of them. What's more, I believe that we perceive those things and events directly, not indirectly by way of mental intermediaries (ideas, sense data, or the like). So I am also (pardon my neologism) a *directist* about perception. I am, then, a *direct realist*: I believe that the immediate objects of perception are nonmental, external, and independent of our perception of them.

While I'm comfortable with the realist half of this position, I'm not quite as satisfied with the directist half. In particular, I am unsure what my belief in *direct* perception amounts to. Despite its familiarity, the phrase "directly perceive" is too vague to be philosophically satisfying. Nevertheless, I find it difficult to take seriously the idea that we don't directly perceive tables, chairs, etc., and this difficulty of mine is a fine illustration of Charles Peirce's insight that the "indubitable is invariably vague."¹ Not surprisingly, the less vague and more precise I try to be about what it is to perceive something directly, the less comfortable I am in my belief.

Because of my dissatisfaction with the directist half of direct realism, I sympathize with Susan Haack's desire to find an alternative to, on one hand, realist theories that downplay the interpretative character of perception, and on the other hand, irrealist theories that deny perception's directness. As a Peircean, I am encouraged by Haack's suggestion that an account of perception based on that developed by Peirce can overcome this false dichotomy.² I am tempted to refer to Haack's Peircean theory of perception as "*Peirception*." But despite the appeal that word may have as an essay title, the fact that it is homonymous with "perception" makes it an inconvenient name for a distinct philosophical account of perception. So I will instead refer to the Peircean account of perception articulated by Haack as *Critical Common-sensism* (or *CCS*).³

Haack believes that the dichotomy between realist and irrealist theories of perception is overcome by Peirce's distinction between the *perceptual judgment*, the

belief that accompanies a perceptual experience, and the *percept*, the phenomenal, interactive aspect of a perceptual experience. It is the concept of the percept that legitimates CCS's claim that perception, which is in some sense interpretative, can nonetheless be *directly* of external things and events. But as I will argue, there are reasons to doubt that CCS is an adequate account of perception.

Ideally, I would begin my examination of CCS with a detailed and precise understanding of the phrase "direct perception" already in hand. But unfortunately, I know of no such understanding on which the claim that we directly perceive external things and events is plausible. All I will assume is the following, quite minimal conception of direct perception: to perceive *x* directly is to perceive *x* itself, not some representation of *x* or perceptual intermediary of *x*. This is, of course, *not* a satisfying philosophical explanation of direct perception; in fact, it is close to being tautological. But that, at least, is a good reason for thinking it's true, and at any rate, I believe that it suffices for my present purposes.

SECTION I

Before I start building my case against CCS, I should first explain the theory itself in more detail and also explain in what sense it is an alternative to the dichotomy of typical realist and irrealist theories. I'll begin by noting an ambiguity in the claim that perception is direct. In one sense, the claim has to do with the *objects* of perception. This is the sense of "direct perception" in which I claimed, at the outset, to be a directist. In this sense, the claim is tantamount to direct realism. It is assumed that we perceive external (nonmental) things, and what is asserted is that we perceive those things immediately, directly. Opposed to this is *indirect realism* (aka, representationalism), the view that we perceive external, nonmental things and events, but only indirectly, by way of our (direct) perception of mental intermediaries.

On the other hand, the claim that perception is direct can be understood as meaning that perception is *inferentially* direct, that our perceptual beliefs are spontaneous rather than the result of conscious or unconscious inferential processes. Call this view *noninferentialism*: when I am perceiving, say, a bowl of guacamole on the table in front of me, my belief that there is a bowl of guacamole in front of me is not the result of an inference. This view is opposed to *inferentialism*, the idea that our perceptual beliefs are always inferred; for example, an inferentialist might maintain that I infer my belief that there is a bowl of guacamole in front of me from beliefs about green patches and garlicky smells. Inferentialism and noninferentialism concern, not perceptual objects, but perceptual *beliefs*.⁴

Whether perception is objectually direct rather than indirect (whether direct realism is true and indirect realism false) and whether it is inferentially direct rather than indirect (whether noninferentialism is true and inferentialism false) are independent issues. It is consistent to maintain that perception is objectually direct but also inferentially indirect; i.e., to maintain that the immediate objects of perception are

external but that our beliefs about those objects are always inferred. And it is also consistent to say that perception is objectually indirect (we directly perceive mental items, not external things) but inferentially direct (our perceptual beliefs are spontaneous, not the result of an inferential process). The choice between direct realism and inferentialism is a false dichotomy, since there is no good reason to think we must choose between them; it is consistent to accept only one, to accept both, or to accept neither.

Haack sees that these issues are independent, that we are not forced to choose between "a realist approach stressing the directness of our perceptual acquaintance with the external world" and "an inferentialist approach stressing the indirectness of all our knowledge of things around us."⁵ Direct realism and inferentialism are answers to two intimately related, but nevertheless independent, questions: "Are the objects of direct perception external?" and "Are our perceptual beliefs the result of an inferential process?" It is consistent to answer yes to the former, thereby embracing direct realism, and to answer no to the latter, thereby rejecting inferentialism. And that is exactly what CCS does.

