Abstract
I argue that intentionalist theories of perceptual experience are unable to explain the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. I begin by describing what is involved in explaining phenomenal character, and why it is a task of philosophical theories of perceptual experience to explain it. I argue that reductionist versions of intentionalism are unable to explain the phenomenal character of perceptual experience because they mischaracterize its nature; in particular, they fail to recognize the sensory nature of experience’s phenomenal character. I argue that nonreductionist versions of intentionalism are unable to explain the phenomenal character of perceptual experience because, although they recognize its sensory nature, they mislocate it.
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Notes
One might object that there are some properties such that knowing their nature does not enable one to know a priori the nature of their instantiations. For example, if I know the nature of the property of being Fred’s favorite color, then I cannot know a priori the nature of an instantiation of this property, for the nature of an instantiation will depend on which color Fred’s favorite color is (green, say), and that is something that can only be known empirically. In response, I note that the objection assumes that the instantiation of the property of being green is identical to the instantiation of the property of being Fred’s favorite color. But this assumption can be resisted; I can hold that since the property of being Fred’s favorite color is not identical to the property of being green (since they are not co-instantiated in every possible world), then the instantiation of the property of being Fred’s favorite color is not identical to the instantiation of the property of being green. And then it follows that the alleged counterexample does not succeed: in virtue of knowing the nature of the property of being Fred’s favorite color, I can know a priori the nature of an instantiation of the property of being Fred’s favorite color; what I can’t know a priori is that this instantiation will be accompanied by a different instantiation, the instantiation of the property of being green.
For example, Tye (2000, p. 45) famously distinguishes between an intentionalism that is a thesis “of supervenience: necessarily, experiences that are alike in their representational contents are alike in their phenomenal character,” and a “strong” intentionalism that holds that “phenomenal character is one and the same as representational content that meets certain further conditions.”.
Compare Byrne, who defines intentionalism in terms of supervenience, and holds that intentionalism “does not take a stand on whether phenomenal character can be explained in terms of, or reduced to, intentionality—at least it doesn’t if these claims don’t follow from the mere fact of supervenience” (2001, p. 204, emphasis in original).
Some intentionalists allow that the representational content of perceptual experiences may be nonpropositional; see my discussion of Pautz’s view in Sect. 3. For my purposes in this paper, it will not matter whether the representational content of perceptual experience is or is not propositional.
Strictly speaking, Harman and Tye argue for intentionalism on the basis of the phenomenon standardly referred to as the “transparency” of perceptual experience. But here I agree with Martin (2002, p. 392) that to argue for intentionalism from transparency is equivalent to arguing that intentionalism can explain the phenomenal character of perceptual experience: “The argument from transparency, then, can be seen fundamentally to be concerned with the explanation of the phenomenological datum that philosophers such as Tye insist upon.”.
The motivating idea is concisely expressed by Kennedy (2009 p. 580, emphasis in original): “In perception, material things seem to be dominant components of our subjective situation. Responding to this impression, naïve realism offers a view on which material particulars are dominant components of our subjective situation.” Much more, of course, needs to be said to flesh out and develop this idea into a defense of the view that naïve realism can intelligibly explain the phenomenal character of perceptual experience.
The distinction between reductionist and nonreductionist versions of intentionalism is taken from Chalmers (2004). Reductionist intentionalists include, among others, Dretske (1995), Harman (1990), Jackson (2004), and Tye (2000). Nonreductionist intentionalists include Horgan and Tienson (2002), Kriegel (2007), Loar (2003a, b), and Pautz (2010).
This objection to reductive intentionalism is made by, among others, Smith (2002, p. 46), who charges “reductive intentionalist analyses” with “failing … to recognize the distinctive sensory character of perceptual consciousness.”.
Martin is characterizing here the views of reductive intentionalists generally, not Jackson in particular. Also, Martin does not talk explicitly here of the sensory nature of phenomenal character; rather, he characterizes the “phenomenological characteristics” in question here as “the properties of immediacy or directness” (2002, p. 391).
For example, Tye (1992) attempts to account for the “felt difference” (p. 166) between perceptual experiences and thoughts in terms of the distinctive “functional role” (p. 167) of perceptual experience (Jackson’s fifth feature). Millar (2014) attempts to account for the “phenomenological difference between perceptual experience and conscious thought” in terms of “the representation [by perceptual experience] of the causal relation between the object of perception and the perceiver” (p. 248; see generally pp. 248–250) (Jackson’s fourth feature). But if the combination of Jackson’s five features cannot explain the sensory nature of perceptual experience, then surely one of these five features by itself will be unable to explain the sensory nature of perceptual experience. In addition, my discussion of functional role in the main text should also be understood as a criticism of Tye’s view.
I believe it is Campbell who first used the term “relational view of experience” (2002, p. 114) to characterize naïve realism.
According to Crane, “there are familiar reasons why the adverbial theory is indefensible … and their source can be traced back to the theory’s failure to accommodate even the apparent relationality of perception” (2006, pp. 142–143). See, for example, Foster (2000, pp. 181–185), who concludes that “if the sensory core of a phenomenal experience were as the adverbialist claims—the mere sensing in a certain manner, without any sensory object—there would be no way of understanding how it comes to seem to us that we are presentational percipients of an external reality” (p. 185).
It is worth noting here that Pautz himself acknowledges that his view is “very counterintuitive” insofar as it holds that the subject of a perceptual experience is related to an abstract object rather than a concrete object (2010, p. 293).
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Acknowledgements
Thanks to Trenton Merricks and to two anonymous referees for helpful comments. Thanks also to the University of Virginia for monetary support that allowed me to be on leave during the spring 2016 semester and write this paper.
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Langsam, H. Why Intentionalism Cannot Explain Phenomenal Character. Erkenn 85, 375–389 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0031-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0031-7