

Mind's Knowledge and Powers of Control in Anaxagoras DK B12

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I Introduction

Fragment 12 of Anaxagoras¹ contains a series of assertions concerning the attributes of a cosmic νοῦς or Mind²:

- ¹ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα παντὸς μοίραν μετέχει, νοῦς δέ ἐστιν ἄπειρον καὶ αὐτοκρατὲς καὶ μέμικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι, ἀλλὰ μόνος αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἑωυτοῦ ἐστιν. εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἦν, ἀλλὰ τεωὶ ἐμέμικτο ἄλλωι, μετείχεν ἂν ἀπάντων χρημάτων, εἰ ἐμέμικτό τεωὶ· ἐν παντὶ γὰρ παντὸς μοίρα ἔνεστιν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μοι λέλεκται· καὶ ἂν ἐκώλυεν αὐτὸν τὰ συμμεμειγμένα, ὥστε μηδενὸς χρηματος κρατεῖν ὁμοίως ὡς καὶ μόνον ἔοντα ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ. ἔστι γὰρ λεπτότατον τε πάντων χρημάτων καὶ καθαρώτατον, καὶ γνώμην γε περὶ παντὸς πάσαν ἴσχει καὶ ἰσχύει μέγιστον· καὶ ὅσα γε ψυχὴν ἔχει καὶ τὰ μείζω καὶ τὰ ἐλάσσονα, πάντων νοῦς κρατεῖ. καὶ τῆς περιχωρήσιος τῆς συμπάσης νοῦς ἐκράτησεν, ὥστε περιχωρησάμενη τὴν ἀρχὴν. καὶ πρῶτον ἀπὸ τοῦ μικροῦ ἤρξατο περιχωρεῖν, ἐπὶ δὲ πλέον ¹⁰ περιχωρεῖ, καὶ περιχωρήσει ἐπὶ πλέον. καὶ τὰ συμμισηγόμενά τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενα καὶ διακρινόμενα πάντα ἔγνω νοῦς. καὶ ὅποια ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι καὶ ὅποια ἦν, ἅσα νῦν μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ὅσα νῦν ἐστι καὶ ὅποια ἔσται, πάντα διεκόσμησε νοῦς, καὶ τὴν περιχώρησιν ταύτην, ἣν νῦν περιχωρεῖ ²⁰ τὰ τε ἄστρα καὶ ὁ ἥλιος καὶ ἡ σελήνη καὶ ὁ ἀήρ καὶ ὁ αἰθήρ οἱ ἀποκρινόμενοι. ἡ δὲ περιχώρησις αὐτῆ ἐποίησεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι. καὶ ἀποκρίνεται ἀπὸ τε τοῦ ἀραιοῦ τὸ πυκνὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ζοφεροῦ τὸ λαμπρὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ διεροῦ τὸ ξηρόν. ²⁵ μοῖραι δὲ πολλαὶ πολλῶν εἰσι. παντάπασι δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνεται οὐδὲ διακρίνεται ἕτερον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐτέρου πλὴν νοῦ. νοῦς δὲ πᾶς ὁμοίως ἐστι καὶ ὁ μείζων καὶ ὁ ἐλάττων. ἕτερον δὲ οὐδὲν ἐστιν ὁμοιον οὐδενί, ἀλλ' ὅτων πλείστα ἔνι, ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἐν ἕκαστον ³⁰ ἐστι καὶ ἦν.

H. Diels and W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 6th ed. (Dublin/Zurich, 1966), Vol. II, pp. 37-38; hereafter cited as 'DK'.

² Adopting for the moment the terms of Schofield's translation (M. Schofield, *An Essay on Anaxagoras*; Cambridge U. P., 1980; pp. 3-4).

- (1) Mind is unlimited, self-controlling, and unmixed with anything else, while all other things have a portion of everything (lines 1-3 and 25-26);
- (2) Mind is the finest and purest of all things (9-10);
- (3) Mind has every discerning judgment (πάσαν γνώμην) about everything (10);
- (4) Mind has the greatest strength (10-11);
- (5) Mind controls all things that possess soul (11-12);
- (6) Mind controlled the whole revolution so that it began to rotate (12-13);
- (7) Mind knew (ἔγνω) all things, the things being mixed together and the things being separated off and distinguished (16-17);
- (8) Mind ordered (διεκόσμησε) all things (17-19); and
- (9) Mind is all alike in things both great and small (27-28).

Since Anaxagoras adds that ‘the things mixed together would hinder [Mind] so as to rule nothing in like manner as it does, being single and by itself’ (B12.7-8) we can infer that Mind’s powers of control as described in (5) and (6) derive from the degree of independence and purity credited to it in (1) and (2). But the archaic paratactic style which characterizes much of B12 obscures how Mind’s powers of control relate to the ‘discerning judgment’ or ‘knowledge’ mentioned in (3).

Especially puzzling is the relationship between:

- (3) καὶ γνώμην γε περὶ παντὸς πᾶσαν ἰσχει
 And, moreover, (Mind) has every discerning judgment about everything.

and:

- (4) καὶ ἰσχύει μέγιστον
 And (Mind) has the greatest strength.³

We have four possible options: (1) Mind has every discerning judgment (or all knowledge, all understanding, etc.) so it also has the greatest strength; or (2) Mind has the greatest strength so it also has every discerning judgment; or (3) Mind has every discerning judgment and, quite independently, it also has the greatest strength; or (4) as Aristotle evidently believed⁴, to say that Mind has the greatest strength is essentially just to say that it has every

³ DK translates: ‘und er besitzt von allem alle Kenntnis und hat die größte Kraft.’ Some alternative translations: ‘and it has every kind of knowledge about everything and the utmost strength’ (Jaeger); ‘and maintains complete understanding over everything and wields the greatest power’ (Sider); ‘and has all judgment of everything and greatest power’ (Guthrie); and ‘has knowledge of all that is and therein it has the greatest power’ (Wheelwright).

