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Technology, Phenomenology and the Everyday World: A Phenomenological Analysis on How Technologies Mould Our World

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Abstract

Technology always provides a new perception of the world. However, it is not clear when technology produces “mere” new informations and when it provides something more such as a production of new objects in our world which start to “live” around us. The aim of this paper is to study how technology shapes our surrounding world. The questions which we are going to answer are: Is it really adding new objects to our world? If yes, does every technology have this potentiality? We are going to tackle the problem using a phenomenological and post-phenomenological approach focussing our attention on the perceptual level. Using Husserl’s philosophy we will study how technology are deeply involved in our perception and, thanks to post-phenomenology and its concept of “embodiment relations,” we will be able to determine which kind of technologies have the potentiality to change our surrounding world introducing and producing new objects in it.

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Notes

  1. In order to have an introduction to post-phenomenology see Selinger (2006) or Verbeek (2001) on Don Ihde. See also Wasiak (2009).

  2. In order to have a general introduction on phenomenology and its relation to technology see Thomson (2009).

  3. This is the nature of the object as intentional object. “Instead, the tower is a unified “intentional object” that remains the same despite being presented through the greatest variety of different perceptions”. (Harman 2011). See also Sokolowski (1974).

  4. According to Husserl’s philosophy the object is always given to the perceiving subject with its horizons. These horizons concern every hidden aspect of the object. Therefore, the hidden faces are present in the object, even if in its horizons. On the concept of horizon in Husserl’s philosophy see Geniusas (2012).

  5. For example, Harman explains this fact by making a parallelism with the writer Lovecraft. The monsters of Lovecraft are objects in the same world of humans and, at the same time, they are completely unreachable by human beings. Lovecraft opens abysses in the “ordinary” life by introducing the infinitness in common objects. In the same way the objects, in Husserl, are always something more than what we can perceive, they are infinite in almost the same sense of Lovecraft’s abysses. See Harman (2008).

  6. For a study on Husserl and Foucault see Gyllenhammer (2009) and Carr (1987).

  7. Even If this paper does not contain any computation we can use a computational formalism in order to identify in a concise way the relations among the various elements.

  8. “im Schatten sieht man nicht so viele Unterschiede; das Hellere, Belichtete gilt als das Bessere und die Norm” (my emphasis) (Husserl 1910, 1915; 1916, 1917, 206b).

  9. See Steinbock (1995: 139) and Fricke (2012: 207).

  10. This is the necessary relation between optima and praxes we are going to highlight in the next pages.

  11. We use the term “praxis” in the widest sense. Therefore we have a “praxis” in the case of an activity derived by social costumes or in the case of a practical action in opposition to theoretical approach

  12. The praxes related to some aspects require the optimum related to such aspects because it is the best way to achieve such aspects of the object. That is also highlighted by K. Mulligan. “The optimal or normal perspective on a thing varies with the interests of the subject. But given such interests, there is an internal relation between the appearances of the thing which is their different distances from the relevant optimal appearance” (Mulligan 1995: 204).

  13. See Husserl (1966) and, in order to have a wide panorama on such a concept, Biceaga (2010).

  14. “I feel things poorly” (Steinbock 1995: 144).

  15. See also “Das Tageslicht, der helle Tag läßt die Dingmerkmale am reischsten und differenziertesten hervortreten, in ihm betätige ich mich daher mit Vorliebe” (Husserl 1910, 1915, 1916, 1917: 160b).

  16. The white printing paper is seen as “red” under the red light of a dark room. However, the subject is in front of a white paper according to its optimum, that means according to an optimal illumination of a sunny day.

  17. On illuminating light see also Piana (1966), de Caro (1996: 54) and Murata (2007).

  18. For us it is not important to identify this modification of the optimum as a betterment of the previous optimum, we need only the possibility of a modification in this optimum.

  19. That are also called black light or wood’s lights.

  20. UV photography is used to highlight the part of a canvas which has to be restored.

  21. UV light highlights the colour of such animals and so using this particular illumination it becomes possible to identify scorpions in the dark because they glow. See, for example, Gaffin et al. (2012).

