

The effects of six bases of power upon compliance, identification, and internalization*

HELENA LEET-PELLEGRINI

and JEFFREY Z. RUBIN

Tufts University, Medford, Mass. 02155

The links between Raven's (1965) and Kelman's (1958) models of influence were assessed in a questionnaire study. Coercive, informational, and reward power were rated as especially likely to elicit compliance; coercive power was most likely to elicit negative identification with the influence transmitter; finally, informational and coercive power were rated as most likely to elicit internalization.

Social influence may be most generally defined as a change in one person's (P's) behavior, cognition, or attitude which has its origin in another person or group (O). French & Raven (1959) and later Raven (1965) have developed a theoretical position in which they suggest that there are six bases of influence (or power) O can invoke in order to influence P in the manner O chooses: reward, coercive, expert, legitimate, referent, and informational power. Kelman (1958), in his analysis of the process of opinion change, has suggested that influence may be understood in terms of its consequences for the recipient (P): either compliance (behavioral change), identification (change in feelings about O), or internalization (change in P's underlying attitudes). Raven and Kelman thus approach the influence process from two, rather different, vantage points: those of the transmitter (O) and the recipient (P), respectively. How may these two vantage points be understood in relation to each other, and the influence process more generally?

When O invokes *reward* or *coercive* power, he is saying in effect: "Do what I ask because I am bigger and stronger than you; I can help you or hurt you, as I see fit." In response, P is likely to comply—not because he likes O or values their relationship (identification) or because he has incorporated new information (internalization), but because O appears to be stronger. Reward and coercive influence are thus likely to elicit compliance, but not identification or internalization. Coercive power, moreover, as Rubin & Lewicki (1973), Cheney, Harford, & Solomon (1972), and others have suggested, should actually lead to *negative identification* (dislike of O). When O invokes either *expert*, *legitimate*, or *referent* power, he is saying in effect: "Do what I ask because I know more than you (expert), I have a right to make this request (legitimate), or because you like me (referent)." P is likely to comply in response to these three influence attempts, not because O is stronger or because P has incorporated new information, but

because of his relationship with O as a source of expertise, legitimacy, or reference. P is thus likely both to comply and to identify with O—and especially when referent power is employed, since this is the most interpersonally "friendly" of the three appeals. Finally, when O invokes *informational* power, he is saying in effect: "Do what I ask because of the information with which I am presenting you—information that, upon reflection, will cause you to see things my way." In response, P is likely to comply, primarily because he has internalized additional information, not because of O's strength or because of his relationship with O.

Although the theoretical links connecting Raven's (1965) and Kelman's (1958) influence models have been considered recently (Raven, 1971), we know of no attempts to consider these links in the laboratory. The present experiment represents such an attempt, and its major purpose is to test the above hypotheses—which may be summarized as follows: All six bases of influence are likely to elicit compliance, although reward and coercive power are especially likely. In addition, expert, legitimate, and especially referent power are likely to elicit identification with the transmitter (coercive power eliciting negative identification), while informational influence is most likely to result in internalization.

Of secondary interest in this study are three additional variables: the sex of P, the sex of O, and the sex of the S asked to make judgments about O's influence upon P. We know of virtually no research which has attempted to assess the effects of these three variables in relation to Raven's six bases of power. One exception is a recent experiment by Berrio and Rubin (1972), in which the effects of five bases of power upon compliance and internalization were studied in nursery schools and kindergartens. Berrio and Rubin found that coercive, informational, and legitimate power were more likely to elicit compliance than either referent or reward (expert power was not considered). They found, moreover, that girls displayed greater overall compliance than boys (although there were no sex differences in internalization). Based on these findings, we might expect a female P to be more likely to comply (or to be rated as more likely to comply) with O than a male P. In addition, given an experimental situation such as the present one, in which Ss are asked to rate the influence of O upon P, we might expect female raters to predict greater compliance by P than male raters. Given the nature of the Berrio and Rubin experiment, of course, no predictions appear possible with respect to the effects of varying the sex of the transmitter.

METHOD

Subjects

Ss were 141 Tufts University undergraduates (75 male, 66

*This research was supported by Grant MH 22605 from the National Institute of Mental Health to the second author. The paper is sponsored by Leonard C. Mead, who takes full editorial responsibility for it.

Table 1
Mean Responses to Measures of Compliance, Identification, and Internalization*