According to CCS, a perceptual experience (or *percipuum*, as Peirce called it)⁶ has two aspects: the *percept* and the *perceptual judgment*. These two elements of perception are conceptually distinct, although ordinarily they are, in Haack's words, "phenomenologically inseparable" (1998.b, 161); we can think of each of these aspects separately, but neither aspect of the percipuum ever occurs apart from the other. The percept itself has two aspects: a phenomenal aspect and a causal or reactive aspect. These aspects correspond to Peirce's categories of Firstness, or quality, and Secondness, or reaction.⁷ On one hand, the percept is the locus of phenomenal qualities—green, warm, garlicky, etc. Not that the percept itself is green, warm, or garlicky. Rather, the percept is our experience of those qualities as they occur in external objects; it is the phenomenal presentation of those qualities to us. The green shade and garlicky taste of guacamole are phenomenally presented to us in the percept. But not *represented* to us—the percept is a *presentation*, not a representation, of the external world:

To say that an external object is phenomenally presented is not to say that one perceives a mental image that represents it. . . . [T]o say that the percept *involves* an image_{NR} [a nonrepresentational image] is not equivalent to saying that perception is *of* an image_{NR}. . . . In perception, one might say, one *has* images_{NR}; but these images_{NR} are not *what one perceives*. (1994.a3, 22f)

And since the percept is not a representation, it cannot represent the world accurately or inaccurately; it is neither true nor false; it just *is*.⁸ On the other hand, a percept is also a direct causal interaction between the perceiver and the external environment. When I perceive a ladybug, the perception involves a direct relation—a "clash," as Peirce described it⁹—between my senses and the ladybug itself. What I am perceiving is not something mental; what I am perceiving is a ladybug (1998.b, 161). The percept, then, is my direct perceptual interaction with external objects and events, an interaction that has a phenomenal aspect.

So the first component of CCS is:

(CCS-1) One aspect of perception is the percept, which is both a phenomenal presentation of the external world to the perceiver and a direct interaction between perceiver and external world. There is nothing representational about the percept; it does not represent the world as being any particular way; it doesn't represent the world at all; it just *is*.

CCS-1 seems to imply an answer to the question whether perception is objectually direct. Because CCS-1 says that a perceiver's phenomenal experience of the world is itself a direct interaction between perceiver and external world, it seems to imply direct realism. I say "seems to" because what it means for perception to be objectually *direct* is not nearly clear or precise enough to make the inference from CCS-1 to direct realism obviously valid.¹⁰ But I think that on the minimalist understanding of the notion of (objectually) direct perception I mentioned above (viz. that to perceive *x* directly is to perceive *x* itself, not some representation of *x* or perceptual intermediary of *x*), CCS-1's characterization of the percept does imply that we directly perceive external objects. Haack does not indicate whether she takes CCS-1 to imply direct realism, but she clearly believes that we directly perceive external objects and events. "Perception is interpretative," she says, "but it is also direct . . . what we perceive, and sometimes misperceive, is not sense data or ideas . . . but things and events around us" (1998.b, 161).

While the idea of the percept reflects perception's objectually direct nature, its interpretative nature is reflected in the concept of the perceptual judgment, the belief that automatically accompanies the percept. Perceptual judgments are "[o]ur normally spontaneous judgments or descriptions of what we perceive."¹¹ If I notice a bowl of guacamole on the table in front of me, I automatically and involuntarily believe that there is a bowl of guacamole there. This belief is not merely *representational*; it is *propositional*, in that it represents the world as being a specific way, viz. as containing a bowl of guacamole that's sitting just in front of me.

In addition, my perceptual judgment is potentially *explanatory* of my phenomenal experience of the guacamole. Why am I having an experience as of a green, garlicky-smelling substance? Because there's a bowl of guacamole in front of me, just as I believe there to be. A perceptual judgment is like the conclusion of an abductive inference, although, because it is spontaneous and involuntary, it is not in fact the conclusion of an inference.¹² We hypothesize external things to explain our percepts, but we come to those hypotheses involuntarily. When I experience a percept as of a bowl of guacamole in front of me, I cannot help believing that there's a bowl of guacamole there.