⁴ *de anima* III4, 429a18: ἀνάγκη ἄρα, ἐπεὶ πάντα νοεῖ, ἀμυγῆ εἶναι, ὅσπερ φησὶν Ἀναξαγόρας, ἵνα κρατῆ, τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ἵνα γνωρίζῃ – ‘Necessarily, then, since mind thinks all things, it is unmixed, as Anaxagoras says, so it may rule; that is, so it may know. . .’

discerning judgment. David Sider⁵, following Schofield (p. 147n36), detected in the assonance of *ἴσχει* with *ἰσχύει* the hint of a connection between knowledge and strength along the lines of option (1): Mind ‘has every discerning judgment’ (or, as Sider translates, ‘maintains complete understanding’) so it also has the greatest strength. But this would be a peculiar view to attribute to anyone, since having every discerning judgment or maintaining complete understanding concerning events taking place in the cosmos would be no guarantee of having *any* power to control them, much less the *greatest* degree of control.⁶

In general, option (3) would appear the most natural choice: having knowledge about events and being able to control them are logically separate matters (although possessing full knowledge might help us to acquire and retain a degree of control). But it could be argued that option (4) obtained in the circumstances Anaxagoras and his predecessors were discussing, *viz.* the attributes of a supreme being. It might be thought a blot on the escutcheon of a supremely powerful being for it to be unaware of events taking place in some corner of the universe.⁷ Given the importance that has been assigned to Anaxagoras’ conception of a cosmic intelligence by Aristotle and many others⁸ it is at least incongruous that the relationship be-

⁵ D. Sider, *The Fragments of Anaxagoras* (Hain: Meisenheim am Glan, 1981), p. 98.

⁶ It has sometimes been held that the ancient Greek terms for knowledge and action were so intimately intertwined that it would have been impossible for any writer of this period to depict a knowledge that failed to issue in action. But Phaedra’s comments in Euripides’ *Hippolytus* provide at least one example of a felt distinction between knowing the right thing to do and carrying it out: τὰ χρήστ’ ἐπιστάμεσθα καὶ γινώσκομεν/ οὐκ ἐκπονοῦμεν δ’ – ‘We fully recognize the good, but don’t achieve it.’ (380-81). The dual intellectual-volitional character of a number of early Greek expressions, and the philosophical implications of this linguistic phenomenon, are discussed in M. J. O’Brien, *The Socratic Paradoxes and the Greek Mind* (U. of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, N. C., 1967). The classic discussions of the topic are Bruno Snell’s *Die Ausdrücke für den Begriff des Wissens in der Vorplatonischen Philosophie* (Philologische Untersuchungen No. 29: Berlin, 1924); and R. B. Onians, *The Origins of European Thought* (Cambridge U. P., 1951), pp. 15-22.

⁷ I have in mind here the synoptic knowledge and vast influence credited to the ‘one greatest god’ in Frs. 23-26 of Xenophanes of Colophon of the previous generation. On one interpretation, Xenophanes’ god ‘sees, thinks, and hears as a whole’ and ‘shakes all things by the thought of his mind’ since only by doing so would he be truly ‘greatest’ (*viz.* in honor and power). See further, J. Lesher, *Xenophanes of Colophon: Fragments* (University of Toronto Press: Toronto, Buffalo, and London, 1992), pp. 96ff.

⁸ Cf. Aristotle, *metaphysica* A, 984b15-18: ‘Someone said that just as in animals so in nature mind is present and responsible for the world and its whole ordering: he appeared as a sober man compared to his predecessors who spoke at random’ (Barnes trans.). As we will soon see, however, Aristotle did not give an entirely accurate account of pre-socratic cosmologies.

tween Mind's knowledge and its powers of control is not better understood.

II Mind's Function (I)

André Laks has recently argued that Aristotle's comment that Anaxagoras 'did not explain [how mind knows] nor can any answer be inferred from his words' (*de anima* 12, 405b22), taken together with Theophrastus' silence on an Anaxagorean theory of intellection, makes it virtually certain that Anaxagoras never actually expressed a view on this topic.⁹ Nevertheless, and despite recent attempts to show that the cosmic νοῦς did no more than give the cosmos an initial nudge¹⁰, Laks has sought to explain how Anaxagoras' cosmic νοῦς actually functioned as a cognitive faculty.

The key step, according to Laks, is to recognize that knowing is itself an act of κρίσις or κρίνειν – an intellectual act of distinguishing or separating one thing from another. Since the process of separation Mind initiates when it sets the cosmos spinning is isomorphic with the act of knowing, we can employ Anaxagoras' cosmogony as a template for reconstructing his epistemology. According to Laks, Mind initiates the separation process in order to replicate itself and gain full knowledge; it wants to make everything else into an individual with a unique identity so that it can then know each thing for what it is:

. . . the process of separation, which brings about the cosmos, may also be seen as the means by which νοῦς undertakes to make things as similar as possible to itself, namely [self] identical. For in distinguishing things by means of the rotation, νοῦς undertakes to identify them properly. (p. 31)

Somewhat surprisingly, however, Mind cannot possibly succeed in this cognitive venture. Since, as Anaxagoras explains it, everything except Mind will always have a portion of everything else mixed in with it, nothing that has been separated off will ever be absolutely just one thing. As Laks puts it, 'complete separation is mind's wishful thinking' (p. 33).

One could reasonably ask whether the idea that νοῦς knows things by individuating them is enough to constitute a *theory* of intellection¹¹, but the crucial question, I think, is whether Anaxagoras conceived of νοῦς and its

⁹ 'Mind's Crisis. On Anaxagoras' ΝΟΥΣ,' *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 31 Supplement (1993), pp. 19-38. See also J. G. DeFilippo, 'Reply to André Laks on Anaxagoras' ΝΟΥΣ,' *ibid.*, pp. 39-48.

¹⁰ See M. L. Silvestre, 'Significato e Ruolo del *Nous* nella Filosofia di Anassagora,' *Il Contributo*, Vol. 12 (1988), pp. 29-52. See also her 'Simplicius' Testimony Concerning Anaxagoras,' in *Ionian Philosophy*, ed. K. J. Boudouris (Athens, 1989), pp. 369-74.

¹¹ See DeFilippo, pp. 42 ff.

interaction with the cosmos along the lines Laks suggests. In my view, this is very unlikely.

We should first notice how many of the elements in Laks' account of Anaxagoras' epistemology require us to go beyond anything actually said in the fragments or reported in any of the ancient *testimonia*: (1) that *Mind wants to know all things*; hence (2) that *Mind wants to make all things like itself*; (3) that *Mind assumes that in order for things to become like itself they must become completely separate individuals*; and hence that (4) *Mind wants to make things into completely separate individuals*; and finally, (5) that *Mind initiates the rotation of the cosmos in order to achieve this objective*. So far as I can see, there is no evidential warrant for attributing any of these views to Anaxagoras. At one point Simplicius does allude to what the cosmic Mind wants or wishes to accomplish, but he makes no mention of knowledge:

ἔδοκει δὲ λέγειν ὁ Ἄ., ὅτι ὁμοῦ πάντων ὄντων χρημάτων καὶ ἡρεμοῦντων τὸν ἄπειρον πρὸ τοῦ χρόνον βουληθεὶς ὁ κοσμοποιὸς νοῦς διακρίναι τὰ εἶδη, ἅπερ ὁμοιομερείας καλεῖ, κίνησιν αὐταῖς ἐνεποίησεν. (A 45)

Anaxagoras seemed to say that when all things had been together and at rest for an unlimited time until then, the cosmos-making Mind, wishing to separate off the forms which he calls homeomerics, produced motion in them.