  22. We can use the term “better” because it can be related to the praxes of the subject without considering a better absolute richness of the perception. A praxis is related to some details and a modification in the optimum which enhances such details helps the action.

  23. See the concept of “optimal distance” in Merleau-Ponty (1945: 348).

  24. See Fig. 1.

  25. Husserl (1952: 60).

  26. See for example the cyborg culture or the post-humanism. See Haraway (1991), Hayles (1999, 1993) and Winner (2004).

  27. I use the term “in” because we will see that some technologies can be considered part of the living body of the subject even if they are not internal as the lenses introduced by surgical operation.

  28. That means we are not going to take into consideration two kinds of relations among the subject, technology and world identified by Ihde: alterity and background relations. See Ihde (2009b: 43f., 1995: 108, and 2004: 89–97).

  29. The previous section shows how technology plays an important role in the constitution of our world. However, not all technologies have the same effect because they are designed in a different way. This second part will study which technology can shape the perceptual world by analysing the way the subject perceives through it.

  30. That means it is something related to scientific theories only.

  31. We are using the term “visible” as perceivable and therefore, it has not to be limited to the visual field.

  32. Neil Armstrong in 1969 landed on the Moon and he perceived the same mountains we can perceive through the telescope’s lenses.

  33. It is not only too small to be perceivable by naked eye, but it is also something that has not the same characteristics of a common object. Schrödinger’s cat (Schrödinger 1935) is a classical example of the translation of the quantum physics’ laws to a more common object: a cat. Therefore we have an object that is something perceivable by the naked body but it has characteristics that are not tied to the common perception.

  34. For example B&W photography. See above “Optimum of the Object” section.

  35. Obviously always related to some praxis. The better has to be identified always in relation to a praxis. It is the praxis that gives the basis to have a better perception because it is the praxis that needs the emphasis of some aspects in the world.

  36. See, for example, for far-infrared Ring and Ammer (2012), Berz and Sauer (2007) and Hildebrandt et al. (2010) or in a more “artistic” way for photography, see, for example, for near-infrared Harnischmacher (2012) and Farace (2006).

  37. We identify the post-phenomenological movement as the “technological turn” phenomenology had with Ihde. It studies technology and how it interacts with the subject and the world from a phenomenological point of view. There are many elements related to post-phenomenology, but their introduction would lead us away from our purpose. Therefore, we will introduce only the elements expressly used in our analysis.

  38. For example we are going to analyse glasses and not the fridge in our house, even if both of them have an important effect on our life.

  39. We are excluding the alterity relations and the background relations from our analysis as we have said before.

  40. “My glasses become part of the way I ordinary experience my surroundings” (Ihde 1990: 73). See also Watson (2007) on the relations between Ihde and Mereau-Ponty.

  41. The motivations of the subject changes according to the technologies used. Therefore, the use of a technology instead of another can be preferred because it provides different changes in the subject. That is what Verbeek, quoting Baudet (see Baudet 1986), suggests. The use of a certain kind of pen yield a modification in the subject at a deeper level. The use of the “old” pen instead of the “new” ball-pen is pedagogical, the device embedded a “general social discipline” (Verbeek 2005: 115). In our case, the use of LaTeX does not produce the same result of a ball-point pen or another word editor, the structure of the document is modified by the device we use. Ihde, for example identifies the technology as non-neutral because the pen tends to write “belles lettres” while the typewriter inclines the subject to a journalistic prose. See Ihde (1979); Restivo (1981). Maybe these examples fall within psychology and not within phenomenology. However, to provide simple cases is useful to highlight these effects in order to understand in a better way how technology interacts with the subject and the perceived object.

  42. See Fig. 2. See also Nagataki and Hirose (2011).

  43. We used the sign “\(-\)” and not the sign “+” in order to follow the post-phenomenological framework. Moreover, the sign “+” would have suggested a bodily merge between the two elements subject and technology. Even if it is possible to think of some technologies as merged with the subject, such as in the case of certain prostheses, it is not possible to think of every technology in an embodiment relation as completely merged with the subject’s body. Posing the glasses on the subject’s nose doesn’t turn them into a prosthetic device.

