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The timing of a subjective experience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

Benjamin Libet
Benjamin Libet
Affiliation:
Department of Physiology, School of Medicine, University of California, San Francisco, CA 94143
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Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , March 1989 , pp. 183 - 185
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1989

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References

REFERENCES

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