Searle on the biology of seeing

Highlights

• Biologism is distinguished from Narrow Biologism.

• One can accept Biologism without accepting Narrow Biologism.

• Searle's main arguments for his views on seeing depend on an untenable Narrow Biologism.

Abstract

Searle offers an account of seeing as a conscious state not constituted by the object(s) seen. I focus in this article on his biological case for this thesis, and argue that the biological considerations he adduces neither establish his own position nor defeat a rival object-inclusive view. I show (among other things) that taking seeing to be a biological state is compatible with its being (partially) constituted by the object(s) seen.

Introduction

Over many decades, John Searle has championed a version of a view we may call “Biologism”—the thesis that, insofar as humans and other conscious animals are concerned, anything mental (including any conscious state) is biological.¹ An important recent work of his proves to be no exception.² Therein, he argues that all conscious states are biological and as such are realized in cellular systems and caused by biological processes. As he puts it:

Consciousness with all of its touchy-feely, “mysterious,” ontologically subjective features is a biological, and therefore physical, part of the world. As such, it enters into causal relations with other parts of the physical world. Thus, for example, all of my conscious perceptions are caused in my brain by the impact of perceptual stimuli on my nervous system. And these perceptions in turn together with other processes, some conscious and some unconscious, cause my physical behavior. For example, I see the glass of beer in front of me, so I reach out with my hand, take it, and drink from it. Some people still think that the ontological irreducibility of consciousness makes consciousness not a part of the physical world. They are mistaken (…) [T]he very conscious state which is qualitative, subjective, touchy-feely, etc. must have a lower-level description in which it is a biological process causing the secretion of acetylcholine. This is no more mysterious than the fact that my car engine has a higher-level description where the explosions in the cylinder move the piston, and a lower-level description where the oxidation of hydrocarbon molecules releases heat energy (48–49).

A particular concern of Searle's is to offer an account of seeing as a conscious state, and a significant part of his case for this account appeals to biological considerations. I focus in this article on this biological case.³ I argue that, even if we accept Biologism, the biological considerations Searle adduces neither establish his own position nor defeat a rival object-inclusive view: ultimately, his appeals to biology do not settle the question of the ontology of seeing.

This article unfolds as follows. In the next five sections, I address some preliminary matters useful for assessing Searle's case: I delineate what I call the “Intra-Organismic Conditional” in section 2, distinguish between Biologism and a species of it I dub “Narrow Biologism” in section 3, delineate some key assumptions of the article in section 4, discuss the state of depression as a prelude to seeing in section 5, and distinguish between the object-exclusive and object-inclusive conceptions of seeing in section 6. After these preliminaries, I summarize Searle's account of seeing in section 7, and then present his biological case and show why it fails to establish his own position and to defeat the rival object-inclusive view in section 8. I consider, in terms of its implications for seeing, an argument Searle deems to be decisive against consciousness existing outside the brain in section 9, I conclude with some retrospective and prospective remarks in section 10.