Abstract
This paper critically discusses a deflationary view of scientific representation, which sees models in science and technology as no different in essence from other sorts of representational vehicles and regards all of them as derivative devices determined by convention. To reject the view, it is first argued that there are at least two radically different roles that representation plays, one is purely symbolic and therefore conventional, and the other is epistemic. The failure to recognize the epistemic role of representation, which is the main role for models in science and technology, led to the mistaken view that models are just like other symbols, such as the linguistic ones, and that defationism is the right answer to the constitutional question of scientific representation. The paper briefly considers in passing some broader questions in connection with the criticism of deflationism.
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Notes
- 1.
Cf. three seminal articles by Grice: “Meaning,” “Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence Meaning, and Word-Meaning,” and “Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions,” all in Grice (1989).
- 2.
In this respect, Teller (2001) should also be regarded as a deflationist, especially when he says,
I take the stand that, in principle, anything can be a model, and that what makes a thing a model is the fact that it is regarded or used as a representation of something by the model users. Thus in saying what a model is the weight is shifted to the problem of understanding the nature of representation (Teller 2001, p. 397).
Here, the talk of being ‘regarded’ or ‘used’ as a representation clearly implies that what makes something a model depends exclusive on a stipulation/convention in the community of model users; and ‘the problem of understanding the nature of representation’ clearly concerns the fundamental or natural representations. And so, perhaps to a lesser degree, is van Fraassen. He observes that if one is to have a theory of representation (which he doesn’t) one must accept what he takes to be the ‘Hauptsatz’: “There is no representation except in the sense that some things are used, made, or taken, to represent some things as thus or so.” (van Fraassen 2008, p. 23).
- 3.
Callender and Cohen uses an example of an upturned right hand representing the state of Michigan to explain how General Griceanism works and said:
[I]n each case, the story is that the left hand represents what it does (a cat, a fact about a cat) by virtue of (i) an analogous representational relation that obtains between a mental state and its object (alternatively, a cat or a fact about a cat), together with (ii) a stipulation that confers upon the left hand the representational properties of that mental state. Indeed, the easy adaptability of the Gricean story to these different sorts of representation is a mere corollary of its indifference to the kinds of things that serve as representational relata. (Callender and Cohen 2006, p. 14)
- 4.
The belief states don’t have to be ‘iconic’ or ‘pictorial,’ but they must have representational content. Despite the suggestive examples used in this paper, there is no suggestion that all belief states that serve as the fundamental representations must be iconic. For how we represent the world through perception, see Freeman (1991) and Siegel (2011).
- 5.
At least, that is not the case when one is directly perceiving what is in front of her (when we see a table, we don’t see the image of it in our head while that image is connected to the table in one way or another such that our representation of it may be veridical in one case but illusory in another).
- 6.
The discussion here about representationism and its opposite is not meant to stand on its own (for which a survey of the contemporary literature is pre-requisite). Primitive though it is, it is intended to flesh out some possible details of deflationism that follow General Griceanism.
- 7.
The question is obviously meant in a conceptual way; it is not intended to be a historical question.
- 8.
For observable systems, this claim can be understood straightforwardly, as in the case of representing a cat one sees for the first time; but for unobservable systems, systems such as atoms and extinct creatures long ago, the resemblance relationship can only be understood as holding with the hypothetical “original” experience, something we imagine by reason of analogy that we could experience if we were put into the supposed circumstances. In the case of the unobservables, the assumption of such a resemblance relationship is in fact more important than with the observables because the models, if deemed correct, would be the only things that could tell us what the target systems may “look like.” What else could tell us what the hydrogen atoms look like apart from their latest quantum mechanical model?
- 9.
This would not be true if non-representationism as mentioned above is adopted. For lack of space, I have to omit any discussion of this point. The conclusion is the same, namely, it is epistemic virtues, not pragmatic ones, which primarily govern the choices of scientific representation.
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Liu, C. (2013). Deflationism on Scientific Representation. In: Karakostas, V., Dieks, D. (eds) EPSA11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science. The European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings, vol 2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01306-0_8
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