And there are other, more serious problems. First, it is unlikely that Anaxagoras held that the cosmic Mind undertook to make all things like itself in order to know them since (as Laks elsewhere points out) Anaxagoras had good reason not to subscribe to the common view that like was known by like.¹² And if Anaxagoras did not himself believe that like was known by like he would hardly have attributed a strategy to his all-knowing cosmic Mind which assumed that like did have to be known by like. Second, on Laks' view, Mind assumes it must make things into completely individual entities in order to know them. Yet it appears from B12.16-17 that Mind knows some things even when they have not been separated from one another:

καὶ τὰ συμμισγόμενά τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενα καὶ διακρινόμενα πάντα ἔγνω νοῦς.

And [7] Mind knew all things, the things being mixed together and the things being separated off and distinguished.

¹² Laks explains: '... the assumption on which Aristotle's [second doxographical discussion] rests is that the similar knows the similar. Otherwise, there would be no reason why the soul should be constituted by the principles. But Anaxagoras is of course the last thinker we might credit with such an assumption. ... in Anaxagoras' theory νοῦς is unlike everything else. For the main feature of Anaxagoras' νοῦς is that, being the only thing that is pure and unmixed, it is similar only to itself.' (p. 24).

As Laks explains (p. 36 n58), τὰ συμμισγόμενα here refers to compound substances as they are presently being formed, rather than to the ‘elements’ (or quasi-elements) in the primordial cosmic soup (although Anaxagoras uses the cognate noun form in speaking of the initial state of the cosmos as itself a mixture; cf. ‘the mixture’ – ἡ συμμίξις – in B4.14 which exists ‘before there was separation’). In either case Anaxagoras appears to be crediting Mind with the capacity to know some things in a mixed condition. And, since that is so, the epistemic necessity that was supposed to have prompted Mind to start the cosmos spinning has evaporated. Third, if Mind were to decide to set out on an individuating enterprise that could not possibly succeed, it would clearly not be the supremely intelligent being Anaxagoras makes it out to be.¹³ Since Mind possesses ‘all discerning judgment or understanding (γνώμη) concerning everything’ it would have to know better than to attempt to know things in some impossible way. Thus, not only is Laks’ story about Mind’s epistemic aspirations and strategic thinking unsupported by the ancient evidence, it is inconsistent with a good deal of what Anaxagoras had to say about Mind’s cognitive activities. It does not appear, then, that Mind’s capacity to separate things by putting the cosmos into motion supplies us with the key to understanding its cognitive function.

III Early Paragons of NOOΣ

One step toward a more satisfactory understanding of Anaxagoras’ B12 would be to recognize that so far we have been operating with an impoverished conception of the Greek concept of νοῦς. According to Kurt von Fritz, whose account¹⁴ Laks partially adopted, νόος – as portrayed in the Homeric poems – functioned as an organ of thought whose primary (and perhaps temporally primitive) function was ‘to realize the meaning of a situation.’ Out of this basic intellectual sense evolved the derivative conative senses of νόος as ‘intention’ or ‘plan’. Especially important, from the viewpoint of subsequent philosophical thought, was the idea of νόος as a mental faculty which enables us to grasp the true meaning of a situation lying behind appearances. In Heraclitus and Parmenides (still according to

¹³ Aristotle makes this point, not by way of explicating Anaxagoras’ theory, but by way of criticising it: ‘So his “Mind” is an absurd person aiming at the impossible, if he is supposed to wish to separate them’, *physica* I4, 188a9-12.

¹⁴ K. von Fritz, ‘Der NOYΣ des Anaxagoras,’ *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte*, Vol. 9 (1964), pp. 87-102, reprinted in *Grundprobleme der Geschichte der antiken Wissenschaft* (Berlin and New York, 1971), pp. 576-93.

von Fritz) this ‘penetrating’, ‘intuitive’ element in νοῦς remained in effect, although Parmenides changed forever the character of the Greek νοῦς when he identified and emphasized the process of rational inference or deduction. Not surprisingly, when von Fritz came to consider the νοῦς of Anaxagoras, he detected something of a discrepancy between Mind’s intellectual and causal roles: although Anaxagoras appears to have adopted the view of νοῦς as the organ of true knowledge (‘Erkenntniskraft’), he resorted (as both Plato and Aristotle would later complain) to merely mechanical forces in order to explain how the cosmos developed over time. For von Fritz, Anaxagorean νοῦς represented an incomplete stage of development; Anaxagoras had identified the right faculty for the job, but he failed to exploit its powers fully. Although Laks sought to fill in the missing details of how νοῦς functioned, he shared with von Fritz the basic assumption that Mind’s most characteristic function was that of identifying individuals and grasping the larger meaning of the circumstances in which they were encountered.

I have argued elsewhere that von Fritz’ account of the evolution in the meaning of the Greek νοῦς from Homer to 5th-century philosophy is problematic in a number of respects.¹⁵ Here I want only to point out one important element in the early Greek concept of νοῦς that has so far been absent from the discussion: that those who possess νοῦς are paragons of *practical* wisdom.

In the *Iliad* the pragmatic character of νόος is demonstrated most vividly by those who lack it – hotheads like Agamemnon and Achilles who are incapable of ‘thinking (νοῆσαι) of things lying both ahead and behind so that the Achaeans might safely wage war beside their ships’ (I, 343-44). When the Trojan counselor Polydamus explains to Hector that he will have to accept the fact that he is a born warrior, not a born thinker, he cites a famous principle of distributive justice:

To one man God gives deeds of war,
To another dance, to another lyre and song,
And in the breast of another, far-seeing Zeus places a νόος,
A worthy one, from which many men profit
And many cities are saved. (XIII, 727-34).

In Book XVIII ‘wise Polydamus’ is praised as he ‘who alone sees before and after’ (250). When Hector rejects his prudent advice to return to the walled city in order to stave off Achilles’ upcoming attack, and the soldiers side with Hector, Homer editorializes:

¹⁵ In ‘The Emergence of Philosophical Interest in Cognition,’ *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, Vol. 12 (1994).

