

An Empirical Survey of the Analytic/Continental Divide

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Introduction

Modern philosophy is divided, apparently. The two apparent divisions are commonly referred to as “Analytic” and “Continental” (Prado). The former division is often seen as Kantian, ahistoricist, scientific, and logical; the latter division is often seen as Hegelian, historicist, conversational, and rhetorical (Rorty).

The first analysis of this divide is likely from Borradori’s *The American Philosopher*, but the appearance of the divide itself surely predates that work by years (Borradori). Some have argued that these are hard categories, representing important metaphilosophical differences: epistemic, metaphysical, and even ethical. Others have argued that these are fuzzier categories that overlap more than they diverge. Still others argue that the categories are not even real, except in a merely linguistic sense: as rhetorical labels or departmental titles.

But, can we say anything about the Analytic/Continental Divide for certain? Are any hypotheses testable according to empirical observation? If so, is the divide strong or weak, wide or narrow, sharp or fuzzy? Furthermore, what features define the divide? What ideas, concepts, or words distinguish the divide?

In this paper, we attempt to use the principles of experimental philosophy and comparative computational techniques against a corpus of self-identified “analytic” and “continental” texts in order to test various hypotheses about the analytic/continental divide from the philosophical literature: some hypotheses are supported, some opposed, and others left open to further research.

Method

The methodology employed for the project consisted of experimental philosophy, using empirical digital techniques. The procedure followed the “keyword to key semantic domains” methodology of corpus linguistics as outlined by Paul Rayson (521). Other studies have conducted quantitative keyword analysis which are mimicked in this paper, including Paul Rayson, who, in a foundational article, devises a “keywords to semantic domains” experimental procedure which lays out how to arrive at semantic fields from a list of raw words (521). Complex semantic domains are composite of simpler forms like words. Thus, generating word frequencies can inform us about common word usage (keyword frequencies) in a text. Furthermore, developing a corpus of word frequencies to create a context can compare important

word usage in a text relative to other related texts. The difference between a text and those of its context offers the relative importance of words, hence of semantic domains.

Scope

The scope of the project included articles from the top 50 academic journals of philosophy, published in the last quarter of the year 2020, meant to represent the body of philosophical work published at that historical moment. A full listing of the Journals names may be found in “Appendix A: Self-Identified Journals List”.

Using the PhilPapers.org list of most popular journals, we cross-referenced against The Brooks Blog, Leiter Reports, Journal Rankings, Top Journals. Anything that was referenced in more than one listing was ranked higher. The top 50 journals were chosen in this manner.

Then, using the journal descriptions from the websites of the journals self-described “analytic” or “continental” identity markers were found. Those top-tier journals self-identifying as “analytic” or “continental” were placed in a special self-identifying tier which was used as the comparison class of articles.

Corpus

The corpus of textual data used for analysis consisted of articles from the self-identified tier of journals found on academic journal websites, downloaded manually according to tier lists.

Procedural Steps

1. Build

The articles for the journals and years selected were downloaded from their respective websites. These were downloaded in portable document format (.pdf) file format. These files were then converted into ANSI plain text files for ease of processing. An automated converter was devised in Python, where possible. These cleaned text files were parsed into a “WordFrequencies” table using Python code. The table consisted of the following fields: ArticleID, Word, Frequency.

2. Annotate

The plain text files of the corpus are saved according to the naming system “division@journal@year@issue@article.txt”, where the journal, year, issue, and article were derived from the source. The metadata from these text files were processed into a metadata table “ArticleList” table, documenting the words used and their frequency of usage, for ease of further processing. The table consisted of the following fields: Article ID, ArticleName, Division, Year, Issue. Unconventional constructions were removed. Non-standard characters were replaced. The journals were then classified as Analytic or Continental based on the descriptions as provided by the journals themselves. The top journals listings were split into two lists: analytic and continental.

3. Retrieve

The “WordFrequencies” and “ArticleList” tables were placed into a referential database. The two tables were further cross-referenced to determine a resulting “DivisionFrequencies” table. The new table was composed of the following fields: Division, Word, Frequency. This table was further visually graphed to reveal the patterns in Keyword Frequency across philosophical

divisions, journals, and years. These results can be found in the “Appendix C: Statistically Significant Data”.

4. Question

The resulting data was parsed to answer the question: what difference, if any, is there between the keyword usage, and therefore the conceptual space, in Analytic and Continental philosophic writing during the years 2020? By parsing corpora of articles across philosophical Divisions into keywords and plotting the dependence of these keywords across articles, patterns of important keyword usages can come to represent the differences in the conceptual space of these Divisions.

5. Interpret

The “KeywordFrequencies” table was analyzed to discern the keyword differences between the philosophical divisions. The increases in keyword frequencies was correlated with increases prevalence of that conceptual space in the article in question. Those keywords with positive correlation were assumed characteristic of the philosophical division of the article. Those keywords with negative correlation were assumed uncharacteristic of the division. The keywords themselves were then used to attempt to support or counter hypotheses from the philosophical literature about the Analytic/Continental divide. For example, if a philosopher believes that the analytic tradition focuses more on reason and the Continental tradition more on life, then the keywords “reason” and “life” would be compared and contrasted in the data to determine whether the hypothesis is supported or not. A preponderance of “reason” in the former corpus and “life” in the latter, would support the hypothesis. These hypotheses are listed in the “Appendix B: Testable Hypotheses”.

