Abstract
The debate between ‘inclusive’ and ‘dominant’ interpretations of Aristotle's concept of happiness (eudaimonia) has become one of the thorniest problems of Aristotle interpretation. In this paper, I attempt to solve this problem by presenting a multi-step argument for an ‘all-inclusive’ thesis, i.e., the Aristotelian philosopher or contemplator, in the strict sense, is someone who already possesses all the intellectual virtues (except technē), all the moral virtues (by way of the possession of phronēsis), and considerable other goods. If this thesis is correct, the inclusive and dominant interpretations will converge, for the philosopher turns out to be the happiest human being both in the inclusive and dominant senses.
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Notes
It should be made clear at the outset what I mean by ‘inclusive’ and ‘dominant’ interpretations. By ‘inclusive interpretation’ I actually include two different interpretations (for my present purpose there is no need to separate them strictly): (1) the interpretation that takes all the goods (both intrinsic and external) as ingredients of a supremely happy life (sometimes called ‘comprehensive interpretation’) and (2) the interpretation that only takes intrinsic goods, such as virtue, honor, pleasure, as the ingredients of the supreme happiness. Some representatives of this camp are Ackrill (1974/1980), Keyt (1978), Cooper (1987/1999), Broadie (1991), Irwin (1991), and Natali (2001). By ‘dominant (or ‘intellectualist,’ which I take as synonymous) interpretation’ I mean the interpretation that identifies happiness exclusively with contemplation, and thus leaves little or no room for ordinary moral virtues, or sees the value of moral virtue only in the service of contemplation; some representatives of this camp are Cooper (1975), Kenny (1978 and 1992), Kraut (1989), Jiyuan Yu (2001), and Lear (2004).
Among the literature that I am aware of, Adkins (1978) raises the possibility that a true philosopher actually possesses all the moral virtues, but he devotes most of his attention to the possible conflict, and in the end concludes that the conflict between these two can hardly satisfactorily solved (p. 307). Cooper (1987/1999) represents a typically inclusive approach to this question, stopping at Aristotle’s explicit discussion of the criteria of happiness and the fulfillment of these criteria by contemplation, and only considering the possibility of such a unity. Natali (2001) has a closer position with what I am arguing here, but from a different perspective. His position is best summarized by the following statement: ‘it [happiness] consists of contemplating, and at the same time practicing the virtues of character that are compatible with the primacy of contemplation and necessarily connected with it, not as a means to an end, but as part of the harmonious realization of the philosopher’s personality’ (p. 171); whereas my argument goes much further than this, i.e., an Aristotelian philosopher will actually possesses all the virtues (none of them, except technē, is incompatible with the contemplation) and considerable other goods. Broadie (1991)’s suggestion that the contemplative life is not a rival of practical life but a certain kind of practical life, i.e., the perfection of it (p.417) is also in some way similar to my thesis, but such a view together with the remark ‘a life of practical virtue enlightened by nobility looking towards theōria’ (p. 389) eliminate the sharp distinction between practical life and contemplative life altogether, and attribute at least some share of contemplation to every morally virtuous person, a mistake I will criticize below. Szaif (2006) in a footnote provides a similar yet very argument as I give in my following steps three and four, to support a conclusion ‘the philosophers are supposed to have a good character and good practical judgment’ (p. 191, and footnote 38).
Although Aristotle never explicitly gives the kind of argument I present here to support such an all-inclusive understanding of contemplation, this argument is nevertheless in perfect agreement with his principles. I do not mean to speculate why Aristotle did not give such an argument explicitly, but given the argument presented below, it is very plausible that Aristotle himself never saw the question frequently raised since Hardie as a real challenge.
I will speak more of the phrase ‘a combination of nous and epistēmē’ in a moment.
Toward the very end of the Eudemian Ethics, when commenting on the contemplative life, Aristotle mentions god as the subject matter (VII.15, 1249b13-21), but it does not seem arbitrary to add being qua being, since it is the most universal question in the universe. Furthermore, these two questions actually are connected, for the study of god can be seen as the culmination of the study of being qua being, for god is the cause of all beings (Metaphysics XII and Physics VIII). Kraut (1989) clearly makes ‘contemplation’ too broad (p. 73).
Aristotle often uses the word theōria in a broader sense, meaning scientific study or inquiry in general (such as NE II.2, 1103b26 and X.5, 1174b21), in contrast to what he means in NE X.6-8, the most divine activity of human being, which I always translate as ‘contemplation’ to mark the difference.
