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On the Early Buddhist Attitude Toward Metaphysics

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Abstract

Buddhist scholars in the West broadly agree with the proposition that Buddhism has a philosophical tradition, in many respects comparable to Western ones, while many claim that it also has a practical or empirical dimension that Western philosophies, especially the analytic tradition, lack. There is also a scholarly consensus that an implicit metaphysical system serves as the foundation for the doctrines and practices of early Buddhism as represented in the Pāli suttas. However, Buddhist scholarship to date has not distinguished clearly between philosophical speculations, on the one hand, and on the other, teachings based on experience and practice. This study explores early Buddhist texts’ concept of “domain” (viṣaya/visaya, 境界), which encompasses both an experiential domain and a linguistic framework; i.e., a word is only valid within its own domain, and fails to refer beyond it. As such, it closely resembles Rudolf Carnap’s ideas of “internal” and “external” questions regarding linguistic frameworks, and his suggestion that metaphysical questions, considered as external questions, are meaningless and cannot be answered. More specifically, the Buddha’s refusal to directly answer the “unanswered” questions may indicate that early Buddhism took an attitude similar to Carnap’s rejection of metaphysics. Moreover, textual evidence suggests that teachings such as impermanence and dependent origination, though they may appear to be “metaphysical” to modern readers, are in fact empirical in the context of the early suttas.

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Notes

  1. Siderits (2007) and Garfield (2015) are two recent representative examples.

  2. Richard Gombrich (2005, p. 152) has proposed that Sue Hamilton and Noa Ronkin represent a new trend of scholarship on early Buddhism in the UK.

  3. Scholars have been using these terms more or less interchangeably in this context.

  4. See especially Edgerton (1959). Oldenberg believed that there was no such a system, while Glasenapp proposed that there was likely one. Edgerton’s position was closer to Oldenberg’s.

  5. The discussion here is partly inspired by Ronkin (2005, 43ff). Dan Lusthaus (2002, pp. 55–59) has also discussed the significance of the Sabba Sutta.

  6. This sutta is the beginning of the Sabba Vagga, which contains 10 suttas. SN IV 15: sāvatthinidānaṃ. “sabbaṃ vo, bhikkhave, desessāmi. taṃ suṇātha. kiñca, bhikkhave, sabbaṃ? cakkhuñceva rūpā ca, sotañca saddā ca, ghānañca gandhā ca, jivhā ca rasā ca, kāyo ca phoṭṭhabbā ca, mano ca dhammā ca – idaṃ vuccati, bhikkhave, sabbaṃ. Yo, bhikkhave, evaṃ vadeyya: ‘ahametaṃ sabbaṃ paccakkhāya aññaṃ sabbaṃ paññāpessāmī’ti, tassa vācāvatthukam eva ’ssa; puṭṭho ca na sampāyeyya, uttariñca vighātaṃ āpajjeyya. taṃ kissa hetu? yathā taṃ, bhikkhave, avisayasmin”ti. Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation (2000, p. 1140), slightly modified. Chinese parallel: Taishō No. 99 SĀ 雜阿含經 no. 319 (卷13) T02, p91a24–b03: 如是我聞: 一時, 佛住舍衛國祇樹給孤獨園。時, 有生聞婆羅門往詣佛所, 共相問訊, 問訊已, 退坐一面, 白佛言: 「瞿曇!所謂一切者, 云何名一切?」佛告婆羅門: 「一切者, 謂十二入處, 眼色、耳聲、鼻香、舌味、身觸、意法, 是名一切。若復說言此非一切, 沙門瞿曇所說一切, 我今捨, 別立餘一切者, 彼但有言說, 問已不知, 增其疑惑。所以者何?非其境界故。」

  7. There are various readings in different editions, though they will not make much difference in the meaning: vācāvatthukam, vācāvatthur, vācāvatthud. See the note in the PTS edition, SN IV 67n11.

  8. SN IV 68: dvayaṃ, bhikkhave, paṭicca viññāṇaṃ sambhoti. kathañca, bhikkhave, dvayaṃ paṭicca viññāṇaṃ sambhoti? cakkhuñca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññāṇaṃ. Bodhi’s translation (2000, p. 1172).

  9. Maria Heim (2018, pp. 150–2) has argued convincingly based on the Bahuvedanīya Sutta (MN 59) that the lists in the suttas are intended to be instructional tools to demonstrate ways of analyzing experience, and should not be taken as ontological descriptions of things that exist.