Assumptions and Sources of Error

Furthermore, the methodology introduced many assumptions, some of which might limit the interpretation of the results, though none of them without some warrant.

The procedure introduced many sources of error, many of which were significant, but none of which were considered fully undermining. These sources will be addressed here in approximate order of importance:

Textual Issues:

These errors relate to the corruption of the texts used:

- The source formatting often used, justified alignment, so many words ended up inadvertently split in half by the margins of the pages. Thus, some nonsense words were inevitably produced and included in the resulting word frequency sets. This was only estimated to happen to only a handful of words per page, on ~500 words pages, 2% or so, an acceptable margin of error.
- The downloading process inevitably included some of the marginalia, the metadata (URLs, dates downloaded, etc.) of the files. These marginalia were not removed, because such method would have not been programmatically robust, nor feasible in time constraints, and further risked removing non-marginalia content. However, the marginalia being only a handful of words or so words per page on average, on ~500 word pages, 2% or so, an acceptable margin of error.

- Some of the articles have redundant pages, whether due to downloading methods or source formatting, especially book reviews, because the individual articles begin and end on the same page. Thus, some of the content of one article might be reproduced and/or included in the content of another. This redundancy of content represents a significant source of error. The amount of redundant content can be approximated to be about 1 page per article for some journals and 0 pages per article for other journals. It is thus estimated to constitute less than 1% of the corpus size, an acceptable margin.

Scope Issues:

These errors relate to the limitations and imprecisions of the scope used:

- The scope of the corpus collected, that of the top 50 academic philosophy, may not be a representative sample of philosophical thought. Firstly, the scope is representative only of at least surviving articles that managed to be published in the field, specifically in digital text formats, not the unpublished thoughts contained in other media (May 230). Thus, a layer of survivorship bias is baked into the methodology. Secondly, particular to the top 50 journals, the articles are representative only of the most successful of articles published, not field as a whole. So, a further layer of exceptionalism bias is baked into the methodology as well. However, due to the impossibility of digitally analyzing unpublished material, the former bias must be accepted unreservedly; furthermore, due to the budget-constraints placed upon scope, the latter bias must be entertained with pragmatism but skepticism
- The Divisions were assumed using self-identifying descriptions in the journals themselves. Specifically, the Division tags used, analytic or continental, were mostly self-identified; however, in some cases, distinguishing this was not possible for major journals that were still deemed important to include in the corpus (Appendix: Journals Listing). In other cases, the journals may have changed in content over time, describing themselves differently, which was not captured. This means that some journals may not have identified with their division for the full scope. Thus, these Divisions are subject to marginal revision and criticism according to these understanding (Suarez 45).
- Many of the Continental journals surveyed accept analytic articles as entries. This perhaps implies that Continental is a fuzzy category, whereas analytic is a tighter category. To give one philosophical example, Continental philosophy seems to be encompassing of German Idealism, which seems to overlap substantially with Analytic philosophy. However, this problem was considered overridden by the self-identification of journals with one side of the division or the other. This rough and ready approach acknowledges some level of overlap in the comparison classes but accepts it as inevitable.
- Continental philosophy seems to split off into extra-philosophical academic journals, including sociology, world literature, and other disciplines. This is certainly a scope problem. We cannot possibly encompass all journals in this study, so the scope has been arbitrarily defined around the boundaries of philosophy as an academic/departamental/institutional discipline, defined by the corpus lists developed.

Methodological Issues:

These errors relate to the method used:

- These keywords were assumed to be determinate of the conceptual focuses of these philosophical divisions, analytic and continental: their intellectual interests respectively. It is notable though that the presence of keywords cannot be considered intensity of interest in a direct sense, but only correlated with interest; likewise, absence of keywords cannot be considered absence of interest. In many cases, words may be present or absent that do not reflect the overall conceptual focus of the work. Thus, keywords are neither necessary nor sufficient for semantic importance, but merely correlative. This connection between keyword and semantic domain must be assumed with caution, minding the gap between them.
- The method employed does not handle homographs: the typographic words are captured but not their meanings. So, the same word may have multiple meanings. For example, the word “fair” might mean both “impartial and just” and “light of complexion”, but these meanings would both be clumped under the same word “fair”. Although this problem is inherent to the word frequency methodology employed, pointing to a very real difference between typographies and semantics, it ultimately is negligible. The margin of error is only expected to be as significant as the number of homographs analyzed, few and insignificant.
- The nature of the methodology also presents significant risk of P-hacking: using the results to inform how to tease out interpretations in the results. For example, one could run the data and then search for the most significant results and then only report those results. In order to avoid any semblance of p-hacking, the only conclusions drawn from the data were tested against testable hypotheses drawn from other scholars in the academic literature. Testing these hypotheses does not run the risk of p-hacking because they were proposed independently, before our results were tabulated, not in response to our results being tabulated.

These assumptions and errors notwithstanding, significant results can still be derived from the approach.

