Abstract
This paper takes a bottom-up approach to empirically investigate how people construct the meaning of obscenity, and offers an experientialist, cognitive linguistic account to explain why the term appears to defy definition and makes a problematic legal concept. To study the contextual dependence of the term, we examined the extent to which various item characteristics (such as genre, context, and the race or celebrity status of the people portrayed) and individual variables (such as gender, religion, sexual orientation and previous personal and cultural experiences) influence our perception of seemingly obscene materials. We report correlations that have not been previously shown. The data support the thesis that the meaning of obscenity emerges in a cognitive-affective response that arises during a dynamic process of interpretation, and thus allows for extralegal factors to influence judgment. The results challenge the assumption that obscenity is a symbolic representation of objectively existing reality and argue that community standard of obscenity is a legal fiction.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Interested persons, who ordinarily reside in Hong Kong and has so resided for at least 7 years, and are proficient in written English or written Chinese, may apply to become adjudicators.
A gradient bar allows for a more sensitive reflection of judgment and does not galvanise opinion.
There was however no significant interaction between this effect and subject gender (p > 0.05).
The main feature that distinguishes obscene things from other repellant or offensive things is their blatancy: their massive obtrusiveness, their extreme and unvarnished bluntness, their brazenly naked exhibition. A subtle offensiveness is not obscene; a devious and concealed immorality, unless it is an extreme violation of the governing norms, will not be obscene; a veiled suggestiveness is not obscene [4].
The remaining 23.1% of participants attended both a single-sex and a co-educational school.
Such as “the feelings of repulsion, by virtue of soliciting or naturally eliciting fascination in responses taken to be morally prohibited, and attraction toward indulging or even delighting in those very responses” (p. 44). Please refer to Kieran [8] for a non-exhaustive list of conditions for obscenity judgment.
Other possible reasons, such as fatigue and boredom, cannot be ruled out, but note the short duration of the experiment (30 min including briefing and debriefing).
Some might argue, if an average person cannot be expected to know their community standard (if one exists), perhaps the court could resort to expert opinion. The expert might be able to come up with data that show for instance that 40% of the community think A, 30% B, 20% C and 10% D. Now, does A then represent ‘community standard’, or is there no ‘community standard’ at all if there is no real majority? Also, in reality, obscenity ratings and standards form a continuum; forcing participants to choose among ‘obscene’, ‘indecent’ and ‘neither indecent nor obscene’ necessarily creates boundaries where no boundaries lie. Even in cases where the majority of people think that an item is obscene, there remains the question of transparency of law and rights of minority expression. Can an average citizen be reasonably expected to foresee what the majority opinion is? Does it satisfy due process to ascribe criminal liability to someone holding a minority opinion and publishing materials that they do not understand as being offensive?
References
Benjamin, M. 2007. Possessing pollution. New York University Review of Law & Social Change 31(4): 733–772.
Bessmer, S. 1981. Anti-obscenity: A comparison of the legal and the feminist perspectives. Political Research Quarterly 34: 143.
Evans, V., and M. Green. 2006. Cognitive linguistics: An introduction. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Ltd.
Feinberg, J. 1985. Offense to others. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fish, S. 1999. Doing what comes naturally: Change, rhetoric, and the practice of theory in literary and legal studies, 4th ed. Duke: Duke University Press.
Gunther, A.C. 1995. Overrating the x-rating: The third person perception and support for censorship of pornography. Journal of Communication 45(1): 27–38.
Herrman, M.S., and D.C. Bordner. 1983. Attitudes toward pornography in a Southern community. Criminology 21: 349–374.
Kieran, M. 2002. On obscenity: The thrill and repulsion of the morally prohibited. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXIV(1): 31–55.
Lakoff, G. 1987. Women, fire, and dangerous things: What categories reveal about the mind. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Leung, J. 2011. On the edge of reason: Law and borderline cases. In The legal case: Cross currents between law and the humanities, ed. M. Wan. London: Routledge.
Nussbaum, M.C. 1995. Objectification. Philosophy & Public Affairs 24(4): 249–291.
Rosch, E.H. 1973. Natural categories. Cognitive Psychology 4(3): 328–350.
Rosch, E. 1975. Cognitive representations of semantic categories. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 104: 192–233.
Samek, R.A. 1973. Pornography as a species of second-order sexual behaviour. A submission for law reform. Dalhousie Law Journal 1: 265–293.
Scott, J.E., D.J. Eitle, and S.E. Skovron. 1990. Obscenity and the law. Is it possible for a jury to apply contemporary community standards in determining obscenity? Law and Human Behavior 14(2): 139–150.
Scott, J.E. 1991. What is obscene? Social science and the contemporary community standard test of obscenity. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 14(1–2): 29–45.
Simpson, A.W.B. 1982. Obscenity and the law. Law and Philosophy 1: 391–418.
Tanaka, J.W., and M. Taylor. 1991. Object categories and expertise: Is the basic level in the eye of the beholder? Cognitive Psychology 23(3): 457–482.
Cases Cited
Cohen v. California, 403 US 15. 1971.
Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543. 1945.
DPP v. Whyte. 1973. AC 849.
DPP v. Whyte. 1972. 3 All ER 12, 23.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 US 184. 1964.
People v. Nelson 88 Ill.App.3d 196. 1980.
R. v. Hicklin. 1868. L. R. 3 QB 360.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Appendix: The Obscene Articles Tribunal
Appendix: The Obscene Articles Tribunal
Under the control of Obscene and Indecent Articles Ordinance, the Obscene Articles Tribunal’s power to classify articles effectively provides society with an effective means of interpreting in practice the notions of obscenity and indecency. Indecency is here deemed to include violence, depravity and repulsiveness.
In arriving at the determination and classification of an article, the Tribunal is called upon by law to take account of:
-
the standards of morality, decency and propriety that are generally accepted by reasonable members of the community;
-
the dominant overall effect of an article or matter;
-
the persons, classes of persons, or age groups intended or likely to be targeted by an article’s publication;
-
in the case of matter publicly displayed, the location of such display and the persons, classes of persons, or age groups likely to view it; and
-
whether the article or matter has an honest purpose or whether instead it seeks to disguise unacceptable material.
The Tribunal can classify an article as follows:
-
Class I—neither obscene nor indecent;
-
Class II—indecent; or
-
Class III—obscene.
The Tribunal may impose conditions or restrictions relating to the publication of a Class II article. Class III articles are prohibited from being published.
For the purposes of this Ordinance:
-
(a) a thing is obscene if by reason of obscenity it is not suitable to be published to any person; and
-
(b) a thing is indecent if by reason of indecency it is not suitable to be published to a juvenile.
1.1 Penalties
Anyone who publishes, possesses or imports for the purpose of publication a Class III article is liable to a fine of $1 million and to imprisonment for 3 years. Anyone who publishes an indecent article to a juvenile is liable to a fine of $400,000 and to imprisonment for 12 months on first conviction and $800,000 and imprisonment for 12 months for a second or subsequent conviction.
Anyone who fails to observe conditions or restrictions on publishing Class II articles is liable to a fine of $400,000 and imprisonment for 12 months on first conviction and to a fine of $800,000 and imprisonment for 12 months on a second or subsequent conviction.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Leung, J.H.C., Wan, M. Constructing the Meaning of Obscenity: An Empirical Investigation and an Experientialist Account. Int J Semiot Law 25, 415–430 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-011-9251-8
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-011-9251-8