  44. Radio-telescopes are what Ihde called imaging technology, see Ihde (2009a).

  45. That is also a representation of the “external” object.

  46. See, for example, the brain computer interface evolution. See Guger et al. (2013) and Poli et al. (2011).

  47. See above “Subject” section.

  48. Even a transparent technology designed to be colourless and without any correction of the sight yields a modification because they protect the naked eye of the subject. For example, they could be used as protection in a case of workers who need protection for their eyes.

  49. For a “radical beginner” even the ping-pong racket could be something mysterious. However, this object is directly perceivable by the subject thanks to its perceptual elements. A text, in addition to the perception of its graphemes which compose its words, needs to be read and understood by the subject. This aspect will be analysed in the next pages in more details.

  50. “Wir sind nicht in speziallem Sinn darauf aufmerksam, obschon es zeitweilig primär bemerkt wird” (Husserl 1986: 21).

  51. This is a Husserlian distinction. See Husserl (1986: 3).

  52. “Das Druckzeichen ist kein Gegenstand des ,,Interesses“. Es ist nicht unser Thema. Mit dem Wortlautbewußtsein ist verflochten das Bedeutungsbewußtsein, das sinngebende. Hier ist das Thema” (Husserl 1986: 22).

  53. The same connotation of “false” colours should be changed. In fact the term “false” suggest an opposition to the “real” colours. We can call the colours real or false if they are perceived by naked body or by a technological device. Therefore the fact that the false colours perceived through technology are “false” depends only to the fact that they are not perceived by the naked body, but by a sort of deviation from it. Ihde suggests to substituted the term “false” with “relative” in order to give more dignity to the technological perception.

    Scientists call this ‘false color’ but I call it ‘relative color’ since the implication of a ‘true color’ is frankly irrelevant. [...] Such color assignments function similar to map making with colors both falling into convention, and into an assigned purpose. (Ihde 2010: 5)

  54. Obviously this technology produces magnifications and reductions. It allows the perception of the temperature of the object (magnification), but it precludes any perception of the “real” colours of the object (reduction).

  55. That is the information about the temperature of the object.

  56. See Ihde (1990, 1991, 2003a, and 2008).

  57. See Verbeek (2005, 2011).

  58. As we can see the sole fact of being processed by a computer does not compromise the noematic transparency of the technology. What is important is the output visible to the subject and not the processes used to achieve such visualisation.

  59. At least it is possible to have a visualisation of the object instead of strings of data. Ihde, as we have previously said, calls this kind of technology an imaging technology (see, for example, Ihde 2003b). The reason is that the device produces an image of the object which “looks like” the original one.

  60. As Ihde points out, there are various traditions which associate technology with negative aspects.

    Their critiques, not unlike the metaphysical traditions which they analyse, are variations on a theme. They saw, in the rise of technological culture, a threat to some deep aspect of European culture in its highest values. Ortega saw the emergence of a “mass man,” Berdyaev a loss of “spirituality and community,” Heidegger saw “calculative thinking” and all as “standing reserve,” Marcuse saw “one-dimensionality,” Ellul the replacement of “nature” with “technique.” To phrase it succintly: modern technology was seen to be acid to traditional or “deep” culture (Ihde 1994: 252).

  61. See also Kiran and Verbeek (2010) and Verbeek (2008).

  62. We identify with “naked objects” the object perceivable by the naked body.

  63. See “Optimum of the Object” section.

  64. See above “Transparency of Directionality” section and “Noematic Transparency” section.

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Acknowledgments

Nicola Liberati is supported by the PostDoctoral Research Fellowship of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) No. P14782.

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    Nicola Liberati

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Liberati, N. Technology, Phenomenology and the Everyday World: A Phenomenological Analysis on How Technologies Mould Our World. Hum Stud 39, 189–216 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-015-9353-5

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