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Environmentally Virtuous Agriculture: How and When External Goods and Humility Ethically Constrain (or Favour) Technology Use

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Abstract

This paper concerns virtue-based ethical principles that bear upon agricultural uses of technologies, such as GM crops and CRISPR crops. It does three things. First, it argues for a new type of virtue ethics approach to such cases. Typical virtue ethics principles are vague and unspecific. These are sometimes useful, but we show how to supplement them with more specific virtue ethics principles that are useful to people working in specific applied domains, where morally relevant domain-specific conditions recur. We do this while still fulfilling the need for principles and associated practical reasoning to flexibly respect variation between cases. Second, with our more detailed approach we criticize and improve upon a commonly discussed principle about ecosystemic external goods that are crucial for human flourishing. We show this principle is far more conservative than appreciated, as it would prohibit many technology uses that are uncontroversially acceptable. We then replace this principle with two more specific ones. One identifies specific conditions in which ecosystem considerations are against a technology use, the other identifies favorable conditions. Third, we uncover a humility-based principle that operates within an influential “hubris argument” against uses of several biotechnologies in agriculture. These arguments lack a substantive theory of the nature of humility. We clarify such a theory, and then use it to replace the uncovered humility-based principle with our own more specific one that shifts focus from past moral failings, to current epistemic limits when deciding whether to support new technologies.

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Notes

  1. For a relatively comprehensive list of papers and books on this topic, see Barker (forthcoming).

  2. For discussion of character and GM crops, see Moula (2014), Sandler (2007), and Raffensperger (2002). On CRISPR crops more specifically, see Song et al. (2016).

  3. Elsewhere, one of us has defended the framework (Barker, forthcoming).

  4. We offer these criteria by drawing on criteria stated by Hursthouse (1999, 167). Ours depart from hers in ways that we hope make small improvements, though given the different goals of our article we leave judgment of improvement to the reader.

  5. Thus even if it appears that a consequentialist principle and a virtue principle favour the same action in a given case, this will be mere appearance if the underlying consequentialism is false, since principles drawn from a false view in fact advise nothing at all.

  6. Although this may amount to an anthropocentric justification for their protection, this would not imply that we ought to be anthropocentrically motivated to protect them. A neo-Aristotelian framework may suggest that part of what it is to be a flourishing and morally excellent human is to be disposed to act in many circumstances for the sake of the environment and the non-human entities it contains (Barker, forthcoming).

  7. This example comes from family history; Barnes was Barker’s step-grandfather.

  8. The original source of this common phrase is unknown.

  9. As presented in Barker (2017).

  10. For a recent summary of these findings for a wide audience see Szalavitz (2012); for empirical studies themselves, see the excellent bibliography in LaBouff et al. (2012).

  11. For relevant background see “Videotape Format War” (2016).

  12. On Blackberry’s rise and fall, see Hill (2013).

  13. For other criticisms of appeals to an attitude of domination and control, see Moula (2014).

  14. But see Temple (2017) for coverage of current Harvard experiments that involve “a high-altitude balloon that would spray a small quantity of reflective particles into the stratosphere”.

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Acknowledgements

We thank Jennifer Welchman and the audience at the first meeting of the Canadian Society for Environmental Philosophy for helpful feedback. For research assistance we thank John Barker, Wyatt Barnes, Laura Gallivan, Marc Gagnon, and John Nenniger.

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Correspondence to Matthew J. Barker.

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Barker, M.J., Lettner, A.F. Environmentally Virtuous Agriculture: How and When External Goods and Humility Ethically Constrain (or Favour) Technology Use. J Agric Environ Ethics 30, 287–309 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-017-9669-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-017-9669-4

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