		Influence												Subject														
		Transmitter			Recipient			Informational			Reward			Coercive			Referent			Expert			Legitimate					
N	C	M	F	M	C	F	M	C	I	In	M	C	F	M	C	I	In	M	C	I	In	M	C	F	M	C	I	In
M	M	17	46.5	21.0	32.3	42.8	27.9	31.2	51.9	8.5	33.2	37.5	29.2	25.1	33.7	24.4	23.3	43.8	28.6	26.2								
M	F	13	37.9	28.2	37.7	31.8	31.1	30.9	46.1	9.3	33.5	36.9	40.5	38.7	32.6	23.5	32.5	42.3	35.8	24.1								
F	M	16	48.2	24.8	43.1	34.3	33.4	30.3	51.1	4.9	40.0	31.8	32.5	27.9	22.6	27.4	16.8	33.5	26.7	23.6								
F	F	29	46.1	22.0	35.7	41.8	30.0	32.3	51.9	10.9	34.7	38.4	31.0	28.4	36.6	27.4	26.7	40.4	30.5	26.3								
M	M	12	39.5	26.3	36.9	39.8	20.2	25.2	44.7	13.6	30.8	27.3	24.9	17.0	26.4	24.8	17.9	40.8	35.2	28.2								
F	F	17	45.7	29.0	40.4	25.8	20.3	25.6	49.8	8.8	33.9	35.3	33.8	36.4	34.2	27.2	32.0	34.7	23.8	25.7								
F	M	18	40.9	27.4	38.5	32.0	22.2	31.2	43.2	10.8	30.2	27.1	29.2	25.9	24.0	25.1	22.4	34.4	28.4	26.3								
F	F	19	44.4	27.0	37.8	47.3	27.3	32.6	48.0	4.0	25.6	38.5	36.1	31.0	31.7	23.5	20.3	37.5	26.3	16.5								
Mean			43.7	25.7	37.8	36.9	26.5	29.9	48.3	8.9	32.8	34.1	32.1	28.8	30.2	24.9	24.0	38.4	29.5	25.5								

*The larger the mean, the greater the perceived compliance, identification, or internalization.

female). They were asked to complete a short questionnaire during a regular class meeting of an introductory psychology course.

Questionnaire

The questionnaire, adapted from a cartoon task developed by Raven (1973), consisted of six pages, each of which contained three line drawings (cartoon panels). The first cartoon panel on each page showed a young adult standing in front of a doorway at a city street corner. In the second cartoon panel on each page, a police officer was shown with the young adult, saying to the latter: "Would you please move away from here." In the third panel on each page, the police officer was shown stating one of six reasons why the young adult should comply with the request made in Panel 2. After studying the three panels on a page, Ss were asked three questions about the young adult (see below); he then proceeded to the next page.

Experimental Design and Dependent Measures

Four variables were combined in a mixed design. Three of these variables were between-Ss factors: *sex of transmitter* (policeman vs policewoman), *sex of recipient* (man vs woman), and *sex of subject*. The fourth variable, *basis of power*, was a within-Ss factor, and was manipulated by varying the reason stated by the police officer in the third cartoon panel: reward ("If you do, I will keep it in mind—there are ways that I can help you"); coercive ("If you don't, I will take you in and book you—it won't be good for you"); expert ("You will have to take my word for it, but I happen to know that this is not a place for you to stand"); legitimate ("I'm asking you to do this as part of my job"); referent ("Speaking as a friend, I wouldn't stand here and you shouldn't either"); and informational ("I don't suppose you noticed, but there is a door behind you and you're blocking it"). Since each S was exposed to all six levels of the basis of power variable (one on each of the six pages of the questionnaire), a 6 x 6 Latin square was employed in order to counterbalance order of presentation.

In order to assess the degree to which the recipient was seen by Ss as having complied, identified, and internalized with the transmitter's request, Ss were asked three questions after viewing the three panels on each page: *compliance* ("How likely is the young man (woman) to do what the policeman (policewoman) says?"); *identification* ("How do you think the young man (woman) feels about the policeman (policewoman)?"); *internalization* ("How likely is the young man (woman) to return to that same place later in the day when the policeman (policewoman) is gone?"). Ss answered each of these questions on 61-point bipolar rating scales, extending from "not at all likely" (1) to "very likely" (61) for compliance and internalization, and from "dislikes" (1) to "likes" (61) in the case of identification.

RESULTS

The condition means for each of the three dependent measures are presented in Table 1. Ss' responses to each of these measures were analyzed by means of complex analyses of variance. Prior to performing these analyses, however, the data were tested for order effects. One-way analyses of variance yielded nonsignificance for each of the three dependent measures, justifying pooling across order.

Compliance

Analysis of variance of the compliance data revealed a main effect for power [$F(5,665) = 32.04, p < .001$]. Thus, recipients exposed to coercive, informational, or legitimate power were seen as far more likely to comply

with the transmitter than were those exposed to reward, referent, or expert power (as tested by a Tukey multiple comparison test; Winer, 1962). In addition, sex of recipient was found to interact significantly with sex of transmitter [$F(1,133) = 7.63, p < .01$] and power [$F(5,665) = 2.18, p > .05$]. With respect to the former

interaction, the young man was rated as more likely to comply with a policeman than with a policewoman, while the young woman was rated as no more likely to comply with one than the other. With respect to the interaction between sex of recipient and power, the young woman was rated as more likely to comply with referent and expert power than was the young man.

Identification

Analysis of variance of this measure yielded a significant power effect [$F(5,665) = 54.80, p < .001$]: coercive influence resulted in greater perceived dislike for the police officer than did any of the other five bases. In addition, a significant interaction emerged between sex of subject and power [$F(5,665) = 3.21, p < .01$], indicating that when reward power was used, male Ss rated the recipient as liking the transmitter more than did female Ss.