  10. Of course, it would be an oversimplification to say that the 12 āyatanas are equivalent to Husserl’s noesis and noema, given that we may never find an exact match for any Buddhist concept in Western philosophy or vice versa. Nevertheless, we may find similarities between the two philosophical traditions. As Dan Lusthaus (2002, pp. vi–vii), Christian Coseru (2012, pp. 9–10) and Robert Sharf (2016) have noted, the methods of the Yogācāra tradition in general, as well as those of the later Buddhist philosophers Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, resemble Western phenomenology in many respects. I would suggest that early Buddhism as reflected in the Nikāya/Āgama suttas also had a phenomenological attitude similar to that of the Yogācāra tradition. Conceivably, the Yogācāra philosophers inherited such an attitude from the early Buddhist tradition.

  11. The word viṣaya/visaya is more often used to refer to the object of perception. For a discussion of the word viṣaya alongside other words denoting “object” in early Buddhist texts, see Warder (1975).

  12. DN I 199: evaṃ vutte, citto hatthisāriputto bhagavantaṃ etadavoca: “yasmiṃ, bhante, samaye oḷāriko attapaṭilābho hoti, moghassa tasmiṃ samaye manomayo attapaṭilābho hoti, mogho arūpo attapaṭilābho hoti; oḷāriko vāssa attapaṭilābho tasmiṃ samaye sacco hoti. yasmiṃ, bhante, samaye manomayo attapaṭilābho hoti, moghassa tasmiṃ samaye oḷāriko attapaṭilābho hoti, mogho arūpo attapaṭilābho hoti; manomayo vāssa attapaṭilābho tasmiṃ samaye sacco hoti. yasmiṃ, bhante, samaye arūpo attapaṭilābho hoti, moghassa tasmiṃ samaye oḷāriko attapaṭilābho hoti, mogho manomayo attapaṭilābho hoti; arūpo vāssa attapaṭilābho tasmiṃ samaye sacco hotī”ti. Maurice Walshe’s (1995, p. 168) translation, slightly modified.

  13. DN I 200: yasmiṃ, citta, samaye oḷāriko attapaṭilābho hoti, neva tasmiṃ samaye manomayo attapaṭilābhoti saṅkhaṃ gacchati, na arūpo attapaṭilābhoti saṅkhaṃ gacchati; oḷāriko attapaṭilābhotveva tasmiṃ samaye saṅkhaṃ gacchati. yasmiṃ, citta, samaye manomayo attapaṭilābho hoti, neva tasmiṃ samaye oḷāriko attapaṭilābhoti saṅkhaṃ gacchati, na arūpo attapaṭilābhoti saṅkhaṃ gacchati; manomayo attapaṭilābhotveva tasmiṃ samaye saṅkhaṃ gacchati. yasmiṃ, citta, samaye arūpo attapaṭilābho hoti, neva tasmiṃ samaye oḷāriko attapaṭilābhoti saṅkhaṃ gacchati, na manomayo attapaṭilābhoti saṅkhaṃ gacchati; arūpo attapaṭilābhotveva tasmiṃ samaye saṅkhaṃ gacchati. Walshe’s (1995, p. 168) translation.

  14. Note that the term sacca (Skt. satya), when used as an adjective, can mean both “real” and “true”, and when used as a noun, both “truth” and “reality”. See PED s.v. sacca, MW s.v. satya, Harvey (2009, pp. 197–206) and Gethin (1998, p. 60).

  15. First published in Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4 (1950), pp. 20–40. A slightly revised version was reprinted in his Meaning and necessity: A study in semantics and modal logic, enlarged edition, Chicago, IL, USA and London, UK: University of Chicago Press (1956, pp. 205–21). This article is considered his magnum opus against metaphysics. See Bradley (2018, p. 2248).

  16. Carnap (1956, p. 206), italics in original.

  17. Carnap (1956, p. 206). Carnap’s definitions of internal and external questions are not totally clear, however, and I found Graham H. Bird’s (1995) further analyses very helpful to clarifying them.

  18. See Gethin (1997) for a detailed discussion of Buddhist cosmology and its relationship to meditation practice.

  19. E.g., DN I 190; MN II 233: so imaṃ lokaṃ sadevakaṃ samārakaṃ sabrahmakaṃ sassamaṇabrāhmaṇiṃ pajaṃ sadevamanussaṃ sayaṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā pavedeti. Translation by Gethin (1997, p. 187).