Fools (νήπιοι) they were, for from them Pallas Athena took away their wits.
To Hector they all gave praise in his bad devising (κακὰ μητιόωντι),
But Polydamus who gave them good counsel (βουλήν) no man praised. (311-13)

On the Greek side it is Nestor who represents the cool voice of reason, counselling prudence and caution to those congenitally incapable of either. In the *Iliad*, then, νόος is epitomized by those who have the capacity to learn from the past and plan wisely for the future so that their well being and that of others will be protected.

In the *Odyssey*, νόος is less a matter of supplying sage counsel to others than devising clever schemes to achieve one's own objectives. This quality is most on display in Homer's accounts of the schemes concocted by Odysseus to enable him to return home and slay the suitors. But Penelope, 'she who excels all other women νόον καὶ ἐπίφρονα μῆτιν – 'in intelligence and shrewd cunning' (*Od.* XIX, 325-26) shows she is no slouch in νόος when she fools the suitors, and then tricks the arch-trickster, Odysseus himself, into revealing his identity in an unmistakable fashion. In sharp contrast with these twin towers of νόος stand Penelope's suitors, the name of whose chief, Antinoos, says it all. Clearly, those who possess νόος are often involved in recognizing a person's true identity or realizing the true meaning of a situation, as von Fritz maintained, but neither of these two achievements in themselves conveys a clear sense of the creative, adaptive, practical powers of intelligence which are the hallmark of Homer's paragons of νόος.

Further, as is clear from the association of νόος with μῆτις (cf. the description of Penelope just given and Odysseus' standard epithet πολύμητις), the possession of νόος typically involves the exercise of 'brains over brawn', skill or cunning over brute force:

By cunning (μῆτι) indeed does a woodcutter do far better than by might;
By cunning (μῆτι) too does a helmsman (κυβερνήτης) on a wine-dark sea
Steer straight (ἰθύνει) a swift ship buffeted by winds;
And by cunning (μῆτι) does charioteer surpass charioteer. (II. XXIII, 315-18)¹⁶

Thus, Homer's paragons of νόος are models of practical intelligence, persons who can learn from experience, sense the troubles that may lie ahead, and conceive and execute measures that will bring success, even in the face of superior forces. It should come as no surprise, then, that Anaxagoras would characterize the operations of his cosmic νοῦς in terms of controll-

¹⁶ Similarly, when Antilochus apologizes for having cut in front of Menelaus' chariot, ignoring his father's good advice, he pleads the impulsiveness of youth: 'for a young man is hasty in νόος and thin in μῆτις' (XXIII, 590).

ing and ordering the events taking place in nature, for controlling and ordering is what νοῦς typically does, indeed it is what νοῦς had always done.

IV Presocratic Conceptions of a Cosmic Intelligence

Contrary to the impression given by Aristotle's well known remark¹⁷, Anaxagoras was not the first presocratic thinker to hold that the universe operated under the influence of a supremely powerful intelligent being. Roughly a generation earlier Xenophanes of Colophon had affirmed:

But completely without toil he shakes all things by the intelligence of his mind.

ἀλλ' ἀπάνευθε πόνου νοῦ φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει. (B 25)

Heraclitus also states that the processes taking place in the cosmos are overseen by a power endowed with intelligence or wisdom (cf. the γνώμη in B41 below, σόφρον in B32, and τὸ σόφρον in B108).

Although we do not know the basis for their claims, later writers credited Anaximander with the important idea that a cosmic power 'surrounds and steers all things'.¹⁸ It is not easy to imagine how the 'indefinite' substance Anaximander identified as the basic reality could literally have steered anything, but the reference in his Fr. 1 to the way in which 'they [presumably the opposites] pay penalty and retribution to each other according to the assessment of Time' suggests a cosmic power which sees to it that any element enjoying the upper hand will in time give way to its opposite number. A law of retribution which governs all natural changes can be plausibly construed as a kind of cosmic tiller or intelligent helmsman – in some respects a naturalized Zeus – always at work ensuring that the natural order will be preserved.¹⁹ Appropriating another traditional epithet of Zeus,

¹⁷ See note 8 above. According to Aetius (*placita* I, 7, 11; DK 11A23) Thales had earlier stated that νοῦν τοῦ κόσμου τὸν θεόν – 'the divine is the mind of the cosmos' (similarly Cicero, *de natura deorum* I, 10, 25). As has often been noted, Aristotle seems not to have recognized that Xenophanes and Heraclitus were serious students of nature.

¹⁸ Hippolytus, *Refutations* I, 6,1-2; DK12A11: Anaximander held that 'a certain nature of the indefinite' (φύσιν τινὰ τοῦ ἀπείρου) was 'eternal and unaging and it also surrounds all the worlds' (πάντας περιέχειν τοὺς κόσμους); Aristotle, *physica* Γ4, 203b7: 'all those who do not postulate other causes such as mind, or love' say that 'the indefinite enfolds all things and steers all' (περιέχειν ἅπαντα καὶ πάντα κυβερνᾷ).

¹⁹ Following the account given by Kirk, Raven, and Schofield in *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 2nd edition (Cambridge U. P., 1983), p. 116, although it must be admitted that the relationship between the indefinite substance and the law of retribution remains opaque. But perhaps, as J. M. Robinson remarks, 'With the office of Zeus the infinite has inherited the titles and privileges of that office. It is not only 'ageless' and 'imperishable' and 'divine' but in some sense a living intelligence. The notion of order never quite

Heraclitus affirmed that ‘Thunderbolt helms (οἰακίζει) all things’ (Fr. 64), and that (B41):

ἐν τῷ σοφον· ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην †δότη κυβερνήσαι† πάντα διὰ πάντων.

Wisdom is one thing: knowing the intelligence <which steers> all things through all.²⁰

where intelligence/Thunderbolt is almost certainly the ‘Everliving Fire’ described in B30 as kindled in measures and extinguished in measures (cf. also ‘fire’s turnings’ in B31a, the ‘equal interchange of fire and all things’ in B90, the fixed measures for the sun’s path in B92, and the description of the sun in B100 as sharing in the oversight of the changes taking place in the cosmos). Here also we can understand the steering metaphor in terms of a cosmic power that exerts an equalizing and restorative influence on the universe – in effect, a cosmic enforcer of the principle of equals in exchange for equals. Parmenides also speaks of a goddess, who ‘steers all things’, apparently by means of orchestrating births and mixtures:

ἐν δὲ μέσῳ δαίμων ἢ πάντα κυβερνᾷ.
πάντων γὰρ στυγεροῖο τόκου καὶ μίξις ἄρχει.