This is a view shared by most Greek philosophers up to Aristotle, such as Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Anaxoagoras, and Plato.
Aristotle uses the word nous in a number of ways, and two are most closely related to the present discussion. Nous as an intellectual virtue is to find the nondemonstratable first principles of a scientific system (see NE VI.6); whereas nous in X.6-8 refers to our highest intellectual faculty as a whole, similar to what he means in De anima III.4-8. Here I will not touch upon the famous controversy about ‘passive nous’ and ‘active nous,’ and for me, Burnyeat (2008) provides a largely convincing discussion of this problem.
Aristotle begins his account of contemplative life with a recapitulation of the main point of the function argument: ‘if happiness is activity in accord with virtue, it is reasonable for it to accord with the supreme virtue, which will be the virtue of the best thing’ (X.7, 1177a12-13). It echoes the words in his function argument: ‘the human good proves to be activity of the soul in accord with virtue, and indeed with the best and most complete virtue, if there are more virtues than one’ (I.7, 1098a16-18). And Aristotle’s following discussion in X.7-8 gives the answer to this supreme or most complete virtue, i.e., the virtue of sophia.
Practical and productive sciences such as ethics, politics, rhetoric, and poetics, in so far as they are science, can also be systematized into deductive format, and thus share the essential features of such purely theoretical sciences as physics and biology. These scientific features of practical and productive knowledge do not impact the fact that they in the end aim at action and production, i.e., particulars.
So it is not a surprise that we see hints of such a theology all over Aristotle’s works, not only in metaphysics, but also in physics, ethics, psychology and zoology.
Aristotle clearly sees happiness as a concept with different degrees or a hierarchy, as he says ‘to each type of person the activity that accords with his own proper state is most choiceworthy’ (X.6, 1176b26-27). On this point, I am in general agreement with Kraut (1989), chap. 4.
Aristotle discusses the difference between natural and full virtue at VI.13, 1144b4-8. Plato offers us such a list of natural talents required for a philosopher, such as love of learning, love of truth, moderation, high-mindedness, courage, justice, gentleness, fast-learning, good memory, measured mind, and gracefulness (Republic VI.485a-487a). I certainly do not mean that this list is exhaustive or Aristotle has exactly the same view, but it may give us a rough idea about what natural dispositions a philosopher need.
Aristotle discusses practical syllogism in a number of passages, such as NE III.2-4, VI.2, VI.8, 1142a20-30, VII.3, 1147a25-31, and De Anima III.9-11. I will not go into the details of this controversial topic. For some good discussions of it, see Cooper (1975), chap. 1, Kenny (1979), chap. 10-13, Natali (2001), chap. 3, and Gottlieb (2006).
These are all the examples Aristotle gives in NE VI.
This judgment is similar to the judgment about philosophers in Plato’s famous analogy of ship, in which the real captain is seen as a stargazer, chatterer, and useless (see Republic VI.488d-489a).
Aristotle argues this point several times in his Politics, such as III.5, 1278a20-21, VI.4, 1319a26-28, VII.7, 1328b39-1329a2, and VIII.2, 1337b8-15.
Ackrill (1981), pp. 139-141, Kraut (1989), chap.3, Curzer (1991), Tuozzo (1995), and Lear (2004) are some good representatives of such attempt in different ways. I do not deny that certain moral virtues, especially temperance, will have positive value for contemplation, but in the ultimate sense, this kind of argument is doomed to fail. If such argument can succeed, then moral virtue becomes mere means, which conflicts with Aristotle’s general position that we choose them for their own sake. To say moral virtues are also for the sake of happiness will not render them as mere means, because happiness and virtue are not two separate things since moral virtues are constitutive to happiness, but moral virtue and sophia are separate in this respect.
Natali in his comments of an earlier draft of this paper does not think this passage should be taken as literally as I do. According to him, what Aristotle means is something like ‘my theory can also give a good argument for the unity of virtues.’ But for me, given the determining relation between phronēsis and moral virtues, I do not see why we should not take this passage in the most literal sense.
I can partly agree with Irwin (1988)’s argument that in the case of magnificent, there does seem to be a disunity of moral virtues. But that is true only in the sense of actualization, but in the sense of possession, i.e., a state of character, there is no such disunity.