Related to, but not quite identical with, the explanatory aspect of a perceptual judgment is its *interpretative* aspect. Perceptual judgments involve "interpretation, depending on background beliefs, expectation, set, as well as sensory input" (1998.b, 161). It's not entirely clear what Haack means to emphasize here. Sometimes she seems to use "interpretative" (and "interpretive") to denote the explana-

tory character of the percept described above (e.g., 1994.a3, 18, 31), but on at least one occasion, she seems to use "interpretive" to denote merely the percept's representational character.¹³ A subtler understanding of "interpretative" is suggested by her claim that "our perceptual beliefs involve explanatory *filling in of the often limited information* afforded us by our perceptual interactions with those things" (1994.a3, 32; emphasis added). The idea is that perceptual judgment, as an interpretation that is potentially explanatory of the percept that it accompanies, says more than does that percept itself. Of course, this is metaphorical, since a percept does not literally *say* anything. A more literal way of putting it might be that the *content* of the perceptual judgment exceeds that of the percept. But this isn't entirely satisfactory, since the content of a perceptual judgment is propositional, while the content of a percept is not, and it's not clear what it means to say that the propositional content of one thing can exceed the nonpropositional content of another.¹⁴

Whatever it is that Haack means by "interpretative," she takes the interpretative nature of a perceptual judgment to be compatible with its being noninferential (1993.b, 110). In other words, she believes that the interpretativeness of perceptual judgments does not require that such judgments be inferential. This seems right no matter which of the three suggested understandings of "interpretative" she intends: that a perceptual judgment is the result of an inference is implied neither by the claim that it is potentially explanatory, nor by the claim that it is representational, nor by the claim that its content exceeds that of the percept it accompanies.

So the second component of CCS is:

(CCS-2) Another aspect of perception is the perceptual judgment, the spontaneous and involuntary belief that is prompted by the percept. The perceptual judgment is representational, propositional, abductive, and interpretative.

CCS-2 implies an answer to the question whether perception is inferentially direct; specifically, it implies noninferentialism—our beliefs about the (nonmental, external) objects of our perception are spontaneous, immediate, noninferential.

So, to the question, "Do we directly perceive external, extramental things?" CCS answers yes; to the question, "Does perception involve interpretation?" CCS answers yes; and to the question, "Is perception inferential?" CCS answers no. Haack's account of perception is thus a noninferentialist form of direct realism that acknowledges the interpretative aspect of perception.

Haack takes it to be a virtue of CCS that the theory shows how perception can be both direct *and* interpretative. She says that "the prevailing view seems to be that we must choose the direct *or* the interpretative": choose either a form of direct realism (e.g., as defended by J. J. Gibson) or a view that emphasizes the interpretativeness of perception (e.g., as defended by R. L. Gregory).¹⁵ But, Haack says, we don't have to choose. Peirce's distinction between the percept and the perceptual judgment is supposed to demonstrate that perception is both: percepts are *direct* interactions with external things and events, interactions that are accompanied by our *interpretative* judgments about those things and events.

SECTION 2

At first blush, Haack's explanation of how perception can be representational and interpretative, on one hand, and objectually direct, on the other, is quite plausible. But despite this initial plausibility, there is good reason for thinking that CCS is not an adequate account of perception, and thus good reason for doubting whether Haack has provided a satisfactory explanation of how perception can be both direct and interpretative.

I will begin my arguments against CCS by noting that together CCS-1 and CCS-2 imply the following corollary: the propositional judgment is the only representational aspect of the percipuum; only the perceptual judgment, not the percept, serves a representational function in perception.¹⁶ I'll call this idea *the representational exclusivity of judgment* (REJ). Peirce analyzed only the perceptual judgment, not the percept, in terms of Thirdness (representation, generality, connectedness). As Haack notes, this reflects two details of Peirce's theory: first, that percepts are nonpropositional—unlike perceptual judgments, percepts make no claims and can be neither true nor false, neither certain nor uncertain; and second, that percepts are not representational *at all*—they don't represent anything to the perceiver; they simply *are* (1994.a3, 15f). It is by way of the notion of the perceptual judgment that CCS attempts to accommodate the fallibility of perception without sacrificing its directness. The perceptual judgment is the locus of perceptual representation, and therefore the locus of perceptual misrepresentation. REJ implies that every case of perceptual error is a case of false belief about what one is perceiving. Representation is a necessary condition of misrepresentation; only something that purports to represent *x* can misrepresent *x*. If, as REJ states, the only representation involved in the perceptual event is that of the perceptual judgment, then perceptual error, or misperception, must be a matter of false perceptual judgment or belief. Our perceptions are fallible because the perceptual judgments that accompany our percepts are fallible.

The claim that perceptual error is a matter of false perceptual judgment, and nothing else, is plausible for many types of perceptual error.¹⁷ But other types of perceptual misrepresentation cannot be explained by appealing to the perceptual judgment alone; there are other cases of perceptual error for which it is simply wrong to say that one's beliefs are the sole locus of misrepresentation. If I'm right about this, then, contra REJ, percepts *do* have a representational character. Because CCS implies REJ, and REJ says that perceptual error affects perceptual judgment only, CCS is committed to characterizing hallucination as a sort of belief. CCS must say, for example, that for Macbeth to hallucinate a floating dagger is for him mistakenly to believe that the space in front of his face, which is in fact empty, is occupied by a floating dagger.¹⁸

But this cannot be an accurate account of hallucination, since it is possible for the perceptual judgment that accompanies a hallucinatory percept to be true. This is the phenomenon psychologists refer to as *pseudohallucination*.¹⁹ A pseudohallucination is a hallucination that does not fool the perceiver. If I see pink elephants and believe, not

that there are pink elephants in front of me, but that I'm drunk, I am not fooled by my hallucination. It is possible to hallucinate *x* and at the same time to believe that one is hallucinating *x* and that *x* isn't real. In such a case, the perceptual judgment does not misrepresent anything. Call this the *argument from pseudohallucination*:

1. Some perceptual misrepresentations have only a phenomenal aspect and do not affect one's perceptual judgment.
2. Therefore, the percept must, on at least some occasions, be a misrepresentation of the world.
3. If *x* is a misrepresentation, then *x* is a representation.
4. Therefore, the percept is, on at least some occasions, a representation.