In the middle [of the cosmic rings] is the goddess who steers all things;
For she rules over hateful birth and mixing of all things. (B12.3-4)

The view that the cosmos is ‘steered’ by a pervasive and controlling intelligence will also be expressed by Diogenes of Apollonia²¹ as well as the

lost, either for Anaximander or his immediate successors, the implications which it has in human affairs, where order has always to be created and maintained by intelligence.’ J. M. Robinson, *An Introduction to Greek Philosophy* (Houghton Mifflin: Boston, 1968), p. 39.

²⁰ Assuming, following Marcovich, that γνώμην refers to an intelligent being, rather than to an opinion or judgment in the person who ἐπίσταται. Marcovich notes the parallels of Διὸς γνώμην in Aeschylus, *Prom.* 1003 and Διὸς τοι νόος μέγας κυβερνᾷ/δαίμον’ ἀνδρῶν φίλων – ‘In truth it is the great mind of Zeus that steers the fate of men he loves’ in Pindar, *Pyth.* V, 122-23. Cf. also Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 177ff: ‘Zeus has led us on to know, the Helmsman lays it down as law, that we must suffer, suffer into truth’ (Fagles trans.); and Cleanthes, *Hymn to Zeus*, 2-3: ‘Nature’s great king, through endless years the same/Omnipotence who by thy just decree/Steerest all.’ (Adam trans.) A number of alternatives have been suggested for the impossible δότη κυβερνήσαι; see M. Marcovich, *Heraclitus* (Los Andes U. P.: Merida, Venezuela, 1967); C. Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus* (Cambridge U. P., 1979); and T. M. Robinson, *Heraclitus: Fragments* (Toronto U. P.: Toronto, Buffalo, and London, 1987).

²¹ τὸ τὴν νόησιν ἔχον εἶναι ὃ ἀήρ καλούμενος ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου πάντας καὶ κυβερνᾶσθαι καὶ πάντων κρατεῖν – ‘That which has intelligence is called air by men, and by this all are steered and it has power over all things’ (B5.1-3).

Heraclitus-inspired author of the Hippocratic treatise *de Victu*²². It can only be this group of early thinkers Plato had in mind when (at *Philebus* 28d7-8) he alludes to ‘the ones who spoke before us’ (οἱ πρόσθεν ἡμῶν ἔλεγον) who believed that:

νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν τινα θαυμαστὴν συντάττουσαν διακυβεργᾶν

reason and a marvellous organizing intelligence pilots (the whole universe).²³

In short, a number of philosophers of Anaxagoras’ era subscribed to the proposition that an intelligent power pervades and rules the cosmos, on some accounts imparting movement to it (as in the ‘shakes all things’ of Xenophanes B25), on others devising one or more of its features (as in Parmenides’ B13) and more generally, in the terms of the ancient simile, overseeing its operations as a skillful helmsman steers a storm-tossed ship along its intended course. Thus, when Anaxagoras spoke of a νοῦς which started the cosmos to rotate (B12.13, 13.1), ‘ordered all things’ (12.17-19), and now ‘surrounds’ and ‘controls’ all that is (B14.1-2)²⁴ it is clear he is working within a framework established by his philosophical predecessors.

V *Mind’s Function (II)*

It remains to consider how Mind’s ordering and controlling activities relate to the ‘knowledge’ ascribed to it at B12.10: καὶ [νοῦς] γνώμην γε περὶ παντὸς πᾶσαν ἴσχει.

Unhelpfully, the key term here, γνώμη, is one of the most flexible, and therefore most difficult terms in the whole Greek intellectual lexicon, ranging from a core sense of ‘means of knowing’ (either the identifying marks on an object or the faculty of intelligence, comprehension, or understanding) to a large number of secondary meanings relating to various products of intelligence – knowledge, opinion, judgement, decision, will, intention, purpose, proposal, maxim, etc. On occasion, as when Thucydides refers to a motion put before the Athenian assembly for debate, the meaning of γνώμη

²² τὸ θερμότατον καὶ ἰσχυρότατον πῦρ ὄπερ πάντων κρατεῖ . . . τοῦτο πάντα διὰ παντὸς κυβερνᾷ – ‘The hottest and strongest fire which has power over all things. . . this steers all things through all’ (DK 22C1; I, 185, 21-24). The view of the cosmos as being steered (κυβερνώμενος) by the One also appears in what is generally considered a spurious fragment of Philolaus (Stobaeus *ecl.* I, 20, 2).

²³ Cf. *Philebus* 30d6-8: ‘This supports those ancient thinkers whom we mentioned who declared that reason always rules all things (ἀεὶ τοῦ παντὸς νοῦς ἄρχει).’

²⁴ *Contra* Plato and Aristotle, Mind’s ordering role continues into the present day (cf. B12.17-18: καὶ ὅποια ἦν ἄσσα νῦν μὴ ἔστιν, καὶ ὅποια νῦν ἔστι . . . πάντα διεκόσμησε νοῦς).

can be precisely defined. But on others, as when Thucydides refers to a particular γνώμη of Pericles, it is not clear whether this is an intelligent judgment, decision, proposal, or plan of action.²⁵

Even the employment of the term by presocratic philosophers resists simple classification. In Heraclitus' B78, the γνώμαι described as characteristic of the divine nature (but not the human one) might have been either 'intelligent judgments', or 'wise insights', while the distinction between a genuine and spurious γνώμη Democritus drew in his B11 might have involved either 'knowledge' or 'judgment'. Both 'intelligence' and 'opinion' would have been appropriate in the context of Parmenides' B8.61 where the goddess assures the youth that her instruction will prevent any 'mortal γνώμη' from 'passing him by', but Parmenides could hardly have supposed that those opposing γνώμαι qualified as knowledge or wisdom.²⁶ And when Parmenides alludes to the two sensible forms mortals have 'set down or recorded as their decision to name' (8.53, μορφὰς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνώμας ὀνομάζειν, following LSJ), γνώμη is neither 'knowing' nor 'judgment', but rather a decision to think or act in a particular way.

