한국 헌정사에서 시민의 정치참여로 이루어진 ‘대통령 탄핵’이라는 초유의 사건은 단순히 ‘공화국’에 대한 사전적 개념정의에 국한될 수 없는 입헌민주주의의 진정한 의미를 되새겨 보게 하는 역사의 한 장이 됨과 동시에, 탄핵 이후 “(‘헌법상 명시된 민주 공화국을 현실에서 어떻게 구현할 것인가?’라는 차원에서) 우리의 공화국은 어떤 공화국이어야 하는가?”라는 공화국의 가치를 묻는 정치적·도덕적 질문에 직면하게 되는 계기가 되었다.
이러한 질문에 대해 진지하게 답변하는 과정이 향후 헌정사의 한 부분을 구성하게 될 것임은 자명하다. 이 지점에서 공동체의 다수가 원하기 때문에 다수가 원하는 것들을 공화국이 추구해야 할 가치라고 선언하는 것도, 또는 “옳음은 좋음에 앞선다”라는 명제로 대변되는 정의의 보편성과 근원성에 기인한 도덕에 대한 가치중립적 태도를 고수하는 입장도 새로운 국면에 접어든 민주주의의 시대적 요구를 감당하기에는 버거워 보인다.
본고는 샌델의 입장을 지지하기에는 한국의 헌정사와 정치사의 질곡이 너무 커서 ‘연고적 자아’ 개념을 혈연·지연·학연으로 얽힌 한국적 연고로 변질시키고, ‘공화국’을 전체주의적 국가주의로 뒤덮어 버릴 위험성을 염려하면서도, 그가 지적한 미국 민주주의의 위기 상황과 이러한 문제들 속에서 드러난 자유주의의 실천적 무기력함을 간과할 수 없었다. 자유주의의 실천적 무기력함의 문제는 이론적 문제(한계)와 관계가 있다. 본고는 “자유주의의 한계”를 밝힌 샌델의 ‘이론적 도전’이 공화주의적 차원에서 헌법과 민주주의의 기초가 되는 공공철학의 중요성을 새삼 인식하게 된 한국사회에 많은 시사점을 줄 수 있다고 본다.
샌델은 ‘좋음 또는 좋은 삶’(선)의 개념을 가정하지 않고서는 권리의 확정이나 정당화가 불가능하며 이러한 논의와 ‘정의’가 분리될 수 없음을 주장하면서도, 그 ‘좋음’의 내용과 판단기준을 명확하게 제시하지는 못했다. ‘기본적 가치’(선)의 존재와 내용, 그리고 실천적 합당성의 요건을 통해 이 가치들이 도덕적 지위를 얻게 되는 구조를 명확하게 논증한 피니스의 이론은 샌델의 이론을 강화시켜 줄 수 있다. 또한 민주주의와 공공철학의 요청을 공화주의의 관점에서 체계화한 샌델의 이론은 피니스 이론의 정치절학적 부족함을 보완해 줄 수 있다. 이러한 두 이론의 상보적 협력은 법과 정치에 관한 의미 있는 (자유주의와 법실증주의의 협업에 대한 대안적 이론으로써) 이론적 패러다임을 구성할 수 있다.
민주 공화국에 대한 자각과 함께 특정 정치인에 대한 우상화를 추구하는 ‘신민’이 아닌, ‘시민의 덕’을 지니고 ‘민중’이 아닌 공화국의 ‘시민’으로서, 즉 공화주의의 정치주체로서 헌정사의 중심에 서게 된 시민들과 향후 한국 입헌민주주의의 (이론과 실천 양 측면에서) 질적 성장을 위해 샌델과 피니스의 이론적 협력 가능성을 모색하고자 하는 시도는 의미가 있다고 생각한다.