If REJ is construed as covering *all* percepts, both hallucinatory and nonhallucinatory, then a further inference is warranted:

5. Therefore, REJ is false.

And since CCS implies REJ, it follows that CCS is false.

An obvious response to this argument is to say that REJ should not be construed as covering *all* percepts but only ordinary, "genuine," nonhallucinatory ones. The idea is to understand CCS-1 and CCS-2, and therefore REJ, as providing an account of *normal*, nonhallucinatory perception only. Hallucinations (pseudo- or full-blown) tell us nothing about the nature of genuine perception, because hallucination and genuine perception are very different types of psychological phenomena. CCS, says this response, is an adequate account of *genuine* perception, but some other account of hallucination is needed. This response calls to mind so-called *disjunctive theories*, which attempt to defend a direct realist position about perception against considerations of misperception by maintaining that genuine perception and hallucination are such different kinds of experience that a philosophical account of genuine perception need not also apply to hallucination.²⁰

I do not think this is an adequate response, because I find the disjunctive approach itself to be implausible. I will return to this issue below. In the meantime, I want to articulate a second argument, similar to the first in that it appeals to facts about hallucination, but also different, in that it is directed squarely against CCS-1 rather than REJ. It goes as follows. The space directly in front of me can look two completely different ways to me (e.g., it can look empty, on one hand, and it can look as if it is occupied by a floating dagger, on the other) without changing at all. My phenomenal experience of that area can vary wildly while the area itself stays the same. It is possible that at *t* I have a genuine percept of my dog Murphy lying at my feet, while at *t+1* I have a percept as of Murphy having been replaced by, say, an armadillo, when in fact Murphy is still there. The opposite is true, as well. It is possible for my environment to change significantly and my phenomenal experience to remain exactly the same. Rather than my percept changing from *t* to *t+1*, my per-

cept remains unchanged, while Murphy has actually disappeared. In this example, it's the external world that's changed; my perceptual experience (and perhaps its underlying neurology, as well) remains the same.²¹ In sum, our perceptual experience of the external world, and the external world itself, are independent of each other. Each can change without a corresponding change in the other.

In light of this, CCS needs to be able to explain how the phenomenal and the reactive aspects of a percept can be so thoroughly independent of one another, if in fact percepts are themselves direct interactions with the external world. In neither of the cases sketched above does the percept present the world as it really is. That the percept can be so different than it ought to be given the perceiver's actual environment strongly suggests that it cannot be one and the same thing as a direct interaction between perceiver and environment, as CCS-1 claims.

Call this the *strengthened argument from hallucination*. It resembles the traditional argument from hallucination against direct realism, but it emphasizes that the independence of percept and environment is bidirectional. Not only can the percept change with no corresponding change in the environment, but the opposite is possible as well. It is also not nearly as ambitious as the traditional argument, as it doesn't attempt either to disprove direct realism or to prove indirect realism (or idealism). Stated formally, the argument is as follows:

1. The phenomenal aspect of a percept can vary wildly without the external world itself changing at all, and thus without the interactive aspect of the percept changing at all.
2. The external world around a perceiver, and thus the interactive aspect of the perceiver's percept, can vary wildly without the phenomenal aspect of the percept changing at all.
3. Therefore, at least in those cases where phenomenal and reactive aspects vary independently of each other, the percept is not a direct interaction between perceiver and external world.

If CCS-1 is construed as referring to *all* percepts, not just standard, genuine, non-hallucinatory percepts, then a further inference is warranted:

4. Therefore, CCS-1 is false.

It is conceivable that the inference from (1) and (2) to (3) is a non sequitur. This is conceivable largely because the word "direct" has not been given a precise meaning in this context. However, I do think that (1) and (2) jointly provide a very compelling reason for thinking that (3) is true. Again, I am assuming only a very stripped down concept of direct perception: to perceive x directly is to perceive x itself rather than some representation of x or perceptual intermediary of x . If my phenomenal experience of the world is a perception of the external world itself, it is mysterious how it is possible that the external world change without my phenom-

enal experience of it changing and that my phenomenal experience of the world change without the world itself changing.

To argue convincingly that the first inference in this argument is a non sequitur, Haack would need to explain how it can be true both that

- (A) the phenomenal aspect of a percept can be just as it would be were the world around the perceiver very different than it actually is; and that
- (B) percepts are direct interactions between perceiver and external world.