Given the presence of γνώμη in Heraclitus B 41 as that which 'steers all things through all' it is certainly tempting to translate Anaxagoras' (νοῦς) πᾶσαν γνώμην ἴσχει as '(Mind) has all intelligence' and to think of B12.10 as essentially a reiteration of Heraclitus' view. But while γνώμη can mean 'intelligence' or 'the power of intelligence' on some occasions²⁷, this does not appear to be one of them. It is natural to speak of knowledge, judgment, and opinion as περὶ τινος – 'concerning' or 'about something', intelligence – our capacity to think, know, judge, etc. – cannot itself 'be about' or 'concern' anything. Thus, in so far as Anaxagoras asserts that Mind's γνώμην is περὶ παντὸς, he is not talking about 'Mind's intelligence'.

The phrase ἔχειν γνώμην can mean 'having an opinion' (cf. LSJ s.v. γνώμη III), but in light of the fact that here in B12 we are dealing with a god-like power that rules the cosmos, it would be unlikely that Anaxagoras'

²⁵ As for example at II, 55, 2: '[Pericles] περὶ μὲν τοῦ μὴ ἐπεξίεναι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην εἶχεν – [Pericles] held to the same judgement/decision/policy concerning the Athenians not going out to take the field of battle.'

²⁶ As Snell remarks: 'γνώμη wird ihm zum Synonym von δόξα' (*op. cit.* p. 37).

²⁷ Cf. Xenophon, *Mem.* I, IV, 8-9: 'But as for mind (νοῦν), which alone it seems is without mass, do you think that you snapped it up by a lucky accident, and that all these huge masses here, infinite in number, possess order by some sort of absurdity. . . Neither do you see your own soul which has the mastery of the body; so that as far as that goes, you may say that you do nothing by the power of intelligence (γνώμη) but everything by chance (τύχη)?'

point was merely that Mind ‘has all opinions’ – including all the false ones as well. Whatever else it may turn out to be, Mind’s γνώμη must be something more than just ‘Mind’s opinion’.

Yet if we take B12.10 to mean that ‘Mind has all knowledge concerning all things’, and understand this in a traditional fashion as an awareness of all the things, persons and events throughout the universe²⁸ we are compelled to saddle Anaxagoras with a singularly incoherent account. In the course of describing and explaining Mind’s control over the cosmos Anaxagoras contrasts how Mind would be hindered if it had been mixed with things with the manner in which it presently rules, being single and by itself (lines 7-9). He then mentions its fineness and purity, perhaps as a direct explanation for how Mind is able to operate as it presently does, but perhaps also a continuation of the ‘self ruling and mixed with nothing’ point made at the outset. Immediately following his statement about Mind’s γνώμη he asserts that it has the greatest strength (lines 10-11) and rules everything that has soul (lines 11-12). The mention of ‘knowledge’ in this sequence of remarks is out of place. It is as though Anaxagoras were having a hard time keeping his own mind on the topic at hand, and while describing Mind’s enormous strength and power to control the things in the cosmos he succumbs to the temptation to throw in a side remark about the breadth of its intellectual awareness.

Yet B12.10 speaks not of Mind’s γνώσις – its ‘knowledge’²⁹, or its σύνεσις – its ‘understanding’, but of its γνώμη, and one potentially helpful text for ascertaining what that might have meant is Sophocles’ *Philoctetes* 836-38. When the chorus advises Neoptolemus to seize the moment of opportunity presented by a sleeping Philoctetes, it alludes to the manner in which καιρός – Opportunity or ‘The Timely Moment’ operates, characterizing it as πάντων γνώμαν ἰσχων:

πρὸς τί μένομεν πράσσειν;
καιρός τοι πάντων γνώμαν ἰσχων
πολὺ παρὰ πόδα κράτος < > ἄρνυται.

To what purpose do we delay acting?
Opportunity, in truth, holding γνώμη of all things,
< > gains victory then and there. (836-38)

²⁸ As Hesiod described the synoptic form of awareness enjoyed by Zeus: Πάντα ἰδὼν Διὸς ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ πάντα νόησας – ‘The eye of Zeus seeing and noting all things’ (*Works and Days*, 267).

²⁹ Which appears for the first time in Heraclitus B56: ‘People are deceived with respect to their knowledge of the obvious (πρὸς τὴν γνώσιν τῶν φανερῶν)’.

Jebb thought that πάντων γνώμων ἰσχων here just meant πάντα γινώσκων: ‘taking cognisance of all things – discerning, in every case, whether the circumstances warrant prompt action.’³⁰ But others have thought that more than just knowledge or discernment was involved. T.B.L. Webster, comparing the official use of ἐγνώσθη – ‘it was decided’, took πάντων γνώμων ἰσχων to mean ‘having the decision in everything’:

The Right Moment, having the decision in everything
Wins a mighty victory then and there.³¹

Both line 838 as well as Sophocles’ *Electra* 75 indicate that καιρός/Opportunity is a force to be reckoned with:

νῶ δ’ ἐξίμεν· καιρός γάρ, ὅσπερ ἀνδράσιν
μέγιστος ἔργου παντός ἔστ’ ἐπιστάτης

And we too will go, for among men it is Opportunity
Which is the best overseer of every enterprise.’ (75-76)

And unless ‘καιρός holds the γνώμη of all things’ means something like ‘Opportunity holds the decision in the success of every enterprise’ we will not have any explanation given for how it is that καιρός can achieve instant success. Clearly, just ‘discerning whether the circumstances warrant prompt action’, as Hamlet knew to his sorrow, would be no guarantor of action, instant or otherwise. So γνώμη here, as elsewhere in both philosophical (as at Parmenides 8.53) and non-philosophical contexts³², is well understood as

³⁰ R. C. Jebb, *Sophocles: The Plays and Fragments: Part IV The Philoctetes* (Hakkert: Amsterdam, 1966), p.137n.

³¹ T.B.L. Webster, *Sophocles’ Philoctetes* (Cambridge, 1970), p. 121. Similarly: ‘Opportunity which has the final say in everything’ (Ussher); ‘Opportunity which decides everything’ (Mazon, Kamerbeek); Passow, citing this passage noted: ‘γνώμη: etwas kennen und bestimmen’ (F. Passow, *Handwörterbuch der griechischen Sprache*, Vogel: Leipzig, 1841, p. 564).