Internalization

Finally, with respect to the third dependent measure, a pattern emerged that was roughly comparable to that for the compliance data. A main effect for power was again found [$F(5,665) = 15.12, p < .001$], indicating that informational and coercive power resulted in greater perceived internalization than did the other four. In addition, sex of recipient and power interacted significantly [$F(5,665) = 3.37, p < .005$], reflecting the fact that the young woman was rated as more likely to internalize a referent influence attempt than was the young man.

DISCUSSION

The major purpose of this study was to investigate the links between Raven's six bases of power and Kelman's articulation of the three consequences of influence. It was found, as predicted, that all six bases of power were seen as likely to elicit compliance (overall mean for compliance = 38.6, out of a maximum of 61). Moreover, coercive, informational, and legitimate power were found to elicit more rated compliance than reward, referent, or expert. These findings lend support to the earlier results reported by Berrio & Rubin (1972). While we expected both coercive and reward power to be especially likely to result in compliance, we found this to be the case only for coercion. Perhaps the reason reward power was not as effective as predicted is because its use (like the use of expert and referent influence) was seen as somehow inappropriate in the context of a police officer-citizen interaction.

With respect to identification, referent power resulted in the greatest perceived liking of O by P (although not significantly so), and coercive power resulted in the greatest perceived disliking. Thus, coercion, which was rated as most likely to elicit compliance, and also relatively likely to result in internalization, was the one basis of influence whose transmitter was seen as especially reprehensible. This finding lends support to previous research on the differential effects of promises and threats (Rubin & Lewicki, 1973).

Finally, we found (as predicted) that informational power was especially likely to be seen as eliciting internalization. However, coercion, despite our expectation that it would produce compliance only, was also rated as likely to result in internalization. Perhaps our measure of internalization, which read "later in the day," was not far enough removed in time for

internalization to have truly occurred. Perhaps the results would have been different had the internalization measure read "one week (or one month) later, with no police officer around." Or possibly the coercive influence statement used in this study was so punitive, given the minor nature of the infraction, that the "long arm of the law" was seen as stretching at least into the twilight of that same day.

Expert and referent influence, which evoked less compliance (relative to the other bases of power), understandably evoked less internalization. But interestingly, legitimate influence, one of the high compliance procedures, was among the sources of influence which produced low internalization. While acknowledging the need to comply in this instance, Ss may have privately rejected the legitimacy of an appeal made by a person in the role of police officer in our society. How, one might ask, would the results have differed if the influencer had occupied a more prestigious role than that of police officer?

Although no simple main effects were found with respect to any of the three sex variables, several interactions did emerge. Male recipients (Ps) were rated as more likely to comply with a male than with a female transmitter (O), while perceived compliance for female Ps did not vary as a function of sex of O. Similar effects did not emerge for identification and internalization, perhaps because attitudes and feelings are private dimensions, while compliance is public. A man's stereotypic image is far more damaged when he is observed obeying someone of supposed lesser stature, capability, strength, etc. (a woman!) than when he privately acknowledges that policewomen are as effective and as liked (or disliked) as their male counterparts.

In addition, it was found that referent influence was more effective in eliciting compliance and internalization for female Ps than for males. For women to be perceived as responding readily to this most interpersonally "friendly" basis of power is not incompatible with research which has shown that women possess higher affiliative needs than men. Male Ps, on the other hand, may be seen as unable or unwilling to reconcile two potentially conflicting roles, those of friend and authority figure.

We are aware, of course, that the particular influence situation used in this study, involving a police officer and a citizen, may have imposed particular constraints on the generalizability of our findings. It thus may be useful to replicate the study in other settings—Involving a doctor and a patient, perhaps, or a teacher and a pupil. Also, it may be useful to test the present hypotheses in a live, rather than a hypothetical, setting, in which Ss are themselves asked to become either the transmitters or recipients of particular influence attempts.

REFERENCES

- Berrio, M., & Rubin, J. Z. Bases of influence in the nursery school and kindergarten. Unpublished manuscript. Tufts University, 1972.
Cheney, J., Harford, T., & Solomon, L. The effects of communicating threats and promises upon the bargaining process. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1972, 16, 99-107.
French, J. R. P., Jr., & Raven, B. H. The bases of social power. In D. Cartwright (Ed.), *Studies in social power*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1959. Pp. 150-167.
Kelman, H. Compliance, identification and internalization: Three processes of attitude change. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1958, 2, 51-60.
Raven, B. H. Social influence and power. In I. Steiner and M. Fishbein (Eds.), *Current studies in social psychology*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1965. Pp. 371-382.
Raven, B. H. The comparative analysis of power and power preference. Paper prepared for the Albany Symposium on Power and Influence, Albany, N.Y., October 11-13, 1971.
Raven, B. H. A cartoon task for the analysis of the bases of power. Unpublished manuscript. University of California, Los Angeles, 1973.
Rubin, J. Z., & Lewicki, R. J. A three-factor experimental analysis of promises and threats. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 1973, in press.
Winer, B. J. *Statistical principles in experimental design*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962.

(Received for publication September 27, 1973.)