But it is not obvious that both (A) and (B) *can* be true. In fact, it is unclear how, if you accept (A), you can avoid giving up (B). This is because it is unclear how the phenomenal aspect of a percept, conceived as an unmediated interaction with real, external objects, can vary so radically when there is no corresponding variation in the percept's reactive aspect. Of course, in making this point I must have some idea of what it means for a perceptual interaction to be *direct* rather than indirect or mediated. And again, I do not claim to have any precise or detailed concept of perceptual directness. But given even the stark concept of perceptual directness mentioned above, it is difficult to see how (A) and (B) could both be true.

Suppose that at time t Lady Macbeth experiences (genuine, nonhallucinatory) percept x_t , which is a direct interaction between her and her immediate environment. There is no blood on the floor in front of her, nor is her percept as if there were blood. But at $t+1$, she experiences (hallucinatory) percept x_{t+1} —she begins to hallucinate blood on the carpet. x_{t+1} is very different from x_t in its phenomenal aspect, but *not* in its reactive aspect. In fact, in so far as Secondness is concerned, x_t and x_{t+1} are identical, since Lady Macbeth's environment hasn't changed—the carpet is still free of blood. If percepts x_t and x_{t+1} are direct interactions between Lady Macbeth and her environment, and if that environment does not change from t to $t+1$, it is unclear how the phenomenal aspects of x_t and x_{t+1} can be so very different. The same reasoning holds with regard to scenarios in which the external world changes but the phenomenal aspect of the percept in question does not.

A possible defense of CCS-1 is to deny that the phenomenal aspect of the percept can change without the reactive aspect changing as well. According to this defense, the reactive aspect includes the causal interactions that take place in the perceiver's nervous system as he has a phenomenal experience. Such experience cannot vary without some corresponding variation in the perceiver's underlying neurology, so the phenomenal aspect of a percept cannot change without a change in the percept's reactive aspect. But while the point about neurology is accurate, it does not help CCS-1 avoid my argument. It's true that I have been using "reactive aspect" to refer to only the causal interaction (or "clash") between the perceiver's body and its environment. A broader conception of the reactive aspect of the percept might also encompass causal interactions within the perceiver's nervous system that are relevant to perception. On this broader conception, the phenomenal aspect of the percept could not vary without corresponding changes in its reactive aspect. But none

of this is to the point, since the issue at hand is not whether phenomenal experience can vary independently of neurology. The issue is how phenomenal experience can vary independently of changes in the perceiver's environment given that phenomenal experience is a direct (unmediated) experience of *that environment*. In other words, it isn't causal interaction per se that's relevant; it's causal interaction *between perceiver and external world* that's relevant. That there are always neural interactions underlying hallucinatory perception is beside the point.

Another defense is the one mentioned above with regard to the argument from pseudohallucination, viz. the disjunctive approach. On this view, hallucinations don't tell us anything about the nature of genuine perception because genuine perception and hallucination are of very different psychological types. So CCS-1 should not be construed as a claim about *all* percepts, but only as a claim about genuine, nonhallucinatory percepts. It follows that in the strengthened argument from hallucination, the inference from (3) to (4) is invalid and that the argument fails to show that CCS-1 is false. But as I mentioned before, I find the disjunctive position implausible, for the following reasons.²²

The disjunctive approach is justified only if there is some essential difference between genuine and hallucinatory percepts (i.e., some difference between all possible genuine percepts and all possible hallucinatory percepts) that can justify the claim that a philosophical account of genuine perception (like CCS) need not also apply to hallucinatory perception. Now, it seems to me that the only essential difference between genuine and hallucinatory percepts is that genuine percepts are of real, external things and events (although not necessarily directly of those things and events) and hallucinatory percepts are not (but neither are they necessarily of inner, mental objects). Any other difference between a genuine percept of *x* and a hallucination of *x* (i.e., an apparent, but not actual, percept of *x*) is inessential. While it's true that the genuine percept can be phenomenologically very different from the hallucinatory percept, it need not be; hallucinatory percepts are capable of being phenomenologically indistinguishable from genuine percepts.²³ Furthermore, while it's true that my genuine percept of *x* might have a different underlying neurology than my hallucination of *x*, there need not be such a difference. It is possible that a hallucinatory percept of *x* results from exactly the same neurological happenings as a genuine percept of *x*. If at *t* I am having a genuine percept of *x*, and at *t*+1, *x* is removed and all properties of my central nervous system were made to remain unchanged from *t*, then, at *t*+1, I will have a nongenuine percept of *x*, the underlying neurology of which will be identical to that caused by a genuine perceptual interaction with *x*.

So the only essential difference between genuine and hallucinatory percepts is that the former, but not the latter, have real, external things and events as their objects. And that difference seems insufficient to motivate a disjunctive version of CCS. In other words, it is not at all obvious why the fact that genuine percepts, but not hallucinatory percepts, have real, external things and events as their objects is an adequate reason for maintaining that a philosophical account of perception need be true of only genuine, and not also hallucinatory, perception. At the very least, the

defender of CCS is obligated to explain why this difference between genuine and hallucinatory percepts motivates such an approach. In the absence of such an explanation, to adopt a disjunctive version of CCS seems ad hoc at best, a move motivated solely by the need to avoid problems posed by hallucination and other types of perceptual error. So the disjunctive approach is not an adequate defense of CCS-1 against the strengthened argument from hallucination, and neither is it an adequate defense of REJ against the argument from pseudohallucination.