Thanks to Natali’s comment, I would like to clarify my position on the relation between philosopher and the magnanimous person. When I draw some characteristics of the magnanimous to illustrate philosopher, I do not mean to suggest, as Gauthier and Jolif (1970) does, that they are identical. What I am trying to do is to show how the philosopher incorporates certain aspects of practical or political life, since magnanimity is the culmination in such a life. According to my interpretation, Aristotle’s intriguing depiction of the magnanimous person leaves us some important hints about how the philosopher should behave in a political world without severely hindering his contemplation.
It is indeed strange to see Bostock (2000) ask: ‘what reason does the contemplator have for behaving virtuously toward his colleagues, and to what extent will he aim to do so? But Aristotle shows absolutely no interest in these questions’ (p. 208, original italics).
This passage is sometimes read in another way, i.e., the philosopher only does virtuous actions without being truly virtuous (this is the way Cooper [1975] argues (p. 164)). For an objection of Cooper’s view, see Keyt (1978), p. 183, and Cooper later in his (1987/1999) revoked such an unnatural reading of these words (p. 232, n.16).
Philosopher is certainly the kind of person who needs least goods from others.
Dorothea Frede in her comments of an earlier draft of this paper raises the doubt that whether this Aristotelian philosopher is really able to handle political affairs as well as, say, Pericles, since actual politics requires a lot of experience. I may respond from the following five angles. (1) In ancient Greek cities, given their size and social conditions, there were much less to be cared about than a contemporary state. To run a Greek city is probably much easier than to run a modern university. (2) As I argued in step two, the philosopher’s political knowledge, though universal in nature, will help him grasp the particulars, which may be collected by his colleagues and students. (3) As I argued in step three and four, the philosopher cannot be a young man, and he will also be a morally virtuous citizen, attending assemblies and law courts, so he will be experienced enough in actual politics, and given his natural talent, he will have a better understanding of these matters than his fellow citizens. (4) Aristotle sees phronēsis as one single state (VI.13, 1145a2) with different types (VI.8), so once the philosopher has phronēsis in full, he can easily apply it to broader contexts to serve the common good, and thus is able to be a phronimos like Pericles. (5) Aristotle clearly sees himself as a capable politician in the highest sense, i.e., a legislator, as he does in the Politics, especially in VII and VIII.
I will argue in another occasion that Aristotle has this project in mind when composing NE and Politics.
I find it very surprising that many interpreters, especially those intellectualists, identify the maximization of happiness with the maximization of contemplation. This strange phenomenon seems to arise from Aristotle’s offhand exaggeration when he compares contemplation with god’s life: ‘the whole life of the gods is blessed, and human life is blessed to the extent that it has something resembling this sort of activity…hence happiness extends just as far as contemplation extends, and the more someone contemplates, the happier he is, not coincidentally but insofar as he contemplates, since contemplation is valuable in itself’ (X.8, 1178b25-31). This remark can only be seen as an exaggeration, because if it is taken as its literal meaning, it will lead to the strange conclusion that a man who contemplates four hours a day is happier than a man who contemplates three hours a day. What Aristotle means here is simply that god contemplates all the time, so to lead a life similar to god we should contemplate as much as we can, but again we should never forget that we are not god, and in the end we need to live a human life.
Crisp (1994), p. 134, n.45.
It is highly plausible that whatever good nature one has, if he is put among corrupted people since youth, he will never become a real philosopher.
Aristotle does say at one place that the external good could be impediment or hindrance of contemplation, but the context shows clearly that what he means is that external goods can be hindrance only in regard of the contemplative activity, which does not need those goods (X.8, 1178b3-5, quoted above), but not in regard of the happy life of philosopher which does require external goods.
But the two different ways of life, life of contemplation and life of practice cannot converge. This philosopher, though possessing all the practical virtues, nevertheless leads a contemplative life. On this point, I am in agreement with Natali (2001), pp.173-176.
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I would like to dedicate this paper to G. R. F. Ferrari, my mentor during my visit at UC, Berkeley, for his constant encouragement and always sympathetic criticisms. I also thank Carlo Natali, Dorothea Frede, A. A. Long, Purushottama Bilimoria, David Crane, Vanessa de Harven, and Olof Pettersson, for their comments and discussions on earlier drafts of this paper.
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Liu, W. An All-inclusive Interpretation of Aristotle’s Contemplative Life. SOPHIA 50, 57–71 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-010-0203-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-010-0203-7