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Right to Experimental Treatment: FDA New Drug Approval, Constitutional Rights, and the Public's Health

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Elizabeth Weeks Leonard
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Do terminally ill patients who have exhausted all other available, government-approved treatment options have a constitutional right to experimental treatment that may prolong their lives? On May 2, 2006, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in a startling opinion, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, held “Yes.” The plaintiffs, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs (Abigail Alliance) and Washington Legal Foundation, sought to enjoin the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) from refusing to allow the sale of investigational new drugs that had not yet received FDA approval. The terminally ill plaintiffs contended that they quite literally could not wait that long for the drugs. With no other treatment options available, the plaintiffs urged the court to recognize a fundamental, constitutional right to take potentially life-saving or life-prolonging drugs, even though the treatment had not been fully tested through human trials for safety and effectiveness and could not be legally marketed to the public.

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Symposium
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 37 , Issue 2 , Summer 2009 , pp. 269 - 279
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2009

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References

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