³² Cf. Chantraine: ‘[γνώμη] qui implique à la fois l’ idée de connaissance et celle d’ avis, de décision prise en connaissance de cause,’ *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque* (Paris, 1968), p. 224. Cf. also Thucydides, II, 2, 4: ‘Instead of following the advice of those who had invited them over, namely to set to work at once and enter the houses of their enemies, they determined rather [γνώμη δὲ ἐποιούντο – ‘made the judgment/decision/determination’] to try conciliatory proclamations and to bring the city to an amicable agreement’ (Smith trans.); Euripides, *Hecuba*, 189 ff. where Polyxena is told of the γνώμη or ‘decree’ of the Argives that she must die (cf. Odysseus’ comment at 218: ‘you know the army’s decision’ – εἰδέναι γνώμην στρατοῦ); Plato, *Laws* 946d: ‘[The auditors] shall hold an inquiry into the conduct of all outgoing officers of state, and declare in writing in the agora what sentence or fine each official should incur according to the judgment of the board of auditors – κατὰ τὴν τῶν εὐθύνων γνώμην.’ Aristotle equates ‘what is called γνώμη’ with ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς . . . κρίσις ὀρθή – ‘the

a matter of decision or the power of decision.

Adopting this translation of γνώμη for Anaxagoras' B12.10: καὶ (νοῦς) γνώμην γε περὶ παντὸς πᾶσαν ἴσχει yields:

(3) Yes, and in addition, (Mind) holds every decision concerning everything.

It would be difficult, I believe, to imagine a more appropriate premiss to find at the heart of Anaxagoras' account of how a supremely powerful intelligence controls and orders the cosmos than the assertion that whatever happens in the cosmos results from Mind's decision-making powers. As we have seen (in A 45 quoted earlier), Simplicius explains Anaxagoras' account by tracing Mind's arranging activities to an act of will or desire (βουληθεὶς ὁ κοσμοποιὸς νοῦς). And, as Aristotle observed, the origin of all purposeful action is a decision.³³

The reappearance of the γνω- element of γνώμην in the ἔγνω in line 16 (as well as the echoing of the παντός by πάντα) suggests that the assertion 'Mind ἔγνω all things. . .' is presented in order to elucidate the previous claim in greater detail. But here, as others have recognized, it is possible to understand γινώσκω in its secondary sense of 'judge, determine, decide', and to read B10.16 as 'Mind decides or determines everything, the things being mixed, separated, and divided off.'³⁴ Having already credited Mind

correct determination . . . of what is equitable' (*ethica nicomachea* VI,11, 1143a19-20). For additional examples of γνώμη with the meaning of 'Stimme', 'Beschuß', 'Urteil' see Snell, *op. cit.*, p.35n. Snell, however, understood the γνώμη at Anaxagoras B12.10 to mean 'Erkenntnis' and regarded it, along with Heraclitus B 78 and Democritus B11, as an anticipation of Platonic ἐπιστήμη (pp. 36-7).

³³ *ethica n.* VI, 2, 1139a31-32: 'Now the origin of an action – the source of movement, not the action's goal, is decision' – πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις – ὅθεν ἢ κίνησις ἀλλ' οὐχ οὐ ἔνεκα. Quite commonly in ancient Greek literature deciding to do something is expressed in terms of thinking that a certain course 'would be the best' (cf. *Od.* V,360: ἀλλὰ μάλ' ὄδ' ἔρξω, δοκέει δέ μοι εἶναι ἄριστον – 'But this will I do, since it seems to me that this is best.' Hussey comments: '. . . it seems likely that [Anaxagoras] stated explicitly that it was the best possible plan, and that all of God's work was for the best. It was this suggestion that excited the interest of Plato and Aristotle in Anaxagoras, and their complaints. . .' (Edward Hussey, *The Presocratics*; Duckworth: London, 1972; p. 139). But since the idea of a decision was present in B12, we need look no further for an explanation for why Plato and Aristotle understood Anaxagoras to be claiming that everything that happened in nature was 'for the best' (*Phaedo*, 97c).

³⁴ Reading πάντα ἔγνω νοῦς as a gnomic aorist, i.e. as a statement in the past tense intended as a universal generalization. For γινώσκω with the meaning of 'judge, determine' see LSJ, s.v. γινώσκω II. Cf. Herodotus I, 74: '[when a marriage agreement had been reached] ἔγνωσαν that Alyattes should give his daughter Aryenis to Astages'; VI, 85: 'The Spartans had assembled a court and ἔγνωσαν that Leutychides had done violence to the Aeginetans'. Cf. Passow, *op. cit.*, s.v. γινώσκω (2): 'erachten, eine

with the power to move, surround, control and arrange, it would have been something of an oversight for Anaxagoras not to credit Mind with deciding how the individual portions get distributed.³⁵

Thus, since what the first half of B12.10 actually asserts is that Mind holds every decision concerning everything that has happened, is now happening, and ever will happen throughout the entire cosmos, Anaxagoras would be entirely justified in claiming, as he proceeds directly to do, that:

(4) Mind wields the greatest strength.

The ‘γνώμη concerning all things’ Anaxagoras attributed to his cosmic Mind should not, therefore, be understood as a matter of its possessing all γνώσις or σύνεσις – full knowledge or complete understanding of the cosmic order, but rather as the same *wise or intelligent decision-making* Anaxagoras’ predecessors had detected at work throughout the cosmos imposing an order on the natural realm and setting limits to its processes of change.³⁶ Seen in this light, Anaxagoras’ story about the powers and oper-

Ansichten oder ein Urteil fassen, urtheilen, erkennen, entscheiden, beschliessen.’ Sider, following F. Lämml, *Vom Chaos zum Kosmos* (F. Reinhardt: Basel, 1962), proposed that ἔγνω be read as ‘decided’, but his case against ἔγνω as ‘knew’ (‘not merely “knew” which would produce little more than *figura etymologica* with Nous’) is problematic in two respects: (1) Νοῦς and γινώσκω in all likelihood are not etymologically related (γνω- has been traced to an IE root meaning ‘notice’ or ‘note’, and while various etymologies for νοῦς have been proposed, none has tied it to γινώσκω). (2) Anaxagoras would not have avoided this figure of speech, even if the two terms had been linked, as is clear from B12.19: τὴν περιχώρησιν ταύτην, ἣν νῦν περιχωρεῖ. Simplicius understood the ἔγνω at B12.16 to mean ‘know’ but was clearly troubled by the implications of an assertion that νοῦς πάντα ἔγνω since ‘if things really were infinite they would be unknowable, since knowledge (γνώσις) defines and limits the object of knowledge’ (*de caelo* 608,23).

