Abstract
One of the major divergences between dynamical systems theory and symbolism lies in their views on the role of representation in cognition. From the perspective of development, the cognitive development could be divided into three levels: sensorimotor, imagery representation and linguistic representation. It is claimed that representation is not a sufficient condition though it is necessary for cognition. However, it does not mean that the authors agree with the notion of strong coupling in dynamicism that completely rejects representation.
摘要
认知动力系统理论和符号主义之间的一个基本分歧, 就是关于表征在认知中的作用问题。 从认知发展着手, 将认知发展区分为感觉运动、 意象表征和语言表征三个水平, 可见表征对于认知是必要的, 但不是充分的。 然而, 动力主义中完全否定和反对表征的强耦合观点也是不妥当的。
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Translated by Wang Xiaolu, Xiao Jiayan and Li Hengwei from Zhongguo Shehui Kexue 中国社会科学 (Social Sciences in China), 2006, (2): 34–44
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Li, H., Huang, H. Representation and development of cognition. Front. Philos. China 2, 583–600 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11466-007-0038-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11466-007-0038-7
Keywords
- cognitive science
- representation
- cognitive development
- the dynamical system theory
- embodiment
- situatedness
- strong coupling