CONCLUSION

I should emphasize that the conclusion of the strengthened argument from hallucination is rather modest. The argument concludes only that CCS-1 is false. The traditional argument from hallucination goes much further, concluding that we do not directly perceive the external world, and therefore that direct realism is false. I do not advocate making this inference. The denial of CCS-1 does not entail the denial of direct realism. The CCS model of perception is not the only model of perception compatible with direct realism, so its failure does not force us to deny that perception of the external world is direct (and in saying this, I am, as before, assuming only a bare-bones understanding of "direct perception").

So my arguments do not imply that direct realism is false. Neither do they imply that indirect realism is true. But they do provide strong reasons for thinking that CCS-1 and REJ are false. As a realist about perception, and as a Peircean, I am not very happy about this conclusion. Although I agree with Haack and Peirce that perception is both direct and representational, I have grave doubts about whether perception is direct and representational in the way CCS says it is. The theory locates the representational character of perception exclusively in the perceptual judgment, but in doing this it renders it mysterious how hallucination can be anything other than false belief, how pseudohallucination can happen at all, and how the phenomenal and reactive aspects of the percept can be so radically independent from each other. What we need is a way to retain the fallible, representational nature of the percept without giving up its directness: a way to explain how one and the same psychological event can be, on the one hand, a direct interaction or "clash" between perceiver and external objects and events, and on the other, representative of those objects and events, and therefore fallible.

But I am not sure that this is possible. The two characterizations of the percept—as a direct interaction between perceiver and external objects and events, and as a phenomenal event that represents the external world—are obviously in tension with each other. But the relevant concepts (of *direct interaction*, *representation*, *phenomenal*, etc.) are far from clear enough to judge whether the percept can in fact live up to both characterizations. For the moment, I am confident in concluding only that CCS-1 and REJ are false and that my belief in the directness of perception is still in need of support. Whether such support can be found for this indubitable but

vague belief I share with Haack, and with Peirce, is a question about "Peirception" that I will leave for another day.²⁴

NOTES

1. CP 5.446, 1905. Unless otherwise indicated, references to Peirce are to the *Collected Papers*, 1931–58. CP, followed by volume and paragraph number.
2. Haack says that Peirce's theory "is as successful an attempt as any philosopher has made to escape the confines of the false dichotomy and seize the middle ground" (1994.a3, 10).
3. Peirce's account of perception was one facet of his so-called Critical Common-sensism, his synthesis of elements from Kant's critical philosophy and Reid's common sense philosophy. For a detailed statement of Critical Common-sensism, see, e.g., CP, 5.438ff. Peirce explicitly states his allegiance to Reid and Kant on the matter of immediate perception at CP 5.56 (1903), CP 5.444 (1905), and CP 8.261 (1905). Haack's most detailed articulation and defense of CCS is in (1994.a3, 10). Chapters 4 and 5 of 1993.b include a Peircean account of perceptual experience as both direct and interpretative. That account, she says, "was arrived at initially without reference to Peirce's work: but then sharpened and refined when I realized that Peirce had supplied a map to the territory through which I was stumbling" (1994.a3, 33n20).
4. The distinction between perceptual objects and perceptual beliefs is not a trivial one, nor is it necessarily an easy one to keep straight. Frank Jackson criticizes both Berkeley and D. M. Armstrong for having gotten tripped up by it; see Jackson (1977, 7–9).
5. 1994.a3, 9f; cf. 31f.
6. E.g., CP 7.629, 1903.
7. Haack gives a capsule summary of Peirce's categories in (1994.a3, 14f). For a longer account in Peirce's own words, see, e.g., Peirce (1992, 146ff).
8. CCS's claim that percepts are not the sorts of thing to be truth-valued is reflected in Haack's foundherentism as the claim that experiential S-evidence (the sensory and introspective states that sustain a given belief-state), including current sensory S-evidence, is "not the kind of thing with respect to which [one] has, or needs, evidence" (1993.b, 77). On Haack's view, perceptual states don't represent the world as being a certain way; they just *are*. They are therefore not the type of thing for which evidential support could be provided. Cf. Descartes's observation that ideas considered apart from their referential relationships to the external world cannot be false (*Meditations on First Philosophy* III: 37).
9. CP 8.41, c.1885.
10. What's clearer, perhaps, is that direct realism does not imply CCS-1; from the claim that we directly perceive extramental objects and events, it does not follow that there is a single event in perception which is both a phenomenal presentation of the world to the perceiver *and* a direct interaction between the perceiver and the world. Other models of perception may be compatible with direct realism.
11. Haack (1998.b, 161). Peirce describes a perceptual judgment as "a judgment asserting in propositional form what a character of a percept directly present to the mind is" (CP 5.54, 1903).
12. Haack (1994.a3, 18). As Haack notes, Peirce characterized perceptual judgments as "the extremest case of Abductive Judgments" (CP 5.185, 1903).
13. "In every judgment . . . there is something in some degree interpretive, and hence

fallible." (Susan Haack, "Realistically Speaking: How Science Fumbles, and Sometimes Forges, Ahead." 2001. Unpublished typescript, p. 10. [Cf. 2003.b, 128.]

