Abstract
This paper argues that truth values of sentences containing predicates of “personal taste” such as fun or tasty must be relativized to individuals. This relativization is of truth value only, and does not involve a relativization of semantic content: If you say roller coasters are fun, and I say they are not, I am negating the same content which you assert, and directly contradicting you. Nonetheless, both our utterances can be true (relative to their separate contexts). A formal semantic theory is presented which gives this result by introducing an individual index, analogous to the world and time indices commonly used, and by treating the pragmatic context as supplying a particular value for this index. The context supplies this value in the derivation of truth values from content, not in the derivation of content from character. Predicates of personal taste therefore display a kind of contextual variation in interpretation which is unlike the familiar variation exhibited by pronouns and other indexicals.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
C. Barker (2002) ArticleTitle‘The Dynamics of Vagueness’ Linguistics and Philosophy 25 1–36 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1014346114955
D. Beaver (2001) Presupposition and Assertion in Dynamic Semantics CSLI Publications Stanford, California
Bhatt, R. and R. Izvorski: 1995, ‘Genericity, Implicit Arguments and Control’, presented at the Seventh Annual Student Conference in Linguistics, University of Connecticut, April 8–9, 1995.
G. Carlson (1977) Reference to Kinds in English University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA
G. Carlson (1982) ArticleTitle‘Generic Terms and Generic Sentences’ Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 145–181 Occurrence Handle10.1007/BF00278382
G. Chierchia (1984) Topics in the Syntax and Semantics of Infinitives and Gerunds University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA
E. Doron (1991) ‘Point of View as a Factor of Content’ S. Moore A. Z. Wyner (Eds) Proceedings from Semantics and Linguistic Theory I Cornell University Ithaca, New York 51–64
S. D. Epstein (1984) ArticleTitle‘Quantifier-pro and the LF Representation of PRO arb ’ Linguistic Inquiry 15 IssueID3 499–505
P. T. Geach (1965) ArticleTitle‘Assertion’ The Philosophical Review 74 449–465
Grinder, J. T.: 1971, ‘A Reply to Super Equi-NP Deletion as Dative Deletion’, in Papers from the Seventh Regional Meeting, pp. 101–111, Chicago Linguistic Society, Chicago.
C. L. Hamblin (1958) ArticleTitle‘Questions’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 36 159–168
D. Kaplan (1989) ‘Demonstratives’ J. Almog (Eds) et al. Themes from Kaplan Oxford University Press Oxford 481–563
Kimball, J.: 1971, ‘Super Equi-NP Deletion as Dative Deletion’, in Papers from the Seventh Regional Meeting, pp. 142–148, Chicago Linguistic Society, Chicago.
J. King (2001) Complex Demonstratives MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts
M. Kölbel (2002) Truth Without Objectivity Routledge London
P. Lasersohn (1999) ArticleTitle‘Pragmatic Halos’ Language 75 522–551
J. MacFarlane (2003) ArticleTitle‘Future Contingents and Relative Truth’ The Philosophical Quarterly 53 321–336 Occurrence Handle10.1111/1467-9213.00315
R. Montague (1970) ArticleTitle‘Universal Grammar’ Theoria 36 373–398
P. Schlenker (2002) ArticleTitle‘A Plea for Monsters’ Linguistics and Philosophy 26 29–120
R. Stalnaker (1978) ‘Assertion’ P. Cole (Eds) Syntax and Semantics 9: Pragmatics Academic Press New York 315–332
T. Williamson (1994) Vagueness Routledge London
C. Wright (1992) Truth and Objectivity Harvard University Press Cambridge, MA
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Most of the work for this paper was completed before I became aware of Kölbel (2002), which argues for a very similar position (though without the Kaplan-style formalization I develop here). Readers are referred to Kölbel’s book for a fuller philosophical defense of this position, and for programmatic suggestions of a slightly different approach to formal implementation.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Lasersohn, P. Context Dependence, Disagreement, and Predicates of Personal Taste*. Linguist Philos 28, 643–686 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-005-0596-x
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-005-0596-x