Literature Review

We surveyed various sources discussing the nature of the analytic/continental divide. Many philosophers have proposed conjectures, definitions, and rules of thumb regarding the divide. These proposed hypotheses are diverse, but they generally can be categorized under the headings of history (including Carnap, Frege, Hegel, Husserl, Kant, Nietzsche, Plato), reason, being, time, subjectivity, antipsychologism and phenomenology, and the natural sciences. Our discussion of the hypotheses in this section is organized around the topics in turn, as follows.

History

Prado (in “Introduction”) notes that Rorty “characterizes the Analytic/Continental division in terms of ahistoricist and historicist loyalties and commitments” (p. 16). Buckle (“Analytic Philosophy and Continental Philosophy”) contends that continental philosophy shows “a marked attraction to historical modes of explanation” (p. 149). According to Rockhill (Review of *Analytic Philosophy and the History of Philosophy*), history frequently has been thought to be a major dividing line between the two traditions. Different figures appear to fall on each side of the line. According to Rorty (“Analytic and Conversational Philosophy”), the analytic/continental divide is roughly a divide between “the neo-Kantians from the neo-Hegelians . . . [t]he quarrel

between Kant and Hegel, and perhaps even the one between Plato and Nietzsche” (p. 29; cf. Buckle, p. 149). Regarding Plato, for example, Buckle contends that, from the perspective of the continental philosopher, the analytic philosopher “seems a sort of latter-day Platonist” (p. 149).

According to some writers in the secondary literature, *both* traditions should be understood in connection to one of the pivotal philosophers mentioned by Rorty. Rockmore (“Remarks on the structure of twentieth century philosophy”) argues that the two traditions, along with American pragmatism, should be understood as reactions to Kant more than anything else. Relatedly, Stocker (“Time, Synthesis, and the end of Metaphysics: Heidegger and Strawson on Kant”) contends that “harmonizing elements” in the analytic and continental traditions can be brought out by means of two readings of Kant (p. 15). According to Babich (in “On the Analytic-Continental Divide in Philosophy: Nietzsche Lying Truth, Heidegger's Speaking Language, and Philosophy”), “analytic and Continental styles of philosophizing should be understood in light of Nietzsche's philosophy” (p. 15).

Some writers attribute the divide to the work of other pivotal figures, such as Carnap, Frege, and Husserl. Allen (in “Carnap's Contexts: Comte, Heidegger, Nietzsche”) writes, “Carnap's influence--unquestionably the most significant influence--on how the boundaries were drawn between the analytic and Continental ways of Philosophizing” (p. 14). Priest (“Where is philosophy at the start of the twenty-first century?”) traces the development of the analytic and continental traditions as originating with the work of Frege and Husserl.

Reason

In addition to contending that continental philosophy tends toward ‘historical modes of explanation,’ Buckle also contends that, from the perspective of the analytic philosopher, the continental philosopher has a “lack of regard for independent rational standards . . . lacking concern for, and frequently denying, rational standards immunized against historical contingencies” (p. 149). So, the differences between the two traditions, according to such an interpretation, centers on “the status of reason” (p. 149).

Being

According to Barris (“The Convergent Conceptions of Being in Mainstream Analytic and Postmodern Continental Philosophy”), “being as such and in general is, in a critically reconsidered form, meaningful and fundamental” in “a prominent strand of mainstream positions” in postmodern continental philosophy (p. 15). In Anglo-American analytic philosophy, however, “we cannot sensibly or meaningfully talk about—we simply cannot attach a meaning to—such a notion in general” (p. 15). Rather, “we can only talk about localized senses of being as such, senses that need have nothing in common with all the indefinite variety of other senses occurring in other contexts of thought and practice,” senses “couched in terms of ‘essence’ or of what is ‘internally related to’ or ‘belongs to the concept of’ the matter at issue” (p. 15).

Time

Reynolds (“The Analytic/Continental Divide: A Contretemps?”) takes the representatives of analytic philosophy and continental philosophy to be respectively defined, and a defense to be provided against their interlocutors, by different philosophies of time and related methodological techniques.

Subjectivity

The majority, if not totality, of continental philosophers take the relationship between subjectivity and time to be a precondition of the possibility of questioning, thinking, and philosophizing. A disagreement with this stance is suggested by the practices of most analytic philosophers.

Antipsychologism and Phenomenology

Soldati ("Early Phenomenology and the Origins of Analytic Philosophy") argues that analytic philosophy (in Ryle's sense) emerged from a rather specific, naturalistic form of antipsychologism whose roots are in early phenomenology. Opposed to this is transcendental antipsychologism, characterizing later phenomenology.

The Natural Sciences

Regarding the natural sciences, Rorty remarks that "the model of the natural sciences remains much more important for most analytic philosophers than it does for most Continental philosophers" (p. 19).

Results

We found some agreements and disagreements along the lines of the aforementioned topics between our analytic and continental corpuses, when related terms were tested against the top 100 mentioned terms in each corpus. We tentatively summarize the results as follows.

History

History is the 26th most mentioned term, and *historical* the 50th most mentioned term in the continental corpus. Neither term is among the 100 most mentioned terms in the analytic corpus. This suggests that continental philosophers tend to prioritize mention of history and over analytic philosophers.

