In his well-known piece ‘Autonomy and Benevolent Lies’ (in Thomas Hill, Autonomy and Self-Respect [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991]) Thomas Hill argues that out of respect for people's autonomy, we ought not to tell benevolent lies. He argues that we are obligated to tell the truth, especially when asked directly for it, even if we know it will cause a person more pain. This is because truth-telling is tied to respecting autonomy, which involves giving people a realistic picture of their situation, however rosy or bleak, and letting them decide what to do with the information given. Telling people benevolent lies, because one thinks they will be happier believing something else, is an instance of paternalism, which Hill wants to resist. In this paper I will raise a case that seems at first glance to be an objection to Hill's theory i.e. a case in which the right information to give someone is not what he has requested. In offering an explanation for how Hill can respond, I will suggest that a revision to his view would allow him to justify certain benevolent lies, while still avoiding his worry that benevolent lies are necessarily paternalistic.