Abstract
Various moral theories are essentially welfare-involving in that they appeal to the promotion or the respect of well-being in accounting for the moral rightness of at least some acts. Further, various theories of well-being are essentially morality-involving in that they construe well-being in a way that essentially involves morality in some form or other. It seems that, for any moral theory that is essentially welfare-involving and that relies on a theory of well-being that is essentially morality-involving, a circularity problem may well arise, one where moral rightness will end up being accounted for partly in terms of well-being, which itself is already being accounted for partly in terms of moral rightness. In this paper I will elaborate on this last point. Then I will examine five responses to the circularity problem at issue, and I will argue that one of them appears to be at least slightly better than all of the others.
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Notes
I am not aware of any detailed discussions of the morality-welfare circularity problem. However, I do know of three places in which this circularity problem (or at least some instance of it) has been briefly discussed: (1) Bykvist (2010: 53–54), (2) Scanlon (1998: 217), and (3) Southwood (2010: 69–70).
For discussion, see Hooker on Quinn’s divine command theory (2001: 333–335).
For a discussion of welfarism, see Keller (2009).
For Moore’s denial of the reality of well-being, see Moore (1903: 97–101). (In categorizing Moore as a non-utilitarian, I am assuming that one cannot be a utilitarian unless one is committed to the maximizing of well-being.)
For some discussion of distributive factors, see Kagan (1998: 25–69).
For instance, in the Groundwork Kant says, “Now in a being that has reason and a will, if the proper end of nature were its preservation, its welfare, in a word its happiness, then…” (1997: 8). Or again, in The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant says, “Benevolence is satisfaction in the happiness (well-being) of others…” (1996: 201).
One could contest this claim by saying, “But Kantian ethical theories derive all of our moral duties from the categorical imperative, all without incorporating any independent content, such as well-being/happiness content.” In response: While Kantian ethical theories do somehow or other derive all of our moral duties from the categorical imperative, I think that many Kantians, if pressed, would admit that well-being/happiness content is included in the derivation process, at least in relation to the duty to promote one’s own well-being/happiness and the duty to promote the well-being/happiness of others. Thus I think that many Kantians, if pressed, would admit that well-being/happiness content is not really independent of the categorical imperative, but rather is internal to it. I realize that this implies that many Kantian ethical theories include goodness in the form of well-being/happiness within the categorical imperative, which might seem strange, since Kantian ethical theories are sometimes said to entail that the right is prior to, and independent of, the good. Still, I think that what I have said is correct and that many Kantians, if pressed, would simply admit that the slogan “the right is prior to, and independent of, the good” is not entirely accurate as applied to Kantian ethical theories.
Of course, accepting such a version of welfare hedonism may bring with it other worries.
Aristotelian-perfectionist objective-list theories typically have this entailment (e.g., see Badhwar 2014: 3–4). Further, Fletcher is an example of a non-perfectionist objective-list theorist who puts “virtue” on the list of general goods that enhance well-being (2013: 214). Though Fletcher may intend more than simply moral virtue here, I assume that moral virtue is at least a large part of what he intends here.
I here particularly have in mind Finnis’s approvingly quoting Aquinas as saying that all of the moral virtues “‘involve a sharing in the good of practical reasonableness’” (1998: 84).
On a non-reductive desire theory, there is no reduction of well-being to desires (or to facts about desires), but there is an explanation of well-being in terms of desires: X is good for me because I desire X.
For Mill’s claim that the intellect, the feelings and imagination, and the moral sentiments count as higher faculties, see Mill (1998: 56).
Even though there is no circularity present in this chain of explanation, this chain of explanation might still be unsatisfactory in some way (see Campbell 2016: 411).
As indicated above, Hooker has noted that achievement (i.e., accomplishment) might be one of the general goods on the list and that it might be claimed that moral virtue is a form of achievement (1996: 147–149).
Perhaps I am mistaken about this. For perhaps we can adopt the accepting-circularity response and still avoid the regress in play here. Perhaps we can do this by taking your own disposition to morally right action as somehow primitive. (Compare this appeal to the primitive with Dorsey 2012: 438–441.) Two questions can be asked about this move, though. (1) If we make this move, are we staying within the parameters of the accepting-circularity response? I am not sure that we are, since now it appears that there are two senses of “moral rightness” on the table, one that is act-utilitarian and one that is primitive. And, if there are two senses of “moral rightness” on the table, then presumably we have left the accepting-circularity response behind us and have moved onto some version of the two-different-senses-of-“morality” response. (2) Even if we say that making this move keeps us within the parameters of the accepting-circularity response, there is the question of how plausible this move is. In general, I find appeals to the primitive to be last-resort maneuvers, and that is how I view this particular appeal to the primitive.
Should this same sense of the moral virtues or moral sentiments be invoked in relation to the well-being of all of the other beings whose well-being is included in well-being in the world (i.e., on the right side of the account-of-moral-rightness bi-conditional)? The mine/others objection discussed earlier made it clear that it is only the agent’s own well-being that gives rise to the morality-welfare circularity problem. So, to avoid circularity, it is not necessary to invoke this same sense of the moral virtues or moral sentiments in relation to the well-being of any being except the agent himself or herself. That said, I can understand the desire to have uniformity on the right side of one’s account-of-moral-rightness bi-conditional, that is, such that one is invoking the same sense of the moral virtues or moral sentiments wherever it arises on the right side of this bi-conditional. Ultimately, I have decided to leave this matter open.
Instead of adopting any of the responses to the morality-welfare circularity problem that I have discussed in Sect. 3, one might adopt a theory of well-being that is wholly non-moral from the start (e.g., Benthamite hedonism), since doing so would allow one to escape the morality-welfare circularity problem from the start. This move is worth considering, but, for brevity’s sake, I am foregoing discussing this move in any detail in this paper.
The response that Kagan ultimately accepts entails that a person’s moral status as good or bad—that is, a person’s moral worth—depends not on whether he or she actually does what is morally right, but rather simply on whether he or she has the motive to do what is morally right (2006: 62–67). This response bears some resemblance to the two-different-senses-of-“morality” response. This point can be spelled out as follows. Kagan is explaining morally right action partly in terms of desert and, by extension, moral worth; then he explains moral worth in terms of the motive to do what is morally right, and this helps in avoiding circularity because the motive to do what is morally right does not by its very nature involve a directedness toward moral rightness (after all, someone with the motive to do what is morally right may or may not actually do what is morally right). Thus Kagan’s explanation of morally right action partly in terms of the motive to do what is morally right bears some resemblance to the explanation of morally right action partly in terms of the uneducated moral virtues or moral sentiments, which do not by their very natures direct one toward moral rightness.
Also, Skow has responded at length to the indeterminacy problem discussed in Kagan’s article (Skow 2012), and it may well be that Skow’s response can be fruitfully adapted to the morality-welfare circularity problem.
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Acknowledgments
Two former students of mine at Chestnut Hill College, Nick Williams and Sarah Powitzky, had an in-class exchange regarding Mill’s qualitative hedonism that first prompted me to think about the morality-welfare circularity problem. Thanks to both of them. Also, for helpful comments, let me thank Stephen Campbell, anonymous reviewers from previous journals, and an exceptionally insightful anonymous reviewer from Philosophical Studies.
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Lauinger, W. The morality-welfare circularity problem. Philos Stud 174, 1959–1981 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0777-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0777-1