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Assimilating Supererogation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 September 2015

D.K. Levy
D.K. Levy*
Affiliation:
University of Edinburgh
*
david.levy@ed.ac.uk
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Extract

The interest in supererogation and supererogatory actions derives from the perception that there is something problematic about them. I shall argue that there is nothing problematic about them. The perception to the contrary arises from preconceptions common in ethical theory. When these are relaxed or dismissed, supererogatory actions are easily assimilated as well-motivated responses to moral situations. Assimilating, rather than denying, them is important for a sound moral philosophy.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 77: Supererogation , October 2015 , pp. 227 - 242
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2015 

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References

1 J. Urmson, “Saints and Heroes,” in Essays in Moral Philosophy, A. Melden (ed.), Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958.

2 Urmson, 198–9.

3 Urmson, 202.

4 For a relevant defense of this idea, see Gamlund, Espen, “Supererogatory Forgiveness,” Inquiry 53 (6):540–564, 2010 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5 Urmson, 203.

6 There are of course many motivations for saying that one forgives. Many counterfeit an act of forgiveness, e.g. making it mere reconciliation or self-serving. This example depends on the idea that forgiving is a moral act motivated by the good of forgiving. If this is denied, an alternate example of a reflective, deliberative supererogatory act will serve.

7 Urmson 203–4.

8 Michael Frede, ‘The Original Notion of Cause’, in: Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), pp.125–150.

9 The variety of bases for holding responsible is similar in inspiration to the idea of the variety of bases by which one might be excused responsibility, which are canvassed in J. L. Austin, ‘A Plea for Excuses’, in: J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock, editors, Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), pp. 123–152.

10 Cf. Peter Geach, Mental Acts, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957.

11 Raz attempts the first accommodation while Portmore attempts the second. Raz, J., “Permissions and Supererogation”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 12: 161–168, 1975 Google Scholar; Portmore, D., “Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding?”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 11: 369–388, 2008 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 A parallel version of this complication for value-monistic consequentialism could be constructed using value that seems to be (intermittently) more valuable than ordinary value, i.e. “especially valuable.”

13 Urmson makes a tentative suggestion of how to accommodate supererogation in a utilitarian theory, pp. 208–15; as does Portmore in “Position-Relative Consequentialism, Agent-Centered Options, and Supererogation,” Ethics, Vol. 113, No. 2, 2003 pp. 303–332 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14 See Susan Hale, “Against Supererogation,” American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Oct., 1991), pp. 273–285.

15 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:389.

16 A similar claim is made in Stocker, M., “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,” Journal of Philosophy 73 (14):453–466, 1976 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

17 Martha Nussbaum, “‘Finely Aware and Richly Responsible’: Literature and the Moral Imagination” in Love's Knowledge, Oxford University Press, 1990.

18 This contest could perhaps be re-staged around obligation and the question whether individual moral authority is ever sufficient to produce an obligation with the same modality as duty, i.e. an obligation not incurred.

19 Anscombe, E., “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy, 33, 1958, pp. 1–19 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.