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No purely epistemic theory can account for the naturalness of kinds

  • S.I.: Natural Kinds: Language, Science, and Metaphysics
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Abstract

Several philosophers have recently tried to define natural kinds in epistemic terms only. Given the persistent problems with finding a successful metaphysical theory, these philosophers argue that we would do better to describe natural kinds solely in terms of their epistemic usefulness, such as their role in supporting inductive inferences. In this paper, I argue against these epistemology-only theories of natural kinds and in favor of, at least partly, metaphysical theories. I do so in three steps. In the first section of the paper, I propose two desiderata for a theory of natural kinds. In the second section, I discuss one example of a ‘general’ epistemology-only theory, proposed by Marc Ereshefsky and Thomas Reydon, and argue that theories like theirs fail to provide adequate criteria of natural kinds. In the third section, I focus on one example of a ‘specific’ epistemology-only theory, proposed by P. D. Magnus, and use it to show why such theories cannot justify the claim that the proposed epistemic criteria account for the naturalness of kinds.

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Notes

  1. Most philosophers implicitly accept this monism about natural kinds, for some examples consider the criteria of Wilkerson (1988) and Ellis (2001).

  2. For doubts about the notion of mind-independence by an essentialist, see Wilkerson (1988). For a broader discussion of the troubles with spelling out naturalness in terms of mind-independence, by a non-essentialist, see Khalidi (2016).

  3. There is some debate in the literature on whether Boyd holds the view that all natural kinds are HPC’s. In my view, this just depends on how broadly one defines the notion of an HPC, that is, whether it also includes kinds that do have necessary and sufficient conditions for kind-membership. In any case, nothing important depends on this for the purposes of this paper.

  4. In this paper I will only discuss realist epistemic theories of natural kinds. There are some other epistemic theories of natural kinds that are explicit about not conceiving of ‘naturalness’ as a realist notion anymore (Franklin-Hall 2015). These theories abandon the idea that the naturalness of kinds lies somehow in getting something right about the world – which conventional categories do not – but rather conceive of the ‘naturalness’ of a category as a particular role this category can have in a scientific theory or discipline. McLeod (2010) defends a theory like this, according to which natural kinds allow for many generalizations (criterion), explaining their unitary role for scientific fields (naturalness). If having a unitary role for science is not understood as a ‘sign’ of naturalness anymore, but as naturalness itself, I don’t see why we should still call this naturalness. Hence in this paper I only discuss those epistemic theories that explicitly aim to provide a realist but epistemic answer to the problem of natural kinds.

  5. What is described here is one method for species delimitation based on the PPSC. This is not to say, however, that different (ontological) species concepts will always result in incompatible (or even different) ways of delimiting species. See Wiens (2007).

  6. In fact, their criteria seem to originate from an earlier text of Ereshefsky where he asks exactly this question (Ereshefsky 2001). Also telling for the fact that the proposed criteria are an awkward fit for a theory of natural kinds, is that Ereshefsky himself elsewhere calls the phylo-phenetic species concept ‘nominalistic’ (Ereshefsky 2010).

  7. For the details on this restriction clause, see Magnus (2012).

  8. Practical success here is meant to refer to that type of success that is not reducible to epistemic success. Thus, one particular isotope could perhaps be a natural kind for chemists or physicists based on epistemic success. Furthermore, it could also be a natural kind for economists based on epistemic considerations. However, the fact that it is practically useful as a currency is the result of it being sufficiently rare and stable, and hence not due to its epistemic credentials. One cannot think of this isotope as a natural kind simply based on the fact that it is sufficiently rare and stable. Practical success in this non-epistemic sense does not make for natural kinds.

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Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek—Vlaanderen. Postdoctoral fellowship.

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  1. Centre for Logic and Analytic Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, KU Leuven/FWO, Leuven, Belgium

    Olivier Lemeire

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Lemeire, O. No purely epistemic theory can account for the naturalness of kinds. Synthese 198 (Suppl 12), 2907–2925 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1806-8

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