14. As a direct realist, I am skeptical of the claim that percepts themselves have some sort of content, and therefore I'm skeptical of the claim that the content of a perceptual judgment can exceed that of a percept. But for now I must set these suspicions aside. I will point out, however, that there are many philosophers who don't share my skepticism. *The Contents of Experience* is a collection of (nonskeptical) essays on the topic of perceptual content, and David Crane writes in his introduction to that collection that it is now a "generally accepted assumption that perceptions have content" (1992, 7).

15. 1994.a3, 31, where she refers to Gibson (1966) and (1967), and Gregory (1966).

16. More accurately, this corollary is implied by the conjunction of CCS-1, CCS-2, and the assumption that the percipuum consists of nothing but the percept and the perceptual judgment.

17. E.g., the Ponzo illusion and other psychology textbook examples of perceptual mistakes; perceiving a passing train as if it is moving and the train car you are sitting in is standing still, etc. A nice example of the Ponzo illusion can be found at http://www.sandlot.com/Distortions/Ponzo_illusion.htm (accessed August 8, 2006).

18. Peirce himself strongly suggested this view at one point: "Hallucinations, delusions, superstitious imaginations, and fallacies of all kinds are experiences, but *experiences misunderstood*" (CP 6.492, c.1896, emphasis added).

19. See Slade and Bentall (1988, 18f). Siegel and Jarvik (1975, 104f) conjecture that most drug-induced hallucinations, including the hashish-induced hallucinations reported by William James (1890, 121f), are actually pseudohallucinations. Jerry Fodor appeals to pseudohallucinations, although not by that name, in his criticism of Putnam's account of perception (2000).

20. Pitcher (1970), Hinton (1973), and, perhaps, Putnam (1999) defend disjunctive theories.

21. The importance of this sort of scenario, in which one's environment changes with no corresponding change in one's percept, did not occur to me until I read the first chapter of Foster (2000).

22. The objection I offer here resembles the standard criticism of disjunctive theories of perception, viz. that there is nothing in the nature of genuine, illusory, and hallucinatory perceptual experience that justifies the disjunctive claim they are not subtypes of a single, more general psychological type. For a recent example of such criticism see chapter 6 of Robinson (1994). Note, though, that I disagree with Robinson's ultimate conclusion, that what we perceive directly are sense data.

23. Haack grants this point: "in extraordinary circumstances the subject could be in a state which is indistinguishable by him from the states resulting from his sensory interactions with the world" (1993.b, 78).

24. I wish to thank Cornelis de Waal, Mark Migotti, and James Ryan for their very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay.

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HOW I SEE THINGS NOW

Response to Robert Lane

SUSAN HAACK

"*Peirception*" is lovely—I wish I'd thought of it; and the concerns Professor Lane raises about pseudohallucination, disjunctivism, etc., and how they bear on the approach to perception tentatively sketched in "How the Critical Common-sensist Sees Things" (1994.a3), have proven well worth wrestling with. Lane sympathizes with my Critical Common-sensist account of perception as at once realist and fallible; but he thinks it fails to accommodate the phenomenon of "pseudohallucination," which he takes to reveal that there is something propositional not only in perceptual judgments, but also in perceptual events. Lane grants that this argument could be avoided by adopting a disjunctivist position that excludes hallucination and pseudohallucination as not really perception at all; but sees this as implausibly ad hoc. I agree that it is undesirable to exclude hallucinations and pseudohallucinations by fiat, and that it is a mistake to insist that the only kind of perceptual misfire is false perceptual judgment; and Lane has persuaded me, also, that "direct" and "interpretive" are words best avoided. I believe, nevertheless, that the phenomena to which Lane draws our attention can be accommodated within the broad outlines of the CCS approach.

Let me begin by observing that not every kind of disjunctivism is arbitrary or ill-motivated. We can distinguish the perceptual event (the core 2ndness of perception, in Peirce's terms); its phenomenal character (1st); and the judgment it prompts (3rd). The perceptual event seems crucial, in this sense: if there is *no* relevant perceptual interaction with external things and events, what is happening is not properly described as perception. Think of the visual disturbance that precedes a migraine: distinctive, jaggedly circular patterns in the visual field, starting small and growing larger, looking a bit but not exactly like strong artificial lights seen through a rain-blurred window. This visual disturbance superimposes itself on your visual field, partly occluding whatever is in sight; but it persists even when you try to stave off the migraine by retreating to a darkened room and closing your eyes. There is excitation of the visual part of the brain; but this excitation is causally independent of your per-

ceptual interactions with external things and events. It might be plausibly described as detached visual experience; but it is surely not plausibly described as perception.

