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Probability, Self-Location, and Quantum Branching

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Peter J. Lewis
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Abstract

The main problem with the many-worlds theory is that it is not clear how the notion of probability should be understood in a theory in which every possible outcome of a measurement actually occurs. In this paper, I argue for the following theses concerning the many-worlds theory: (1) If probability can be applied at all to measurement outcomes, it must function as a measure of an agent's self-location uncertainty. (2) Such probabilities typically violate reflection. (3) Many-worlds branching does not have sufficient structure to admit self-location probabilities. (4) Decision-theoretic arguments do not solve this problem.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 76 , Issue 5 , December 2009 , pp. 1009 - 1019
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

Research for this paper was supported by a National Science Foundation Scholar's Award (SES-0724760). I also acknowledge the hospitality and support of the Centre for Time at the University of Sydney and the Department of Philosophy at Durham University. I would like to thank audiences in Sydney, Canberra, and St. Andrews and at the British Society for the Philosophy of Science 2008 and PSA 2008 meetings for helpful feedback.

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