Neither *Carnap-* nor *Frege-* is among the 100 most mentioned terms in either corpus. *Hegel* is the 24th most mentioned term, and *Hegel's* is the 78th most mentioned term, in the continental corpus, while neither is among the 100 most mentioned terms in the analytic corpus. *Husserl* is the 45th most mentioned term in the continental corpus, and is not among the 100 most mentioned terms in the analytic corpus. *Kant-* is not among the 100 most mentioned terms in either corpus. *Nietzsche* is the 31st most mentioned term in the continental corpus, and is not among the 100 most mentioned terms in analytic corpus. *Plato-* is not among the 100 most mentioned terms in either corpus.

This suggests that neither continental philosophers nor analytic philosophers tend to prioritize mention of *Carnap-*, *Frege-*, *Kant-*, or *Plato-*. It also suggests that continental philosophers tend to prioritize mention of *Hegel-*, *Husserl*, and *Nietzsche* and over analytic philosophers.

Reason

Reason is the 90th most mentioned term, and *reasons* is the 21st most mentioned term, in the analytic corpus. Neither term is among the mentioned terms in the continental corpus. This suggests that analytic philosophers tend to prioritize mention of reasons and reason (in that order) and over continental philosophers.

Being

Being is the 58th most mentioned term in the continental corpus. It is not among the 100 most mentioned terms in the analytic corpus. This suggests that continental philosophers tend to prioritize mention of *Being* and over analytic philosophers. None of the other related terms referenced by Barris (*essen-*, *internal-*, *relat-*, *concept-*) is among the 100 most mentioned terms in either corpus.

Time

Neither *time-* nor *temporal-* is among the 100 most mentioned terms in either corpus, suggesting that neither continental philosophers nor analytic philosophers tend to prioritize mention of either (over the others).

Subjectivity

Subjectivity is the 76th most mentioned term, and *self* is the 15th most mentioned term, in the continental corpus. Neither term is among the 100 most mentioned terms in the analytic corpus. This suggests that continental philosophers tend to prioritize mention of subjectivity and the self and over analytic philosophers.

Antipsychologism and Phenomenology

Antipsychologism is not among the 100 most mentioned terms, and *phenomenology* is the 13th most mentioned term, in the continental corpus. Neither term is among the 100 most mentioned terms in the analytic corpus. This suggests that continental philosophers tend to prioritize mention of phenomenology and over analytic philosophers. *Naturalis-* is not among the 100 most mentioned terms in either corpus, while *transcendental-* is the 83rd most mentioned term in the continental corpus. This suggests that continental philosophers tend to prioritize mention of *transcendental-*.

The Natural Sciences

Neither *science-* nor *scienti-* is among the 100 most mentioned terms in either corpus. This suggests that neither continental philosophers nor analytic philosophers tend to prioritize mention of either.

Other Speculations

We noticed other potential word patterns in the corpuses, which we summarize as follows according to the traditional interrogative Who? What? When? Where? and Why?

Who?

The analytic corpus tends to include more first- and second-personal language (i.e. *I*, *we*, *you*, *your*, *our*, *ours*) than the continental corpus. The plural third-personal *they* also is used rather frequently in the analytic corpus. The “I say, you say” back and forth of the analytic corpus, not found in the continental corpus, suggests an explicit dialogic or dialectic structure in the former. This conversational structure of analytic philosophy is a point of disconfirmation against Rorty’s suggestion that continental philosophy is more conversational. Presumably because (if in part) of the frequent reference to historically significant philosophers, the continental corpus tends to be more singular third-personal and masculine, including the pronouns *he*, *his*, and *him*.

The continental corpus contains many proper names: Hegel, Bachelard, Husserl, Heidegger, Foucault, etc. These names tend to refer to famous philosophers, typically those who tend to be associated with the continental tradition. In contrast, the analytic corpus contains hardly any proper names. So, Rorty seems right in suggesting that Hegel is significant to continental philosophers. However, he seems to be incorrect in suggesting that Kant is just as significant to analytic philosophers.

The continental corpus tends to include reflexive and self-oriented language given the inclusion of words like *self* and *itself*.

The continental corpus is rather preoccupied with identity and consciousness, given the high ranking of terms including *embodied*, *experience*, *consciousness*, *life*, and *human*.

What?

The analytic corpus has many terms related to argumentation and knowledge (e.g. *reason(s)*, *case*, *theory*, *argument*, *belief*, *evidence*, *mind*, *value*, *fact*). Moreover, the analytic corpus has terms indicating (and confirming) that analytic philosophers tend to include logical language conventions (e.g. *p*, *q*, *if*, *then*).

When?

The analytic corpus prioritizes mention of *causal* and *states*. While time is not among the 100 most mentioned terms in either corpus, the following terms are among the 100 most mentioned terms in the continental corpus, suggesting that continental philosophers tend to make reference to social time, in addition to history: *new*, *present*, *modern*, *historical*, *movement*.

Where?

When space is mentioned in the analytic corpus, it is *physical*. In contrast, potential spatial terms like *presence* and *world* are highly ranked in the continental corpus. *Real* and *reality* are highly ranked in it as well. Prepositions associated with orientation in space are used by continental philosophers (e.g. *through*, *into*, *in*). Perhaps this suggests that continental philosophers are not so much interested in space as such as in “social” space. Terms like *social*, *political*, and *cultural* imply social context. Moreover, the frequent use of non-English words by continental philosophers is suggestive of a social space that is not exclusive to the English-speaking world, but inclusive of other languages, languages of continental Europe, notably, including French, Spanish, and German.

