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Epistemological Challenges to Mathematical Platonism

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Abstract

Since Benacerraf’s “Mathematical Truth” a number of epistemological challenges have been launched against mathematical platonism. I first argue that these challenges fail because they unduely assimilate mathematics to empirical science. Then I develop an improved challenge which is immune to this criticism. Very roughly, what I demand is an account of how people’s mathematical beliefs are responsive to the truth of these beliefs. Finally I argue that if we employ a semantic truth-predicate rather than just a deflationary one, there surprisingly turns out to be logical space for a response to the improved challenge where no such space appeared to exist.

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  1. Merton College, Oxford, UK

    Øystein Linnebo

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  1. Øystein Linnebo
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Correspondence to Øystein Linnebo.

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Linnebo, Ø. Epistemological Challenges to Mathematical Platonism. Philos Stud 129, 545–574 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-3388-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-3388-1

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