Abstract
What it would take to vindicate folk temporal error theory? This question is significant against a backdrop of new views in quantum gravity—so-called timeless physical theories—that claim to eliminate time by eliminating a one-dimensional substructure of ordered temporal instants. Ought we to conclude that if these views are correct, nothing satisfies the folk concept of time and hence that folk temporal error theory is true? In light of evidence we gathered, we argue that physical theories that entirely eliminate an ordered substructure vindicate folk temporal error theory.
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Notes
For discussion of the general issue of space–time emergence in such theories see also Lam and Oriti (2018), Lam and Esfeld (2013) and Crowther (2016). For related discussion see Anderson (2017) and Gomes (2018). Other approaches to this problem have been to embrace what has become known as space–time functionalism, according to which we ‘functionalise’ space–time (we say what it would be for something to play that role) and then we find things, at the fundamental level, that do play that role. See for instance Lam and Wuthrich (2018). Still others have argued that there are approaches on which, in fact, temporal structure is fundamental (Gryb and Thebault 2016).
Of course, it could be that the folk concept is satisfied only if there is such a substructure, and that substructure is fundamental. But at this stage of enquiry we see little reason to suppose this to be so.
And perhaps only if: we take no stand on this.
See Baron et al. (2015).
It is in many ways misleading to say that presentists believe that there is substructure of ordered instants, since they deny there is any dimension along which such instants can be ordered. Still, they clearly think that instants are ordered, insofar as there is a fact of the matter as to which order instants ‘occur’ in. For our purposes this sort of order is sufficient.
Sometimes people use ‘B-theory’ synonymously with ‘block universe theory’, and, as such, this view does not entail that time has a direction. However, that usage makes little sense of the debate between B-theorists and C-theorists, (nor is it faithful to McTaggart’s (1908) introduction of the terms) or the debate amongst B-theorists, regarding in virtue of what time has a direction. At any rate, we intend to use ‘B-theory’ to pick out the view that time has a direction, regardless of whether or not this is standard usage.
This is not, then, how McTaggart (1908) thought of the C-series.
As for instance, presentists surely do not.
Repeated measures ANOVA are used to compare the means of 3 or more groups when the participants in those groups are the same. The ANOVA tells us whether the means are statistically significantly different between those groups. We ran a two-way (2 × 2) repeated measures ANOVA because there were two independent variables (theory being evaluated and context of evaluation).
That is not to say, of course, that there might not be lots of other ways to vindicate folk temporal error theory: it is just that we cannot speak to those here.
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Acknowledgements
We would like to thank James Norton for his assistance in constructing the experimental materials. Andrew J. Latham would like to thank the Ngāi Tai Ki Tāmaki Tribal Trust for their support.
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Latham, A.J., Miller, K. Quantum gravity, timelessness, and the folk concept of time. Synthese 198, 9453–9478 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02650-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02650-y