³⁵ Cf. *Il.* XXIV, 527-8 where Zeus dispenses goods and evils from two jars; and *Il.* XXIII, 727-34 quoted above; Hesiod, *Theogony*, 885, where Zeus is said ‘to divide up the various powers and spheres of influence of the gods – διεδάσσατο τιμάς’; similarly *Od.* VI, 188; Pindar, *Isth.* I,5; Aeschylus, *Suppl.* 403 (all employing forms of νέμω – ‘deal out, distribute’); and Hesiod, *Works and Days* 239: ‘for those who practice violence Zeus ordains a punishment (δίκην . . . τεκμαίρεται . . . Ζεῦς); cf. *Il.* VI, 349; VII, 70, etc. The classic description of Zeus as decision maker is *Il.* I, 533 ff. When Zeus has finished pondering his options and renders his judgment (cf. διαζέμεν at I, 542), the accompanying nod of his bushy brows makes all Olympus quake. In B66 Heraclitus assigns a Zeus-like executive power to his cosmic force: πάντα . . . τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὼν κρίνει καὶ καταλήψεται – ‘Fire, coming on all things, will judge and convict them’ (cf. also Δίκη . . . καταλήψεται at B28b).

³⁶ In associating the workings of intelligence with the setting of limits and measures the presocratics were also following tradition; cf. γνώμη πείρατα παντὸς ἔχει – ‘judgment holds the limits of everything’ (*Theognis* 1172); and ‘the hardest part of knowledge/judgment (γνωμοσύνης) is conceiving of the unseen measure which alone holds the

ations of Mind can be recognized as one facet of an interest in the practical workings of intelligence which runs throughout early Greek thought, from Homer's portrayals of the city-saving νόος and βουλή of Nestor and Polydamus and the highly efficacious νόος and μήτις of Odysseus and Penelope, through to the ἐπιστήμη or expert knowledge Socrates believed ensured right conduct³⁷, the σοφία or wisdom Plato regarded as the guide of the just man³⁸, and the φρόνησις or practical intelligence³⁹ Aristotle considered the source of all purposeful action.

None of this, however, implies that Anaxagoras' cosmic Mind *simply* decided how all things were to be; i.e. that it reached its decisions without possessing any knowledge at all. That would be unlikely for several reasons. First (as is evident from Xenophanes B23-25 and Heraclitus B41), any power capable of overseeing the operations of the whole cosmos would most naturally be assumed to possess the greatest amount of wisdom. Second, unlike the English 'decision', the Greek γνώμη carries the clear suggestion (through the γνω- element) of being the product of a knowing mind.⁴⁰ Third, the δια- element in διακοσμέω which appears at 12.18-19 would at least suggest that Mind was intimately involved in the details of

limits of all things (μέτρον, ὃ δὴ πάντων πείρατα μόνον ἔχει)' (Solon, Fr. 16 Edmonds). Heraclitus acknowledged the general – though still only partial – correspondence of his cosmic intelligence with the supreme power of Greek popular religion when in B32 he asserted that 'One thing, the only wise thing, is willing and unwilling to be called by the name of Zeus.' In this sense, the presocratics did not abolish the traditional divinities, they simply re-wrote their existing job descriptions.

³⁷ Cf. *Protagoras* 352 b ff., esp. 352d1-2 [Protagoras agreeing with Socrates]: 'I also would think it shameful to speak of wisdom and knowledge as anything but the most powerful elements in human life' – αἰσχρόν ἐστι καὶ μοι σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μὴ οὐχὶ πάντων κράτιστον φάναι εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων.

³⁸ *Republic* IV, 443e6-7: '. . . in all such doings believing and naming the just and honorable action to be that which preserves and helps to promote this condition of the soul, and wisdom the knowledge that presides over such conduct' – σοφίαν δὲ τὴν ἐπιστατοῦσαν ταύτῃ τῇ πράξει ἐπιστήμην. This seems a passage worth noting in light of the view of Plato's epistemology held by Detienne and Vernant: 'The various forms of practical intelligence are sweepingly condemned once and for all in the name of the one and only Truth proclaimed by philosophy' (*Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society*; Humanities Press, Inc.: Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1978, p. 316).

³⁹ Cf. *ethica n.* VI, 1143a8-9: 'For practical intelligence is prescriptive, since its end is what must be done or not done, whereas understanding only judges.' – ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτικὴ ἐστίν· τί γὰρ δεῖ πράττειν ἢ μὴ, τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἐστίν· ἡ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνον. It happens that Pericles was Aristotle's model of φρόνησις (*ethica n.* VI, 1140b8) as well as Thucydides' paragon of γνώμη (see P. Huart, *Le Vocabulaire de l'analyse psychologique dans l'oeuvre de Thucydide* (Paris: Klincksieck, 1968), pp. 56-7, 306-13, 502-7) and O'Brien, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-70).

⁴⁰ See the definitions of γνώμη given by Passow and Chantraine in notes 31 and 32.

fashioning the cosmos, and hence must have enjoyed some degree of awareness of individual entities as it went about its work.⁴¹ And finally, it is difficult to understand how Anaxagoras' thesis that the different types of physical substances acquire their specific identities in virtue of the predominant ingredient in them (B12.29-30) can avoid incoherence unless some intelligence is capable of grasping the identity of the ingredients in their pure state.⁴² So there is reason to think that Mind must have possessed some body of knowledge which it utilized in connection with its creation of the cosmos. But what I have sought to show is that when Anaxagoras stated that Mind γνώμην περὶ παντὸς πᾶσαν ἴσχει he was attributing to his cosmic intelligence much more than just knowledge.⁴³

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⁴¹ Cf. διακρίνω, διάνοια, διαπεραίνω, διαπονέω, διαριθμέω, διατάσσω, διατίθημι, etc., where the δια- element conveys the sense of 'going through in a detailed, thorough manner' (cf. LSJ, s.v. διά, C5).

⁴² A point made by David Furley in 'Anaxagoras and the Naming of Parts,' presented at the Princeton Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy (December, 1993). For the charge of incoherence see J. Barnes in *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Routledge and Kegan Paul: London, Henley and Boston, 1979), Vol. II, pp. 26-28; as well as F.M. Cornford, 'Anaxagoras' Theory of Matter,' *Classical Quarterly*, Vol. 24 (1930), pp. 14-30 and 83-95; and W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* (Cambridge U. P., 1965), p. 290.

⁴³ I am grateful to Patricia Curd, Lillian Doherty, John Duffy, and Eva Stehle for their criticisms of an earlier draft. I am also indebted to the participants in the October, 1994, meeting of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy at the University of Binghamton, and to the directors and fellows at the Center for Hellenic Studies, Washington, D.C. who heard and helpfully commented on an earlier version of this paper.

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