Why?

It seems that analytic philosophers tend to be preoccupied with “why”, with frequent mention of *normative*, *moral*, and *practical* in the analytic corpus. The analytic corpus includes frequent mention of values and agents, in addition to reason(s), and language such as *should*, *would*, *could*. The continental corpus includes no such normative language.

Conclusion

In conclusion, an empirical study of the corpuses of the analytic and continental divisions of philosophy was fruitful in providing data-backed confirmations and disconfirmations of many of the explanations for the divide. More work in this direction can be conducted, including wider data collection, more diverse methodology, and more in depth analysis.

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Appendix A: Self-Identified Journal List

The articles used to assemble the analytic and continental corpuses were selected from recent issues of self-identified “analytic” and “continental” academic journals, respectively. Self-identification was determined via the terms “analytic” or “continental” in the journals’ self-descriptions:

Table 1: Self-Identified Analytic/Continental Journals

Div	Journal	Quotation	Site
A	Analysis	“ <i>Analysis Reviews</i> is devoted to reviewing recent work in analytic philosophy . . . does not cover the history of philosophy or continental philosophy, except insofar as works in these areas may have central relevance to analytic philosophy.”	https://academic.oup.com/analysis/pages/About
A	Australasian Journal of Philosophy	“The Australasian Journal of Philosophy (AJP) is one of the world’s leading philosophy journals. It is recognised as publishing the very best work in the analytic tradition, but is not narrow in what it regards as worthy of acceptance.”	https://aap.org.au/AJP
A	Dialectica	“Dialectica is a general analytic philosophy journal and the official organ of the European Society of Analytic Philosophy.”	https://dialectica.philosophie.ch/
A	Erkenntnis	“ <i>Erkenntnis</i> is a philosophical journal publishing papers committed in one way or another to the philosophical attitude which is signified by the label ‘scientific philosophy’ . . . In recent years, philosophers standing quite outside the pale of analytic philosophy.”	https://www.springer.com/journal/10670/aims-and-scope
A	Mind	“ <i>MIND</i> is well known for cutting edge philosophical papers in epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind. The editorial team aspires to preserve this tradition in analytic philosophy, but also to enrich and broaden it.”	https://academic.oup.com/mind/pages/About
A	Noûs	“ <i>Noûs</i> , a premier philosophy journal, publishes articles that address the whole range of topics at the center of philosophical debate, . . . analytical”	https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/page/journal/14680068/homepage/productinformation.html
A	Philosophical Review	“The journal aims to publish original scholarly work in all areas of analytic philosophy.”	https://read.dukeupress.edu/the-philosophical-review/pages/About
A	Philosophical Studies	“Philosophical Studies provides a periodical dedicated to work in analytic philosophy.”	https://www.springer.com/journal/11098
C	Chiasma: A Site for Thought	“ <i>Chiasma: A Site for Thought</i> . . . emphasizing contemporary continental philosophy”	https://chiasma-journal.com/about/
C	Continental Philosophy Review	“ <i>Continental Philosophy Review</i> fosters a living international dialogue on philosophical issues of mutual interest . . . in phenomenology and contemporary continental philosophy . . .”	https://www.springer.com/journal/11007
C	Journal of Speculative Philosophy	“The <i>Journal of Speculative Philosophy</i> publishes . . . Continental and American philosophy, as well as novel.”	https://www.psupress.org/Journals/jnls_jsp.html
C	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences	“Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences is an international journal . . . The journal builds bridges between continental phenomenological approaches in the Husserlian tradition....”	https://www.springer.com/journal/11097
C	Symposium: A Quarterly Journal in Modern Literatures	“Symposium is a quarterly journal of criticism in modern literatures originating in languages other than English.”	https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?show=aimsScope&journalCode=vsym20
C	Parrhesia: A Journal of Critical Philosophy	“Established in 2006, PARRHESIA: A JOURNAL OF CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY is dedicated to publishing the latest work on continental philosophy, along with new translations and interviews with contemporary thinkers.”	https://www.parrhesiajournal.org/index.php/parr/about

Appendix B: Testable Hypotheses

Definitions of the “analytic” and “continental” divisions offered by various authors across the metaphilosophical literature were extracted to form hypotheses that were testable against the results. These definitions were tested in accordance with the statistical significance of their associated keywords for each division. For example:

Table 2: Testable Hypotheses from Literature

Article	Author	Quotations	Qualitative Characteristic	Testable Hypothesis	Quantitative Metric
Richard Rorty, “Analytic and Conversational Philosophy.”	Richard Rorty	"divide the neo-Kantians from the neo-Hegelians . . . The quarrel between Kant and Hegel, and perhaps even the one between Plato and Nietzsche" (29)	Kant vs. Hegel	Is analytic more Kantian and/or continental more Hegelian?	Word frequency counts of "Hegel" and "Kant"
Prado, C.G. “Introduction.”	Prado, C.G.	"Richard Rorty characterizes the Analytic/Continental division in terms of ahistoricist and historicist loyalties and commitments" (16)	ahistoricist vs. historicist	Is Analytic more ahistoricist and/or continental more historicist?	Word frequency counts of historicist vs. ahistoricist word clusters.
Richard Rorty, “Analytic and Conversational Philosophy.”	Richard Rorty	"the model of the natural science remains much more important for most analytic philosophers than it does for most Continental philosophers" (19) "I suggest we drop the term "Continental" and instead contrast analytic philosophy with <i>conversational</i> philosophy" (22)	Natural sciences vs. conversation	Is analytic more natural scientific and/or continental more conversational?	Word frequency counts of Natural sciences vs. conversation word clusters.
Richard Rorty, “Analytic and Conversational Philosophy.”	Richard Rorty	"dividing those who love truth and reason from those who prefer dramatic effects and rhetorical triumphs" (26)	reason vs. rhetoric	Is analytic more reasonable and/or continental more rhetorical?	Stylistic
Richard Rorty, “Analytic and Conversational Philosophy.”	Richard Rorty	"dividing the unimaginative clods from the free spirits" (26)	unimaginative vs. free-thinking	Is analytic more unimaginative and continental more free-thinking?	In-group homogeneity? Word density?
"Carnap's Contexts: Comte, Heidegger, Nietzsche"	Allen, Barry	"Carnap's influence--unquestionably the most significant influence--on how the boundaries were drawn between the analytic and Continental ways of Philosophizing." (14)	Carnap vs. Comte, Heidegger and Nietzsche	Analytic is Carnapian?	Word frequency for "Carnap"

<p>Babich, Babette E. "On the Analytic-Continental Divide in Philosophy: Nietzsche Lying Truth, Heidegger's Speaking Language, and Philosophy"</p>	<p>Babich, Babette E.</p>	<p>"analytic and Continental styles of philosophizing should be understood in light of Nietzsche's philosophy" (15)</p>	<p>Nietzsche</p>	<p>Continental is Nietzschean?</p>	<p>Word frequency for "Nietzsche"</p>
<p>Cerbone, David R. "Phenomenology: Straight and Hetero"</p>	<p>Cerbone, David R.</p>	<p>"a comparison of Edmund Husserl and Daniel Dennett on the possibility of phenomenology as a serious methodology." (15)</p>	<p>Straight vs. Hetero Husserl vs. Dennett Phenomenology</p>	<p>Continental is phenomenological?</p>	<p>Word frequency for "phenomenology".</p>
<p>The Rise of 'Analytic Philosophy': When and How Did People Begin Calling Themselves 'Analytic Philosophers'?</p>	<p>Greg Frost-Arnold</p>	<p>I have argued that, in line with previous scholarship, the term 'analytic philosophy' in our sense first appears in the 1930s, but does not begin to gain wide currency until around 1950. I then discussed various rationales people during that time period gave for grouping these (in many ways) disparate philosophers under a single heading. But the later rationale grounding the grouping, namely that philosophical inquiries are at bottom linguistic, contradicts certain earlier actors' explicit descriptions of their activities.</p>	<p>Analytic philosophy is linguistic</p>	<p>The emphasis of language in analytic and the lack of it in continental</p>	<p>search for the term 'linguistic'</p>
<p>Analytic and continental philosophy: Explaining the differences</p>	<p>Neil Levy</p>	<p>"I argue that analytic philosophy is usefully seen as philosophy conducted within a paradigm, in Kuhn's sense of the word, whereas Continental philosophy assumes much less in the way of shared presuppositions, problems, methods and approaches."</p>	<p>Paradigm, presuppositions, problems, methods, approaches vs. less so</p>	<p>Do Analytics focus more on their paradigm, presuppositions, problems, methods, approaches?</p>	<p>Presence of words related to presuppositions, problems, methods, approaches. Also, measure how self-similar articles are.</p>
<p>What's wrong with contemporary philosophy?</p>	<p>Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons & Barry Smith</p>	<p>"AP is sceptical about the claim that philosophy can be a science, and hence is uninterested in the real world. CP is never pursued in a properly theoretical way, and its practice is tailor-made for particular political and ethical conclusions."</p>	<p>Skepticism, properly theoretical vs. real world, political, ethical, agendaed, "tailor-made"</p>	<p>Is analytic more skeptical and theoretical while continental more political, ethical, agenda-laden?</p>	<p>Presence of theoretical/skeptical terms. Presence of real world, political, ethical, and agenda-laden terms.</p>