  20. MN I 85; SN V 109, 112, 118; AN V 50. In each of these cases, the Buddha says that he does not see anyone in the world, except for the Buddha and his disciples, who can answer certain questions.

  21. DN I 12, 17, 22, 24, 29, 39; II 36, 37; MN I 167, 487; II 172, 173; SN I 136; AN II 189, 190.

  22. Despite pointing out that these empty words fail to refer, early suttas do not provide an explanation for why using the “empty words” in such cases is meaningless. Later Buddhist traditions, such as the Sarvāstivādins, and logicians like Dignāga and Dharmakīrti have discussed this issue extensively: see Yao (2009a, 2009b). I am grateful to Prof. Yao Zhihua for providing me with his publications on this issue.

  23. See, for example, Edgerton (1959); Collins (1982, pp. 131–9); Hamilton (1996, pp. xxv–xxvi); and Gethin (1998, pp. 66–8). For a more extensive discussion, see also Jayatilleke (1963, pp. 242–76); Murti (1980, pp. 36–54); Karunadasa (2007); and Shulman (2014, pp. 64–76).

  24. One of the common variations of this list in other texts is its expansion to 14 questions by adding both/neither questions to 1–2 and 3–4. Additonally, the subject in 1–4 sometimes becomes “the self and the world” (attā ca loko ca): see Collins (1982, 283–4n1).

  25. MN 72, Aggivacchagotta Sutta, Bodhi and Ñāṇamoli (1995, p. 591).

  26. Huw Price (2009, p. 324) brings up the following use-mention distinction for the usage of words in Carnap’s linguistic frameworks: one can properly use a word within a framework in an internal question, but beyond its framework, a word can only be mentioned, not used. Hence, according to Price, metaphysical questions – or, in Carnap’s terms, external questions – commit a use-mention fallacy.

  27. See Gonda (1966); Collins (1982, pp. 44–9); Hamilton (1996, pp. xxvi–xxviii).

  28. See the discussion of loka in Hamilton (1996, pp. xxvi–xxviii).

  29. See the quote in footnote 19 above.

  30. Collins (1982, pp. 283–4n1) notes that Pāli commentators understood loka in the unanswered questions as attā “self,” which increases the similarity between the loka questions and questions 5–10.

  31. SN I 62: api ca khvāhaṃ, āvuso, imasmiṃyeva byāmamatte kaḷevare sasaññimhi samanake lokañca paññapemi lokasamudayañca lokanirodhañca lokanirodhagāminiñca paṭipadanti. Translation by Bhikkhu Bodhi (2000, p. 158).

  32. Here, my interpretation differs markedly from that of Shulman (2014, pp. 67–8), who suggested that loka in the unanswered questions should mean what is experienced, and that hence, the questions “are not concerned with theoretical notions regarding the nature of the external world but with questions about the possibility of life after death, most notably about the reality that the spiritually realized attain after they die” (68). Interestingly, the unanswered questions were mostly raised by non-Buddhist followers (both Māluṅkyāputta and Vacchagotta Shulman has quoted have their backgrounds in non-Buddhist traditions. See Dictionary of Pāli proper names, s.v. Māluṅkyāputta, Vacchagotta 1). I therefore suggest that it would be more appropriate to construe the term loka as carrying its non-Buddhist sense in the context of these questions.

  33. See also Mizuno (1957).

  34. SN 22.86 (III 116–119) asks whether the tathāgata can be identified with each of the five aggregates, which confirms the interpretation that tathāgata is considered to be something equivalent to a self.

  35. MN I 486: upapajjatīti kho, vaccha, na upeti […] na upapajjatīti kho, vaccha, na upeti […] upapajjati ca na ca upapajjatīti kho, vaccha, na upeti […] neva upapajjati na na upapajjatīti kho, vaccha, na upeti. English translation by Bodhi and Ñāṇamoli (1995, p. 592).

  36. This resonates with Carnap’s argument that metaphysical statements are meaningless pseudo-statements, which he propounded in his 1932 article “The elimination of metaphysics through logical analysis of language” (Carnap 1996).