I'm not sure whether, by the criterion I have suggested, hallucinations and pseudohallucinations qualify as perceptions, or only as detached sensory experiences. (Happily, I have no firsthand experience of schizophrenia, epilepsy, or delirium tremens, or of hallucinogenic drugs, as I do of migraines.) Perhaps, like the visual disturbances I have described, the hallucinations brought on by schizophrenia, epilepsy, the DTs, etc., would persist even if the sufferer were deprived of all perceptual interactions with external things: the schizophrenic would still "hear" the voice of God, the epileptic would still "smell" newly mown grass, the alcoholic would still "see" pink rats, etc., even in the sensory-deprivation tank. If so, these hallucinations are not, by my lights, perceptions. But perhaps (as not only Lane but also Peirce seems to think) hallucinations and pseudohallucinations *are* genuine perceptions. Perhaps, for example, the alcoholic really is seeing the wallpaper, but in his disordered state the petals on the pink roses printed on it look like pointy ears and noses, the stalks like tails, and the whole pattern seems to squirm and wriggle;¹ in other words, he grossly *misperceives* the wallpaper. Or, quite possibly, some of the phenomena we call "hallucinations" are properly classified as perceptions, and others are not.

Obviously, if hallucinations and pseudohallucinations aren't really perceptions, they pose no difficulty for the CCS account of perception. But equally obviously, if any or all cases of hallucination and pseudohallucination *are* genuine perceptions—albeit radical misperceptions—then the CCS account had better be able to accommodate them. In this case, however, whatever challenges hallucinations and pseudohallucinations pose are already posed by familiar cases of misperception. So the crucial issue raised by Lane's paper is really whether a CCS account can handle misperceptions, whether of the everyday or of more radical kinds, in a plausible way.

Within the category of genuine perception, let me distinguish normal, veridical perception (where the phenomenal character of the perceptual event is normal and the judgment prompted is true), and three possible kinds of perceptual misfire (where the phenomenal character of the perceptual event is abnormal in some way, the judgement prompted is false, or both).

- (i) The subject is interacting perceptually with some external thing, the phenomenal character of this interaction is normal, and his judgment of what he perceives is true.

For example, someone is looking at a dog, it looks as a dog would look to a normal observer in normal circumstances, and he judges, correctly, that there is a dog present.

- (ii) The subject is interacting perceptually with some external thing, and the phenomenal character of his interaction is normal; however, his judgment of what he perceives is false.

For example, someone is looking at a line of print which reads "there are **two paths** to this conclusion"; it looks to him just as these printed words would look to a normal observer in normal circumstances; but he thinks he sees "there are **two paths** to this conclusion."²

- (iii) The subject is interacting perceptually with some external thing, but the phenomenal character of his interaction is abnormal, either because his perceptual apparatus is abnormal or malfunctioning in some way, or because the conditions of observation are abnormal; and so his judgment of what he perceives is false.

For example, someone is looking at a red stain on the carpet, but since he is red-green color-blind, it looks to him as a khaki stain would look to a normal observer in normal circumstances, and he judges, falsely, that there is a greenish-brown stain on the carpet; or he is looking at a dry road, but because of the heat it looks to him as a wet road would look to a normal observer in normal circumstances, and he judges, falsely, that the road is wet.

- (iv) The subject is interacting perceptually with some external thing; the phenomenal character of his interaction is abnormal; however, realizing that his perceptual apparatus, or the circumstances of observation, are abnormal, he makes a true assessment of what he perceives.

For example, someone is looking at a red stain on the carpet which, because he is color-blind, looks greenish-brown to him; but, knowing that he is unable to distinguish red from green, he concludes, correctly, that there is either a red stain on the carpet, or a green one, or a greenish-brown one.

In case (i), there is no misfire; in case (ii), there is simply a false perceptual judgment. But in cases (iii) and (iv), there is something amiss with the phenomenal character of the perceptual event; in case (iii), but not in case (iv), this results in a false judgment. If the CCS account insisted that the only thing that can go wrong in perception is that the judgment prompted is false, it couldn't accommodate case (iii) very comfortably, and it couldn't accommodate case (iv) at all. But it needn't, and shouldn't, say this; the key thought isn't that there can be no possible defect in the percept, but that the locus of fallibility (i.e., the possibility of mistake) lies in the judgment. Sometimes, in fact, a person makes a false perceptual judgment precisely because of the incompleteness, fuzziness, or, etc., of the percept. I can't claim, however, that all this was clearly articulated in "How the Critical Common-sensist Sees Things" (1994.a3); so let me try to do a bit better here.

A perceptual event is just that, an event: as Peirce says, it is a presentation, not a representation. But as Peirce also says, it has a phenomenal character. When I interact visually with some external thing or event, there is some phenomenal character my experience has, some phenomenal way it is—sharp or blurry, straight or