Neurophysiology of ConsciousnessSpringer Science & Business Media, 1993 M01 1 - 404 páginas and made insignificant in practice, by selecting for study simple kinds of ex periences which are devoid of emotional content and which can be tested for reliability. A simple somatosensory ''raw feel" fulfills these characteristics (see papers nos. 2,5). In any case, if we fail to find ways to use introspective reports in convincingly acceptable studies we would give up the ability to investigate the relation between conscious experience and neural activity, something warned against by William James (Krech, 1969). Another factor in the dearth of direct experimental studies is, of course, the comparative inaccessibility of the human brain for such purposes. Meaningful investigations of the issue in question requires simultaneous study of brain events and introspective reports of experiences in an awake, cooperative human subject. Analysis by neuropsychologists of pathological lesions in the brain and the related disturbances of conscious functions have contributed much to mapping the pos sible representations of these functions. The non-invasive recording of electrical activity with electrodes on the scalp, starting from Berger's initial EEG record ings in 1929, has contributed much to the problems of states of consciousness and to various cognitive features associated with sensory inputs, but not as much to the specific issue of conscious experience. |
Contenido
Production of Threshold Levels of Conscious Sensation by Electrical Stimulation of Human Somatosensory Cortex 1964 | 1 |
Cortical Activation in Conscious and Unconscious Experience 1965 | 35 |
Brain Stimulation and the Threshold of Conscious Experience 1966 | 46 |
Responses of Human Somatosensory Cortex to Stimuli below Threshold for Conscious Sensation 1967 | 64 |
Electrical Stimulation of Cortex in Human Subjects and Conscious Sensory Aspects 1973 | 68 |
Cortical Representation of Evoked Potentials Relative to Conscious Sensory Responses and of Somatosensory Qualities in Man 1975 | 118 |
Cortical and Thalamic Activation in Conscious Sensory Experiences 1972 | 136 |
Neuronal vs Subjective Timing for a Conscious Sensory | 149 |
Preparation or IntentiontoAct in Relation to PreEvent Potentials Recorded at the Vertex 1983a | 243 |
Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity ReadinessPotential The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act... | 249 |
Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action 1985 | 269 |
Are the Mental Experiences of Will and SelfControl Significant for the Performance of a Voluntary Act? Response to Commentaries by L Deecke an... | 307 |
Consciousness Conscious Subjective Experience 1987b | 314 |
The Timing of a Subjective Experience Response to a Commentary by D Salter 1989a | 319 |
Conscious Subjective Experience vs Unconscious Mental Functions A Theory of the Cerebral Processes Involved 1989b | 325 |
Control of the Transition from Sensory Detection to Sensory Awareness in Man by the Duration of a Thalamic Stimulus The Cerebral TimeOn Factor... | 340 |
Subjective Referral of the Timing for a Conscious Sensory Experience A Functional Role for the Somatosensory Specific Projection System in Man 1... | 163 |
Retroactive Enhancement of a Skin Sensation by a Delayed Cortical Stimulus in Man Evidence for Delay of a Conscious Sensory Experience 1992a | 196 |
The Experimental Evidence for Subjective Referral of a Sensory Experience Backwards in Time Reply to PS Churchland 1981 | 205 |
Brain Stimulation in the Study of Neuronal Functions for Conscious Sensory Experiences 1982a | 221 |
ReadinessPotentials Preceding Unrestricted Spontaneous vs PrePlanned Voluntary Arts 1982b | 229 |
The Neural TimeFactor in Perception Volition and Free Will 1992b | 367 |
Some Implications of TimeOn Theory | 385 |
A Testable Field Theory of MindBrain Interaction | 393 |
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Términos y frases comunes
actual afferent appear Benjamin Libet cerebral cortex cerebral processes components conscious control conscious experience conscious intention conscious sensation conscious sensory experience conscious sensory response cortical responses cortical stimulus Deecke delay detection electrical stimulation electrode elicit a conscious evidence evoked potentials experimental Feinstein hypothesis initial input intention to act intervals introspective Libet Libet et al liminal medial lemniscus mediate mental event minimum motor act movement msec neural neuronal activities neuronal adequacy Neurophysiol onset parametric region paresthesia PENFIELD peripheral physiological postcentral gyrus precentral gyrus pulse frequency pulses/sec readiness potential recorded relatively retroactive S₂ self-initiated sensory cortex session signal single pulse skin stimulus somatic sensation somatosensory cortex Somatosensory System specific stimulus pulse stimulus train subject reported subjective experience subjective referral supplementary motor area thalamus threshold threshold-c time-on tion train duration trials type II RPs unconscious utilization TD values veto voluntary act Wright
Referencias a este libro
Changing Mind: Transitions in Natural and Artificial Environments Franco Orsucci Sin vista previa disponible - 2002 |