  37. Shulman (2014, p. 68n16) appears to be puzzled by the simile of fire in question 8: if a being is like a fire, when its fuels (i.e., the aggregates) are exhausted, the fire is extinguished, then why can we not say that a tathāgata does not exist after death, just like a fire does not exist after extinguishment? Using the philosophical tools provided by Carnap, this becomes easier to understand. That is, because the term tathāgata does not have a referent in the domain of experience, questions 7–10 are all meaningless, and therefore unanswerable. It should also be noted that in the statement “tathāgata does not have a referent”, the term tathāgata is mentioned, not used; but in the statement “tathāgata does not exist after death”, it is used.

  38. The terms dṛṣṭi/diṭṭhi and dṛṣṭigata/diṭṭhigata overlap somewhat with “metaphysics”, but connote the much broader category of “(wrong) view”.

  39. MN natthi samaṇassa gotamassa uttari manussadhammā alamariyañāṇadassanaviseso. English translation from Bodhi and Ñāṇamoli (1995: 164).

  40. The verb “understands” (pajānāti) is closely related to the noun “wisdom” (prajñā/paññā) because they are both derived from the same combination of root and prefx pra-√jñā. As Alālayo (2006, p. 40) has observed, pajānāti is used in most meditational contemplation instructions, and its content ranges from basic understandings such as identifying long breaths as long or recognizing one’s bodily postures, to more sophisticated intellectual knowledge such as the detailed characteristics of the four noble truths. In addition, the qualifying adverb “as it really is” (yathābhūtaṃ) provides further evidence that the knowledge involved is not inferential but direct.

  41. SN V 220 (Bodhi 2000, pp. 1689–90).

  42. In MN 70 (I 476), the Buddha claims, using the same phrase given here, that he only preaches what he himself has experienced.

  43. In The psychology of nirvana, based on Pāli materials, Rune E. A. Johansson (1969, pp. 41–57) argued in favor of the similar position that nirvana is neither a transcendental fact nor a metaphysical entity, but rather an empirical experience. Of course, it would be hard for someone who has not yet had such an experience to understand, just like human beings cannot fully comprehend “what it is like to be a bat” because we lack the ultrasonic sense faculty; yet, we cannot deny that being a bat is a direct, non-inferential experience.

  44. E.g., in the Brahmajāla Sutta, DN 1 (I 17): ime kho te, bhikkhave, dhammā gambhīrā duddasā duranubodhā santā paṇītā atakkāvacarā nipuṇā paṇḍitavedanīyā, ye tathāgato sayaṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā pavedeti, yehi tathāgatassa yathābhuccaṃ vaṇṇaṃ sammā vadamānā vadeyyuṃ. See also the Aggivacchagotta Sutta, MN 72 (I 487).

  45. A recent study by Tom J. F. Tillemans (2017) discusses attitudes towards metaphysics in the Buddhist Ābhidharmika, Yogācāra, and Mādhyamika schools, but does not mention the early suttas. According to Tillemans, Nāgārjuna and his followers (the Mādhyamikas) held a quietist stance in their “metametaphysics,” which sounds quite close to what I am arguing for here with regard to the early suttas. More recently, Maria Heim and Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad (2019) have argued that Buddhaghosa took Abhidhamma as a “contemplative structuring of phenomenology” instead of a “reductive ontology,” which is again similar to what I am arguing about the suttas.

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Acknowledgements

An early draft of this paper was presented in the workshop “Buddhist Ontology” held at the Academia Sinica, Taipei on December 7, 2018, and I thank its participants for their helpful feedback. Special thanks are also owed to Robert Sharf and Ho Chien-hsing, who offered valuable comments and suggestions on a subsequent draft. I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewer for his/her suggestions to improve this paper.

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    Qian Lin

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Abbreviations

Abbreviations

All Pāli texts are quoted from the Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana CD published by the Vipassana Research Institute. All Chinese texts are quoted from the CBETA digital edition of the Taishō Tripiṭaka.

DN:

Dīghanikāya

MN:

Majjhimanikāya

MW:

A Sanskrit-English Dictionary. See Monier-Williams (1899).

PED:

The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary. See Rhys Davids and Stede (1921–1925)

SĀ:

Saṃyuktāgama

Skt.:

Sanskrit

SN:

Saṃyuttanikāya

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Lin, Q. On the Early Buddhist Attitude Toward Metaphysics. J Indian Philos 50, 143–162 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-021-09500-2

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