<p>Analytic Versus Continental: Arguments on the Methods and Value of Philosophy</p>	<p>James Chase & Jack Reynolds</p>	<p>Since we are, in effect, seeking to partially explicate the divide by considering method, our project might seem to take issue with a number of recent meta-philosophical works in which methodological accounts of one or other tradition are put into question. 6 But we are not engaged in the game of coming up with a “necessary and sufficient conditions” characterization of each tradition in purely methodological terms; it is clear enough that not all analytic philosophers place a high value on explicit argument (nor respect science, etc.), and not all non-analytic philosophers ignore such desiderata. The approach here is more exemplary, and allows for the possibility of figures standing in both traditions, or indeed for there being regions of philosophy in which the traditions somewhat overlap. Analytic and continental philosophers frequently employ distinct methods, and disagree as to their worth and proper field of application. Each tradition exhibits distinct stylistic preferences, norms of engagement and discussion, and harbours distinctly different attitudes as to what are the more significant philosophical issues and questions.</p>	<p>family resemblance Note: isn't this hypothesis too "easy"?</p>	<p>Analytic and continental respectively refer to historical figures and views in a way that is divided?</p>	<p>Note: our method already accommodates family resemblance. But the idea of family resemblance doesn't give us the content of the divergence</p>
<p>Problems of other minds: Solutions and dissolutions in analytic and continental philosophy</p>	<p>Jack Reynolds</p>	<p>"(1) an epistemological dimension (How do we know that others exist? Can we justifiably claim to know that they do?); (2) an ontological dimension that incorporates issues having to do with personal identity (What is the structure of our world such that inter-subjectivity is possible? . . . analytic engagements with the problem of other minds focus on (1), whereas continental philosophers focus far more on (2). In addition, this article will also point to various other downstream consequences of this, including the preoccupation with embodiment and forms of expressivism that feature heavily in various forms of continental philosophy"</p>	<p>Epistemic vs. personal, identity, embodiment, expression</p>	<p>On matters of mind, is analytic more epistemic and continental more about personal, identity, embodiment, and expression?</p>	<p>Presence of epistemic words. Presence of words relating to personal identity.</p>
<p>Post-analytic philosophy : Overcoming the divide</p>	<p>George Duke, Elena Walsh, Jack Reynolds & James Chase</p>	<p>"the particular essays cited, and/or the background literature that is cited, are not shared in common between the standard-bearing analytic and continental journals"</p>	<p>Analytics cite analytics vs. continentals cite continentals</p>	<p>Do analytics cite analytics and continentals cite continentals?</p>	<p>Number of citations for standard-bearing journals.</p>
<p>Analytics, Continentals, and Modern Skepticism</p>	<p>Terry Pinkard</p>	<p>"that analytical philosophers are a bunch of small-minded logic choppers, and continental philosophers are a bunch of woolly minded gasbags . . . tedious logic-chopping or “academic in the worst sense” niggling—is inspired by a brooding sense of skepticism, a sense that without such very intensely rigorous policing of our arguments and our explications, we are simply too prone to slide off into assertions that feel good"</p>	<p>small-minded logic choppers vs. woolly minded gasbags</p>	<p>Are analytics "small-minded" or "logic-choppers"? Are they fundamentally skeptics?</p>	<p>Presence of logical terminology. Presence of skeptical terminology.</p>
<p>The Analytic/Continental Divide: A Contretemps?</p>	<p>Jack Reynolds</p>	<p>very different philosophies of time, and associated methodological techniques, serve to define representatives of each of these groups and also to guard against their potential interlocutors. for most if not all Continental philosophers the very possibility of philosophising, questioning, and thinking requires that one consider the relationship between time and ‘subjectivity,’ 9 whereas the majority of analytic philosophers evince by their practices that this is not the direction to go.</p>	<p>Analytic philosophy is characterized by objectivist view about time while continental is characterized discussion of a</p>	<p>Objective time in analytic vs subjective time in continental</p>	<p>Frequency of 'objective' 'objectivity' vs 'subjective' 'subjectivity' (but it won't be much about time)</p>

			subjective view of time		
Encounters between Analytic and Continental Philosophy	Andreas Vrahimis	"Careful study shows that it is implausible to assume the existence of a century-old 'gulf' between two sides of philosophy. Vrahimis argues that miscommunication and ignorance over the exact content of the above encounters must to a large extent be held accountable for any perceived gap." Note: This says the "divergence" is actually that the two camps talk about the same meaning with different terms. But our method can only measure/access terms.	Miscommunication and ignorance account for the divide.	Is the dispute purely verbal? Or conceptual?	Our method cannot validate this characterization.
Analytic Philosophy and the History of Philosophy (review)	Gabriel Rockhill	"It has often been assumed that history is one of the major dividing lines between analytic and continental philosophy. Participants in the latter tradition have primarily been preoccupied with deferent interpretations of the philosophical auctores, expressing their own ideas through a form of "exegetical thinking" by which present philosophical intuitions are validated when they are discovered."	History and authors are the purview of the continentals vs. analytics	Are continentals obsessed with history and authors?	Presence of "history" and related words. Presence of proper names of authors.
Why I am not an analytic philosopher	David Spurrett	"From a certain simplistic and inaccurate, although regrettably popular, perspective philosophy, at least for the past few decades, is available only in two main flavours – analytic and continental. Some self-identified members of both camps are apt to endorse uncharitable caricatures of what the others are up to . . . the standard moves of analytic philosophy, such as testing a proposal against 'intuitions', "	The divide is simplistic and inaccurate. Intuitions vs. ?	Is the dichotomy simplistic and inaccurate? Are analytics all about testing and intuitions?	Intuition' in analytic and the lack of it in continental
A Plea for Agonism Between Analytic and Continental Philosophy	Robrecht Vanderbeeken	In general terms, we can state that contemporary continental philosophy wants to question and critically analyse any given thought. Unlike analytic philosophy, there is a tendency to continuously readdress the classical philosophical questions, not with the intention to find a final answer, but to generate new insights and to learn about the cultural, social and historical relativity of our knowledge. (19) Compared with contemporary continental philosophy, analytic philosophy has a quite opposite philosophical attitude. In general terms, we can state that analytic philosophy preferably wants find answers to philosophical problems rather than investigate the same questions over and over. (20)	Analytic philosophers try to answer classical philosophical questions for good. Continental philosophers try to come back to classical questions for the purpose of generating new insights	Do continental philosophers come back to classical philosophical questions more?	New' Frequency of 'meaning of life'
Remarks on the structure of twentieth century philosophy	Tom Rockmore	"Three important movements emerged independently, movements which for different reasons rapidly came to dominate the debate: American pragmatism, so-called continental philosophy, and Anglo-American analytic philosophy. . . . The author argues that these three movements of the past century need to be understood against the prior historical background, above all as reactions to Kant."	Different responses to Kant	Do analytic and continental both orient differently around Kant?	Presence of "Kant" and Kantian vocabulary? ("a priori", "analytic", "synthetic", etc.)
Where is philosophy at the start of the twenty-first century?	Graham Priest	"Starting with the foundational work of Frege and Husserl, the paper traces two parallel strands of philosophy developing from their work."	Frege vs. Husserl	Is analytic really Frege and continental really Husserl?	Presence of "Frege" and "Husserl" and their terminology.

