Abstract
Allen Buchanan proposes a methodological framework with which theorists may evaluate different theories of secession, including the national self-determination theory. An important claim he makes is, because the right to secede is inherently institutional, any adequate theory of secession must include, as an integral part, an analysis of institutional morality. Because the national self-determination theory blatantly lacks such an analysis, Buchanan concludes that this theory is inherently flawed. In this paper, I consider Buchanan’s framework and the responses from supporters of national self-determination theory. I try to clarify the confusion shared by both parties. I conclude that, although Buchanan’s theory of institutional morality is sound, his critiques of the national self-determination theory fails.
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Notes
This principle is different from Margaret Moore’s, which holds that state boundaries should be drawn in a way that approximates the boundaries of national communities (2001). It is also different from another principle that holds that each national group has a right to create its own sub-state, autonomous government (Kymlicka 1995; Patten 2002).
The arguments from Buchanan considered here are from his 1997 article “Theories of Secession” and his 2004 book Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination. Notice that there is an evident tone switch. In the earlier article, he prioritizes the institutional aspect because he thinks that in practice, it is the more urgent question. However, in his recent book he suggests that we must study the right to secede’s institutional dimension because this right is inherently institutional. While the former reason for being concerned with the institutional aspect is external, the latter is inherent in the concept of the right to secede itself.
I should clarify that these five criteria come from Buchanan’s book Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-determination. They are, presumably, developed and revised from the four criteria from his earlier article, “Theories of Secession”—minimal realism, consistency with well-entrenched, morally progressive principles of international law, absence of perverse incentives, and moral accessibility. Although he names those criteria differently, Buchanan’s earlier criteria include the last two of his newer version—incentive compatibility and moral convergence. The criterion that a theory be consistent with well-entrenched, morally progressive principles of international law is reflected in his methodological requirement that a theory engage in holistic institutional moral reasoning.
Notice that Buchanan’s criticism of the national self-determination theory is rather extensive. Not only does he use the above framework to criticize this theory, he also raises other objections to it—the Infeasibility Objection and the Equal Respect Objection (1996).
One might suspect that actual states would not sanction policies that would contribute to their own disintegration merely because the power-holders would like to hold on to their power. True as that may be, Buchanan suggests that it is also because a legitimate state is the guardian of both its current and future generations of citizens, and thus has to the right to territorial integrity (1997, pp. 46–49).
Buchanan does claim that “both ideal and nonideal theory must be institutional because the right to secede is inherently institutional.” However, this claim seems to be one about the methodology for determining whether there is a right to secede. It is not directly a claim about the right itself (2004, p. 346).
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Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Professor Andrei Marmor and Professor Mark Schroeder for their comments on an earlier draft. She would also like to thank Miss Alida Liberman for proof-reading the paper.
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The paper is a part of a larger project of critically examining the value and limits of the principle of national self-determination. Many objections have been raised to this principle, but I cannot consider all of them here. In this paper, I will consider only the problems raised by Allen Buchanan’s challenge of institutional morality.
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Lee, Hw. Institutional morality and the principle of national self-determination. Philos Stud 172, 207–226 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0284-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0284-1