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What Truth Depends on

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Abstract

What kinds of sentences with truth predicate may be inserted plausibly and consistently into the T-scheme? We state an answer in terms of dependence: those sentences which depend directly or indirectly on non-semantic states of affairs (only). In order to make this precise we introduce a theory of dependence according to which a sentence φ is said to depend on a set Φ of sentences iff the truth value of φ supervenes on the presence or absence of the sentences of Φ in/from the extension of the truth predicate. Both φ and the members of Φ are allowed to contain the truth predicate. On that basis we are able define notions such as ungroundedness or self-referentiality within a classical semantics, and we can show that there is an adequate definition of truth for the class of sentences which depend on non-semantic states of affairs.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Philosophy, Univ. of Salzburg, Austria

    Hannes Leitgeb

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  1. Hannes Leitgeb
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Leitgeb, H. What Truth Depends on. J Philos Logic 34, 155–192 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-004-3758-3

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