<p>Remarks on the structure of twentieth century philosophy</p>	<p>Tom Rockmore</p>	<p>"Three important movements emerged independently, movements which for different reasons rapidly came to dominate the debate: American pragmatism, so-called continental philosophy, and Anglo-American analytic philosophy. . . . The author argues that these three movements of the past century need to be understood against the prior historical background, above all as reactions to Kant."</p>	<p>Different responses to Kant</p>	<p>Do analytic and continental both orient differently around Kant?</p>	<p>Presence of "Kant" and Kantian vocabulary? ("a priori", "analytic", "synthetic", etc.)</p>
<p>Where is philosophy at the start of the twenty-first century?</p>	<p>Graham Priest</p>	<p>"Starting with the foundational work of Frege and Husserl, the paper traces two parallel strands of philosophy developing from their work."</p>	<p>Frege vs. Husserl</p>	<p>Is analytic really Frege and continental really Husserl?</p>	<p>Presence of "Frege" and "Husserl" and their terminology.</p>

Appendix C: Statistically Significant Data

The Analytic and Continental corpuses were data-mined using comparative analysis in order to determine the statistical significance of certain keywords as positive indicators for the divisions. These keywords were ranked according to their significance:

Table 3: Statistically Significant Continental Words

Word	Z val
of	115
the	98
and	92
de	68
life	66
as	66
la	62
itself	62
its	61
fs	60
human	58
phenomenology	58
through	57
self	56
body	53
h	53
heidegger	52
political	50
deleuze	49
philosophy	49
trans	48
into	47
hegel	47
in	47
history	46
new	46
ibid	45
derrida	44
work	44
nietzsche	44
foucault	44
et	43
merleau	42
politics	42
within	41
consciousness	41
le	41
his	41
power	40
critique	40
own	39
violence	39
time	38
husserl	37
art	37
ponty	36
movement	36
des	36
historical	35
lacan	35
death	35
spinoza	35
heidegger's	35
absolute	35
bachelard	34
narrative	34
being	34
les	34
text	33
world	33
living	33
was	33
thought	33
re	33
badiou	32
que	32
modern	32
spirit	32
critical	32
nature	32
which	32
subject	31
social	31
becoming	31
subjectivity	30
cultural	30
hegel's	30
becomes	30
du	30
thinking	30
man	30
transcendental	29
continental	29
production	29
freud	29
process	29
th	29
dans	28
en	28
culture	28
jean	28
post	28
paris	28
become	28
moment	28
marx	28
beyond	28
levinas	28
god	27
lived	27

Table 4: Statistically Significant Analytic Words

Word	Z val
that	181
p	162
if	153
are	133
x	120
true	117
about	112
belief	111
be	111
moral	109
oxford	108
b	107
some	105
argument	105
properties	105
i	103
case	103
have	101
is	99
reasons	98
for	98
cases	96
view	96
pp	96
there	94
property	93
oup	92
then	92
beliefs	92
c	90
evidence	89
epistemic	87
proposition	83
not	82
s	82
we	82
content	80

downloaded	80
will	79
so	79
do	77
whether	77
suppose	76
relevant	76
you	76
facts	76
w	75
q	74
would	73
might	73
agent	73
should	73
t	73
causal	72
may	71
believe	71
she	69
explanation	69
any	69
claim	68
probability	67
theory	67
false	67
propositions	66
sentence	66
justification	65
com	64
r	64
plausible	63
sentences	63
consider	63
y	62
account	62
g	61
arguments	60
blackwell	60

k	59
ltd	59
objection	58
modal	58
semantic	58
morally	58
normative	58
seems	58
https	57
just	57
why	57
j	57
reason	57
attitudes	56
theories	56
pdf	56
explain	56
conditional	56
justified	55
reasoning	54
your	54
article	54
standard	53
ellsworth	53