It is extremely rare in Korea for a foreign scholar, not a sports star or a celebrity from overseas, to become as well known and popular as Michael Sandel. The extent to which Sandel’s theory is understood, however, does not even remotely correspond to his popularity. Sandel delves into the problem of whether “rights” can be confirmed or justified without believing in the notion of “good life.” This argument is not about whether an individual’s case or a community’s case is more important. Categorizing Sandel as a “communitarian” misrepresents him as clearly as his argument is misinterpreted above. His criticism pertains to the problem of whether the principles of justice governing the basic fabric of society could remain neutral in spite of opposing moral and religious beliefs. He rebutted John Rawls’s theory that revives Immanuel Kant’s argument “being right takes precedence over being good” by clothing it in empiricism. If there is a scholar who deserves the spotlight for his theoretical contributions, although he is not recognized at all by the public in Korea, it would be John Finnis. Interestingly, these two scholars’ theories are complementarily cooperative; at the same time, they suggest many implications for the Korean legal system. This study aims to explore the possibility of complementary cooperation between the two theories and the legal and political meaning of this theoretical cooperation. According to Sandel, politics is a “forum for competing moral arguments,” and in this forum, “liberalism” insistent on “neutrality” is nothing but powerless. Controversial political and legal problems in Korea such as confrontations and conflicts based on the misunderstandings surrounding the “Anti-Discrimination Act” and the serious conflicts about the rights of sexual minorities are relevant to differences in religious and moral positions, as argued by Sandel. In light of the political and constitutional history of Korea, especially when “liberalism,” which is criticized by Sandel, has been rather short-lived and the effects of authoritarian nationalism still linger, it is very reasonable to believe that the way Sandel’s liberalism is understood now could lead to the strengthening of “Korean nepotism” or the tyranny of the majority in order to emphasize the “common good,” not to a recognition of “anti-communism” as a synonym for “liberalism.” Despite such historical conditions, Korea is no exception to his criticism on liberalism and his reasoning on “justice,” which cannot be separated from “good life.” I cannot deny the remarkableness of Martha Nussbaum’s theory, which presents the concept of “core capabilities” within the boundaries of liberalism and explains a guarantee of the minimum capabilities required for human life. In her book Creating Capabilities, Nussbaum says that she will remain true to liberalism, while fixing and supplementing it. However, it is inevitable that this be wrongly interpreted as an admission that liberalism is theoretically indefensible. Nussbaum’s “core capabilities” are in line with Finnis’s “basic goods” and include deep theoretical reflection related to human life that cannot be solved simply by conjecture on the philosophical principles of Aristotle. Even though Sandel systematically explained complaints about democracy caused by the assumption that neutrality cannot be maintained in arguments about “good life” and “justice,” which cannot be irrelevant to “good life,” he did not clearly state what constitutes “good” and what criteria could be used to define it. Finnis reasoned through and demonstrated this problem in an extraordinary way a long time ago. The theoretical cooperation between Sandel and Finnis, who argue that moral arguments cannot be separated from the essence of politics and law, could be possibly result in an alternative to liberalism. This is a point where the two theories could cooperate with one another in a complementary manner, and at the same time, apply their theoretical knowledge to Korean politics and law after the “impeachment of the president,” which marked a historic moment in the constitutional history of Korea.
It is extremely rare in Korea for a foreign scholar, not a sports star or a celebrity from overseas, to become as well known and popular as Michael Sandel. The extent to which Sandel’s theory is understood, however, does not even remotely correspond to his popularity. Sandel delves into the problem of whether “rights” can be confirmed or justified without believing in the notion of “good life.” This argument is not about whether an individual’s case or a community’s case is more important. Categorizing Sandel as a “communitarian” misrepresents him as clearly as his argument is misinterpreted above. His criticism pertains to the problem of whether the principles of justice governing the basic fabric of society could remain neutral in spite of opposing moral and religious beliefs. He rebutted John Rawls’s theory that revives Immanuel Kant’s argument “being right takes precedence over being good” by clothing it in empiricism. If there is a scholar who deserves the spotlight for his theoretical contributions, although he is not recognized at all by the public in Korea, it would be John Finnis. Interestingly, these two scholars’ theories are complementarily cooperative; at the same time, they suggest many implications for the Korean legal system. This study aims to explore the possibility of complementary cooperation between the two theories and the legal and political meaning of this theoretical cooperation. According to Sandel, politics is a “forum for competing moral arguments,” and in this forum, “liberalism” insistent on “neutrality” is nothing but powerless. Controversial political and legal problems in Korea such as confrontations and conflicts based on the misunderstandings surrounding the “Anti-Discrimination Act” and the serious conflicts about the rights of sexual minorities are relevant to differences in religious and moral positions, as argued by Sandel. In light of the political and constitutional history of Korea, especially when “liberalism,” which is criticized by Sandel, has been rather short-lived and the effects of authoritarian nationalism still linger, it is very reasonable to believe that the way Sandel’s liberalism is understood now could lead to the strengthening of “Korean nepotism” or the tyranny of the majority in order to emphasize the “common good,” not to a recognition of “anti-communism” as a synonym for “liberalism.” Despite such historical conditions, Korea is no exception to his criticism on liberalism and his reasoning on “justice,” which cannot be separated from “good life.” I cannot deny the remarkableness of Martha Nussbaum’s theory, which presents the concept of “core capabilities” within the boundaries of liberalism and explains a guarantee of the minimum capabilities required for human life. In her book Creating Capabilities, Nussbaum says that she will remain true to liberalism, while fixing and supplementing it. However, it is inevitable that this be wrongly interpreted as an admission that liberalism is theoretically indefensible. Nussbaum’s “core capabilities” are in line with Finnis’s “basic goods” and include deep theoretical reflection related to human life that cannot be solved simply by conjecture on the philosophical principles of Aristotle. Even though Sandel systematically explained complaints about democracy caused by the assumption that neutrality cannot be maintained in arguments about “good life” and “justice,” which cannot be irrelevant to “good life,” he did not clearly state what constitutes “good” and what criteria could be used to define it. Finnis reasoned through and demonstrated this problem in an extraordinary way a long time ago. The theoretical cooperation between Sandel and Finnis, who argue that moral arguments cannot be separated from the essence of politics and law, could be possibly result in an alternative to liberalism. This is a point where the two theories could cooperate with one another in a complementary manner, and at the same time, apply their theoretical knowledge to Korean politics and law after the “impeachment of the president,” which marked a historic moment in the constitutional history of Korea.
