Abstract
Slurs are derogatory words and they are used to derogate certain groups. Theories of slurs must explain why they are derogatory words, as well as other features like independence and descriptive ineffability. This paper proposes an illocutionary force indicator theory of slurs: they are derogatory terms because their use is to perform the illocutionary act of derogation, which is a declarative illocutionary act to enforce norms against the target. For instance, calling a Chinese person “chink” is an act of derogation to enforce racist norms that license exclusion of the Chinese, deny their rights to dignity, etc. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it offers a more comprehensive explanation of the features of slurs than earlier speech act approaches. Second, it provides a theory that is immune to the problems faced by existing theories, such as wrong predictions of truth-conditions, explaining unacceptability to non-bigots, and explaining slurs against the dominant groups.
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Notes
Warning: this paper contains examples of offensive language. I apologize in advance for any potential offense this could cause.
The use to make the illocutionary force explicit is a property of the type of a force indicator and consequently the type of a sentence that contains the force indicator. The type of a force indicator is shared by the tokens or utterances of it. The tokens or utterances have the corresponding illocutionary force, made explicit by the force indicator, when they are successful illocutionary acts.
This is not to say that slurs consist of two syntactic parts, a force indicator and a propositional indicator.
Slurs are not the only force indicators of derogation. For instance, the force might be indicated by a negative tone or a gesture.
For the difference between the derogatory power of slurs and the derogatory power of utterances of slurs, see (anonymized).
This essential condition should not be taken as the sincerity condition.
For the details of Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt’s theory, see section 4.3.
It may be argued that this is not truly explanatory, because introducing “illocutionary force of derogation” is merely relabeling what is often called the “derogatory force of slurs.” However, this objection is based on a terminological confusion. The term “derogatory force” of slurs should not be conflated with “illocutionary force of derogation.”
Descriptive ineffability is about paraphrasing slurs; it does not mean that the acts performed by using slurs cannot be described by propositions. Suppose a speaker derogates a person by using the slur “chink.” It is possible to give this act a description, i.e., “He derogates the person by calling him a ‘chink’.”
It might be argued that certain force indicators are not perspective dependent. For instance, uttering sentences like “John promised Bob to give him five dollars” reports the promising-attitude of John, not the attitude of the speaker. However, this does not constitute a counterexample to my claim. This is because the verb “promised”, unlike the performative formula “I promise”, does not function as a force indicator here.
Cases like these motivate Torrengo (2020) to argue that slurs are semantically indeterminate.
It also follows from the force indicator theory that slurs are synonymous with composite expressions of pure force indicators and pure propositional indicator (e.g., “damn Chinese” and “fucking Chinese), despite the synatical differences. An evidence for their synonymity is the fact that they share the key features of slurs. Both “chink” and “damn Chinese” have the derogatory power against the Chinese, and they make the same truth-conditional contribution to the sentences (e.g., “Zhang is a chink” is true iff “Zhang is a damn Chinese). Similar to the non-displaceability of “chink,” “damn Chinese” remains derogatory in complex sentences like “if the damn Chinese celebrate Lunar New Year, they eat dumplings.” “Damn Chinese” also exhibits descriptive ineffability, i.e., no descriptive term can paraphrase the derogatory power provided by “damn”. The same can be said for other features such as perspective dependence, Kaplanian inference puzzle, etc. The synonymity between “chink” and “damn Chinese” is an advantage of the force indicator theory, because it is consistent with my theory. By contrast, Hom’s combinatorial externalism would struggle with the synonymity because it builds Chinese stereotypes directly into the truth-conditional content of “chink.”
Thanks go to the anonymous reviewer for raising this possibility.
However, this is not to deny that a person accepting the truth of the premise is committed to the accept the truth of the conclusion in inference 5).
Whether this is really a phenomenon of validity might be controversial. Even if this should be distinguished from validity as truth-preservation, it is still an interesting relation that worth explaining. Perhaps we can study it under the label “schmadity.”
This is not to say that they cannot be used at all. Self-defeating sentences can be used, but not in a satisfactory, literal way. When they are used, the hearers tend to resolve its inconsistency by hearing them as sarcastic or non-literal. When a speaker utters “Praise the chinks”; he is usually interpreted to be either insincere in praising or insincere in derogation.
For the sake of argument, I shall assume the identity between the offensiveness and the derogatory power of slurs.
Since Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt remain silent on other features like descriptive ineffability and perspective dependence, I will refrain from raising objections from these features, for the sake of fairness.
“pig, n.1”. OED Online. June 2020. Oxford University Press. https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/143654? (accessed June 10, 2020).
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Acknowledgements
Drafts of this paper have been presented at the 11th Annual Western Michigan University Graduate Student Philosophy Conference, December 8, 2017; PGSA Colloquium, University of Western Ontario, January 23, 2018; The 25th Annual Philosophy Graduate Student Conference, University of Waterloo, March 9, 2018; The 2019 APA Central Division Meeting, Denver, Colorado, February 20, 2019. I am grateful for the feedbacks from the audiences and the commentators. I would like to express my gratitude for the wonderful discussions with members of the Racial Slurs Reading Group, including Robert Stainton, Justina Diaz-Legaspe, Jiangtian Li, and other members. Furthermore, I am thankful for the written comments from Carolyn McLeod, David Bourget, Robert DiSalle, Sandra DeVries, and Andrew Marquis.
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Liu, C. Slurs as Illocutionary Force Indicators. Philosophia 49, 1051–1065 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00289-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00289-0